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ABSTRACT 
Given the importance of the Australian hospital industry, understanding the 
performance of public and private hospitals is essential for interested groups including 
patients, hospital staff, insurance companies and governments. Jn Australia, little 
information is available on hospitals' relative performance. Hence, studies 
investigating the issue are needed. This thesis addresses a part of this gap, in the 
context of hospital performance, investigating how public and private hospitals in 
Western Australia perform differently in terms of quality of care, and how Australian 
public hospitals in different peer groups perform differently in terms of cost technical 
efficiency. 
The thesis consists of two main parts and the data for each part were obtained from 
different sources. Data on hospital quality of care analysis are obtained from the 
Department of Health, Western Australia. Hospital morbidity and mortality data in 
Western Australia in the period 1995-2004 are provided by the Data Linkage Unit. 
Data on hospital cost technical efficiency analysis are obtained from the Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare and information on hospital cost5 in Victoria, New 
South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, and Northern Territory in the 
period 2002-2005 is provided. 
The study is structured as follows. The first chapter states the motivations and the 
questions this study attempts to address. The second chapter summarizes the state of 
the Australian hospital industry in the past two decades with respect to the relative 
importance of public and private hospitals. Chapter three presents the literature review 
including brief outlines of theoretical and empirical work concerning the performance 
of public and private firms, and a critical summary of studies involving the hospital 
quality of care measurement, hospital cost function and technical efficiency measures. 
Chapters four and five outline the descriptive statistics, the models used for analyzing 
the quality of care of public and private hospitals in Western Australia, the econometric 
results obtained, and the discussion. Similarly, chapters six and seven include the 
descriptive statistics, the methods of efficiency analysis for Australian public hospitals, 
the regression results and the discussion. While concluding the whole study, chapter 
eight also points out the study's limitations and suggestions for further research. 
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The study uses appropriate methods to derive important results. For hospital quality of 
care, this study applies multi-level random intercept logistic models. Since the data 
include information on patient and hospital characteristics, multi-level models appear to 
be the most suitable approach for analyzing the data. Among six quality of care 
indicators, only one gives the results that public hospital perform worse than their 
private counterparts. On two indicators, public hospitals' performance is superior and 
on the other three, no difference in the performance of the two sectors can be found. 
For hospital technical cost efficiency, the stochastic frontier approach (SFA) is applied. 
Among the two main approaches of technical efficiency investigation, namely Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and SFA, the later has advantages on its relaxation of 
statistical noise non-existence. The results show that major and large public hospitals 
are more cost efficient than small ones, and there is no evidence of a trade-off between 
hospital cost technical efficiency and quality of care. 
The study provides important policy implications. The results of hospital quality of 
care analysis suggest policies to reduce the gap in operation between public and private 
hospitals. They include private hospitals taking a larger share of more severely-sick 
patients and more complicated cases, and public hospitals being provided with more 
funding as part of solution for medical staff and bed availability shortage. The results 
of hospital cost efficiency analysis suggest policies to reduce the heavy workload for 
major public hospitals. Improving hospital quality of care policies would not damage 
technical cost efficiency since no evidence of a trade-off between the two can be found. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Australia has transferred almost all of its government owned airlines, transport, post 
offices, telecommunications and financial companies to private owners. Privatisation is 
generally argued as a means to improve firms' efficiency and performance. However, 
the hospital industry in Australia does not seem to follow this trend. Although there has 
been growth in the number of private hospitals, not many sales of public hospitals to 
private operators have occurred and public hospitals still play a dominant role in 
providing hospital services to the Australian population. The statistics provided by the 
Australian Institute of Health and Welfare show that in 2005-2006, admissions to public 
hospitals accounted for 61 % of total admissions in Australia, available beds per 1,000 
population were 2.7 in public hospitals while they were 1.3 in private hospitals (AIHW, 
2008). 
The co-existence of public and private hospitals in Australia does not seem harmonious. 
There have been debates involving each sector's funding, operation and performance. 
Private hospitals have been criticized for cream-skimming behaviour in taking easy 
cases while leaving public hospitals to treat a majority of complicated cases (Pollard & 
Metherell, 2007). In addition, private hospitals have been considered as "sucking more 
doctors and nurses out of the public system" (Pollard & Merethell, 2007). Public 
hospitals, in the other hand, have been considered as "in crisis" in terms of funding and 
performance. The lack of funding in public hospitals leads to staff and bed shortages, 
long waiting lists and "access block" (where hospital occupancy rates are above 
85%)(AMA, 2007). The State and Territory governments and the Commonwealth 
government have blamed each other of engaging in cost-shifting behaviour in funding 
public hospitals (Buckmaster and Pratt, 2005). Despite the public hospital funding 
crisis, privatisation of public hospitals was not considered as successful since the 
program generally resulted in costs rather than savings (The Senate Community Affairs 
Report, 2002). 
It tends to be the case that Australian public hospitals' performance is also "in crisis" as 
is their funding situation. There have been numerous cases of poor performance by 
public hospitals reported in the media. DeCeglie (2008) suggested that "there is a 20-30 
per cent excess mortality rate every year that is attributable to access block and 
emergency department overcrowding in Australia" and "this equates to approximately 
1500 deaths per year, which is similar to the road toll". An example of the poor 
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performance of Australian public hospitals is illustrated by the death of Allan Osterberg, 
a 30-year-old man, when waiting for treatment in Canberra Hospital's emergency 
department in October 2007 (Cronin, 2007). Another involves bathroom miscarriages 
in the Royal North Shore Hospital in September 2007 (Taylor, 2007). The case of "Dr 
Death", Jayant Patel, who is linked v.ith 30 deaths of patients under his care in the 
Bundaberg Base hospital in Queensland between 2003 and 2005 (Foley, 2007) provides 
a further instance of such poor performance. 
Given the important role of hospitals in Australia and controversy around public and 
private hospitals, an examination of their relative perfonnance is needed. However, in 
Australia, little research has been done on the comparative performance of the two 
sectors. This study gains motivation from the important role of the hospital industry, 
the controversy around hospital performance and the lack of research in the area. The 
investigation of the relative performance of public and private hospitals in terms of cost 
efficiency and quality of care provides valuable information to interested groups 
including health insurance companies and governments as the fond providers, patients 
as the consumers of the services, medical and other staff as the providers of the services, 
and the hospitals themselves as the producers. In addition, the relative performance of 
hospitals is an important issue in designing public policy towards the hospital sector. 
Studying the relative performance of public and private hospitals through quality of care 
and cost efficiency for all hospitals in Australia would be ideal. However, due to the 
unavailability of some data required for such a study, this thesis will investigate the 
quality of care of public and private hospitals in W estem Australia and the cost 
efficiency of public hospitals in Victoria, New South Wales, Queensland, South 
Australia, Tasmania and Northern Territory. 
The study attempts to examine the performance of the Australian public and private 
hospitals by addressing the following questions: 
• Australian public hospitals have sometimes been heavily criticized for their poor 
performance. If given the same patient characteristics and other hospital 
characteristics, how would public hospitals perform compared with their private 
counterparts in terms of quality of care? Would public hospitals still perform 
worse than private hospitals? Would the performance of hospitals depend on 
which quality indicator to be examined? 
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• How do public hospitals in Au&tralia perform in terms of cost efficiency? Are 
there significant differences in cost efficiency among peer groups? Is there a 
trade off between cost efficiency and quality of eare in Australian public 
hospitals? 
Using appropriate multi-level logistic regression models and Western Australia's 
hospital discharge data in the period 1995-2004, this study empirically examines the 
relative performance of public and private hospitals in terms of quality of care. In this 
study, the cost efficiency of the Australian public hospitals in the period 2003-2005 is 
investigated using the stochastic frontier approach. 
Important findings are produced as a result of this study. The study finds that among six 
hospital quality of care indicators, there is only one showing inferior performance of 
public hospitals compared with private hospitals. Supplementary findings indicate that 
health outcomes arc associated closely with patient types in terms of method of payment 
and residential location. Public patients generally appear to have a higher chance of 
dying than private patients and patients with other sources of payments such as 
Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust (MVIT), 
Workers Compensation Assurance (WCA), and other compensation bodies. Patients 
who live in rural areas tend to have a higher risk of suffering adverse events and 
mortality. With respect to hospital cost efficiency, the study finds that major and large 
public hospitals are more efficient than small hospitals, and there is no evidence of a 
trade-off between hospital cost efficiency and quality of care which is measured by 
hospital average excess mortality and adverse event rates. 
The study is structured as follows. The second chapter summarizes the state of the 
Australian hospital industry in the past decade with respect to the relative importance of 
public and private hospitals. The literature review chapter (chapter 3) includes three 
subsections. The first subsection provides brief outlines of theoretical and empirical 
work concerning the performance of public and private firms. Hospital performance is 
also discussed in this section. \Vhile the empirical work is concerned with public and 
private hospital relative performance, the theoretical work focuses on the difference 
between for-profit and non-profit hospitals. The second subsection presents studies 
involving the hospital quality of eare measurement and the third summarizes studies 
about the hospital cost function and efficiency measures. Chapter 4 provides 
descriptive statistics and highlights the models used for analyzing the quality of care of 
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public and private hospitals in Western Australia while chapter 5 presents regression 
results aecompanied with an analysis and discussion oftliese results. Similarly, chapter 
6 includes descriptive statistics and highlights the me1hods of efficiency analysis for 
public hospitals in 1he mentioned states while chapter 7 provides regression results 
followed by an analysis and discussion for the cost efficiency results. Chapter 8 
concludes the whole study. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE AUSTRALIAN HOSPITAL INDUSTRY 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a general picture of the Australian hospital industry. It provides 
background about the Australian hospital funding system, the relative activity levels of 
the two sectors and issues concerning their funding and operation. The chapter 
comprises two main sections. Section 2.2 includes information about Australian public 
hospitals and section 2.3 provides information about Australian private hospitals. 
2.2 Australian public hospitals 
The Australian hospital industry comprises public and private hospitals and the two 
sectors are different regarding their financing source and operation. Financing for 
Australian public hospitals is provided by State and Commonwealth governments and 
the contribution of the Commonwealth government is based on the Australian Health 
Care Agreements (AHCAs). The following section provides background to the AHCAs. 
Issues involving public hospital funding will also be mentioned. 
2.2.1 Australian Health Care Agreements (AHCAs) 
The Australian Health Care Agreements refer to a system of health care financing 
arrangements between the Commonwealth and the state and territory governments. The 
agreements originated from the Commonwealth Identified Health Grants to the States 
and Territories in the 1970s with the purpose of assisting the States in financing public 
hospitals. Following the introduction of Medicare in February 1984, specific hospital 
grants were given to the States by the Commonwealth in order to compensate them for 
cost increases and revenue losses as a result of the Medicare implementation. In 1988, 
the Identified Health Grants and Medicare Compensation Grants were merged into the 
1988-1993 Medicare Agreements. After the Medicare Agreements 1993-1998, the 
agreements were then known as the Australian Health Care Agreements (AHCAs) 1998-
2003, 2003-2008. 
Under the AHCAs, the States are responsible for public hospital service delivery and the 
funding for public hospitals are from both the States and the Commonwealth. Public 
hospital services must be provided free of charge to public patients and the AHCAs state 
that people should have equitable access to public hospital services regardless of their 
geographical location. The Commonwealth contributes to the funding for hospital 
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services provided to public patients. The Commonwealth covers about half of the cost 
to the States of running public hospitals regardless of the volume of services that the 
States actually perform. In return for receiving funding from the Commonwealth, the 
States have to satisfy some performance conditions. Also funds from the States need to 
match the growth in Commonwealth funding. Around 4 per cent of AHCAs funds are 
subject to the States' fulfilling the above requirements. States and Territories contribute 
their ov111 funding. In the 2003-2008 AHCAs, the States and Territories need to ensure 
that the range of hospital services available to publie patients \Viii be no less than that 
provided on 1 July 1998 (House Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, 2006). 
The funding regime of publie hospitals in Australia is believed to give incentives to 
cost-shifting behavior (Buckmaster and Pratt, 2005). The State governments argue that, 
with the Commonwealth's removal of GPs' incentives to bulk bill after hours, GP-type 
patients attend emergency departments in public hospitals. The States are also under 
pressure when nursing home type patients occupy public hospital beds, whereas 
residential aged care is the responsibility of consumers and the Commonwealth 
government. On the other hand, the States are criticized for shifting costs to the 
consumers and the Commonwealth by encouraging patients to be admitted as private 
patients and by sending patients to have pathology and radiology services in private 
clinics at the public hospitals. Another example of the States shifting costs to the 
Commonwealth is illustrated by one major public hospital was found sending patients 
scripts to be filled at a community pharmacy in order to gain from the PBS subsidy 
(Parnell, 2007). 
In terms of funding, it appears that the State and Territories have met their obligations 
under the AHCAs. In the report about the state of Australian public hospitals from the 
department of Health and Ageing 2007, it is noted that "The 2003-08 Agreements 
require each State and Territory to increase funding for public hospitals to at least match 
the rate of growth of Australian Government funding provided under Agreements. The 
States and Territories exceeded this commitment in 2005-2006. There has been a 
substantial increase in recurrent expenditure on public hospitals in all States and 
Territories since 1998-99" (Department of Health and Ageing, 2007, pl6). More 
specifically, a media release report from the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 
(AlHW) on the 5th October 2007 pointed out that between 1995-96 and 2005-06, the 
Commonwealth share of public hospital funding decreased from 45% to 41%, whereas 
the states' funding in the same period increased from 46% to 51 % (AIHW, 2007, p.l). 
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2.2.2 Operation of Australian public hospitals 
Despite funding problems and the growing number of private hospitals, public hospitals 
still dominate the Australian hospital industry in terms of capacity and the complexity 
of services provided. In 2005-2006, Australia had 755 public hospitals and 536 private 
hospitals. There were 7,311,938 hospital admissions. Among them, public hospitals 
had 4,466,076 admissions which represented 61% of the total number of hospital 
admissions in 2004-2005. The number of beds per 1,000 population for public hospitals 
was 2. 76 compared with 1.35 for private hospitals (AIHW, 2008). 
Public hospitals handle more complex conditions including emergency surgery and 
medicine, while private hospitals are dominant in elective surgery. In 2001-2002, 42% 
of admissions to public hospitals were emergencies, 45% were elective and 13% 
belonged to other categories. At the same time, only 8% of admissions to private 
hospitals were emergencies, 6% were other categories but a massive 86% of admissions 
were elective surgery (McAuley, 2004, p.11). The situation was similar in 2005. In a 
research note of the Department of Parliamentary Services in June 2005, it was stated 
that "there is also evidence to suggest that the public and private hospital sectors deal 
with different kinds of caseloads: public hospitals tend to treat more emergency patients 
with severe disease levels, while private hospitals tend to handle surgical and elective 
cases" (Pratt, 2005, p.2). 
In addition to treating large number of patients with more complicated conditions, 
public hospitals in Australia also take a dominant role in carrying out research and 
training the medical workforce. Major teaching hospitals in Australia have been 
producing internationally recognized high standard health professionals. Teaching 
hospitals are involved in basic and clinical research, and many have major research 
institutes on their campuses. As with other activities, teaching and research are funded 
by governments. With heavy workloads and limited funding, the teaching and research 
activities may need to be shared with private hospitals. 
At present, Australian public hospitals appear not to be able to cope with funding 
shortage and heavy workload. They are considered by some to be in "crisis". The 
waiting time for elective surgery is seen as unacceptable and the emergency 
departments are believed to be understaffed. The situation of patients waiting for 
elective surgery is seen as unsatisfactory. Many patients have been told just prior to 
admission that their surgery has been cancelled due to the lack of available beds. The 
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Australian Medical Association has stated: "public hospitals are under severe strain 
right arolllld the nation ... Nationally, many hospitals are facing 'access block"'. 
Furthermore, "The AMA has calculated that our public hospitals need a funding 
increase of 5.5% to 6%-or about $600m-just to keep their heads above water" (AMA, 
2007, p.1). 
In August 2007, the Labor Party promised a plan to improve the Australian public 
hospital situation if elected. According to the plan, the new government will invest 
$600 million over four years to reduce waiting times for elective surgery in public 
hospitals. This is part of the government's $2 billion National Health Reform Plan over 
four years to improve the performance of public hospitals. The fund aims to provide 
incentives for the States and Territories to deliver better outcomes for patients including 
a reduction in waiting times for elective surgery, a reduction in avoidable 
hospitalizations, a reduction in non-emergency presentations, and an increase in non-
acute care for elderly people. The Commonwealth will "take over" public hospitals if 
the States and Territories fail to implement the National Health Care Reform Plan by 
mid 2009 (Labor Party, 2007). 
2.3 Australian private hospitals 
The private health sector makes an important contribution to the Australian health 
system and private hospitals play an increasingly substantial role in the Australian 
hospital industry. Private hospitals may operate as for- profit, or not-for-profit 
enterprises, and may be run by private owners, religious or charitable organizations. 
Funding is usually through private health insurance, patient payments, Medicare, 
government contracted services, the Department of Veteran Affairs (D VA), and other 
insurance payments including workers compensation, and motor vehicle accident 
compensation bodies. 
The important role of private hospitals is demonstrated by the increase in their number 
and their share of cases treated. Until the late 1970s, many private for-profit hospitals 
were small, often owned and run by medical practitioners. Since then, there has been an 
expansion in the number of private hospitals. In the period 1996-2002 the number of 
public hospitals was quite stable (738 in 1996 to 746 in 2002) while private hospitals 
increased in number (463 in 1996 and 537 in 2002). In 2004-2005, there were 759 
public hospitals and 534 private hospitals (AIHW, 2005). 'The following graph shows 
the number of public and private hospitals in Australia in the period 1996-2005. 
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Figure 2.1: Number of public and private hospitals in Australia 1996-2005 
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The period 1996-2005 wimessed a significant increase in the number of admissions in 
private hospitals. While public hospitals experienced a 30% increase in the number of 
admissions, the increase in private hospital admission numbers in 1996-2005 was 
62.7%. The number of admissions for each sector in 1996-2005 is included in the 
following table. 
Table 2.1: Number of admissions (OOOs) in Australian public and private 
hospitals, 1996-2005 
96-97 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 
·-
Public 
hospitals 3,642 3,770 3,860 3,873 3,882 3,966 4,091 4,201 4,726 
Private 
hospitals 1,685 1,793 1,875 2,026 2,272 2,433 2,554 2,641 2,742 
Private 
(% of 31.6% 32.2% 32.3% 34.3% 36.9% 38% 38.4% 38.6% 39% 
total) 
.. Source: Austrahan hospital stal!stlcs 2000-01, and 2004-05 (AlHW) 
The above table also shows an increasing share of total admissions from private 
hospitals. By 2005, private hospitals in Australia provided services of: 56% of all 
surgery, 77% of knee procedures, 55% of hip replacement, 52% of chemotherapy, 46% 
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of all cardiac valve procedures, and 42% of all coronary bypass operations (House 
Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, 2006). 
The range of services offered by private hospitals has increased significantly over time. 
More complex services are now available in private hospitals. In 1981, there were only 
two intensive care units (ICU) in private hospitals. In 1998, the number increased to 30 
ICU, 21 coronary care units (CCU) and 33 combined ICU/CCUs (Senate Community 
Committee Report, 2000). In 1981, hospital accident and emergency units did not exist 
in private hospitals while in 2005 there were 4 7 private hospitals with accident and 
emergency services (ABS, Private Hospitals, 2004-2005). By 2002, private hospitals 
performed 633 out of the 639 types of procedure performed in Australian hospitals. The 
six exceptions were liver transplant, multiple organ transplant, heart transplant, lung 
transplant, cardiothoracic/vascular procedures for neonates and HIV with complicating 
conditions (Australian Private Hospitals Association Annual Report, 2003-2004). 
Private hospitals show some interest in participating in medical training activities but 
funding for those activities seems to be an obstacle. In a submission to the Australian 
Health Ministers' Advisory Council (AHMAC) in November 2002 on the issue of 
medical specialist training outside teaching hospitals, the Australian Private Hospitals 
Association (APHA) noted that "the increasing role of the sector in the provision of a 
wide range of hospital procedures requires that private hospitals be involved as a full 
partner in the delivery of training medical specialists" (APHA, 2002, p.2). Since private 
hospitals have difficulties in recovering the costs of medieal training from private health 
insurance funds, they argue for similar funding arrangements between public hospitals 
and governments to be considered for private hospitals. 
Given the increasingly important roles of AuBtralian private hospitals and the 
constraints in capacity and funding of public hospitals, the benefits and costs of hospital 
privatization have been raised. For the benefits, it is argued that private hospitals have 
greater access to capital. The involvement of the private sector in the development of 
public infrastructure may be beneficial because the private sector could provide 
facilities at a time when governments were faced with tight fiscal circumstances. 
However, the notion of selling public hospitals to the private sector or having a high 
involvement of the private sector in public hospital operations has raised some 
concerns. Public hospitals provide services that may not be profitable but important to 
the community such as teaching and research. Public hospitals treat more medical cases 
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and patients with chronic and complex conditions which are not profitable to the private 
sector. 
Despite the debate, there have been attempts to privatize public hospitals under several 
forms of selling: BOO (private firm builds, owns, operates a public hospital), BOOT 
(private firm builds, owns, operates a public hospital and transfers the hospital to the 
government after a certain period of time) and BOLB (private firm builds, owns a 
public hospital then leases the hospital back to the government). Examples of sales 
include the sales of the Repatriation General Hospital Hollywood in WA in 1994 and 
the Repatriation General Hospital Greenslopes in QLD in 1995. Although they were 
sold to the private sector, these hospitals continue to provide some services to the 
governments under contract. Examples of the other types of privatization include: the 
Port Macquarie Base Hospital in NSW in 1994 (BOO), the Hawkesbury Hospital, the 
Windsor in NSW in 1996 (BOOT), the LaTrobe Regional Hospital in Victoria in 1998 
(BOO), the Joondalup Hospital in WA in 1998 and the Mount Gambier Hospital in SA 
(BOLB) (Productivity Commission Report, 1999). 
The involvement of the private sector in public hospitals has been controversial. In 
2002, the Senate Community Affairs Committee reported that some privatizations had 
resulted in cost increases rather than cost savings to the public and one contract had 
been withdrawn by a private operator. The private operator was not able to provide the 
full range of services equivalent to those required at a public hospital. The Committee 
then called for a halt in further hospital privatization until a detailed review evidenced 
significant benefits to patients brought by the process (Senate Community Affairs 
Committee report, 2002). 
An emerging trend is the co-location of private facilities on public hospital sites. In 
2002, there were 30 co-locations of a private wing within or beside a public hospital 
(Taylor & Blair, 2002). Co-location is beneficial to hospitals in terms of scale and 
scope economies. Private hospitals can increase their access to doctors, customer base, 
research and development, and lower their operating costs while sharing facilities such 
as pathology, catering, parking, and laundry with public hospitals. The same kind of 
benefits can be gained for public hospitals. However, when public hospitals have 
contracts with the co-located private hospitals, operational and risk management can be 
difficult. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
In summary, the above information gives an overall picture of the Australian hospital 
industry. Private hospitals are seen as playing an increasingly important role in the 
Australian hospital industry. However, public hospitals in Australia still dominate in 
providing hospital services to the Australian population. The AHCAs between the 
Commonwealth and States are thought to encourage cost-shifting behavior and the 
public hospitals are considered as being under extreme stress. The crisis in Australian 
public hospitals is believed to be a result of under-funding, understaffing and excess 
demand. 
The increasing importanee of private hospitals and the dominance of public hospitals in 
providing hospital services emphasize the necessity of studying their relative 
performance. The next chapter presents the literature review of private and public 
firms' and hospitals' performance theoretically as well as empirically. Studies 
involving hospital performance indicators such as quality of care and cost efficiency are 
also reviewed. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter offers an overview of studies involving the performance of public and 
private entetprises. The chapter consists of three main sections. The first section is 
concerned with the performance of public and private firms in general (hospitals 
included) while the second and the third sections specifically look at hospital 
performance indicators. In section 3 .2, theoretical and empirical works comparing the 
relative financial and managerial performance of public and private firms, for-profit and 
non-profit hospitals, are presented with the purpose of outlining the background of 
firms' performance assessment in general. Section 3.3 critically summarises studies 
involving hospital performance as measured by the quality of hospital care and section 
3.4 critically reviews studies examining hospital cost efficiency. 
Ibis chapter serves two purposes. Firstly, it provides reasoning and evidence of the 
superior (inferior) performance of public firms compared with their private 
counteiparts. Secondly, with the discussion about the strength and weaknesses of the 
quality of care and cost efficiency models, it introduces the foundation of the models on 
which this study is established. 
3.2 The relative performance of public and private firms 
Although public firms are generally believed less efficient than their private 
counteiparts, arguments of the opposite can also found. This section presents 
theoretical and empirical studies of relative performance of the two sectors. While the 
theoretical studies provide reasoning for the difference in firms' performance, the 
empirical studies provide evidences of those differences. 
3.2.1 Theoretical studies 
Theoretical examination of the performance of public and private firms involves the 
application of the theories of property rights, principal-agent relationships, public 
choice and competition. In the case of the health sector, theoretical studies generally 
provide explanation for the existence and the difference in operation or performance 
between for-profit and nonprofit firms. 
According to property rights theorists, the difference in the right of o'wnership in public 
and private firms leads to different productive efficiency. In the public sector, the 
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ovmership remains in the hands of public. Since O\vnership is scattered among the 
public, the rights of each ov.ner to use the asset, to capture the benefits from the asset 
and to transfer those rights which are not clearly defined or may not even exist. In 
contrast, in the private sector, ovmership concentrates on a certain number of 
shareholders, therefore, the ovmers of private firms are able to practice all elements of 
property rights. As a result, they will certainly have more incentives to improve the 
firm's performance (Zeckhauser and Horn, 1989). De Alessi (1995) blamed common 
ownership for prohibiting the realignment of specific property rights and that prevented 
resource rights from flov.ing to those individuals with a comparative advantage in their 
use. Since private property rights are more fully defined, allocated and enforced, they 
motivate the owners to consider more thoroughly about the benefits and costs of their 
decisions (De Alessi, 1995). 
Another property rights theorist, Hart (1997), suggested that the allocation of residual 
control rights resulted in the difference in performance between government ovmed and 
private firms. In public firms, the government kept the residual control rights over 
asset. As a result of their own innovation, providers or employees in public firms 
received only a fraction of the returns from quality improvement or cost reduction. 
Since private providers retained total residual control rights over assets, their motivation 
for improving performance was stronger than that of providers in public firms. The 
property rights theory is also known as Grossman, Hart and Moore theory which 
implies that the person who is made the most important investment decision for 
improving the firm's performance should own assets. 
While both property rights and principal-agent theories examine the right of ownership 
and performance, principal-agent theory places more emphasis on the difference 
between the owners' and the managers' objectives. The theory is concerned with the 
relationship between the principal (the ovvner of the finn), and the agent (e.g. the 
manager of the firm) who might not have the same interests. The principal prefers the 
agent to act in his (the principal's) interest but the agent's behavior might not serve the 
above purpose. As a result, the only thing the principal can do is to design an incentive 
scheme for the agent which should be influential enough (in terms of reward and 
punishment) for the agent to cooperate (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991 ). 
Discussing the reasons for the superior performance of private firms, Zeckhauser and 
Horn (1989) pointed out that in the private sector managers had stronger incentives to 
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improve the enterprise's performance due to the owner's high level of control. The 
shareholders' ability to sell their stock and to vote out management created incentives 
for those who controlled the enterprise to serve the interest of the ovmers. By contrast, 
the owners of public enterprises were either the government or the taxpayers or both. 
The very diffuse and non-transferable shareholding reduced the managers' incentives to 
perform according to the owners' interest. Instead, the groups v.'ith more concentrated 
interests such as suppliers, consumers and employees were able to influence the 
managers much more than the government or the taxpayers do (Zeckhauser and Hom, 
1989). Similar arguments about the principal-agent relationship in private and public 
sectors can be found in Jones et al (1996) and De Alessi (1995). 
Another theory concerning the relative performance of public and private sectors is 
public choice theory. While property rights and principal-agent theories are concerned 
with the concentration and transferability of ov.nership, public choice theory focuses on 
actual behaviour in the public sector. The "public choice" concept along with "political 
economy" and "rational choice" is often used in social science approaches explaining 
the actions of economic factors and methods in certain political phenomena. Public 
choice provides a theoretical framework to examine public or collective choice 
behaviour as opposed to private choice behaviour by individuals as analysed in 
microeconomics. Public choice theorists often implicate the politicians and 
bureaucrats' self-interest motivation as the cause of inefficiency in public enterprises. 
Self-interest motivation of bureaucrats is explicitly discussed by Downs (1967) who 
developed a model to explain self-interested behaviour. Although the model gained 
some merits in explaining bureaucrats' behaviour, it faced criticism from other 
researchers. Dov.ns (1967) argued that while doing the job, some bureaucrats acted at 
least partly according to their self-interest whereas others were solely motivated by self-
interest. There were five prime self-interest motives: power, money income, prestige, 
convenience and security. Bureaucrats also may have few broader motivations such as 
personal loyalty to the work group, bureau or the nation, mission commitment, pride in 
proficient performance of work and desire to serve the public. However, Downs stated 
that the self-interest motivation usually dominated the bureaucrats' behaviour and this 
was often reflected in their interactions with others in the organisation. For example, 
when dealing with a supervisor, bureaucrats acted in favour of their own interest. They 
would present their own or their section's activity in the most favorable light and would 
be keen in carrying out decisions that are consistent with their interest and possibly de-
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emphasise others. Even in solving problems in the organisation, they would favour 
solutions that are relevant to their own interest (Downs, 1967). 
The self-interest motivation model has been subject to criticism. Parker and Hartley 
(1991) suspected whether the extent to which and consequences of self-interest seeking 
in the public sector had been exaggerated. They also noted that both public and private 
managers would find satisfaction from suecessfully completing a job. :Further, since 
senior managers from both sectors normally had similar social and cultural 
backgrounds, they would hold similar values (Parker and Hartley, 1991 ). 
Another exan1ple of model developed by principal-agent theorists and criticized by 
others is that of Niskanen (1971). Examining the behaviour of bureaucrats, Niskanen 
(1971) pointed out that the budget of a bureau was a function of the final output of the 
bureau's services. The model can be expressed as follow: 
B aQ-bQ' 
Where Bis the budget that the government is willing to grant the bureau for a given 
expected level of output, Q. The increasing marginal cost function takes the form 
TC=cQ+dQ 2 
If the total cost is less than or equal to the total budget at the budget-maximising output, 
the choice of output will be Q a I 2b . If the total cost exceeds the budget at the 
output, the bureau will set the output that assures equality of total cost with budget 
Q=-(a-c) 
(b+d) 
Since the bureau had a monopoly on true supply cost information and true demand for 
the services, the budget of the bureau was always above the point where marginal public 
benefits equal marginal costs. Hence, the output produced by the bureau was above the 
social optimal level and the self-interest motivation from bureaucrats might generate 
ever-larger budget. In other words, inefficiency in public organisations was the direct 
result of the bureaucrat's self-interest motivation. According to Moc (1984), 
Niskancn's model was based on an unrealistic assumption that the bureaucrats held all 
the power. In practice, they just acted as the agents of the politicians who held the real 
authority. Consequently, greater attention should be paid to the political control of the 
bureaucrats rather their self-interest motivation. Rowley and Elgin (1985) criticized 
Niskanen's model of ignoring property rights and principal-agent relationship. 
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Self-interest motivation of politicians has substantial impacts on public firms' 
performance. Shleifer (1998) stated that politicians used government ownership to 
pursue their political goals as well as to collect their own-interested income, including 
bribes. As a result, a corrupt government is less able to regulate, contract or run 
enterprises in the public interest. The author favored privatization arguing that it would 
help to reduce the scope of government control and consequently to reduce 
opportunities for corruption. Finns' production therefore would be effective since they 
were dedded freely by market forces rather than by private contractors who bribed 
corrupt politicians. 
While some researchers consider the important role of private ownership in firm 
performance improvement, others believe competition is the main force of efficiency, 
not privatization. Cullis and Jones (1987) emphasised the importance of competition in 
achieving efficiency when considering public, private provision and finance, and 
privatization. Transferring the provision of private goods from public sector to private 
sector would increase competition, hence efficiency would be increased. However, 
privatization would actually reduce efficiency if the new private firms enjoyed 
monopoly position in the market. Transferring the provision of public goods from 
public sector to private sector was not a guarantee of efficiency since the allocation of 
property rights might silence the forces of competition. Therefore, the authors argued if 
the main purpose was to improve efficiency in providing and financing goods and 
services, then increasing competition rather than changing ownership was most 
appropriate. 
In the area of health economics, due to the dominance of nonprofit firms in the health 
sector, theoretical studies place their focus on the explanation for the existence and the 
development of non-profit firms. Some researchers developed discussions about the 
difference between for-profit and non-profit fitms in terms of objectives and 
consequently the firms' relative performance. Newhouse (1970) emphasized the 
financial advantages of non-profit firms compared v.ith for-profit firms in terms of tax 
and subsidies. The author argued that private philanthropy and favorable tax status 
gave non-profit hospitals opportunities to operate below the minimum average costs. As 
a result, the profit in the industry did not appear to be attractive enough for the for-profit 
hospitals to enter. The dominant position of non-profit firms in the industry, therefore, 
continued and developed. This argument can also be found in Arrow (1963). 
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An example of studies explaining the existence of non-profit firms in the health sector is 
that of Glaeser and Shleifer (2001). The authors suggested that non-profit firms played 
an important role in industries such as child care, aged care, schools and hospitals, 
where ex post expropriation existed. To customers, since the quality of the above 
services was not directly observable, non-profit status signaled a preference for higher 
quality to pecuniary rewards from the providers. To providers, non-profit status was 
beneficial in the sense that customers were willing to pay higher prices for services they 
believe would deliver higher quality; employees were more willing to contribute their 
human capital since they believed the providers were not likely to cut wages to raise 
profit; and donors were more willing to give if they believed their wishes were 
protected. The existence of non-profit firms therefore benefited both consumers and 
providers in the market. Arguments for the existence of non-profit firms due to 
informational asymmetries between consumers and providers can also be found in 
Arrow (1963), Hansmann (1980) and Hirth (l 999). 
Explaining the co-existence of non-profit and for-profit firms in general (or hospitals in 
particular), Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998) predicted the link between non-profit 
share of production and competition. Non-profit firms were characterized with 
advantages such as tax breaks and lower costs of capital and labor through donations 
and volunteer time, and with disadvantages such as inability of raising capital through 
equity fmancing and non-distribution constraints. The authors considered the 
coexistence of non-profit and for-profit firms in an industry. They pointed out that 
when profits made under for-profit status rose, the forgone profits of non-profit firms 
rose. As a result, the share of non-profit firms would fall. When the industry was more 
competitive, profits approached zero, hence the disadvantages of distribution constraint 
would be less significant. Consequently, the share of non-profit firms would increase. 
Different from Lakdawalla and Philipson ( 1998), Horwitz (2007) emphasized that non-
profit and for-profit hospitals co-exist because each hospital type offers a different set of 
services. Non-profit hospitals, without profit maximizing objectives, provide services 
that are unlikely offered by for-profit ones. Since the two sectors are considered as 
operating in two different markets, the author argued against the imposition of 
additional charity and tax exemption requirement on non-profit hospitals. Due to the 
distinct nature of the services they offer, any disruption of their operation would result 
in disadvantages for patients. 
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Although non-profit hospitals still dominate the US hospital industry in terms of 
capacity, David (2004) observed the convergence of in size of non-profit and for-profit 
hospitals in the US in the last four decades. The author developed a model of hospital 
ownership and size choice in relation to government regulation and the industry 
environment. Similar to Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998), the author found the share of 
non-profit firms rose when there were more firms in the industry because entry reduced 
profit and hence reduced the attractiveness of for-profit status. When cost advantages of 
non-profit firms decreased, such as reduction in government grants, in benefit from tax-
exemptions, for-profit and non-profit firms converged in size. The choice of ownership 
status and operating capacity of firms (or hospitals) reflected their reaction to the market 
environment. 
Discussing the difference in performance of for-profit and non-profit firms, health 
economics researchers suggest that the difference may due to their different objectives 
and different capital costs. Newhouse (1970) emphasised the difference in objectives of 
for-profit firms compared with non-profit firms such as non-profit hospitals. While the 
former was concerned with profit maximization, the latter's objectives were maximizing 
quantity, quality and/or obtaining prestige. While for-profit hospitals tried to maximize 
service quantity subject to the constraint that quality was at break-even level, non-profit 
hospitals might not necessarily do so. If an increase in quantity was potentially 
accompanied with a decrease in quality (even quality is above break even level), the 
decision would depend on how non-profit hospitals weight quantity relative to quality. 
Duplication of expensive equipment in non-profit hospitals might be the result of 
available cheap capital and the interest in providing high quality services. Thus, as a 
result of their objectives, high quality services provided by nonprofit firms may be 
accompanied with resource misallocation. Arguments about different objectives 
resulting in different performance between for-profit and non-profit firms can also be 
found in Rose-Ackerman (1996). 
Difference in firms' performance might be the result of their difference in capital costs. 
Horwitz (2007) proposed that firms' performance was reflected in the level of 
investment in their services. Non-profit firms had lower capital costs due to the access 
to tax-exempt debt and tax-deductible donations. With those advantages, non-profit 
firms could have a greater ability compared to for-profit firms to invest in capital 
intensive services when the demand arose. At the same time, Hirth (1999) pointed out 
the alternative argument. For-profit firms had the ability to raise capital through equity 
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financing and funds were more readily available than financing by subsidies, donation 
or tax-exempt debts. As a result, for-profit firms might be able to response more 
quickly to rising demand for their services compared with their non-profit counterparts. 
The direction of the difference in non-profit and for-profit firms' performance due to 
differences in capital costs, therefore, is not clear. 
In summary, theoretical studies generally argue that there is a distinct relationship 
between the ownership nature and the performance of a firm. \Vith features such as 
scattered, non-transferable ownership, low incentive driven managers and self-interest 
motivated politicians, enterprises in public sectors are believed not to perform 
efficiently compared with their private counterparts. In health economics, theorists 
tend to suggest the existence of large number of non-profit health service institutions 
may be due to their tax and capital raising advantages as well as the growth of industry 
competition. Differences in performance between non-profit and for-profit firms are 
believed to be a result of differences in objectives and/or capital costs. 
3.2.2 Empirical studies 
There have been a number of empirical studies of the performance of public and private 
enterprises in both regulated and competitive environments. As an example of the 
results of these studies, the following tables provide a summary of methods, findings 
and conclusions from a few of them. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of studies about performance of public and private firms (other than hospitals) 
Caves& 
Christensen 
Monsen& 
Walters 
Atkinson & 
Halvorsen 
Vining & 
Boardman 
YEAR 
1980 
1983 
1986 
1992 
INDUSTRY 
Two Canadian railroad firms: 
Canadian National (public) 
and Canadian Pacific 
(private) 
Time period: 1956-1970 
25 largest state and 25 largest 
private European industrial 
firms 
Time period: 1972-1981 
123 private and public 
electric utilities in the US 
Time period: 1970 
500 largest non-financial 
corporations in Canada 
Time period: 1986 
PERFOR.\1ANCE MEASURES 
and METIIODS 
Productivity indicators: costs for 
ton-miles and passenger-miles 
Method: Simple comparison of the 
two railroad firms' indicators 
Profitability indicators: return on 
sales, return on asset, employees 
per dollar of sales 
Method: Simple comparison of 
public and private firms' 
indicators. 
Performance indicator: cost 
efficiency 
Method: Total cost function 
estimation for each ovvnership type 
group 
Profitability indicators: return on 
sales, return on asset, employees 
per dollar of sales 
Method: OLS Regression analysis 
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FINDINGS and CONCLUSION 
In the late 1950s and early 1960s CN had 
lower level productivity than CP. The gap was 
closer in the 60s and no significant difference 
in the 70s. 
Public ownership was not Jess efficient than 
private ownership. I 
State owned enterprises were both Jess efficient I 
and less profitable than their private 
counterparts. 
New theory needed to be developed for the 
behaviour of state firms. The theory needed to 
be grounded as much in politics as in 
economics. 
Publicly-owned and privately-owned electric 
utilities were equally cost-inefficient. 
Public and mixed ownership firms were Jess 
efficient than private firms. 
Bhattacharyya 1994 225 public and 32 water Performance indicator: Cost Public utilities were more efficient on average, 
et al utilities in the US minimization but were more widely dispersed between best 
Time period: 1992 Method: generalized restricted cost and worst performed than private utilities 
function with maximum likelihood 
technique 
Jin & Qian 1998 224 public and private Performance indicators: Public enterprises associated with increasing 
enterprises in 28 provinces in community government revenue, community revenue, employment and income. 
China non-farm employment and per However, given the levels of non-farm 
Time period: 1987-1993 capita income employment and local public goods provision, 
Method: IV regression analysis public enterprises did not assist with an 
increase in rural income. 
Kumbhakar& 1998 Swedish public and private Performance indicator: production Private distributors were more efficient and 
lljalmarsson electricity retail distributors efficiency for private, public and scale economies were highest for public firms. 
Time period: 1970-1990 mixed-ownership firms 
Method: Stochastic frontier and 
DEA 
D'Souza & 1999 85 companies from 28 Performance indicators: Privatization significantly improved firms' 
Megginson industrialized countries profitability, output, operating performance 
privatized in the period 1990- efficiency, dividend payments and 
1996 leverage ratios 
Method: Wilcoxon signed rank 
test for comparing the 
performance before and after 
privatization 
Dewenter& 2001 Data published in Fortune for Performance indicators: Public firms were less efficient in term of 
Malatesta 1975, 1985 and 1995 profitability, leverage, and labor profitability. They also used more leverage 
included 1,369 total firm-year intensity. than private firms and had higher employees-to 
observations. Method: Multivariate regression sales ratios. Labor intensity appeared lower 
analysis after privatization 
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j Estache & Rossi 
! 
Eldenburg& 
Krishnan 
Gupta 
Jegasothy et al 
2002 
2003 
2005 
2006 
50 water companies in 29 
Asian and Pacific region 
countries 
Time period: 1995 
Publicly-owned non profit 
and privately-ovmed non 
profit district hospitals in 
California 
Time period: 1981-1988 
339 partially-privatized and 
state ovmed manufacturing 
and service firms in India 
Time period: 1990-2000 
Australian major and regional 
banks 
Time period: 1978-2000 
Performance indicator: cost 
efficiency 
Method: Stochastic Cost Frontier 
Performance indicators: CEO 
compensation and profitability 
Method: Linear auto regression 
model 
Performance indicators: 
profitability, productivity and 
investment 
IV regression analysis 
Profitability indicators: return on 
equity, return on asset, and net 
interest margin linking with cost 
efficiency 
Method: Stochastic Cost frontier 
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Efficiency was not significantly different in 
private and public companies 
CEO compensation and operating margin were 
significantly lower for publicly-mvned 
hospitals. The authors also suggested that 
lower payment to the CEO contributed to poor 
performance of the publicly-owned non profit 
hospitals 
Private firms performed better and partial 
privatization had positive impact on firm 
performance 
Transformation of o\vnership (public to 
private) significantly improved perfonnance 
for regional banks but not for major banks 
Results from table 3.1 show variations in findings and conclusions about the 
relationship between the firm's performance and its ownership type. Some studies find 
that private ownership associates with better performance whereas others show either 
public fmns are more efficient, or there are no significant differences in performance of 
the two types. 
Although the above studies are valuable in their contribution to empirical research about 
the relative performance of public and private firms, they only focus on the firms' 
financial performance. Performance in terms of quality of the firm's service is not 
mentioned. Despite its linportance, financial performance provides useful information 
for only some parties of the market including producers, investors and the govemment. 
As another vital party of the market, customers should be provided with information 
about the quality of the products they consume. As a result, the contribution of these 
above studies would have been greater if they also compared the product quality 
between the two sectors. Ideally, an example of examination of the link between 
financial performance and quality performance between public and private firms would 
be valuable. 
Over time, there has been an improvement in terms of the methods used by researchers 
in comparing performance of the two sectors. The simple comparison of performance 
indicators between firms in Cave and Christensen (1980) and in Monsen and Walters 
(1983) is not ideal since it ignores the impact of all other attributes to the firm's 
performance. For studies with performance indicators other than costs, this problem 
was overcome later by multivariate regression analysis with OLS and maximum 
likelihood instrument variable approaches found in Vining and Boardman (1992), Jin 
and Qian (1998), D'Souza and Megginson (1999), Dewenter and Malastesta (2001), 
Eldenburg and Krishnan (2003) and Gupta (2005). For studies with cost technical 
efficiency as a measure for performance, all attributes to the firms' performance were 
taken into account with multiple regression analyses using the OLS approach as in 
Atkinson and Halvorsen (1986), the data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach as in 
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998), and the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
approach as in Estache and Rossi (2002) and Jegasothy at al (2006). 
While all three approaches have advantages in accounting for factors that potentially 
influence a firms' performance, the DEA and the SFA methods appear to be superior to 
the OLS method. The drawbacks of OLS regression analyses lie in the fact that the cost 
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comparison is based on the average value rather than the minimum values. In addition, 
there is no clear distinction between the efficiency terms and the statistical noise. The 
DEA and the SF A methods overcome these above problems by deriving cost efficiency 
terms based on the minimum cost frontier rather than the average cost line. However, 
both DEA and SF A methods have advantages and limitations. With non-parametric 
estimation, the DAE method does not require a particular form of the cost function. 
However, its drawback is reflected in its assumption of a complete absence of statistical 
noise. The SF A method, on the other hand, is more reasonable in allowing the 
existence of statistical noise. However, using this method, researchers need to specify 
the cost functional form. 
Table 3.2 shows a summary of data, indicators, methods and results regarding relative 
performance of public and private hospitals. The results show the superior position of 
private hospitals in terms of financial performance. With quality of care as a 
performance indicator, the results give a mixed picture. Private hospitals appear to 
perform better than public hospitals in most cases. However, two studies, Shortall 
(1988) and Sloan et al. (1998) showed the results of no difference in the performance of 
the two sectors while the superior performance of public hospitals can be found in the 
study by Camilleri and O'Callaghan (1998). 
39 
Table 3.2: Summary of studies about performance of public and private hospitals 
Becker & Sloan 
Shortall 
Butler 
Camilleri & 
O'Cal/aghan 
Sloan etaL 
1985 
1988 
1995 
1998 
1998 
2,231 community for profit, 
private nonprofit and public 
hospitals in the US 
Time period: 1979 
981 hospitals in 45 US states 
Time period: 1983-1984 
Public and private hospitals 
in Queensland, Australia 
Time period: 1977-1978 
Public and private hospitals 
in Malta 
Time period: 1996 
Elderly patients of 1,378 
government, not-for profit 
private and for-profit private 
hospitals in the US 
Time period: 1996 
Performance indicators: total 
expense per adjusted patient day 
and per adjusted admission, patient 
revenue to total cost, and total 
revenue to total cost 
Method: OLS regression analysis 
Performance indicator: mortality 
rates among Medicare inpatients 
for 16 selected clinical conditions 
Method: Aggregation of patient 
level data to hospital level data 
and OLS regression analysis 
Method: Hospital cost function for 
estimating the predicted costs for 
each group 
Performance indicators: hospital 
care service quality 
Method: SERVQUAL model 
using questionnaires (assumes that 
quality is the gap between a 
patient's expectation and 
perception) 
Performance indicators: mortality 
and readmission rates 
Method: Proportional Hazard 
model for patient level data, 
ordered lo git for hospital level data 
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For-profit hospitals were slightly more 
efficient, and not-for-profit private hospitals 
were not more efficient than public hospitals in 
term cost efficiency. Public hospitals were less 
profitable than private hospitals 
No statistically significant difference in 
performance between public, not- for -profit 
private and for- profit private hospitals 
Average cost per case was significantly lower 
in private hospitals even after adjustment for 
case mix, scale and utilization differences 
Both sector services exceeded patient's 
expectation, but the gap between expectation 
and perception was wider for public hospitals. 
No statistical differences for hospital 
ownership in terms of survival and re-
hospitalization 
r,w., ... 2000 57 public and private Pe1formance indicators: Private hospitals provided a higher quality of 
hospitals in Dhaka responsiveness, assurance, services compared with public hospitals 
Time period: 1997 communication, discipline 
Method: questionnaire, multiple 
analysis of variance 
Milcent 2005 Patients in French public and Performance indicator: mortality Private hospitals were associated with higher 
private hospitals rates quality of care 
Time period: 1997 Method: Proportional hazard 
model for patient level data, 
variance analysis for hospital level 
data 
Mathiyazhgan 2006 99 public and private Performance indicator: cost Private hospitals were more cost efficient than 
hospitals in India efficiency public hospitals for both methods 
Time period: 2004 Method: Data Envelopment 
Analysis and stochastic frontier 
analysis 
Morris et al 2007 Patients in public and private Performance indicator: colorectal Patients treated in private hospitals had 
hospitals in Western Australia cancer survival rates improved survival outcomes compared v.ith 
Time period: 1993-2003 Method: Cox proportional hazard patients treated in public hospitals 
model 
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The next section contains the literature review of hospital quality of care and cost 
efficiency. This section gives a critical review of studies in the following order: topic of 
the study, the indicators being used, methods and results of the study, and strengths and 
weaknesses of the study. 
3.3 Hospital quality of care 
Measuring hospital quality of care is an important aspect of examining hospital 
performance. Mortality and adverse event rates are vvidely used as hospital quality of care 
indicators due to the availability and accessibility of patient discharge data. However, other 
more general quality indicators, such as some medical procedures and discharge services, 
have also been examined. Section 3.3. l provides a summary of studies concerning quality 
of care indicators other than mortality and adverse event rates. 
3.3.1 Hospital quality of care with indicators other than mortality and adverse event 
rates 
Although mortality and adverse events have become the most popular quality indicators, 
other indicators have been used for accessing hospital quality of care. Luthi et al. (2005) 
investigated the variation in quality of care of three university Swiss hospitals using six 
quality indicators for the diagnosis and management of AMI patients derived from the US 
Cooperative Cardiovascular Project. They included: the proportion of patients receiving re-
perfusion during the first 12 hours, the frequency of patients receiving aspirin during the 
first 24 hours, frequency of use of aspirin, the j3-blockers at discharge in patients, the 
frequency of use of angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors (ACEis) at discharge in 
patients with reduced left ventricular function, and the frequency of smoking cessation 
counseling. The authors conducted bivariate analyses using analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
and found substantial variations between hospitals. In this study, all important patient 
characteristics such as age, gender, and co-morbidity were properly considered. However, 
reasons for using bivariate rather than multivariate were not provided. With available 
patient and hospital information, the study would have provided more conclusive insights if 
the multivariate method was used. 
Another study using indicators other than adverse events and mortality is Barber (2006). 
The author examined the variation in prenatal care quality between private and public 
clinical settings in urban Mexico in 2003. Quality was measured by a number of prenatal 
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procedures such as: taking a patient's history of physical examination (including asking 
about bleeding), taking blood pressure, weight and height, taking blood and urine samples; 
and prevention services such as providing iron supplements, advising about lactation and 
family planning and recording information on a health card. All reflected the prevention of 
maternal complications or mortality and the provision of care continuity. The author found 
that women received significantly more procedures in public settings than private settings. 
The author compared both the unadjusted proportion and the adjusted mean for each of the 
procedures. A two-step linear regression approach with community fixed effects was 
applied to derive the adjusted mean. While the method accounted for difference in patient 
and community characteristics, the inter-dependence between patients in the same clinic 
had not been accounted for. 
Although examining hospital AMI mortality, Werner and Bradlow (2006) looked at other 
indicators rather than mortality itself as hospital quality of care indicators. The authors 
examined the relationshlp between hospital risk-adjusted all-cause mortality and process 
performance measures for 3657 acute hospitals in the US. Five measures were used for 
assessing quality of care for AMI: aspirin use, /J-blocker use within 24 hours of arrival, 
angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitor use for left ventricular dysfunction, and aspirin 
and /J-blocker prescribed at discharge. Two measures for heart failure included the 
assessment of left ventricular function and the use of an angiotensin-converting enzyme 
inhibitor for left ventricular dysfunction. Three measures for pneumonia included the 
timing of initial antibiotics, pneumococcal vaccination and assessment of oxygenation 
within 24 hours of admission. The authors found small correlation between these above 
measures and hospital risk-adjusted mortality rates and questioned the effectiveness of 
using process measures to detect hospital quality of care. However, as the authors 
admitted, risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates obtained from the study might be an issue 
due to a heterogeneity problem. In other words, some unobserved patient and hospital 
characteristics may not be accounted for. 
A further instance of studies using indicators other than adverse events and mortality is 
Laine et al. (2005). The authors analysed the association between quality of care and 
technical efficiency in long term care wards for elderly patients in Finland in 2002. For 
quality of care, the authors used a set of structural indicators and a set of clinical indicators 
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concerning adverse care process and outcomes. The structural indicators include the 
proportion of registered nurses, the proportion of rooms with own toilet and the proportion 
of single rooms. There is a long list of clinical indicators (39 categories). Among them are 
the prevalence of fall, prevalence of depression without treatment, prevalence of urinary 
tract infection and lack of training and skill practice. The authors divided the wards into 
good quality and poor quality groups according to their rank in the quality distribution and 
considered all quality variables separately. Efficiency scores were obtained by DEA 
approach production estimation and the association between efficiency and quality was 
then tested by the correlation tests between the two variables. The authors found a positive 
relationship between poor quality and high efficiency for one third of clinical quality 
indicators. Results for a few indicators showed a negative association between the two 
variables and for the majority of the indicators no significant relationship could be detected. 
As the authors acknowledged, having many quality indicators might cause problems due to 
the interaction between these indicators. In addition, with the available information at 
patient level, the authors would have been able to derive risk-adjusted quality measures 
which would improve the validity of the study. 
Studies with general quality indicators have their merits in studying hospital performance. 
However, since the information about these general indicators is not widely available, 
studying hospital quality of care using the above general indicators can be expensive and 
time consuming. With the obtained patient discharge database, this study will examine 
hospital quality of care by investigating mortality and adverse events rates. The following 
section discusses studies in which similar hospital quality of care indicators are used. 
3.3.2 Hospital quality of care with mortality and adverse events as indicators 
In this section, two types of models for assessing hospital quality of care are discussed. 
The first type is the count data models where the assessment is based on hospital level data. 
The second type is multi-level models where both patient level data and hospital level data 
are used. 
3.3.2.1 Count data models 
The number of times that some event occurs can be an important outcome for many 
investigations. For instance, investigations about the number of cigarettes smoked per 
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person per day, the number of deaths in a year (or a season) in a city (or in a hospital) 
would provide valuable information for public health policies, and examination of the 
number of patents applied for by a firm per year plays essential role in accessing the 
effectiveness ofR & D activities. Counts are nonnegative, integer-valued responses, taking 
on values (0,1,2, ... ). Examples of studies using count data models include; Crepon et al 
(1998) used the count data model to investigate the relationship between productivity, 
innovation and research at the firm level; Andress (1989) examined the distribution of 
recurrent unemployment in West Germany at an individual level; and Page (1995) studied 
the racial discrimination towards black and Hispanic house searchers in 25 American cities. 
Economic studies of health sector issues using a count data model cover topics such as 
health utilizations (Schellhorn et al., 2000; Riphaln et al., 2003; Ourti, 2004), the 
relationship between air pollution and hospital admissions of respiratory and cardiovascular 
diseases (Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz, 1999; Wong et al., 1999), and hospital performance 
using length of stay as a performance indicator (Brown et al., 2003), and adverse events and 
mortality as performance indicators (Kovner et al., 2002; Shroyer et al., 1996). Since this 
study investigates the hospital quality of care with adverse events and mortality as 
indicators, this section only discusses in detail relevant studies such as Kovner et al. (2002) 
and Shroyer et al. (1996). 
Kovner et al. (2002) analyzed the impact of nurse staffing on selected adverse events in 
American hospitals during the period 1990-1996. An inverse relationship between 
pneumonia and nurse staffing was found. The hospital level dataset for the study was 
drawn from patient discharge data. The count data model in the study used data at hospital 
level. As a result, there exist two main drawbacks: important information about the patient 
characteristics was not used although available, and the interdependence between patients 
in a hospital was not taken into account. With patient level data, the study would have been 
more appropriately carried out with multi-level models where all valuable information 
could have been explored. The author aggregated patient level data up to hospital level and 
the process posed problems of interpretation of the results due to the loss of important 
information. The problem is known as ecological fallacy and discussed in Leyland et al. 
(2003). 
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In Shroyer et al. (1996), the authors examined the association between coronary artery 
bypass grating mortality rates and coronary artery bypass surgical volumes in hospitals 
belonging to the Department of Veteran Affairs system in the US in the period 1987-1992. 
No statistically significant relationship between mortality rates and surgical volumes was 
found. Apart from having the observed number of deaths as count data in the Poisson 
additive model, the authors in this study also used the expected number of deaths as an 
offset term in the model. The analysis about the association between the two variables at 
patient unit gave similar results. Although patient characteristics were taken into account at 
the patient level analysis, as in Kovner et al. (2002), the interdependence between patients 
in a hospital was not accounted for. 
In hospital quality of care investigation, the count data models seem to be the best choice 
only in cases where patient level information is not available. If both patient level data and 
hospital level data are obtainable, multi-level models appear to be more appropriate. 
3.3.2.2 Multi-level models 
Multi-level analyses have been widely used in studies concerning hospital quality of care 
since the researchers are often able to obtain data both at the individual patient level and the 
hospital level. The studies in this section share a common feature in the nature of the 
dataset but they arc varied in the methods used. The dataset contains information on both 
individual patients and individual hospitals. In other words, all studies have the dataset 
with multi-level nature. However, not all studies were carried out using appropriate multi-
level models. There are two main groups of studies with multi-level datasets. In the first 
group, all patient and hospital variables are included as independent variables in ordinary 
logistic regressions. The second group includes t\vo subgroups. In the first subgroup, the 
analysis is undertaken in two separate steps. In the second subgroup, the analysis is 
undertaken in one step (or in two simultaneous steps). 
3.3.2.2.1 Ordinary Logistic Model 
The studies using the ordinary logistic model include Smith et al. (1999), Monero et al. 
(2001) and Baker et al. (2002. Smith et al. (1999) inve&1igated the association between 
health outcome and workload. Post-discharge mortality was used as an outcome indicator 
whereas Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System (TISS) scores signal the workload. One 
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year (July 1997-June 1998) patient discharge data from two hospitals in the UK were used 
for the analysis. The authors found that patients discharged with high TISS scores had 
higher mortality compared with those discharged with lower scores. There are two main 
drawbacks in this study. First, as the authors admitted, the study should have included 
information relating to hospitals and wards. Second, ordinary logistic model usage does 
not appear to be a sufficient way to address the research question. The interdependence of 
patients in the same ward and the same hospital was not addressed. 
Monero et al. (2001) examined impact of organ system failure and nursing workload to 
post-discharge mortality ofICU patients in several hospitals across Europe over four month 
period. Higher organ dysfunction and a higher requirement for nursing care were found to 
be associated with mortality after ICU discharge. Similar to Smith et al. (1999), the study 
did not explore information concerning individual hospitals and countries. In other words, 
the variation in providing health services between hospitals and between c-0untries should 
have been seriously considered. The results would have been more valid if a three-level 
logistic model (with patients at level 1, hospitals at level 2 and countries at level 3) was 
used instead of the ordinary logistic model. 
Baker et al. (2002) were interested in finding how publicly reported hospital performance 
affected mortality. The authors examined mortality AMI, heart failure (CHF), stroke, 
pneumonia, gastrointestinal (GIH) and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) 
patients in 30 Cleveland metropolitan hospitals in the period 1991-1999. The authors 
found no reduction in 30 day mortality and an increase in post discharge mortality over 
time. Without using the multi-level logistic model, the study results seemed to be valid 
since the emphasis was on regional level, not hospital level. However, the interdependence 
among patients in the same hospital should have been considered. 
3.3.2.2.2 Multi-level models: two-stage and one-stage 
There are two subgroups of studies using the multi-level model: two-stage and one-stage 
groups. In the two-stage group, the analysis is done in two separate steps. The first step 
aims to obtain the risk-adjusted mortality rate for each hospital (or hospital fixed effect) via 
a regression of the crude mortality rate of each hospital on patient characteristics. In the 
second step, hospital factors including ownership type, a case-mix index and size are used 
to explain the variation in hospital risk-adjusted mortality obtained in the first step. In the 
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one-stage group, all patient and hospital characteristics are typically included in one 
regression and the association between individual patients in a hospital is accounted for. In 
other words, as Duncan et al. (1998, p.99) described the multilevel one stage approach, "the 
micro-scale of people and macro-scale of contexts" were handled simultaneously. 
There have been a few studies used a multilevel two-stage model to compare quality of care 
across hospitals or groups of hospitals. Among them were studies by Shortall et al. (1988), 
Sloan et al. (1998), Scott et al. (2004), Milcent (2005), McClellan and Stainer (1999), and 
Deily and McKay (2006). 
The study carried out by Shortall et al. (1988) involved regressions at hospital level. The 
authors studied the impact of hospital competition and ownership on in-hospital mortality 
rates for 981 hospitals in 45 US states in 1983-1984. No significant association bet\veen 
competitioni hospital ownership and hospital mortality rates was found. Although patient 
level data were available, the authors aggregated mortality rates and patient characteristics 
such as age, length of stay, medical conditions to hospital level then used the ordinary least 
squares method to estimate the relationship between the log of the hospital mortality rate 
and the covariates. This method would not be considered ideal since important information 
at the patient level could be lost in the process of aggregating data up to the hospital level. 
A related additional issue for this method is, in the aggregation process, the 
interdependence of the probability of dying bet\veen patients in the same hospital is 
ignored. 
Sloan et al. (1998) investigated the relationship between hospital ownership, cost and 
quality of care for l,378 hospitals in the US. For quality of care, the authors obtained the 
predicted probability of survival on mortality and readmission for each hospital using the 
hazard model in the first step which controlled for the unmeasured patient heterogeneity. 
Only small differences in quality of care in terms of survival between for-profit, non-profit 
and govermnent hospitals were found in the result. While the probability of patient 
survival was the same for government and for-profit hospitals, it was slightly higher for 
non-profit hospitals. In Sloan et al. (1998) only predicted hospital mortality rates were 
obtained in the first step where the second step involved the relationship between real 
hospital mortality rates and hospital characteristics. As a result, the difference between the 
predicted mortality rates and the real mortality rates needs to be uncorrelated with hospital 
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characteristics. The imposition of the above assumption is the main drawback of the two-
stage multi-level model. 
Milcent (2005) investigated the role of hospital ownership on mortality rates in French 
hospitals during the year 1997 using a two-stage multi-level model. Instead of using a 
logistic model on patient level data to construct hospital risk-adjusted mortality rates, the 
author applied a proportional hazard model. The study found that private hospitals having 
more innovative procedures were associated with a higher quality of care. Similar to Sloan 
et al. (1998), the study has merits in taking account of patient heterogeneity. Also similar 
to Sloan et al. (1998), the study has limitations in imposing the assumption of no 
correlation between error terms in the first stage and the explanatory factors in the second 
stage. 
McClellan and Stainer (1999) compared quality of care among US hospitals by looking at 
the risk adjusted mortality rates for acute myocardial infarction (heart attack) and ischaemic 
heart disease (IIID) patients. They found great variation in mortality rates across hospitals. 
The study had strengths in the ability of taking into account the inter-correlation between 
hospital mortality rates of the two illnesses as well as their time-wise correlation. However, 
patient heterogeneity (or the interdependence of the probability of dying between patients 
in the same hospital) did not appear to be considered. 
Deily and McKay (2006) investigated the link between cost inefficiency and mortality rates 
which represent hospital quality of care for Florida hospitals in the period 1999-200 I. The 
authors used the predicted mortality rates and inefficiency scores as explanatory factors for 
observed mortality rates. The results showed a positive relationship between mortality and 
inefficiency. The predicted mortality rates were not directly derived by the authors but 
provided by an agent (Shands Health Care System). Although it was said that all patient 
characteristics such as age, gender, type of admission and comorbidity were accounted for. 
The inter-dependence between patients in each hospital did not seem to be taken into 
account. 
Although exploring information both at patient level and hospital level, the multi-level two-
stage model studies have limitations in not taking into account the interdependence of 
patients in the same hospital or/and in having the assumption of non correlation between 
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error terms in the first stage and the explanatory variables in the second stage to be 
imposed. The multi-level one-stage models can be seen as superior since they overcome 
both above issues. 
Studies belonging to the multilevel one-stage group include Congdon (1995), Merlo et al. 
(2001), Escarce (2006) and Morris et al. (2007). Congdon (1995) studied the impact of 
geographic context and health status on premature mortality for electoral wards in London 
and East Anglia. The author used the binomial model and two-level analysis (with ward at 
level one and district at level two) to find the relationship between ward death or illness 
rates and covariates such as health service index, population density, a deprivation index 
and hospital location. The results showed strong effects for death at middle age and long 
term illness, but weak effects for infant mortality. Having ward as the lowest level of the 
analysis, the study ignored the correlation between individuals in a ward. The author 
acknowledged the drawback arguing that it arose due to limitations of the data. 
Merlo et al. (2001) compared the impact of patient factors and hospital factors on heart 
failure mortality in 90 acute hospitals in Sweden during the period 1992-1995. The authors 
used a two-level logistic model with patients at the first level and hospitals at the second 
level. They found that variation in mortality was mainly explained by differences between 
patients, and hospital factors just played a minor role. The study used a multi-level model 
where interdependence between patients in a hospital was appropriately accounted for, 
hence, had an advantage over other studies. However, since this was a panel data study, 
time-wise correlation within hospitals should have also been taken into aecount. 
Escarce (2006) examined the effect of hospital competition and health maintenance 
organization (HMO) on mortality for six medical conditions (heart attack, hip fracture, 
stroke, gastrointestinal hemorrhage, heart failure and diabetes) in California, New York, 
and Wisconsin for the period of 1994-1999. Logistic random intercept regression models 
were used with death within 30 days of admissions as the dependent variable and hospital 
competition, HMO penetration, other hospital characteristics and patient characteristics as 
the independent variables. The authors concluded that higher competition associates with 
lower mortality in California and New York, and higher HMO penetration associates with 
lower mortality in California, but higher mortality in New York. The time-wise correlation 
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of a hospital's mortality rates should be accounted for in this study since the data were 
collected for over five years. 
Morris et al. (2007) compared the survival rates of patients with colorectal cancer in 
Western Australia between 1993 and 2003. The authors used the Cox proportional hazard 
model to find the relationship between patient cancer survival and basic patient 
characteristics together with hospital ownership nature. They found that patients treated in 
private hospitals had improved survival outcomes compared with patients treated in public 
hospitals. The authors acknowledged that some important factors that affect survival were 
not included. These are mode of admission (emergency or elective), general health of the 
patient and quality of surgery. Apart from these factors, some hospital characteristics such 
as size and overall complexity of cases treated should have been considered. As in 
Congdon (1995), Escarce (2006) and Shortall et al. (1988), the interdependence of patients 
in a hospital was not accounted for. In addition, since the dataset had a multilevel nature, a 
discussion about multi-level effects would have also been useful. 
When data at both patient and hospital levels can be obtained, multi-level modeling 
provides an appropriate method in analyzing the data. The single stage approach seems to 
be more advantageous compared with two-stage approach since the later requires an 
assumption involving the difference between actual and predicted mortality rates, and the 
covariates in the second step. 
Apart from quality of care, hospital cost technical efficiency is considered as an important 
performance indicator. In the next section, studies involving the main approaches in 
analyzing hospital cost technical efficiency will be discussed. 
3.4 Hospital cost technical efficiency 
Firm cost technical efficiency measurement shows how effectively a firm controls the costs 
in producing a certain level of output. Previously, a firm's cost technical efficiency used to 
be reflected in the distance between that firm's actual costs and the average level of costs of 
all firms in the study group. The further a firm's costs are away from the average costs, 
the less efficient that firm is. The approach is called deterministric approach. Nowadays, 
the costs of the best performing firm are used as the benchmark instead of the group's 
average costs. The cost efficiency of a firm is reflected in the distance between that firm's 
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actual costs and the costs of the best performed firm whose costs represent a cost frontier. 
The approach is called frontier approach. In this section, studies applying the 
deterministric and frontier approaches will be discussed and the sequence is the same as in 
the previous section. The topic of the study is stated first, followe<l by the finding, 
strengths and weakness of the study. 
3.4.1 Stochastic frontier approach 
A popular method to examine cost efficiency in firms is using the stochastic cost frontier 
approach. Cost technical efficiency is estimated with short-run multi-product cost 
functions since major capital investments were excluded in the analysis. The cost frontier is 
defined as the cost incurred by a firm which utilizes the best practice technique, among a 
given group of firms. Firms then, therefore, operate on the or above the cost frontier, but 
not below it. Deviations from the frontier may be due to factors not under the firm's 
control and the firm's errors. While the former is raodom noise, the latter indicates cost 
inefficiency of the finn. 
The general econometric model is 
y = xfJ+ e (3.1) 
where y is the log of total costs, x measures observable characteristics of the firm's 
facilities, 13 is a vector of coefficients aod e is the error term. 
Aigner et al ( 1977) introduced the idea of breaking the error term e into two parts 
e = u + v where v is stochastic noise and u is the degree of inefficiency. v is assumed to 
be normally distributed, has zero mean and variance a'; while u is assumed to be half 
normally distributed, has non-negative values and has variance cr;. For later works 
applying this method, there are three distributional assumptions of u: half-normal which is 
truncated at zero, truncated normal which is truncated at non-zero point and exponential. 
The above assumptions are imposed for cross-sectional analysis. For panel data analysis, 
only the truncated normal distribution assumption of u is imposed. 
Applications of the stochastic frontier cost function method in measuring cost technical 
inefficiency in health facilities can be seen in the work of Zuckerman et al (1994), Vitaliaoo 
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and Toren (1994), Vitaliano and Toren (1996), Yong and Harris (1999) and Fournier and 
Mitchell (1992). 
Zuckerman et al ( 1994) examined the cost technical efficiency of 1,600 hospitals in the US 
during the period 1986-1987. The authors used the trans-log cost function and argued that 
it was a good approximation of a flexible f'Unctional form. The inefficiency term was 
assumed to have a half-normal distribution. The result showed that inefficiency accounts 
for 13.6% of total hospital costs and inefficiency related to a low occupancy rate, low 
intensity of input use and the skewness of the employment mix toward higher wage 
employees. While the trans-log cost function allows more flexibility compared \Vith Cobb-
Douglas cost f'Unction, it suffers from a reduction in degrees of freedom due to the large 
number of explanatory variables and difficulties in the interpretation of the product terms. 
More convincing reasons for choosing the trans-log cost function would be helpfi.!I. 
Similarly, the reasons for choosing the half-normal distribution assmnption of the 
inefficiency term are needed. 
Apart from the above issues, the work of Zuckerman et al. (1990) raised issues concerning 
the choice of a suitable output measure. Using inpatient days as one of the three types 
seems troublesome. Governments, health funds or individuals pay for hospital treatments. 
If the costs are funded on a case by case basis, there may be an incentive to reduce inpatient 
days by the hospital. On the contrary, if they are funded on a day basis, there may be an 
incentive to make the patients stay longer than necessary. In other words, inpatient days, at 
some level, are under the hospital's control. As a result, it might be more reasonable to 
consider inpatient days as hospital inputs than outputs. 
Vitaliano and Toren (1994) used the stochastic frontier approach to estimate the 
inefficiency of Residential Health Care facilities (nursing homes) in New York State in 
1987 and 1990. The authors provided sound reasoning for using the Cobb-Douglas cost 
function and assmning the half-normal distribution of the inefficiency term. The results 
showed that the average level of cost inefficiency in New York state nursing homes was 
estimated at 29% and there was no change in efficiency between 1987 and 1990. In other 
words, between 1987 and 1990, the New York state nursing homes, on average, operated at 
29% above the cost frontier. The authors also found that excessive managerial and 
supervisory personnel and diseconomies of scale were linked to inefficient operation. 
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Vitaliano and Toren (1996) also examined the inefficiency of New York hospitals in 1991 
using the same method. They found that, on average, the hospitals operated with 18% 
inefficiency, hospitals with more than 30 beds were more efficient, and interestingly, 
unionization accounted for a significant part of inefficiency. The authors presented a sound 
process of selecting the functional form for the cost function and the distributional form of 
the efficiency variable. However, as in Zuckerman et al. (1994), the study has a limitation 
in using patient days as one of the outputs. 
In their study of the cost technical inefficiency for Victorian hospitals in 1994-1995, Yong 
and Harris (1999) tested the suitability of trans-log and Cobb-Douglas cost models for the 
dataset and the latter appeared to fit better. The estimation and comparison of the cost 
inefficiency with two distributional assumptions of u , exponential and half normal, were 
carried out. The authors found that the cost technical inefficiency of major Victorian 
hospitals in Australia was quite small compared with the finding from U.S hospitals (3% 
with exponential distribution of u to 5% with the half normal distribution of u compared 
witb more than I 0% in the US). While the method and argument are reasonable, there is a 
concern over the small sample size: there were only 35 hospitals in the dataset. More 
hospitals should be included to produce more convincing results. 
Fournier and Mitchell (1992) used a generalized trans-log multi-product cost function to 
estimate the impact of market structure on hospital cost. The authors used "generalized" 
trans-log because it accommodated the problem of zero output values for those hospitals 
that provided only a subset of the services. The log metric was used for input prices, total 
costs and admissions, whereas the Box-Cox metric was used for outputs. The results 
suggested that private for-profit hospitals had significantly lower costs compared with 
government and not-for-profit hospitals. The model used by Fournier and Mitchell is more 
advantageous than that of Zuckerman et al (1990) in classifying inpatient admissions into 
several types of outputs and using the Box Cox transformation to avoid the problem 
associated with zero output values. However, using number of physicians as a proxy for 
quality of care, as the authors admit, might be problematic. While hospital number of 
physicians may be a reflection of hospital quality of care, it may also be a reflection of 
doctors' demand inducement. 
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Wang and Mahmood (2002) used a translog cost function to measure the technical 
efficiency ofNSW public hospitals for the 1997/1998 financial year. The authors found that 
technical inefficiencies were 11.3 % and 9.3% for small and large acute hospitals 
respectively. The limitation of this study is that inpatient days were used as the output 
measure. As mentioned above, it might be more reasonable to consider inpatient days as 
hospital inputs rather than outputs. 
The above studies have common limitations: they examined hospital or nursing home cost 
efficiency using SF A in two stage process. The hospital inefficiencies were obtained in the 
first stage and in the second stage, they were regressed on explaining factors of firm cost 
efficiency. In the first stage, the estimated inefficiencies are assumed to be independently 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Since in the second stage the inefficiencies are assumed 
to be a function of a number of firm factors, they can not be regarded as identically 
distributed. Therefore, the two-stage procedure is not statistically efficient 
Battese and Coelli (1995) developed a one-stage estimation procedure for the SFA 
approach which docs not compromise the i.i.d. (independent and identically distributed) 
assumption of the inefliciencies. The method was used in Rosko (2001) and Brown (2003). 
Brown (2003) examined the relationship between managed care insurance and hospital 
technical efficiency for US hospitals in the period 1992-1996 and a positive association was 
found. Rosko (2001) examined the impact of environmental factors on cost technical 
efficiency for hospitals in the US in the period 1990-1996. The author found that increase 
in industry competition and health maintenance organization penetration had a positive 
impact on hospital cost efficiency. Both studies had merit in appropriately identifying the 
variables and using efficient estimation procedures. However, Rosko (2001) provided 
sound reasoning (statistical tests) for selecting the cost functional form whereas it was 
absent in Brown (2003 ). 
3.4.2. Deterministic frontier and data envelopment analysis approaches 
The deterministic frontier cost analysis, usually with flexible cost functions, entangles 
inefficiency with random shocks and statistical noise. The entire deviation between 
A 
predicted cost values and actual cost values (or residual u1 ) is considered as unmeasured 
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inefficiency or excess cost. Application of the deterministic frontier approach can be found 
in Wagstaff(I989), Butler (1995), and Lopez-Casasnovas and Saez (1999). 
Wagstaff ( 1989) estimated the cost teclmical inefficiency of 49 Spanish public hospitals in 
1979 using both deterministic and stochastic frontier approaches. The author found that the 
mean level of cost inefficiency depended substantially on the approach used. On average, 
the Spanish hospitals operated with 28% inefficiency when using the deterministic frontier 
approach and l 0% when using the stochastic frontier approach. 
Butler ( 199 5) compared costs between private and public hospitals in Queensland, between 
teaching and non-teaching private hospitals in Queensland, and between public hospitals in 
Queensland and New South Wales. The general finding from Butler's work was that 
private hospitals in Queensland appeared to be less costly than their public counterparts, 
teaching had a small impact on hospital costs, and NSW public hospitals had higher per 
unit costs than those of QLD. In Butler's work, the input prices and outpatient services 
were not included in the eost function even though they were generally thought to have an 
important influence on hospital costs. 
Lopez-Casasnovas and Saez (1999) compared the average cost for public teaching and non-
teaching Spanish hospitals in the period 1992-1995 using a flexible cost function and the 
deterministic frontier approach. The results showed that teaching hospitals were 9% higher 
in costs compared with non-teaching and the effects of teaching status on costs varied by 
the size of hospitals which was reflected by the number of patients. The authors 
acknowledged limitations of not having input prices in the cost function. 
Non-deterministic cost frontier analysis or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) uses best 
practice observations to trace out the least cost frontier. Cost technical efficiency (CE) can 
be calculated by solving the following linear program 
min p,-'c, Aff 
s.t. p.Y?.y0 
p.C S Acr .c0 
P, 2: 0 
(3.2) 
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where Ac& is cost inefficiency, Y is an n x m matrix of observed outputs, p is a 
Ix n vector of intensity variables, c0 is a scalar representing a hospital's cost level, and C is 
the n x I matrix of observed costs. 
Similar to the detenninistic frontier approach, DEA makes no allowance for statistical 
noise. Applications of DEA can be found in Linna and Hakkinen (1999) Chirikos and Sear 
(2000), Mathiyazhgan (2006), and Linna et al (2006). Linna and Hakkinen (1999) 
compared the cost efficiency in 48 Finnish hospitals in 1994, using DEA and stochastic 
frontier approaches. The results showed that on average cost efficiency was 0.86, and 
between 0.84 and 0.92 using the stochastic frontier approach and the DEA, respectively. 
They also found that specialization and a larger share of physicians in the total number of 
staff contributed to efficiency. The authors used OLS and Tobit analysis to investigate the 
significance of factors attributing to cost efficiency. While OLS is considered as a standard 
technique, explanation needs to be provided for the use of Tobit model. In addition, small 
sample size may have some influence on the final results. 
Sear and Chirikos (2000) carried out a similar comparison for 186 Florida acute hospitals in 
the period 1982-1993. For a pooled cross-section analysis, the technical efficiency scores 
estimated by DEA were higher than that by the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), but for 
panel data analysis, the opposite was found. Both models suggested that government 
hospitals were more cost efficient than their profit and voluntary counterparts. When 
examining hospitals at the top and bottom of efficiency scores, the authors found opposite 
results achieved by the two methods. The SF A results indicated that smaller hospitals with 
lower occupancy rates were less efficient while the DEA results showed the reverse. The 
authors suggested that policy makers should be cautious in the choice of the technique 
especially when identifying the most or least efficient hospital for rate-setting. While 
acknowledging the benefits frontier techniques in cost technical efficiency research, the 
authors also mentioned that more work needed to be done in finding the reasons for the 
divergence of the two techniques' results. 
Mathiyazhgan (2006) compared the cost efficiency between public and private hospitals for 
99 Indian hospitals in Karnataka state using both DEA and SFA. The author found almost 
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identical results from both approaches, and private hospitals were less inefficient than 
public hospitals. Quality of hospital care was found positively related to hospital cost 
efficiency (statistically significant for the whole sample and private hospitals, not 
significant for private hospitals). The limitations of the study include: using patient days as 
outputs and using a small number of observations for private and public hospitals if 
examining them separately (40 and 59 respectively). More detailed discussion about the 
quality of care variable and its related fmdings is also needed. 
Linna et al. (2006) used DEA to compare c-0st efficiency between 51 Norwegian and 47 
Finnish hospitals. The authors found Norwegian hospitals were Jess cost efficient and the 
Finnish hospitals experienced more variation in cost efficiency. The study provided 
interesting insights to the difference in the cost efficiency between the two countries 
including the financing system, DRG case mix and variation in inpatient care. It would be 
more interesting if the authors have also had mentioned the role of hospital quality of care 
in cost efficiency. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In summary, studies comparing the relative performance of public and private firms show 
that there is no unified theoretical and empirical evidence for the superior performance of 
one sector over the other. 
drawbacks in their models. 
For hospital performance, most empirical studies have 
The quality of care two-level one-stage studies when 
controlling for heterogeneity at both patient and hospital levels, generally have limitations 
in not considering the time-wise correlation of hospital mortality. At the same time, the 
count data studies and some two-level two-stage studies have limitations in not controlling 
for patient heterogeneity. For hospital cost technical efficiency studies, apart from 
limitations involving assumptions about the model specification and statistical noise, most 
studies have drawbacks in considering patient days as hospital outputs and in not 
considering the relationship between quality of care and cost technical efficiency. 
For this study, the three-level one-stage logistic models will be used for the hospital quality 
of care analysis. The three levels comprise of patient level as level one, individual hospital 
in each year as level two, and individual hospital over years as level three. The models will 
control for heterogeneity at all levels. Since three-level logistic models appear to be the 
most appropriate method for this study, the main analysis will be based on the results 
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obtained from these models. However, the details of methods and regression results from 
count data models and two-level, two-stage models will also be presented for the purpose 
of supporting the results of the chosen models. 
The cost technical efficiency analysis will be carried out by the application of stochastic 
frontier approach. This approach appears to be more appropriate than DEA and the 
deterministic frontier approach since it allows for the existence of statistical noise. The 
limitation in term of functional specification will be reduced by the estimations of both 
Cobb-Douglas and trans-log cost functions. Selection of Cobb-Douglas or translog 
estimations for result discussion will be based on the log likelihood ratio tests and 
economic sensibility of the results. 
The next four chapters will present the major parts of this study which will compare the 
quality of care of public and private hospitals in Western Australia and will analyze the cost 
technical efficiency of Australian public hospitals. For chapters 4 and 6, each will begin 
with data descriptive statistics followed by a model introduction section. For chapters 5 
and 7, each will begin with the estimation results followed by a discussion of the results. 
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CHAPTER 4: QUALITY OF CARE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
HOSPITALS IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA: DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS AND ESTIMATION METHODS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter involves a general comparison of public and private hospitals in terms of 
quality of care. The study investigates the performance of Western Australian public and 
private hospitals in the period 1995-2004. Hospitals in Western Australia are chosen to be 
examined due to two factors. Firstly, the study takes into account information at individual 
patient level. As a result, with millions of patient records, data of hospitals in one state can 
be considered as sufficient enough for the investigation. Larger dataset would result in 
non-convergence problem. Secondly, the research link between the Australian Centre of 
Economic Research on Health and the Department of Health in Western Australia provides 
an access opportunity to relevant available datasets even though the data obtaining process 
has been time consuming. 
Hospital quality of care will be examined via a range of indicators including hospital 
adverse event rates and mortality rates. The adverse event indicator involves patients 
whose principal diagnosis was cardiac, stroke or any other disease. In total, there are five 
mortality indicators: I) in-hospital non-cardiac non-stroke (all disease) mortality involves 
patients whose principal diagnosis was disease or illness other than cardiac or stroke; 2) in-
hospital heart attack mortality involves patients whose principal diagnoses was heart attack; 
3) in-hospital heart failure mortality involves patients whose principal diagnosis was heart 
failure; 4) in-hospital stroke mortality involves patients whose principal diagnosis was 
stroke; 5) 30 day post-discharge mortality involves patients whose principal diagnosis was 
cardiac, stroke or any other disease. All mortality indicators involve deaths from all causes. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 introduces definitions and identification of 
the quality of care indicators; Section 4.3 presents the data description that relates to the 
quality of care indicators; Section 4.4 is concerned with the inclusion criteria with step 
description and reasoning; and Section 4.5 discusses models used for the estimation in 
chapter 5. 
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4.2 Variables' definition, identification and calculation 
In this section, the identification of patients with adverse events, heart attack (AMI), heart 
failure (CHF), stroke (CVA) and factors causing these conditions are mentioned. The 
section also provides details of the construction of the patient Charlson index and the 
hospital case-mix index. 
4.2.1 Adverse events 
The National Council on Safety and Quality in Health Care defines an adverse event as "an 
incident in which unintended harm resulted to a person receiving health care". Adverse 
events are identified both in the ICD-10-AM version and the ICD-9-CM version. The ICD-
10-AM version (Australian version of the International Classification of Diseases, 10th 
revision) has a range of codes for identifying adverse events: 
- Codes in the range T80-T88.9 (complications of surgical and medical care, not elsewhere 
classified) 
-End of chapter codes specify complications of care to diagnosis in the chapter including 
E89 (post-procedural endocrine and metabolic disorders, not elsewhere specified), G97 
(post-procedural disorders of nervous system, not elsewhere specified), H59 (post-
procedural disorders of eye and adnexa, not elsewhere specified), H95 (post-procedural 
disorders of ear and mastoid process, not elsewhere specified), 197 (post-procedural 
disorders of circular system, not elsewhere specified), 195 (post-procedural respiratory 
disorders, not elsewhere specified), K91 (post-procedural disorders of digestive system, not 
elsewhere specified), M96 (post-procedural musculoskeletal disorders, not elsewhere 
specified), N99 (post-procedural disorders of genitourinary system, not elsewhere 
specified) 
-External cause codes in the range Y80-Y84.9 (complications of medical and surgical care) 
The ICD-9-CM version (Australian version of the International Classification of Diseases, 
9th revision) has the range of codes for adverse events including: 
-996-999.9 (complications of surgical and medical care, not elsewhere specified) 
-External cause code of E87 (misadventures to patients during surgical and medical care) 
Contributing factors of adverse events can be: poor communication (between staff; between 
staff, patients and family members); deficient equipment (e.g. faulty equipment, lack of 
equipment provision, ete.); poor health information (e.g. lack of documentation in the 
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medical record); lack of human resources (e.g. staff allocation, staff training, staff 
supervision and staff recruitment); insufficient policy, procedures and guidelines (e.g. 
physical and behavioral assessment, patient observation process, clinical management 
guidelines); other factors (patient factors). 
4.2.2 Acute myocardial infarction (AlVII) 
Acute Myocardial Infarction (AMI) is a heart attack that occurs when the heart muscle is 
suddenly deprived of circulating blood. The loss of blood supply leads to the death of part 
of the heart muscle which often causes chest pain and electrical instability of the heart 
muscle tissue. Electrical instability of the heart causes ventricular fibrillation and the heart 
can't pump or deliver oxygenated blood to the brain. If oxygenated blood flow is not 
restored within 5 minutes, permanent brain damage and death can be the result. AMI 
patients can be identified by ICD-9-CM codes of 410, 412 and I CD-IO-AM codes of 121, 
122 and 1252 from a patient's principal diagnosis. 
4.2.3 Congestive heart failure (CHF) 
Congestive Heart Failure is the inability of the heart to keep up demand on it, with failure 
of the heart to pump blood with normal efficiency. The heart is unable to provide adequate 
blood flow to other organs such as brain, liver, and kidneys. There are many causes of 
CFH including heart muscle weakness from viral infections or toxins, such as prolonged 
alcohol exposure, heart muscle weakness from heart muscle stiffness due to blocked valve, 
and hypertension. CHF patients can be identified by lCD-9-CM code of 428 and by ICD-
10-AM code of 150. 
4.2.4 Cerebral vascular accident or stroke (CVA) 
Cerebral vascular accident or stroke is the sudden death of brain cells due to lack of 
oxygen, caused by blockage of blood flow. Sudden loss of speech, weakness or paralysis 
of one side of the body can be the symptoms. Prevention involves minimizing risk factors 
such as controlling high blood pressure and diabetes. CV A patients can be identified by 
ICD-9-CM codes of 430-438 and by ICD-10-A"\.1 codes of !60-167, G45 and G46. 
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4.2.5 Charlson index 
The Charlson index is a widely used instrument for measurement of patient comorbidity, 
especially for studies using hospital administrative data. In this study, the index is 
constructed as suggested in Charlson et al. (1987) and Sundararajan et al. (2004). For each 
hospitalization, all diagnostic fields are evaluated for the presence of the specific ICD codes 
and each is assigned with a Charlson weight. For example, stroke, heart failure and 
diabetes are assigned with a weight of 1 while diabetes with complications, general cancer 
are assigned with a weight of 2 and metastatic cancer, severe liver disease are assigned with 
a weight of 3 (Sundararajan et al., 2004 and Charlson et al., 1987). The following table 
gives details of diagnostic categories and their corresponding weight in calculating the 
Charlson Index. 
Table 4.1: Conditions and weight for calculating Charlson Index 
Condition 
Acute myocardial infarction 
Congestive heart failure 
Peripheral vascular disease 
Cerebral vascular accident 
Dementia 
Pulmonary disease 
Connective tissue disorder 
Peptic ulcer 
Liver disease 
Diabetes 
Diabetes complications 
Paraplegia 
Renal disease 
Cancer 
Metastatic cancer 
Severe liver disease 
HIV 
Weight 
l 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
6 
(Source: Sundararajan et al. 2004) 
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The final score (Charlson index) for each patient is obtained by summing up all the weights 
of the hospitalization. Patients with a higher Charlson index are considered as having a 
more severe comorbidity condition. 
4.2.6 Hospital case-mix index 
Hospital case-mix index is used as a proxy for the overall complexity of cases treated in a 
hospital. For each hospital in this study, the case-mix index is constructed according to the 
equation: 
where x is the case-mix index; n is the number of cases; j indexes the hospital; i 
indexes the DRG ; t indexes the period (year); c is the calculated cost weight by DRG in 
public and private sector. 
The derivation of the calculated DRG cost weights for publie and private sectors is based 
on the cost information from the National Hospital Cost Data Collection (NHCDC) and the 
Private Hospital Data Bureau (PHDB) collected and compiled by the Department of Health 
and Ageing. DRG costs of rounds one to nine versions 3.1, 4.2 and 5 are used for 
calculating case mix indexes for public hospitals from 1995 to 2004 and for private 
hospitals from 1995 to 2002. Sinee DRG costs for private hospitals in 2003 and 2004 are 
not available, DRG charges are used instead. 
As mentioned by Duckett and Jackson (2000), Duckett (2004) and Gallego (2006), there 
are differences in funding and recording medical, pathology, imaging, pharmaceutical and 
depreciation costs in public and private hospitals due to Commonwealth-state divisions in 
responsibilities for health expenditures. The DRG cost weights for public and private 
sectors provided in the National Hospital Cost Data Collection (NHCDC) and the Private 
Hospital Data Bureau (PHDB) do not reflect those discrepancies. For the purpose of 
comparison of the two sectors in this study, a new set ofDRG cost weights for private and 
public sectors are calculated excluding the mentioned component costs. 
Let AC, be the average cost per discharge for DRG,; AC,' the adjusted average cost per 
discharge for DRG,; q, the number of cases of DRG, in each sector, each year; Qthe total 
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number of cases in each sector, each year; TC;' the total adjusted cost for DRG;; and 
TC' the total adjusted cost. The calculated DRG cost weight for public and private sectors 
( c;) is obtained as follow: 
where 
AC;' =AC; - C (Med, Imag, Path, Pharm, Depr) 
TC'= AC.'* . / I qi 
(4.2) 
(4.3) 
(4.4) 
c;, in fact, is an average case-mix adjusted cost weight for each hospital sector in each 
year. As mentioned by Duckett (2000), it reflects the average complexity of cases managed 
by each sector. In this study, c; is used to obtain individual hospital case-mix index which 
reflects the complexity of cases managed by each individual hospital. A high case-mix 
index indicates that a hospital, on average, has higher resource usage to manage more 
complex cases. 
4.3 Data description 
This section provides descriptive statistics of the dataset. Features of overall population 
will be given followed by features of each quality indicators. The link between quality 
indicators and each characteristic of the population will also be investigated. The bivariate 
analysis aims to draw a general picture about the relationship between quality of care 
indicators and their explanatory factors before all explanatory factors are accounted for in 
the multivariate regression analysis. 
4.3.1 Overall population 
The source of data for this study is the Data Linkage Unit from the Department of Health, 
Western Australia. The Hospital Morbidity Data provides records of all patients discharged 
from all hospitals in WA in the period 1995-2004. The Hospital Morbidity Data are used in 
combination with the Mortality Data which are also provided by the Data Linkage Unit 
from the Department of Health, WA. The datasets contain information on patient medical 
factors such as admission and separation dates, codes of principal, additional and co-
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diagnoses for each patient, patient length of stay in hospital, separation status, and 
readmission status. The datasets also contain information on patient's various socio-
economic variables such age, gender, postcode of residential location, hospital insurance 
status, and payment method (payclass). At hospital level, the dataset contains information 
about hospital ownership status (public or private), hospital location (rural or metropolitan), 
and teaching status. 
Overall, the quality of the data is satisfactory. The hospital discharge records provide 
information on patient medical factors which are relatively more accurate compared with 
self-reported health information. Missing information does not seem to be a severe 
problem. Apart from hospital insurance status, there is no other variable with missing 
details. Patient hospital insurance status was collected from 1998. In the dataset, there are 
2317 observations in 1999 and 21 observations in 2000 contain no information on patient 
hospital insurance status. However, this issue does not have impact on the study since 
patient payment method is used instead of patient hospital insurance status. In terms of 
data accuracy, only one mistake was detected. Data in 1997 contains information on a 
patient v.~th the recorded age at 117. This information is considered as incorrect since the 
oldest person in Australia was I 14 years old. 
For this study, the target population is patients whose age was from 40 to JOO years at the 
time of admission and whose maximum length of stay in hospital was 30 days. The choice 
of patient age and length of stay is consistent mth the literature. In general, patients in the 
chosen age group more likely face higher risk of suffering from adverse events and 
mortality than patients in other age groups. Patients, who stay no longer than 30 days in 
hospital, are chosen because they are more likely to be treated for the illness of the 
principal diagnosis than other complications. In the period 1995-2004 Western Australian 
hospitals had 3,527,002 admissions of the above patient group. Although public hospitals 
admitted a much larger share for the whole period, the private hospital share had been 
consistently increasing. Tbe following graph shows public and private hospital shares of 
patient admissions. 
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Figure 4.1: Public and private hospital shares of admissions, WA 1995-2004 
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The increase in private hospital share of admissions had been impressive. In 1995, they 
admitted 33.9 % of total admissions of the target population. In 2000, their share jumped to 
41.9 % and in 2004 it was 46.9 %. This can be seen as a reflection of an increasingly 
important role of private hospitals in the Australian hospital industry. 
In terms of patient characteristics, patients admitted to public hospitals were generally older 
and sicker compared with those admitted to private hospitals. The table below shows that, 
for patients aged 40 years and older and who stayed in hospital for no longer than 30 days, 
the average patient age in WA public hospitals was 63.5 years while it was 61.9 years for 
private hospitals. With an average Charlson index of 1.21, public hospitals seemed to 
admit more severely-ill patients than private hospitals whose average Charlson index was 
0.8. At the same time, patients in public hospitals tended to stay longer in hospital than 
those in private hospitals. The mean LOS value for public hospitals was 3.23 days while it 
was 2.86 days for private hospitals. 
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Table 4.2: General patient characteristics in public and private hospitals, 
WA 1995-2004 
Share of total admissions(%) 
Mean of patient age 
Mean of Charlson index 
Mean of length of stay 
Adverse event rate (%) 
Post-discharge mortality rate(%) 
Public 
58.44 
63.45 
(0.01) 
1.21 
(0.001) 
3.23 
(0.003) 
6.18 
l.58 
Private 
41.56 
61.89 
(0.01) 
0.79 
(0.001) 
2.86 
(0.003) 
4.34 
0.85 
Further exploration of differences between public and private hospitals can be observed by 
details of patient age, the Charlson index, LOS and method of payment (or pay-class) 
groups. The age composition reveals a higher proportion of patients aged 70 and older in 
public hospitals compared with private hospitals. This might explain the higher patient 
average age for public hospitals. 
Table 4.3: Age composition 
Public Private 
Age Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
40-49 43,687 2.12 31,274 2.13 
50-59 420,334 20.39 329,383 22.47 
60-69 419,471 20.35 357,296 24.38 
70-79 472,722 22.93 306,560 20.92 
80-100 705,070 34.21 441,205 30.l 
total 2,061,284 100 1,465,718 100 
In WA hospitals from 1995 to 2004, for the target population, the patient Charlson Index 
ranged from 0 to 29. Higher scores indicate more severe illness. The Charlson index 
composition shows that private hospitals had a substantially higher proportion of non-
severely ill patients compared with public hospitals. While public hospitals had 50% of 
patients with a zero Charlson index, the proportion was 70% for private hospitals. Public 
hospitals also had a higher proportion of admissions for almost every group with the 
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Charlson index higher than zero (with the group with Charlson index of 5 as an exception). 
As a result, the average Charlson index was higher for public hospitals compared with 
private hospitals. 
Table 4.4: Charlson Index composition 
Public Private 
Charlson Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Index 
0 1,010,902 49.04 1,036,750 70.73 
1 241,897 11.74 109,049 7.44 
2 590,569 28.65 197,916 13.5 
3 62,375 3.03 21,481 1.47 
4 51,998 2.52 20,000 1.36 
5 54,941 2.67 47,772 3.26 
6 and above 48,602 2.36 32,750 2.23 
total 2,061,284 100 1,465,718 100 
Patient length of stay (LOS) in hospital in this descriptive statistics section comprises of 
four main groups: same day, 2 to 10 days, 11 to 20 days, and 21 to 30 days. The patient 
length of stay composition shows that public hospitals had a lower proportion of same day 
patients and higher proportion of patients in other LOS groups. All contributed to the 
longer average LOS for public hospitals compared with their private counterparts. 
Table 4.5: Length of Stay composition 
Public Private 
Length of Stay Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
same day 1,301,076 63.12 990,034 67.55 
2-10 days 608,306 29.51 383,155 26.14 
11-20 days 115,729 5.61 74,428 5.08 
21-30 days 36,173 1.75 18,101 1.23 
Total 2,061,284 100 1,465,718 100 
69 
Emergency admissions are another important consideration in analyzing hospital adverse 
event and mortality rates. In general, patients admitted to an emergency department were 
considered as having a higher risk of suffering adverse events or death. Consequently, 
hospitals with a large proportion of emergency admissions are expected to have higher 
average mortality rates and adverse event rates. Public and private hospitals in the study 
period had extremely uneven shares of emergency admissions. In the case of WA 
hospitals, for the target population, there were 906,572 emergency admissions which took 
25.7 per cent of the total number of admissions. Public hospitals admitted 81.9 per cent of 
all emergency admissions. 
Apart from the above patient characteristics, this study also explores the impact of patient 
payment methods on quality of care in public and private hospitals. In Australia, public 
hospitals also treat private patients and private hospitals treat public patients (although the 
latter happens less often). When admitted to a public hospital, a patient can choose to be 
treated as a public patient or a private patient. Public patients are treated without paying for 
medical, allied health and pharmaceutical costs. All these costs are paid by the 
governments according to the Australian Health Care Agreements between state and federal 
governments. Private patients can choose their own doctor and have a private room but they 
will have to pay for the costs of their treatment through their private health insurance or out 
of their own pocket. At the same time, some public patients with certain diagnoses can 
receive treatment in private hospitals under contract agreements between private hospitals 
and the state government. 
Table 4.6 presents the number of admissions for each type of patient in each type of 
hospital and their proportion in Western Australian hospitals during the period 1995-2004. 
Patient type "others" represents patients \Yith payment from other sources apart from the 
government, private insurance companies or from the patients' own pocket. Other sources 
include the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA), Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust 
(MVlT), Workers Compensation Assurance (WCA), and other compensation bodies. 
70 
Table 4.6: Public, private patients in public and private hospitals, WA 1995-2004 
Public Hospital Private Hospital 
Patient Public Private Others Public Private Others 
type Patients patients Patients patients 
Number of 1,811,855 155,702 93,727 218,131 1,065,759 181,828 
admissions 
Percentage 87.9 7.55 4.55 14.88 72.71 12.41 
As expected, the proportion of public patients was higher in public hospitals and the 
proportion of private and other patients was higher in private hospitals. The following 
graphs provide details of the proportion of public and private patients for patients aged 40 
years and older in public and private hospitals in the period 1995-2004. Over ten years, a 
gradual decrease in the proportion of private patients in public hospitals can be noticed 
(from 11.5 3% in 1995 to 6.7 % in 2000 and 5.65 % in 2004). At the same time, private 
hospitals experienced an impressive increase in the proportion of public patients (from 2.9 
% in 1995 to 16.24 % in 2000 and 21.67 % in 2004). This can be considered as an 
indication of an increasingly important role of private hospitals in sharing the workload 
with public hospitals. 
Figure 4.2: Patient payclass composition in public and private hospitals 
WA 1995-2004 
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\\'hen staying in hospital, patients may have multiple adverse events. In this dataset, up to 
13 adverse events were observed to be associated with one admission. In WA in the period 
1995-2004, for the target population, there were 190,904 episodes with at least one adverse 
event. Among those, 66. 7% occurred in public hospitals and 33.29% occurred in private 
hospitals. As expected, the average adverse event rate (ratio of total number of admissions 
with at least one adverse event to the total number of all admissions for one hospital in one 
year) was higher for public hospitals (6.18% compared with 4.34% for private hospitals). 
Table 4.7 shows the comparison between patients with at least one adverse event and 
patients without an adverse event in terms of average age, Charlson index and LOS. 
Patients with adverse events in general were older, sicker and they stayed longer in hospital 
than those without adverse events. However, caution is needed when looking at the 
relationship between adverse events and LOS since the latter can be both an outcome and a 
cause of adverse events. 
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Table 4.7: Adverse event patient statistics 
Patients with Patients without 
adverse events adverse events 
Mean of patient age 65.94 62.62 
(0.031) (0.007) 
Mean of Charlson index l.15 1.03 
(0.004) (0.001) 
Mean oflength of stay 7.43 2.83 
(0.016) (0.002) 
The graphs in Figure 4.3 show the combination of adverse event rates and age, Charlson 
index, emergency admission, and patient payclass for public and private hospitals in WA 
1995-2004. It is expected that older patients are generally physically weaker than younger 
patients. As a result, for the combination of adverse events and age, older patients would be 
more vulnerable to medical complications or have a higher probability of suffering from 
adverse events. From graph A, two things can be noticed. First, consistent with 
expectation, adverse event rates increased with patient age. Second, public hospitals had 
significantly higher adverse event rates than private hospitals for all studied age-groups. 
When patient age was taken into account, public hospitals performed worse than private 
hospitals in term of adverse events. However, patient age is only one patient characteristic. 
Another such as a patient's severity of illness also needs to be considered. In graph B, 
public hospitals appear to have higher adverse event rates for all Charlson index groups. 
Different to the case of age and adverse event, higher Charlson indices did not necessarily 
associate with higher adverse event rates. In other words, no obvious link between 
Charlson index and adverse event rates can be detected. 
Graph C shows the link between emergency admission and adverse event rates. Overall, 
emergency patients had a higher probability of suffering adverse events than non-
emergency patients. The link between o\'.nership nature and adverse event rates is not clear 
in this case. ·while public hospitals appeared to have higher adverse event rates for non-
emergency patients, private hospitals had higher adverse event rates for emergency 
patients. 
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The association between patient payment methods and adverse event rates in public and 
private hospitals is summarized in graph D, It appears that patients in public hospitals 
experienced a higher risk of adverse events regardless of their method of payments, 
A) 
C) 
Figure 4.3: Patient groups and adverse events 
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The age, Charlson index and pay-class descriptive statistics for adverse events seem to 
suggest that public hospitals performed worse than private hospitals if adverse event rates 
are considered as a quality indicator. At the same time, the admission type statistics 
suggest the opposite, A more consistent conclusion can be reached \11ith multivariate 
analyses where all patient characteristics and hospital characteristics are accounted for. 
4.3.3 ln-hospital non-cardiac non stroke (all disease) mortality 
Apart from adverse events, mortality rates of patient'> admitted with all diseases, heart 
attack, heart failure and stroke are also considered as quality of care indicators. Since the 
in-hospital mortality of patients admitted with heart attack, heart failure and stroke as the 
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principal diagnosis will be examined separately, those patients will be excluded in the 
analysis of the in-hospital all disease (non-cardiac non-stroke) mortality. After the 
exclusion of admissions of the mentioned illnesses, in WA in the period 1995-2004, there 
were 3,428,879 admissions of patients aged 40 years and older, who stayed no longer than 
30 days in hospital. Table 4.8 gives some statistics of the remaining population. 
Table 4.8: !lion-cardiac and non-stroke patient statistics 
Public Private 
Share of total admissions (%) 57.88 42.12 
Mean of patient age 63.12 61.72 
(0.01) (0.01) 
:Mean of Charlson index 1.17 0.78 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Mean of length of stay (days) 3.10 2.80 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Mortality rate (%) 1.17 0.96 
The above table shows that in the period 1995-2004, in WA, public hospitals treated the 
majority of the patients (57.88 %). Similar to the general statistics, on average, patients 
treated in public hospitals were older, sicker and they stayed longer in hospital compared 
with those treated in private hospitals. On average, public hospitals had a higher average 
in-hospital non-cardiac non-stroke (all disease) mortality rate than private hospitals. 
The graphs in Figure 4.4 outline the relationship between in-hospital non-cardiac non 
stroke mortality and patient age, Charlson Index, LOS, patient admission type, and patient 
payclass compositions. In graph A, older age was clearly associated with higher mortality 
rate. The graph also indicates that public hospitals appeared to incur higher mortality rates 
for all age groups. For example, public hospitals had the mortality rate of 0.28 per cent for 
patients aged between 50 and 59 while private hospitals' mortality rate was 0.19 per cent 
for the patients of the same age group. 
Graph B shows the association between non-cardiac non-stroke (all-disease) mortality rates 
and Charlson scores for public and private hospitals. Sicker patients generally faced a 
higher risk of dying in hospital. The link between hospital ownership and mortality rates 
was not consistent for all Charlson index groups. Compared with private hospitals, public 
hospitals seemed to perform better for patient groups with a Charlson score of 2, 5 and 
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above 6, while performed worse for other groups. As a result, no definite conclusion can 
be drav.n about the relative performance of the two sectors from these statistics. 
Graph C shows mortality rates and patient LOS. It is suggested that a positive link existed 
between the two. Patients who stayed longer in hospital obviously had a higher probability 
of dying in hospital. For the association between hospital ownership and mortality rates, the 
graph indicates that public hospitals performed better for patients with LOS longer than 10 
days, but worse for patients who stayed Jess than 10 days in hospitals. Similar to the case 
of mortality rates and the Charlson index, no definite conclusion can be drav.n for the 
relative performance of public and private hospitals regarding the combination between 
mortality and patient LOS. 
In graph D, patients admitted to emergency departments were clearly facing a higher 
probability of dying in hospital. In the period 1995-2004 in WA, for patients aged 40 years 
and older who stayed no longer than 30 days in hospital, the mortality rates were 2.8 and 
3.3 per cent for emergency patients while they were only 0.3 and 0.7 per cent for non-
emergency patients in public and private hospitals, respectively. These statistics suggest 
that even though public hospitals admitted substantially more emergency patients than 
private hospitals, emergency patients in public hospitals had a higher survival chance. 
For the relationship between in-hospital non-cardiac non-stroke (all disease) mortality and 
patient method of payment, graph E indicates that public patients in public hospitals had 
lower mortality rates than public patients in private hospitals. At the same time, private 
patients experienced lower mortality rates in private hospitals than in public hospitals. 
Similarly, other patients or patients whose hospital services paid by other sources rather 
than government or health insurance companies, had higher mortality rates if they were 
admitted to public hospitals. In other words, patients would have a higher chance of 
survival if admitted to the type of hospitals corresponding to their payment method. 
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Figure 4.4: patient groups and non-cardiac non-stroke (all disease) mortality 
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From all combinations between hospital non-cardiac non-stroke (all-disease) mortality and 
patient characteristics, only the age group statistics shows a clearly superior performance of 
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private hospitals for all age-groups. A more sensible conclusion about the relative 
performance of public and private hospitals, when non-cardiac non-stroke (all-disease) in-
hospital mortality is used as quality indicator, will be obtained from the multivariate 
analysis. 
4.3.4 AMI mortality 
In the period I 995-2004, for patients aged 40 years and older, Western Australian hospitals 
had 28,671 admissions with heart attack as the principal diagnosis. The number of AMI 
patients admitted to public hospitals was more than triple those admitted to private 
hospitals. AMI patients in public hospitals were slightly younger but sicker than those in 
private hospitals. The average lengths of stay for AMI patients in public and private 
hospitals were almost the same. Public hospitals in WA in the period 1995-2004 
experienced a much higher average death rate for AMI patients than private hospitals. 
Details of these above observations are provided in table 4.9. 
Table 4.9: AMI patient statistics 
Share of total admissions(%) 
Mean of patient age 
Mean of Charlson index 
Mean of length of stay (days) 
Mortality rate (%) 
Public 
79.54 
67.95 
(0.088) 
1.97 
(0.009) 
5.64 
(0.032) 
9.75 
Private 
20.46 
68.16 
(0.168) 
1.75 
(0.017) 
5.57 
(0.061) 
6.73 
The graphs in Figure 4.5 show the link between hospital AMI mortality rates and age 
groups, Charlson index, length of stay and patient payelass. In graph A, a higher mortality 
rate is generally associated with an older age group. The graph also shows that, for all age-
groups of A'v!I patients aged 40 and o Ider, public hospitals had higher death rates compared 
with private hospitals. This indicates inferior performance of public hospitals when AMI 
mortality is used as a quality indicator and patient age is taken into account. 
A positive association is also detected between AMI mortality rates and Charlson index in 
graph B. This implies sicker patients had higher a risk of dying in hospital when admitted 
with AMI as the principal diagnosis. Between public and private hospitals, public hospitals 
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had a lower AMI mortality than private hospitals for patients with a Charlson index of 4 
and 5 but higher for patients belonging to other Charlson index groups. As a result, no 
definite conclusion can be made about the relative performance of the two sectors in this 
case. 
The link between patient LOS and AMI mortality shows that longer stay seems to 
accompany higher mortality rates, with same day stay as an exception. While mortality 
rates were highest for same day stay groups in both sectors, public hospitals appeared to 
experience a difficult task in preventing deaths for AMI same day patients. The average 
AMI mortality rate was 27.4 per cent for public hospitals, whereas it was 14.6 per cent for 
private hospitals. In graph C, public hospitals appeared to have higher AMI mortality rates 
for all length of stay groups with the 21-30 days group as an exception. 
Graph D shows the link between patient pay class and AMI mortality. The outline indicates 
that regardless of patient method of payment, AMI patients being admitted to public 
hospitals always faced a higher risk of dying compared with those admitted to private 
hospitals. In addition, patients with other sources of payment experienced higher mortality 
rates compared with patients whose payments were funded by governments or private 
health insurance companies. 
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Figure 4.5: Patient groups and AMI mortality 
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From all combinations of AMI mortality and patient characteristics, the age group and 
patient payclass statistics show an apparently inferior performance of public hospitals for 
all groups while the others show a mixed picture regarding the relative performance of the 
two sectors. A more definite conclusion may be obtained from the multivariate regression 
analysis. 
4.3.5 Heart failure mortality 
In the period 1995-2004, WA hospitals had 33,606 admissions of heart failure for patients 
aged 40 and older. The majority of the admissions (77 .9 per cent) occurred in public 
hospitals. In contrast to the case of AMI, heart failure patients in private hospitals, on 
average, were older and they stayed longer in hospital compared with those in public 
hospitals. Similar to the AMI case, heart failure patients in public hospitals were more 
severely-ill than those in private hospitals. Private hospitals had a higher average heart 
failure mortality rate compared with public hospitals. 
Table 4.10: CHF (heart failure) patient statistics 
Share of total admissions(%) 
Mean of patient age 
Mean of Charlson index 
Mean of length of stay (days) 
Mortality rate (%) 
80 
Public 
77.91 
75.74 
(0.073) 
2.29 
(0.009) 
6.55 
(0.034) 
7.84 
Private 
22.09 
78.53 
(0.110) 
2.13 
(0.017) 
8.12 
(0.034) 
8.89 
The graphs in Figure 4.6 show the association between hospital heart failure mortality rates 
and age, Charlson index, LOS and patient payclass groups. In graph A, the noticeable 
mortality difference between public and private hospitals for the age group 40-49 is the 
result of extremely small number of admissions in private hospitals. From 1995 to 2004, 
private hospitals had only two heart failure admissions in this age-group and both survived 
whereas public hospitals had 50 admissions with two deaths. Heart failure mortality rates 
overall seemed to be positively associated with age for public hospitals. A similar trend 
can be found for private hospitals except that the average mortality rate for the age group 
70-79 was lower than that of the age-group 60-69 (4.2 per cent compared with 4.6 per 
cent). For three out of five age groups, public hospitals performed better if heart failure 
mortality is used as a hospital quality indicator. 
The graph (graph B) for the link between patient Charlson index and heart failure mortality 
suggests that, in general, more severely-ill patients faced higher probability of dying in 
hospital (with Charlson index group 5 as an exception). Public hospitals appeared to 
perform better than private hospitals for all Charlson index groups if heart failure mortality 
is used as a hospital quality indicator. In graph C, similar to the case of AMI mortality, 
average mortality rates were high for the same-day group compared with 2-10 days and 11-
20 days groups. Longer stay seemed to be accompanied by a higher probability of dying in 
hospital with same day group as an exception. For the relative mortality rates of public and 
private hospitals, three out of four LOS values indicate better performance of public 
hospitals. 
Showing the link between heart patient pay class and heart mortality, graph D points out 
two features. Firstly, regardless of the ownership type of the admitting hospital, heart 
failure public patients had higher mortality rates than private and other patients. Secondly, 
regardless of the patient method of payments, on average, heart failure patients admitted to 
private hospitals in WA in the period 1995-2004 incurred a higher risk of dying in hospital 
compared with those admitted to public hospitals. The deseriptive statistics suggest public 
hospitals generally performed better than their private counterparts when heart failure 
mortality is considered as a hospital quality of care indicator. 
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Figure 4.6: Patient groups and heart failure mortality 
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In contrast to all-disease mortality and AMI mortality, the overall impression for heart 
failure mortality case is public hospitals seemed to perform better than their private 
counterparts. Whether or not this still holds after controlling for all patient and hospital 
characteristics, remains a question of interest. 
4.3.6 Stroke mortality 
In the period 1995-2004, WA hospitals had 35,846 admissions of stroke for patients aged 
40 and older. The majority of the admissions (77.03 %) occurred in public hospitals. 
Similar to the case of heart failure, stroke patients in private hospitals, on average, were 
older than those in public hospitals. However, stroke patients in public hospitals were 
more severely-ill and they stayed in hospital longer than those in private hospitals. Public 
hospitals had a higher average stroke mortality rate compared with private hospitals. 
Details are provided in the table below. 
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Table 4.11: Stroke patient statistics 
Share of total admissions(%) 
Mean of patient age 
Mean of Charlson index 
Mean oflength of stay (days) 
Mortality rate (%) 
Public 
77.03 
72.08 
(0.075) 
2.30 
(0.009) 
7.40 
(0.042) 
12.3 
Private 
22.97 
74.47 
(0.1J8) 
2.08 
(0.016) 
6.85 
(0.069) 
7.57 
The graphs in Figure 4. 7 illustrate the associations between stroke mortality rates and age, 
Charlson index, LOS and patient payclass groups. Although the mortality rates were high 
for patients aged 80-100 years, a positive link between age and mortality is not obvious in 
graph A. Public hospitals consistently had higher average mortality rates than private 
hospitals for all age-groups. The inferior performance of public hospitals is also noticeable 
in graph B. For all Charlson index groups, mortality rates for stroke patients were always 
higher. Graph B also shows that stroke mortality rates were positively associated with 
more severe commorbidity conditions. 
Graph C shows a reverse direction for public and private hospitals concerning the 
combination of stroke mortality and patient LOS. For public hospitals, the graph suggests 
that the longer stay patients had a greater chance of survival. In contrast, apart from same 
day patients with high mortality, private hospital stroke patients had higher mortality rate 
when staying longer in hospital. For three out of four LOS groups, public hospitals 
performed worse than private hospitals when stroke mortality is used as an indicator of 
quality of hospital care. For patient payclass and stroke mortality, graph D reveals public 
hospitals only performed better than private hospitals when they treated public patients. 
The lower mortality rates for public patients in public hospitals, for private and other 
patients in private hospitals suggest public patients were better off if they were admitted to 
public hospitals while private and other patients were better off if they were admitted to 
private hospitals. 
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Figure 4.7: Patient groups and stroke mortality 
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The descriptive statistics for stroke mortality generally signal an inferior performance of 
public hospitals in bivariate analysis. 
4.3. 7 30-day post-discharge mortality 
The 30-day post-discharge mortality analysis includes all patients in the target population. 
However, patients who died during hospitalization are excluded. In WA hospitals, in the 
period 1955-2004, for patients aged 40 years and older, there were 45,155 30-day post-
discharge deaths and 72.3 % of those occurred \Vith patients admitted to public hospitals. 
The average post-discharge mortality rates for public and private hospitals were 1.58 % 
cent and 0.77 % respectively. Other general descriptive statistics such as average patient 
age, Charlson index, and LOS are shown in the table below. 
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Table 4.12: 30 day post-discharge patient statistics 
Share of total admissions(%) 
Mean of patient age 
Mean of Charlson index 
Mean oflength of stay (days) 
Mortality rate (%) 
Public Private 
57.6 42.4 
63.27 61.76 
(0.009) (0.011) 
1.18 0.75 
(0.001) (0.001) 
3.16 2.78 
(0.003) (0.003) 
1.58 0.77 
The graphs in Figure 4.8 below outline the combination of 30-day post-discharge mortality 
and patient age, Charlson index, LOS, admission type and payclass groups. Graph A 
shows a consistently positive association between age and mortality. This implies a higher 
risk of post-discharge death for older patients. The graph also highlights the inferior 
performance of public hospitals for all age groups. Poorer performance of public hospitals 
is seen also in the combination of post discharge mortality and Charlson index. Mortality 
rates were higher in public hospitals for all groups. Graph B shows that generally, a higher 
Charlson index was accompanied by a higher post discharge mortality rate. 
In graph C and D, patients who stayed longer in hospitals and those admitted to an 
emergency department faced a higher probability of dying after discharge. Again, public 
ownership of hospital appears to be associated with higher post-discharge mortality rates. 
Similar to the case of stroke mortality, graph E points out public hospitals only performed 
better than private hospitals when they treated public patients. The lower mortality rates 
for public patients in public hospitals, for private and other patients in private hospitals 
suggest public patients were better off if they were admitted to public hospitals while 
private and other patients were better off if they were admitted to private hospitals. The 
descriptive statistics consistently signal an inferior performance of public hospitals m 
bivariate analysis with 30-day post-discharge mortality as the quality indicator. 
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A) 
Figure 4.8: Patient groups and 30 day post-discharge mortality 
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In summary, the above descriptive statistics suggest that in the bivariate analyses, public 
hospitals generally performed worse than private hospitals (with heart failure mortality as 
an exception). In order to obtain a more accurate picture about the relative performance of 
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the two sectors, patient characteristics and hospital characteristics other than type of 
ownership need to be taken into account at the same time. Multivariate regression analysis 
will be the appropriate method to eompare the performance of the two sectors. 
4.3.8 Hospital Statistics 
The number of WA hospitals that admitted patients aged 40 to l 00 years and who stayed no 
longer than 30 days, was stable over the period 1995-2004. In 1995, there were 89 public 
hospitals and 32 private hospitals. While the number of public hospitals fluctuated between 
89 and 91 in the study period, private hospitals had increased in number, from 32 in 1995 to 
42 in 2000 and remained stable at 42 in 2004. The number of teaching hospitals remained 
unchanged over time at 6 hospitals. No observable transformation from public hospital to 
private hospital and vice versa had been detected from the dataset. In terms of hospital 
location, 18% of public hospitals were located in the metropolitan area and the proportion 
was 88 .2% for private hospitals. 
The annual number of total admissions in public hospitals and private hospitals varied 
greatly. Minimum annual numbers of admissions were 3 and 4 while the maximum annual 
numbers of admissions were 68,014 and 51,367 for public and private hospitals, 
respectively. Teaching hospitals had less variation in the number of admissions with a 
minimum value of 13,279 and a maximum value of 68,014. On average, public hospitals 
had a larger proportion of complicated cases than private hospitals. That is reflected in the 
average case-mix index of 0.89 with standard deviation of 0.25 for public hospitals, and 
0.75 with standard deviation of0.27 for private hospitals. For all hospitals, the maximum 
value was 2.72 and the minimum value was 0.11. 
4.4 Inclusion Criteria 
The inclusion criteria for this study are concerned with patient age, length of stay and with 
hospital size. This study examines adverse events and mortality for patients aged between 
40 and 100 years old and stayed in hospital for 30 days or less. As mentioned in section 
4.3.1, these inclusion criteria are necessary because these patients more likely have higher 
probability of suffering adverse events or death eompared with younger patients and they 
are also more likely treated for the illness of the principal diagnosis. Another criterion 
involves volume of admissions for each hospital each year. For all disease in-hospital 
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mortality, post-discharge mortality and adverse events, the samples include hospitals with 
at least 1,000 admissions each year. Before the exclusion there were 3,530,871 admissions 
in total of the target population and the number was 3,416,850 after the exclusion. This 
inclusion criterion is imposed for the purpose of limiting the outlier problem. The inclusion 
appears to be acceptable since it involves an insignificant data loss (3 per cent). 
4.5 Variable description 
Thls section provides information about variables included in the models. The section 
comprises of the introduction of the variables' name and meaning, the discussion about the 
expected sign for each variable in the models and a brief statement about the potential 
correlation between some variables. 
There are two sets of variables: patient characteristics and hospital characteristics. The 
patient characteristics include demographic information (such as gender, age, residential 
location, and payment method) and information about the illness such as illness severity, 
emergency admission and length of stay. Patient residential locations are divided into two 
main groups: metropolitan and rural. Hospital features cover ownership status, teaching 
status for public hospitals, location, case-mix index, and volumes. Ideally, hospital 
characteristics should also include information on hospital staff such as number of FTE 
staff, proportion of medical staff. Unfortunately, these details are not available in the 
obtained dataset. The application of a multilevel model, more specifically, the random 
intercept model at hospital level aims to control for the heterogeneity problem including 
omitted variables. 
Table 4.13: Variable description 
- -· Variable name Description 
Adverse event Having at least one adverse event= 1, no adverse event=O 
: Separate type Discharge condition: ' I, . " ~ 
Post discharge ; 30 day post-discharge condition: dead=!, alive=O 
Age Patient years of age 
Age squared Age squared ' 
Male Gender dummy: male=!, femaJe=O 
Length of stay Length of stay in days 
·-·- -·-·-
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Length of stay squared Square value of length of stay 
Charlson score Patient total Charlson index 
City (patient) Patient residential location dummy: metropolitan=!, 
rural=O 
Emergency Emergency dummy: emergency admission=!, else=O 
Private patient Patient payment method- private patient (with public 
patient as reference) 
Other patient Patient payment method- payment from other sources 
(with public patient as reference) 
Total hosp. sep. (OOs) Hospital annual total admissions(in hundreds) 
Total hosp. cases Total annual hospital admissions of AMI, HF or stroke 
Hosp. case mix index Hospital case-mix index 
Public hospital Hospital ownership status dummy: public=!; private=O 
Hosp. teaching Hospital teaching status dummy: teaching=!, non-
teaching=O 
Hosp. metropolitan Hospital location dummy: metropolitan=!, rural=O 
Year 1996 Year 1996 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 1997 Year 1997 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 1998 Year 1998 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 1999 Year 1999 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2000 Year 2000 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2001 Year2001 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year2002 Year 2001 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2003 Year 2003 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2004 Year 2004 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
The above variable description is for the ordinary and multi-level logit model. Older 
patients are expected to have higher risk of having adverse events or in-hospital and post-
discharge death. The age squared term aims to reflect the non-linearity nature of the impact 
of patient age on their survival change. Ideally, five-year age group dummies would allow 
more flexibility in capturing the impact of patient age. However, the complexity of the 
multi-level model, combining with the large size of the dataset and numerous dummy 
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variables, prevents the convergence of the regressions when using STA TA with the gllamm 
(Generalised Linear Latent and Mixed Models) command. As a result, patient age and age 
squared are used instead. Convexity is expected for the impact of patient age on adverse 
events or death since older patients would faee increasing risk with an increasing rate. 
Similar to the case of patient age, the impact of patient hospital length of stay on the risk of 
suffering adverse events or death might also be non-linear. Patient length of stay dummy 
variables such as same day stay, less than 1 O day stay, and from 10 day to 30 day stay, were 
included for the purpose of capturing non-linear effects between patient length of stay and 
adverse events and mortality. Due to the non-convergence problem, length of stay and 
length of >1ay squared were considered as the best alternatives. Being admitted to a 
hospital, a patient may initially face an increasing risk v,ith an increasing rate of suffering 
adverse events or death. The risk would be reduced after a threshold of patient stay. The 
reverse can also be argued for the impact of length of stay on patient survival chance. A 
patient condition might also deteriorate after staying in hospital for a period of time. 
Hence, the risk of suffering adverse events or death may increase with length of stay. As a 
result, both concavity and convexity are expected for the impact oflength of stay on patient 
risk of adverse events and death. 
With adverse events as quality indicator, the model does not include patient length of stay 
as an explanatory factor due to potential endogeneity at patient level. There may be a two-
way causation relationship between adverse events and patient length of stay. A patient 
who stays longer in hospital would face higher risk of having adverse events. At the same 
time, staying longer in hospital may also be a consequence of adverse events. As a result, 
the inclusion of length of stay for adverse events may lead to inaccurate estimation 
outcomes. One may argue that exclusion of patient length of stay may also result in 
inaecurate outcomes due to the omitted variable problem. The multi-level model has its 
strength in being ahle to account for heterogeneity problems at all levels. Hence, in this 
study the problem of an omitted variable seems to be less serious than the problem of 
endogeneity. 
Other patient characteristics include Charlson total scores reflecting patient co-morbidity 
condition, residential location and emergency admission status. Patients with a more 
serious co-morbidity condition and patients admitted to the emergency department are 
90 
expected to have a higher risk of suffering adverse events. Metropolitan patients are 
presumed to have greater access to hospital care compared to those living in rural areas. As 
a result, negative association between city dummy and adverse event and mortality rates is 
expected. 
For hospital factors, both negative and positive coefficients are expected for hospital 
ownership while positive coefficients are expected for hospital case-mix index and size. 
Public hospital ownership can be associated with either a lower or higher number of 
adverse events and deaths. While the former indicates better performance of public 
hospitals compared with private hospitals, the latter indicates inferior performance. 
Hospitals with a higher case-mix index have a higher proportion of complicated cases and 
they are expected to have a higher number of adverse events and deaths. Bigger hospitals 
with a larger volume of admissions are also expected to have a higher number of incidents. 
In the main data analysis, where public and private hospitals are pooled together, hospital 
characteristics such as location (metropolitan or rural) and teaching status are not included 
because of the potential multi-colinearity problem. All teaching hospitals in WA are public 
hospitals and almost all private hospitals in WA are located in the metropolitan area. The 
ownership dummy variable by itself seems to capture the above features. Hospital 
characteristics such as teaching status and location are included in the analysis where public 
and private hospitals are examined separately. 
On the impact of hospital operating environment on adverse events and mortality, 
impressive improvement of technology in the past decade implies an increase in the 
survival chance of patients over time. At the same time, with an ever-increased ageing 
population, the medical burden on hospitals becomes excessive. As a result, the survival 
chance of each patient can be decreasing over time. The environment impact on adverse 
events and mortality, therefore, can be negative or positive. 
The study also attempted to investigate the change in adverse event rates and mortality rates 
in WA public and private hospitals separately over time in the period 1995-2004. Two-
level model regressions with year dummies were proposed for each sector. The 
convergence did not happen because regressions for public and private hospitals in 
separation already included more dummy variables (patient payment methods, hospital 
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location and teaching status) compared with the pooled ones. As a result, the impact of 
time on quality of hospital care was observed for both sectors combined via time dummy 
variables in all hospital two-level logit model regressions. 
One important aspect of model estimation is considering the correlation between variables. 
If they are highly correlated, the accuracy of the estimation might suffer. In this study, 
patient age and Charlson index, patient age and LOS, patient Charlson index and hospital 
case-mix index may have a high level of correlation. As a result, finding and reporting the 
correlation coefficients of these above pairs is necessary. As a simple way to measure the 
correlation, "correlate" command in STATA is used and the coefficients are 0.10 (or 10%) 
for patient age and Charlson index, 0.21 (or 21%) for patient age and LOS, and 0.06 (or 
6%) for patient Charlson index and hospital case-mix index. Although the coefficients are 
all positive indicating the existence of the correlation, their small values imply that the 
correlation between variables in the model would not be considered as a serious problem. 
4.6 Estimation models 
There are three possible methods to investigate the impact of ownership status on hospital 
quality of care for this study. They include the count data model, the multi-level logistic 
model with two steps and the multi-level logistic model with one step. 
4.6.1. Count data models 
This section provides outlines of the count data models that can be used in this study. The 
general Poisson model is the simplest form of the count data models where over-dispersion 
and hospital-time wise relation are not taken into account. The one level random intercept 
model makes allowance for the over-dispersion issue but disregards hospital time-wise 
correlation whereas the two-level random intercept addresses both issues. 
4.6.1. 1 General Poisson model 
If events can occur any time in continuous time, they occur independently of each other and 
at a constant incidence rate A, then the number of events y occurring in a time interval t 
has a Poisson distribution 
Pr(ylµ)= exp(-µ)µ' 
y! (4.5) 
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where µ is the expectation of y and is given by µ = )J 
\Vhen counts are observed for different unit i, the mean µ, is usually modeled using a log 
linear model. Assume there is only one explanatory factor x,, the regression model is 
(4.6) 
Substitute µ = Ai into the above equation and taking the exponential of both sides 
?~,t = exp(/31 + /32 x,) = exp(/31) exp(/32 x,) (4.7) 
Then the ratio for two units ia and 10 beeomes 
exp(/31) exp(/32 x,,) 
exp{/32 (x1 -x, )} 
" b (4.8) 
exp(/31 )exp(/32x,) 
= 
When the covariate changes by one unit, the ratio of incidence rates is exp( /32 ) 
It is assumed that conditional on covariate x,, the count y1 has a Poisson distribution with 
Meanµ, 
Pr(y, Ix) exp(-µ,)µ{' 
y,! (4.9) 
For the Poisson distribution, the conditional variance of the counts equals the mean 
Var(y, I x1 ) µ, (4.10) 
In practice, this condition is often violated. Over-dispersion or under-dispersion occurs 
when the conditional variance is greater or smaller than the mean, respeetively. Over-
dispersion is more common and could be due to variability in the rates ,{1 that is not fully 
accounted for by included covariates (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005). 
4.6.1.2 One -level random intercept model 
The logarithm of the expected count of number of deaths or number of separations with at 
least one adverse event is modeled as a linear function of explanatory variables 
lnE(y")=lnµ,, vu =X11 B+T 1 r (4.11) 
Where B is a set of parameters for a set of covariates X including hospital ownership, 
case-mix index, number of annual admissions, percentage of aged patients and male 
patients, hospital average length of stay, percentage of patients with Charlson score higher 
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than 5, percentage of hospital emergency patients, and percentage of patients from 
metropolitan areas; T denotes time invariant factors represented by a set of year-specific 
dummy variable for eaeh year between 1995 and 2004, and r is a set of coefficients for T. 
For the Poisson distribution, the conditional variance of the counts, given the covariates, 
equals the mean 
Var(y11 Ix,,)=µ,, (4.12) 
The assumption of the Poisson model (conditional on the covariates, the expectation of the 
count is equal to the variance) is often violated and the most common violation is over-
dispersion, or the variance is larger than the expectation. 
Over-dispersion can be handled by including a random intercept ;,(ll - N(O,l/f(l)) at the 
first level (hospital level) 
The variance now is 
Var(y,, Ix,,)=µ,,+ µ(,{exp(lf'('l) I} 
which is larger than µ,, if l//(I) > O 
4.6.1.3 Two-level random intercept model 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
( 4.15) 
The one-level count model ignores time-wise correlation within hospitals. In order to 
accommodate the heterogeneity problem due to the time-wise correlation of hospital 
counts, a two-level model is introduced. In the random intercept model, a level two (group 
which includes the counts of the same hospital over time) random intercept is included 
(4.16) 
We assume that ,,-(iJ - N(O w<2l) 
':i lj ,.,, 11 
The variance now is 
(4.17) 
94 
where j denotes level two (groups) and each group comprises of values of the same 
hospital over years. 
A random intercept at level two (group) addresses some degree of the over-dispersion 
problem. However, if important over-dispersion remains at level one (hospital level), a 
random intercept at level one should also be included. 
1nµ" = /31 + (1\~l + (iJl +XijB ( 4.18) 
(Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005) 
4.6.2 Logistic multi-level models 
The count data models consider only characteristics at the hospital level. These single level 
analytical methods have been criticized because they fail to consider the existence of 
multilevel structure when analyzing patient mortality or adverse events in different 
hospitals. In the single level analysis, variation in patient mortality rates or adverse event 
rates attributed to patient characteristics or hospital characteristics are not clearly identified. 
A more appropriate model is the multi-level model where patients are nested in hospitals 
4.6.2.1 Two-level two-stage model 
In the two-level two-stage model, the patient-level data are used to construct hospital-level 
fixed effect measures (hospital risk adjusted mortality rates) and the hospital level data 
together with hospital risk adjusted mortality rates or adverse event rates are used to 
examine the impact of ownership status on quality. In the first step, logistic regression 
models of deaths and adverse events are estimated with post-discharge, in-hospital deaths 
and adverse events as the dependent variables and patient characteristics as explanatory 
variables. 
P(y=ljx)=G(XB) (4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.21) 
X is a vector of explanatory variables including patient characteristics 
G is a function taking on values strictly between zero and one: 0 < G( z) < I for all real 
numbers z . In the logit model, G is the logistic function: 
G(z) = exp(z)l[I +exp(z)] = A(z) (4.22) 
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G(z) is between zero and one for all real numbers z .This is the cumulative distribution 
function for a standard logistic random variable. 
The ordinary logistic model in the first step is: 
(4.24) 
Where His a vector of hospital dummy variables and E (o"o,,. .. ,o,) is a vector of hospital 
dummy coefficients. The fixed effect or risk adjusted mortality or adverse event rate for 
each hospital, each year will be obtained from step one 
In the second step, hospital level data are used 
(4.25) 
where o is hospital risk adjusted mortality rate and W' 1s a vector of hospital 
characteristics. 
However, the real hospital risk adjusted mortality rates are not observable. The estimated 
values 51, can be obtained from the first step and they might contain errors. 
Suppose 
o1, =oJt-sjt 
then 
011 =W'i1 r+e11 +S1, 
(4.26) 
(4.27) 
Equation ( 4.27) shows that obtaining the marginal effects y in ( 4.25) is still achievable as 
long as we assume that the error <; 1, is not correlated with the explanatory variables W . 
Apart from this strong assumption, in equation (4.24) this method also implies that the 
probability of suffering from medical adverse events or probabilities of death of patients in 
the same hospital are mutually independent after controlling for the included covariates 
(Milcent, 2005). 
4.6.2.2 Two- level one-stage model 
The ordinary logistic model is 
logit{Pr(y u = l Ix u) )= /30 + /32 X 2u + ... + /31X 1u 
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(4.28) 
where i indexes the patient, j indexes the hospital and x1 to x, are the explanatory 
variables including both patient and hospital characteristics. As mentioned, this model 
makes the unrealistic assumption that the probabilities of having adverse events or death of 
patients for a given hospital are mutually independent after controlling for the included 
covariates. This assrnnption is relaxed in the random intercept logistic model below. 
Multilevel logistic regression modeling was performed with patients (I st level) nested in 
hospitals (2nd level). Institutional effects (that is, 2nd level variance and intra-hospital 
correlation) were calculated adjusted for patient and institutional characteristics. 
logit{Pr(yij = 11 xif )}= /Jo+ fJ2x2 lj + ... + f31x1" +;1 + e'i (4.29) 
where hospital specific random intercept ; 1 - N(O, If') represents the combined effect of all 
omitted hospital-specific covariates (unobserved heterogeneity) and e" has a logistic 
distribution with variance tr 2 /3. 
The intra-hospital correlation was calculated as; 
p =If' /(If'+ tr 2 I 3) (4.30) 
Two-level formulation 
The patient level (level I) can be written as 
logit{Pr(yif J!x,1)}= 1711 + /J,x2,1 + ... + /3,x,if ( 4.31) 
where the intercept 1711 varies between hospitals j . Denoting the covariates at hospital level 
as w1 , the hospital level (level 2) model for the intercept becomes 
(4.32) 
Substituting the model for 17if into the level 1 model, we obtain 
logit{Pr(ylj =I Ix", ;)2l)} =ru + ;y) + /32x1" + ... + /31x111 + tr12 w,1 + ... + tr1m w"ll (4.33) 
4.6.2.3 Three- level one-stage model 
For this study, both two-level one-stage and two-level two-stage models have limitations. 
While the two-level one-stage model relaxes the assumption of conditional independence 
among patients for the same hospital, it does not take into account the relationship of 
hospital mortality or adverse events across time. In other words, quality of care for a 
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hospital in one year is assumed to be independent from the quality of the same hospital in 
another year. On the other hand, the two-level two-stage model accounts for the relation of 
one hospital across time but ignores the interdependence of patients in a hospital. 
A three-level one-stage model is appropriate for overcoming the above problems. In this 
model, level l involves individual patients, level 2 involves hospitals where each hospital 
in each year is considered as one separate level 2 entry and at level 3, the same hospital 
over a ten year time span will form a group. Hence, both the interdependence of patients in 
one hospital and the links of a hospital quality of care across time are taken into account. 
The heterogeneity problem at all levels is accommodated. 
1 't{P ( -1 I r(l) /"(3))} _ n n R rC'l r(J) og1 ry1)k- XfJk'S1k'l:ik -p1+f"ZtJkX2yk+ ... +pnkXnk+'::tJ! +s,k +Eijk (4.34) 
Wh ( )' . . . 11 . l'c21 N (0 r2i) · crex 0, x 2ij,,. .. ,xnijk 1savectorcontammga covanates, ~ 1, - , If/ 1sa 
random intercept varying over hospitals each year (level 2), and sfl-N (0, lf/<3l) is a 
random intercept varying over groups of hospitals (level 3). Note that one group comprises 
the same hospital over several years. And finally & ijk has a logistic distribution '.'.ith 
variance n 1 13 
The intra-hospital correlation is calculated as: p = l//('l /(lf/C2J + l//l3l + 71: 1 13) 
The time-wise correlation of hospital is calculated as: 
p lj/(3) /(lf/(2) +\V(J) + 77: 1 13) . (4.36) 
Three-level formulation 
The patient level (level 1) can be written as 
log it(Pr(y v l Ix"'}= 1]11, + P2x20, + ... + fJ1x1v' (4.37) 
(4.35) 
where the intercept ry,1, varies between hospitals j and group k. Denoting the covariates at 
hospital level as w1,, the hospital level (level 2) model for the intercept becomes 
(4.38) 
Suppose the covariates for the group level are v,, then the group level (level 3) model is: 
77:1a = Ym + Ym v,, + ... +Yun v "' + sJ'l (4.39) 
98 
Substituting the model for Jr1" into the level 2 model and for 1luk into the level 1 model, 
we obtain 
1ogit{Pr(yu =llxu,, s)Jl,(J'l))= y111 +{J2x2"' + ... +/J,xu, +Jr1mwmJk 
;-(2) ;-(3) 
+Y112V2k + ... +YunVnk +,.Jk +,., 
Three-level single stage random coefficient model: 
(4.40) 
The variation of hospital mortality or adverse event rates can also be investigated by 
including a random slope at level 3 
1ogit{Pr(yu =llxij,, s)il,si°l))= Yiu +{J2x2u, + ... +/J,xu, +Jr1mwmjk 
( 4.41) 
Where (1~), ( J!l have a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and covariance 
matrix 'I'/3) = Cov(r/3) ;-/3)) = l/111 l/112 '"(3) = ,,,13) 
[ 
(3) (3)] 
'::t1k ''::t2k (3) (3) ''t'21 't'12 
l/f 21 l/f 22 
Details of the above methods indicate that the three-level single-stage logistic model is the 
most appropriate for this study. The count data model limitations lie in the loss of 
information due to the aggregation of patient-level data into hospital-level data. The multi-
level two-stage approach limitations are mainly reflected in the assumption about that there 
is no relationship between the error terms in the first stage and the regressors in the second 
stage. The advantages of the three-level single-stage models can be found in its ability to 
overcome the heterogeneity at all levels with no extra assumption to be imposed (Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal, 2005). 
4.7 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has drawn a general comparison of mortality and adverse event 
rates between public and private hospitals in Western Australia. However, factors 
attributed to those indicators are only controlled one at a time. A multivariate regression 
analysis with all factors being controlled for is necessary. The chapter has also provided 
details about methods that can possibly be used in the regression analysis for this study. 
With the ability of controlling for heterogeneity at all levels and the non-imposition of tall 
assumptions, three-level single-stage logistic models appear to be the most appropriate for 
this study. In the next chapter, results of econometric estimation are provided. The chapter 
will also include the discussion of the obtained results. 
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITY OF CARE -REGRESSION RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the results of regression analyses for quality of care as well as the 
corresponding discussion. In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that the three-level 
one-step model is the most suitable method for this study. However, results of other 
methods, count data models and multilevel two-step models, will be provided in Appendix 
A for the purposes of comparison. The chapter is arranged as follows: Section 5.2 presents 
the regression results when all public and private hospitals are included; Section 5 .3 
provides the results for separate regressions for public and private hospitals; Section 5.4 
presents the discussion. 
5.2 Ordinary, Two-level One-stage and Three-level One-stage Logistic Models 
In this section, regression results of ordinary, two-level one-step, and three-level one-step 
random intercept lo git models will be presented 1. The purpose is to compare the results 
when the assumptions about interdependence of patients in the same hospital and 
interdependence of adverse events and mortality of the same hospital over time are relaxed 
one by one. 
Two-level and three-level random intercept logit model regressions were carried out using 
the STATA command "gllamm" which estimates the Generalised Linear Latent and Mixed 
Models. The command is appropriate for multilevel and multifactor models. However, as 
the STATA reference manual mentions, the program takes a while to converge. The 
convergence of the regressions in this study has been especially time consuming due to the 
large dataset. For indicators such as adverse events, non-cardiac and non-stroke mortality, 
and post-discharge mortality, the dataset contains more than one million observations. 
Hence, the convergence of each regression for each model took up to two weeks. For 
indicators that involve smaller numbers of observations such as AMI mortality, heart 
1 Attempts to apply random coefficient multi-level logit models (discussed in chapter 4) have been made but 
no convergence has been achieved. Large dataset and the complication of multi-level processing nature are 
possible explanations. 
100 
failure mortality and stroke mortality, the c.onvergence took up to one day for each 
regression for each model. 
Apart from long c.onvergence times, another drawback of the "gllamm" command relates to 
the inclusion of dummy variables in the regressions. With this command, the regressions 
only converge with a limited number of dummy variables. As was mentioned in chapter 4, 
due to the non-c.onvergence problem, five-year (or ten-year) age group dummy variables 
were replaced by two continuous variables: age and age squared. With respect to patient 
length of stay, same day stay, less than 10 day stay, and 10 day to 30 day stay, dummy 
variables were replaced by two c-0ntinuous variables: length of stay (LOS) and length of 
stay squared. The inclusion of these continuous variables aims to capture non-linear 
effects of patient age and length of stay on hospital adverse event and mortality rates. 
Similarly, c.onvergence was not achieved when year dummy variables were included for 
public and private hospitals separately. As a result, the impaet of time on quality of 
hospital care was observed for both sectors combined using time dummy variables in all 
hospital two-level model regressions. Despite all the above set-backs, the "gllamm" 
command is the most suitable STATA procedure for this study. The following tables 
present estimation results for the three model regressions. 
Adverse Events 
Table 5.1: Multi-level one-stage logit estimated coefficients for adverse events 
Dependent variable: adverse event status 
Ord. logit Two-level logit Three-level logit 
Age 0.058** 0.050** 0.061** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared -3.5E-04** -2.8E-04** -3.7E-04** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
, Male 0.038** 0.049** 0.077** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Charlson score -0.007** -0.009** -0.011 ** 
I City (patient) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) -0.279** -0.471 ** -0.419** 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Emergency 0.624** 0.687** 0.700** 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Total hosp. seps(OOs) l.lE-03** 0.002** 0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
, Hosp. case mix index 1.299** 1.326** 1.294** 
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(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Public bospital -0.064** -0.240** -0.075** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
year 1996 0.131** 0.261 ** 
(0.012) (0.012) 
year 1997 0.092** 0.212** 
I (0.012) I co.012) 
year 1998 0.056** 0.156** 
(0.012) (0.012) 
year 1999 0.215** 0.314** 
(0.012) (0.013) 
year 2000 0.176** 0.182** 
(0.012) (0.015) 
year 2001 0.073** -0.021 
(0.012) (0.013) 
year 2002 0.001 0.050** 
(0.012) (0.013) 
year 2003 -0.011 -0.103 
(0.012) (0.012) 
year 2004 0.011 0.015 
(0.012) (0.013) 
Constant -6.728 -6.698 -6.640 
(0.057) (0.055) (0.055) 
level I units 3,412,860 3,412,860 3,412,860 
level 2 units 654 654 
I level 3 units 81 
log likelihood -698,607 -690,735 -690,200 
hosp. level variance 0.185** 0.067** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
group level variance 0.090** 
(0.000) 
intra-hosp. correlation 5.3% 2% 
, hosp. time-wise correlation 2.6% 
**p$0.05; * p$0.l; H. : /3 = O;HI : /3"" 0 
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In-hos[!ital non-cardiac non-stroke (all disease} mortali!Y 
Table 5.2: Multi-level one-stage logit estimated coefficients for non-cardiac non-stroke 
mortality 
Dependent variable: separate type 
Ord. logit Two-level logit Three-level logit 
Age 0.021** 0.022•• 0.031 ** 
I Age squared (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 2.7E-04** 2.5E-04** 1.9E-04** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.305** 0.277** 0.269** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) I Length of stay (LOS) 0.113** 0.111 ** 0.098** 
I LOS. squared 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
-0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Charlson score 0.339** 0.341 ** 0.345** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
City (patient) -0.138** -0.019 -0.107** 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.039) 
j Emergency 1.570** 1.578** 1.612** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) 
Total hosp. seps(OOs) -9E-05** -2. IE-04** -4.0E-05 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
I Hosp. case mix index 0.206** 0.215** 0.295** 
l (0.035) (0.041) (0.055) I I Public hospital -0.100** -0.064** -0.228** 
(0.015) (0.024) (0.014) 
i year 1996 0.080** 0.014 
• (0.029) (0.035) 
year 1997 0.126** 0.084** 
(0.029) (0.036) 
year 1998 -0.098** -0.082* 
(0.029) (0.047) 
year 1999 -0.157** -0.137** 
(0.029) (0.035) 
year2000 -0.225** -0.203** 
(0.029) (0.036) 
year 2001 -0.200** -0.228** 
(0.029) (0.034) 
year 2002 -0.149** -0.174** 
(0.028) (0.034) 
year 2003 -0.274** -0.289** 
(0.029) (0.034) 
year 2004 -0.368** -0.372** 
l (0.029) (0.036) I Constant -9.214 -9.258 -9.724 
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(0.166) (0.162) (0.162) 
level 1 units 3,319,784 3,319,784 3,319,784 
level 2 units 654 654 
level 3 units 81 
log likelihood -131,974 -131,081 -134,955 
hosp. level variance 0.222** 0.063** 
(0.011) (0.000) 
group level variance 0.24** 
(0.029) 
intra-hosp. correlation 6.3% 1.8% 
hosp. time-wise correlation 6.7% 
**p < o os· • p < o 1 · H · jJ = O· H · jJ ot 0 
- . ' - . • 0. ' 1. 
AMI mortality 
Table 5.3: Multilevel one-stage logit estimated coefficients for AMI mortality 
Dependent variable: separate type 
Ord. logit Two-level logit Three-level logit 
Age 0.083** 0.081 ** 0.084** 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Age squared -l.7E-05 -3.5E-06 -3.3E-05 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.280** -0.280** -0.281 ** 
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Length of stay (LOS) -0.486** -0.488** -0.487** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
LOS. squared 0.015** 0.016** 0.015** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Charlson score 0.404** 0.406** 0.405** 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
City (patient) -0.252** -0.280** -0.324** 
(0.069) (0.072) (0.078) 
Emergency 0.604** 0.610** 0.625** 
(0.089) (0.090) (0.093) 
Total hosp. AMI cases -l.IE-04 -9.8E-05 -0.001 ** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hosp. case mix index -0.238 -0.124 1.363** 
(0.220) (0.246) (0.327) 
Public hospital 0.137* 0.117 0.197 
(0.083) (0.089) (0.138) 
year 1996 -0.290** -0.280** 
(0.106) (0.132) 
year 1997 -0.360** -0.314** 
(0.112) (0.138) 
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year 1998 
year 1999 
year 2000 
year 2001 
year 2002 
I I year 2003 
I year 2004 
I Constant 
level 1 units 
level 2 units 
level 3 units 
log likelihood 
hosp. level variance 
group level variance 
intra-hosp. correlation 
hosp. time-wise correlation 
Heart Failure mortality 
-0.486** 
(0.110) 
-0.654** 
(0.112) 
-0.694** 
(0.113) 
-0.913** 
(0.110) 
-0.854** 
(0.110) 
-1.056** 
(0.112) 
-1.218** 
(0.115) 
-6.795 
(0.871) 
27,819 
-6,425 
-0.475** 
(0.134) 
-0.640** 
(0.135) 
-0.707** 
(0. 137) 
-0.887** 
(0.135) 
-0.844** 
(0.135) 
-1.017** 
(0. 136) 
-1.232** 
(0.137) 
-6.839 
(0.880) 
27,819 
442 
-6,421 
0.02* 
(0.010) 
0.6% 
-8.901 
(0.831) 
27,819 
442 
58 
-6,470 
0.108** 
(0.026) 
0.052** 
(0.019) 
3.1% 
1.5% 
Table 5.4: Multilevel one-stage logit estimated coefficients for heart failure mortality 
Dependent variable: separate type 
Ord. logit Two-level logit Three-level Iogit 
Age 0.015 0.016 0.015 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) 
Age squared 2.5E-04 2.SE-04 2.5E-04 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.053 0.066 0.038 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
1 Length of stay (LOS) -0.146** -0.146** -0.148** 
' (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) 
' 
' I LOS. squared 0.006** 0.006** 0.006** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
i Charlson score 0.276** 0.275** 0.279** 
0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
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City (patient) -0.165** -0.180** -0.103 
(0.062) (0.062) (0.081) 
Emergency -0.204** -0.218** -0.249** 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.064) 
Total hosp. HFcases -l.6E-04 -I.3E-04 -2.4£-04 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hosp. case mix index 0.144 0.114 0.153 
(0.165) (0.168) (0.193) 
Public hospital --0.007 -0.001 0.142 
(0.061) (0.062) (0.087) 
year 1996 -0.111 -0.097 
(0.096) (0.099) 
year 1997 -0.050 -0.057 
(0.097) (0.100) 
year 1998 -0.076 -0.067 
(0.097) (0.100) 
year 1999 -0.149 -0.165 
(0.100) (0.103) 
year 2000 -0.254** -0.193* 
(0.102) (0.103) 
year 2001 -0.230** -0.293** 
(0.101) (0.104) 
year 2002 -0.053 -0.125 
(0.098) (0.102) 
year 2003 -0.151 -0.151 
(0.100) (0.102) 
year 2004 -0.433** -0.287** 
(0.104) (0.104) 
Constant -5.072 -5.097 -5.317 
(0.924) (0.926) (0.898) 
level 1 units 31,236 31,236 31,236 
level 2 units 506 506 
level 3 units 61 
log likelihood -8, 131 -8, 133 -8,130 
hosp. level variance 0.003** 0.024* 
(0.000) (0.010) 
group level variance 0.048** 
(0.019) 
intra-hosp. correlation 0.1% 0.7% 
hosp. time-wise correlation 1.4% 
**ps0.05; • psO.l; H 0 : /3 O;H, :f3ot0 
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Stroke mortali!:r 
Table 5.5: Multilevel one-stage logit estimated coefficients for stroke mortality 
Dependent variable: separate type 
Ord. logit Two-level logit Three-level logit 
i Age -0.098** -0. 100** -0.099** 
I Age squared (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 
I (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
I I Male -0.172** -0.170** -0.170** (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
1 Length of stay (LOS) -0.164** -0.164** -0.165** 
I (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
J LOS. squared 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Charlson score 0.253** 0.255** 0.257** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
I City (patient) -0.024 -0.060 -0.l 0 I 
I (0.051) (0.056) (0.064) 
Emergency 1.010** 1.016** 1.036** 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.062) 
Total hosp. stroke cases 0.001 ** 0.001 ** 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hosp. case mix index -0.298** -0.438** -0.293 
I (0.152) (0.215) (0.208) 
1 Public hospital 0.165** 0.111 -0.006 
(0.059) (0.073) (0.112) 
year 1996 -0.045 0.023 
(0.083) (0.149) 
year 1997 -0.212** -0.279* 
(0.089) (0.159) 
year 1998 -0.185** -0.192 
(0.087) (0. 163) 
year 1999 -0.252** -0.314** 
(0.088) (0.154) 
year 2000 -0.256** -0.285** 
l (0.087) (0.156) 
' 
'year 2001 -0.272** -0.289* 
(0.087) (0.152) 
year2002 -0.240** -0.214 
(0.086) (0.154) 
year 2003 -0.310** -0.319** 
(0.086) (0.152) 
year 2004 -0.447** -0.475** 
(0.089) (0.162) 
Constant -1.095 -0.930 -1.250 
(0.565 (0.585 0.554) 
107 
level l units 34021 34021 34021 
level 2 units 497 497 
level 3 units 60 
log likelihood -10,667 -10,659 -10,666 
hosp. level variance 0.051 ** 0.077** 
(0.018) (0.024) 
group level variance 0.052** 
(0.03) 
intra-hosp. correlation 1.5% 2.3% 
hosp. time-wise correlation 1.5% 
**p:$0.05;*p:$0.l; H0 :fl O;H, :fJ-¢0 
30 dav post-discharge mortality 
Table 5,6: Multilevel one-stage logit estimated coefficients for post-discharge 
mortality 
Dependent variable: post-discharge status 
Ord. logit Two-level logit Three-level logit 
Age 0.007** 0.000 0.008** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Age squared 2.lE-04** 2.3E-04** 2.7E-04** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.325** 0.324** 0.325** 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Length of stay (LOS) 0.097** 0.098** 0.099** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
LOS. squared -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Charlson score 0.334** 0.336** 0.331 ** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
City (patient) -0.086** -0.060** -0.080** 
(0.014) (0.023) (0.014) 
Emergency 0.741 ** 0.721** 0.742** 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Total hosp. seps(OOs) 4.9E-05 -8.6E-05 -6.9E-05** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hosp. case mix index -0.113** -0.098* -0.051 * 
(0.030) (0.054) (0.029) 
Public hospital 0.335** 0.351 ** 0.353** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
year 1996 -0.004 0.001 
(0.026) (0.032) 
year 1997 0.065** 0.075** 
(0.0262 (0.008) 
108 
year 1998 -0.080** -0.079** 
(0.026) (0.033) 
year 1999 -0.043 -0.058* 
(0.025) (0.034) 
year 2000 -0.013 0.010 
(0.025) (0.054) 
year 2001 0.002 -0.024 
(0.025) (0.037) 
year2002 -0.093** -0.098** 
(0.025) (0.034) 
year 2003 -0.115** -0.119** 
(0.025) (0.030) 
year 2004 -0.239** -0.252** 
(0.025) (0.033) 
Constant -7.496 -7.497 -7.644 
(0.131) (0.136) (0.128) 
level 1 units 3,372,952 3,372,952 3,372,952 
level 2 units 654 654 
level 3 units 81 
log likelihood -191,390 -190,764 -190,658 
hosp. level variance 0.18** 0.039** 
(0.013) (0.003) 
group level variance 0.099** 
(0.011) 
intra-hosp. correlation 5% 1.1% 
hosp. time-wise correlation 2.8% 
**p$0.05;*p$0.l; H, :fJ=O;H1 :fi*O 
As mentioned, the ordinary logistic models do not take into account the inter-dependence 
between patients in the same hospital and the two-level logit models do not aec-0unt for the 
time-wise relation of a hospital's performance. Three-level logit models appear to be the 
most appropriate for this study. Consequently, the results description below will be based 
on the three-level logit model outcomes. When the description involves the impact of 
hospital operating environment reflected by the year dummy variables, results from the 
two-level logit models will be considered. 
The results concerning the association between patient characteristics and adverse events 
and mortality are generally consistent with expectations. Older patients appeared to have a 
higher risk of suffering adverse events and death. Male patients tended to face higher risk 
of adverse events, non-cardiac and non-stroke in-hospital mortality, and post-discharge 
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mortality. Convexity was found for the impact of patient age on mortality. Concavity of 
patient length of stay could be found in non-cardiac and non-stroke mortality and 30 day 
post-discharge mortality. At the same time, convexity of patient length of stay could be 
found in the case of specific illnesses including AMI mortality, heart failure mortality and 
stroke mortality. This reflects the difference of general patients and patients admitted with 
cardiac and stroke illnesses2. 
The positive coefficient of the Charlson index variable in all cases (except adverse events) 
shows that patients with a more severe co-morbidity condition faced a higher risk of dying 
in-hospital or post-discharge. As expected, patients living in metropolitan areas 
consistently had a better chance of surviving hospital adverse events and mortality, and 
emergency patients had a higher probability of suffering from adverse events, dying in 
hospital and post discharge. A possible explanation is that urban patients have a greater or 
more timely access to hospital services, and hence a have higher survival chance. There is 
no clear explanation for the negative and statistically significant coefficients for emergency 
status variable in the case of heart failure mortality. 
The impacts of some hospital characteristics, such as hospital size and case-mix index, are 
similar across indicators. Hospital size, as reflected by the number of total admissions or 
by the number of specific illness admissions, did not seem to have important effects. 
Although the variable is statistically significant in some cases, the extremely small values 
of the coefficients reflected insignificant roles of hospital size on hospital quality of care. 
The hospital case mix index, as a reflection of overall complexity of cases treated in a 
hospital, tended to be positively associated with hospital adverse events and mortality. This 
combination is expected since the heavier the workload, reflected by the higher proportion 
of complicated cases a hospital has, the less chance patients in that hospital have for 
survival. 
There is a mixed picture about the impacts of hospital ownership status on hospital 
performance. The role of hospital ownership status on quality of hospital care is not 
2 Endogeneity due to a two-way causation relationship between patient length of stay (LOS) and mortality is a 
potential problem in this analysis. However, relevant instruments for formally testing and addressing this 
potential problem are not available in the dataset. The AMI mortality equation has been re-estimated (table 
El Appendix E) without LOS and the result does not show major differences in the parameters estimates 
from the original equation where where LOS is included. This suggests that endogeneity, if present, may not 
be a serious issue. 
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conclusive across indicators. While public hospitals appeared to perform worse compared 
with their private counterparts in the case of 30 day post-discharge mortality, the reverse 
can be found in the case of adverse events and non-cardiac and non-stroke in-hospital 
mortality. No significant difference in the performance of the two sectors can be found in 
AMI, heart failure and stroke in-hospital mortality. The inferior performance of public 
hospitals in the case of 30 day post-discharge mortality might be an indication of lower 
quality of post-discharge services in public sector compared with private sector. The 
variation in the results shows the benefits of using more than one indicator for quality of 
hospital care. Bias in drawing conclusion about the relative performance of the two sectors 
can be potentially minimised when different indicators are considered. 
Recall that the year dummies represent the environment the hospitals operate in. Time 
dummies are generally used as a reflection of the change in medical technology and 
medical practice. The results show that for all indicators, values of the coefficients of year 
dummy variables generally decreased over time. This suggests a consistent improvement 
of quality of hospital care over time during the period 1995-2004 as a result of progress in 
medical technology and practice. 
Across the three logit models, there are two noticeable features in the results. The first 
feature is concerned with the variation in results across the models and the second is 
concerned with the role of patient factors in explaining differences in patient adverse events 
and mortality. The ordinary logit regression model is a model of population-average 
conditioning on the covariates. In contrast, the multi-level logit model is a model of 
hospital-specific probability given the covariates and the random intercept. The two-level 
and three-level logit models take into account hospital unobserved effects (each hospital, 
each year in the two-level model, and each hospital over ten years in the three-level model). 
Although the coefficients across the three models have identical signs, their point estimates 
and standard errors are different. These differences confirm that hospital unobserved 
effects are an important consideration in examining patient probability of suffering adverse 
events or death when receiving hospital care. 
With respect to factors influencing the variation in patient adverse events and mortality, 
patient characteristics appear to be dominant. In the case of adverse event, the intra-
correlation of 2% and the hospital time-wise correlation of 2.6% imply that hospital factors 
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explained only 4.6% of the variance of prognoses. In other words, patient characteristics 
were found to explain for 95.4% of the variance of prognoses. Similarly, the intra-hospital 
correlation and hospital time-wise correlation for non-cardiac and non-stroke mortality 
were 1.8% and 6.7% respectively. Therefore, 91.5% of the variance of prognosis was 
explained by patient characteristics. Results for other indicators show that patient factors 
generally accounted for more than 90"/o of the variance of prognoses. 
Recall that the impacts of ownership status on quality of hospital care are the main focus of 
this study. While the descriptive statistics results generally suggest an inferior performance 
of public hospitals c-0mpared with private hospitals, the econometric results do not give the 
same impression. Table 5.7 summarizes the relationship between hospital ownership status 
and on adverse event and mortality rates. Results from the three-level logit models suggest 
that in the period 1995-2004, public hospitals in Western Australia performed better than 
private hospitals if adverse events and non-cardiac and non-stroke mortality were used as 
quality indicators. No statistically significant difference can be found in the performance of 
the two sectors if AMI, heart failure and stroke mortality were used as quality indicators. 
Public hospital performance appeared to be inferior compared with private hospitals when 
30 day post-discharge mortality was considered as quality of care indicators. However, 
results from the adverse event regression need to be treated with caution due to some issues 
about identifying and reporting adverse events. Possible explanations for those issues will 
be presented in the discussion section. 
Table 5.7: Result summary of logit multi-level models for public hospitals (private 
hospitals as reference) 
Adverse event rate 
In-hospital all disease 
mortality 
Ordinary 
lo git 
** 
** 
AMI in-hospital mortality +* * 
Heart failure in-hospital 
mortality 
Stroke in-hospital +** 
Two-level logit Three-level logit 
model model 
** ** 
** ** 
+ 
+ 
+ 
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mortality 
30 day post discharge +** 
mortality 
••p::;o.os; • p::;o.1; H0 : /3 = O;H1 : /3 ot 0 
+** +** 
(the sign '_' indicates a lower adverse event or mortality rate for public hospitals and the sign '+' 
indicates a higher adverse event or mortality rate for public hospitals ) 
In the next section, separate results for public and private hospitals are provided. The 
section aims to examine the impact of patient payment methods, hospital teaching status, 
and location on adverse event and mortality rates. 
5.3 Three-level one-stage logit results for public and private hospitals 
In this section, the impact of hospital location, hospital teaching status together with patient 
payment class (based on patient payment method) on hospital adverse events and mortality 
will be examined. As mentioned, a majority of private hospitals (90%) were located in 
metropolitan areas and none of them are teaching hospitals. At the same time, 37% of 
public hospitals were located in metropolitan areas, and 16% of public hospitals were 
teaching hospitals. Given the above division, public hospitals will be examined separately 
with the inclusion of teaching status and location dummy variables. Private hospitals will 
also be examined separately with the inclusion of the hospital location dummy variable. 
With regard to patient payment methods, there were three types of patients: public patients, 
private patients and other patients whose payments were from sources other than 
governments, their own pocket or from health insurance companies. Other sources 
included the Department of Veterans Affairs (DV A), Motor Vehicle Insurance Trust 
(MVIT), Workers Compensation Assurance (WCA), and other compensation bodies. Two 
patient pay-class dummy variables, private patient and other patient, are included for 
capturing the difference in the patient method of payment. Public patients were used as the 
benchmark for both public and private hospitals. The following tables provide the separate 
results of public and private hospitals. 
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Adverse event 
Table 5.8: Three-level one-stage logit estimated coefficients for adverse events 
Dependent variable: adverse event status 
Age 
Age squared 
Male 
Charlson score 
City (patient) 
Emergency 
Private patient 
Other patient 
Total hosp. seps(OOs) 
Hosp. case mix index 
Hosp. metropolitan 
Hosp. teaching 
constant 
level I units 
level 2 units 
level 3 units 
log likelihood 
hosp. level variance 
group level variance 
intra-hosp. correlation 
hosp. time-wise 
correlation 
public 
hospital 
0.058** 
(0.002) 
-3.3E-04** 
(0.000) 
0.020** 
(0.007) 
0.033** 
(0.002) 
-0.564** 
(0.011) 
0.593** 
(0.007) 
0.443** 
(0.013) 
0.440** 
(0.014) 
-7.5E-04 
(0.000) 
0.519** 
(0.020) 
0.245** 
(0.015) 
0.748** 
(0.019) 
-6.333 
(0.022) 
1,971,656 
349 
40 
-384,044 
0.051 ** 
(0.000) 
0.117** 
(0.004) 
1.5% 
3.4% 
*•p:o;0.05; * p:o;O.l; H 0 : /3 = O;H1 : /3 7' 0 
private 
hospital 
0.055** 
(0.003) 
-2.9E-04** 
(0.000) 
-0.005 
(0.009) 
-0.021 ** 
(0.003) 
-0.304** 
(0.017) 
0.820** 
(0.011) 
0.134** 
(0.019) 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
4.7E-04** 
(0.000) 
1.520** 
(0.024) 
0.094** 
(0.019) 
-7.020 
(0.096) 
1,441,204 
283 
39 
-244,914 
0.068** 
(0.003) 
0.263** 
(0.024) 
1.9% 
7.3% 
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In-hospital non-cardiac and non-stroke mortality 
Table 5.9: Three-level one-stage Iogit estimated coefficients for non-cardiac non-
stroke mortality 
Dependent variable: separate type 
l i Age 
I Age squared 
Male 
I Length of stay 
i i Length of stay squared 
I Charlson score 
I 
i 
J City (patient) 
I 
Emergency 
Private patient 
Other patient 
Total hosp. seps(OOs) 
Hosp. case mix index 
! Hosp. metropolitan 
Hosp. teaching 
constant 
level I units 
level 2 units 
level 3 units 
log likelihood 
hosp. level variance 
group level variance 
public 
hospital 
0.086** 
(0.007) 
-2.6E-04** 
(0.000) 
0.171** 
(0.016) 
0.084** 
(0.004) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
0.316** 
(0.003) 
-0.510** 
(0.043) 
1.679** 
(0.022) 
-0.004 
(0.037) 
0.010 
(0.033) 
0.001 ** 
(0.000) 
-0.070 
(0.055) 
-0.001 
(0.034) 
-0.023 
(0.037) 
-11.127 
(0.252) 
1,910,839 
349 
40 
-80770 
0.043** 
(0.010) 
0.231 ** 
(0.055) 
private 
hospital 
0.026** 
(0.007) 
-2.6E-04** 
(0.000) 
0.366** 
(0.023) 
0.192** 
(0.005) 
-0.005** 
(0.000) 
0.381** 
(0.003) 
0.337** 
(0.043) 
1.016** 
(0.026) 
-0.735** 
(0.037) 
-0.990** 
(0.046) 
-0.001 ** 
(0.000) 
1.612** 
(0.088) 
-0.623** 
(0.062) 
-10.634 
(0.248) 
1,419,837 
283 
39 
-39352 
0.069** 
(0.007) 
0.475** 
(0.048) 
intra-hos . correlation :.:=:.::.:.:~__:..:::..:.::__~~~_.:.:~:_.__~~-1.2% 1.8% 
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hosp. time -wise 
correlation 6.5% 12.3% 
••p,,;o.os; • p:s;O.l; H 0 : /3 = O;H1 : /3 * 0 
AMI mortality 
Table 5.10: Three-level one-stage logit estimated coefficients for AMI mortality 
Dependent variable: separate type 
public private 
hospital hospital 
Age 0.091 ** 0.201 ** 
(0.025) (0.075) 
Age squared -1. !E-04 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.281 ** -0.188 
(0.054) (0.124) 
Length of stay -0.502** -0.421 ** 
(0.016) (0.033) 
Length of stay squared 0.016** 0.013** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Charlson score 0.400** 0.404** 
(0.016) (0.035) 
City (patient) -0.393** -0.238 
(0.093) (0.194) 
Emergency 0.647** 0.631 ** 
(0.119) (0.160) 
Private patient -0.344** -0.279 
(0.100) (0.189) 
Other patient -0.202** -0.395 
(0.098) (0.263) 
Total hosp. AMI cases -0.003** -0.005** 
(0.001) (0.001) 
Hosp. case mix index 1.931 -0.245 
(1.319) (0.523) 
Hosp. metropolitan 0.006 0.436 
(0.302) (0.338) 
Hosp. teaching 1.116** 
(0.377) 
constant -9.105 -13.120 
(1.387) (2.900) 
level I units 21,961 5,858 
level 2 units 322 120 
level 3 units 39 19 
Jog likelihood -5370 -1055 
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hosp. level variance 
group level variance 
intra-hosp. correlation 
hosp. time-wise 
correlation 
0.072** 
(0.023) 
0.078 
(0.046) 
2.1% 
2.3% 
**p~0.05;*p~O.I; H 0 :f3=0;H1 :f3,;0 
Heart Failure mortality 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.046** 
(0.000) 
0% 
1.4% 
Table 5.11: Three-level one-stage logit estimated coefficients for heart failure 
mortality 
Dependent variable: separate type 
public private 
hospital hospital 
Age 0.016 0.050 
(0.026) (0.068) 
Age squared 2.5E-04 3. lE-05 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.060 0.041 
(0.051) (0.094) 
Length of stay 
-0.135** -0.193** 
(0.012) (0.021) 
Length of stay squared 0.006** 0.007** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Charlson score 0.276** 0.283** 
(0.014) (0.024) 
City (patient) 
-0.214* 0.488** 
(0.129) (0.218) 
Emergency 
-0.222** -0.447** 
(0.085) (0.112) 
Private patient -0.259** -0.205 
(0.107) (0.157) 
Other patient -0.277** -0.329* 
(0.102) (0.178) 
Total hosp. HF cases 
-3.9E-04 0.001 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Hosp. case mix index 0.174 1.247** 
(0.311) (0.322) 
Hosp. metropolitan -0.200 -0.523** 
(0.212) (0.199) 
Hosp. teaching 0.263 
(0.201) 
constant 
-5.201 
-7.418 
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(1.023) (2.688) 
level I units 23,885 7,351 
level 2 units 336 170 
level 3 units 49 22 
log likelihood -6165 -1946 
hosp. level variance 0.023* 0.004 
(0.011) (0.021) 
group level variance 0.070** 0.226 
(0.000) (0.181) 
intra-hosp. correlation 0.7% 0.1% 
hosp. time-wise 
correlation 2.1% 6.4% 
**p~0.05;*p~O.J; H, :f3=0;HI :f3*0 
Stroke Mortality 
Table 5.12: Three-level one-stage logit estimated coefficients for stroke mortality 
Dependent variable: separate type 
public private 
hospital hospital 
Age -0.087** 0.020 
(0.016) (0.063) 
Age squared 0.001 ** 4.2E-04 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Male -0.141** -0.135 
(0.041) (0.098) 
Length of stay -0.172** -0.129** 
(0.010) (0.022) 
Length of stay squared 0.004** 0.004** 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Charlson score 0.241 ** 0.324** 
(0.012) (0.027) 
City (patient) -0.175** 0.062 
(0.073) (0.161) 
Emergency 1.205** 0.558** 
(0.074) (0.112) 
Private patient -0.290** -0.450** 
(0.075) (0.143) 
Other patient -0.203** -0.111 
(0.075) (0.165) 
Total hosp. stroke cases 4.2E-04 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.001) 
Hosp. case mix index 0.140 -0.851 ** 
(0.283) (0.329) 
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Hosp. metropolitan 0.271 0.225 
(0.175) (0.167) 
Hosp. teaching 0.206 
(0.211) 
constant -1.974 -6.291 
(0.612) (2.425) 
level 1 units 25,863 8,158 
level 2 units 331 166 
level 3 units 38 22 
log likelihood -8812 -1783 
hosp. level variance 0.068 0.000 
(0.038) (0.000) 
group level variance 0.077 0.001 
(0.047) (0.004) 
intra-hosp. correlation 2% 0% 
hosp. time-wise 
correlation 2.2% 0.03% 
**pS0.05;*pSO.l; H0 :j3=0;H1 :j3o;'0 
30 day Post-discharge mortality 
Table 5.13: Three-level one-stage logit estimated coefficients for post discharge 
mortality 
Dependent variable: post-discharge status 
public private 
hospital hospital 
Age 0.003** 0.016** 
(0.004) (0.008) 
Age squared 2.9E-04** 2.2E-04** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Male 0.281 ** 0.473** 
(0.012) (0.021) 
Length of stay 0.083** 0.158** 
(0.003) (0.005) 
Length of stay squared -0.002** -0.004** 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Charlson score 0.325** 0.362** 
(0.002) (0.003) 
City (patient) 0.113** -0.096** 
(0.023) (0.031) 
Emergency 0.698** 0.725** 
(0.014) (0.024) 
Private patient -0.059** -0.478** 
(0.024) (0.028) 
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Other patient -0.046* -0.861 ** 
(0.024) (0.040) 
Total hosp. seps(OOs) 0.001 •• -0.001 ** 
i (0.000) (0.000) 
' Hosp. case mix index 0.018 0.652** 
(0.042) (0.054) 
Hosp. metropolitan -0.368** -0.393** 
(0.031) (0.036) 
Hosp. teaching -0.163** 
(0.031) 
constant -6.928 -8.440 
(0.147) (0.269) 
level I units 1,971,656 1,441,204 
level 2 units 349 283 
level 3 units 40 39 
log likelihood -133101 -52099 
hosp. level variance 0.027** 0.053** 
(0.003) (0.000) 
group level variance 0.218** 0.131 ** 
(0.000) (0.023) 
intra-hosp. correlation 0.8% 1.5% I hosp. time-wise 
correlation 6.2% 3.8% 
i 
**ps0.05; * ps0.1: H0 : /3 = O;H, : /3 ot 0 
The above results show consistent outcomes with the pooled public and private hospital 
analyses for all general patient characteristics. They also constitute an interesting discovery 
about the impact of patient payment types. Older, sieker and emergency patients generally 
faeed higher risks of dying in hospital or post discharge. It is worthwhile to note that 
private hospitals have higher coefficient values of the Charlson score variable compared 
with public hospitals. This implies that an increase in patient severity of illness would 
result in a greater increase in the probability of dying for patients treated in private 
hospitals compared vdth patients treated in public hospitals. The opposite is found in the 
case of emergency patients. For all in-hospital mortality cases, non-cardiac non-stroke, 
AMI, heart failure and stroke and post discharge, the coefficient values of emergency were 
higher for public hospitals than for private hospitals. This suggests that emergency patients 
in public hospitals faced a higher prohahility of dying in hospital or post discharge than 
emergency patients in private hospitals. The relatively superior performance of emergency 
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cases in private hospitals may link to the relative scarcity of those cases in the private 
system. 
Patient method of payment appears to have a significant role in the probability of suffering 
adverse events or death in hospital or post discharge. More interestingly, for the majority 
of mortality cases, private patients and patients with other payment sources (such as DV A, 
MVIT, WCA and other compensation bodies) appeared to have a lower probability of 
dying compared with public patients regardless of the ownership type of hospitals they seek 
treatment in. In other words, controlling for other factors, public patients in public or 
private hospitals tended to face a higher risk of dying than private patients and patients with 
other payment sources. This finding suggests two possibilities. On one hand, health 
insurance can be considered as a proxy for education and income. Higher income people 
tend to invest more in health care, hence, may respond better to hospital treatment. On the 
other hand, this may relate to the difference in levels of care received by public patients 
compared with private and other patients in both public and private hospitals. For adverse 
events, the same outcomes are not found. Private and other patients appeared to face a 
higher risk of adverse events than public patients. The difference in adverse event results 
may be explained by factors which will be discussed in the next section. 
While there is almost no difference between public and private hospitals in terms of the 
impact of hospital size (reflected by total number of hospital admissions) on adverse events 
and mortality, there are some noticeable variations in the impact of the hospital case mix 
index. The coefficient values of the hospital size variable are almost identical and close to 
unity for all cases. Although statistically significant, these close to unity values imply a 
practically insignificant impact of hospital size on patient probability of dying or suffering 
adverse events in either public or private hospitals. Apart from AMI and stroke mortality, 
the hospital case mix index coefficient values are higher for private hospitals. This 
indicates that the hospital case mix index seemed to have a higher impact on the probability 
of dying and suffering adverse events for patients treated in private hospitals compared 
with those treated in public hospitals, ceteris paribus. 
When important factors such as patient age, length of stay, co-morbidity conditions, and 
hospital average complexity of cases treated were controlled for, hospital teaching status 
was associated with lower post-discharge mortality rates but with higher adverse event rates 
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and AMI mortality rates. For other quality indicators, there was no significant difference 
between teaching and non-teaching public hospitals. Teaching hospitals may have high 
quality medical staff, equipment and facilities, hence expected to have better performance 
than non-teaching hospitals. At the same time, teaching hospitals are often partially staffed 
by trainee doctors who are less experienced. Hence, the quality of care may be lower 
compared with non-teaching hospitals. However, information about hospital staff numbers 
and staff composition was not available (hence not included in the model). Although the 
multi-level models are expeded to take care of heterogeneity issues including omitted 
variables as all levels, knowing the magnitude and direction of the impact of hospital 
staffing situation on quality of care would be beneficial. 
The results for another hospital characteristic, hospital's location, appear to be more 
consistent. Keeping other patient and hospital features unchanged, urban public and private 
seemed to perform better than their rural counterparts in cases of non-cardiac non-stroke 
mortality, heart failure mortality and post-discharge mortality but worse in the case of 
adverse events. Compared with rural hospitals, metropolitan hospitals generally are more 
able to attract highly qualified staff and obtain advanced medical equipment. Hence, the 
metropolitan hospital performance is expected to be superior to that of rural hospitals. 
Similar to the ease of hospital teaching status, the results for the impact of hospital location 
may be partly influenced by the lack of information on hospital staffing situation. 
To summarise, there are three main approaches in examining hospital quality of care: the 
count data approach, the two-level two-step approach (combination of logit and the panel 
data random effects), and the multi-level logit approach. In this chapter, only results of the 
multi-level logit models are presented. Results of the count data models and the two-level 
two-step model are provided in the Appendix A. The following table provides the 
summary of results of three main methods. For each approach, only results of the most 
reasonable method are presented. More specifically, for the count data method, the results 
summary of the two-level, random intercept model is selected, and for the multi-level logit 
model, only the result summary of three-level random intercept (three-level one-step) 
model is selected. 
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Table 5.14: Results summary of the three main approaches for quality of care 
Count data Two-level, two- Three-level,one-
approach stage approach stage logit approach 
Adverse event rate +** + ** 
-
In-hospital all disease +** •• 
-
-
mortality 
AMI in-hospital mortality +** 
-
-
Heart failure in-hospital +** + + 
mortality 
Stroke in-hospital +** ** 
- -
mortality 
30 day post discharge +** +** +** 
mortality 
**pS0.05; *pSO.I 
(the sign '_' indicates a lower adverse event or mortality rate for public hospitals and the sign '+' 
indicates a higher adverse event or mortality rate for public hospitals ) 
The above results suggest that the selection of an estimation approach strongly influences 
the final outcomes for most cases. Only post discharge mortality results were consistent 
across the three approaches. Heart failure mortality results showed some consistency but 
the ownership variable was not always statistically significant. 
As was highlighted earlier, both the count data and the two-level, two-stage models have 
estimation limitations. The count data approach loses important information about patients 
in the process of aggregating the data to the hospital level. The two-level two-stage 
approach ignores the interdependence of patients in the same hospital. Given those 
drawbacks, the three-level one-stage model appears to be the most appropriate model for 
examining hospital quality of care. As a result, the result discussions of WA public and 
private hospital quality of care will be based on the outcomes of the three-level one-stage 
model. 
5.4 Discussion 
This section discusses the advantages of the multilevel model used in the analysis and 
provides possible explanations for the results and discusses factors that may have crucial 
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impacts on the obtained outcomes. In addition, possible policy implications of the 
regression results are also mentioned. 
The multi-level logistic one-stage model is chosen for this study analysis due to the nature 
of the data obtained and the advantages of this method for dealing with the characteristics 
of those data. Patient discharge data for all hospitals in Western Australia in the period 
1995-2004 are used. By nature, the dataset contains information at two levels including 
patient level and hospital level. In addition, for each hospital, the time span naturally forms 
another level. This phenomenon can be characterized as a cluster problem: "individuals are 
often clustered within higher level group, which themselves may be clustered within further 
groups. This clustering often results from shared characteristics ... such clustering imposes 
a correlation structure on the data which invalidates classical assumptions of independence 
and hence, common techniques will be inefficient" (Rice & Jones, 1997, pp.562). Apart 
from the technical drawbacks of using a single level method when the data has a multilevel 
nature, using single level analysis potentially fails to exploit the richness of information 
contained in the data. Consequently, the validity of results obtained from such an approach 
is questionable. 
The results give a mixed picture about the relative performance of public and private 
hospitals in Western Australia in the period 1995-2004. The data analysis shows that 
public hospitals in Western Australia performed better than their private counterparts when 
adverse events and non-cardiac and non-stroke mortality were used as hospital quality 
indicators. Their performance appeared to be inferior when the indicator was 30 day post-
discharge mortality. Since results of other indicators such as AMI, heart failure and stroke 
mortality are not statistically significant in the three-level one-stage approach, no 
conclusion can be drawn about the relative performance of public and private hospitals in 
Western Australia in terms of those indicators. 
As noticed in the econometric analysis, there are inconsistencies with respect to the results 
of adverse events. Patients with a higher Charlson score are expected to be more 
vulnerable to adverse events. However, the results of adverse events show the opposite. 
With respect to patient methods of payments, while private patients and patients with other 
sources in both public and private hospitals consistently had lower risk of dying compared 
with public patients, the opposite can be found with the adverse event case. Private patients 
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and patients with other sources of payment are found to be at higher risk of suffering 
adverse events than public patients. The above inconsistencies may due to factors other 
than the included patient and hospital characteristics such as adverse event identification 
and reporting. 
As shown in the descriptive statistics section, public hospitals had higher adverse event 
rates for all age groups and all Charlson Index groups. This might give the impression that 
their performance was inferior compared with private hospitals. However, patients in 
public hospitals in general had more severe co-morbidity compared with those in private 
hospitals. In addition, with a higher average case-mix index, public hospitals appeared to 
treat greater a proportion of complicated cases compared with private hospitals. 
Controlling for all above factors, it is possible that public hospitals truly performed better 
than private hospitals. However, as with other variables in the regression, the values and 
signs of the estimated coefficients of hospital ownership variable may also be influenced by 
adverse event identification and adverse event reporting in Australian public hospitals. 
The identification of adverse events by ICD-9 and ICD-10 does not give any indication of 
whether or not the admitting hospital is responsible for the occurrence of adverse events. 
Apart from Victorian hospitals, the recording of adverse events in all Australian hospitals 
suffers from the above limitation. On ABC Radio National on the 5th June 2006, Prof. 
Stephen Duckett pointed out the difference in the way Victorian hospitals record adverse 
events: "The Victorian data is different from the data in all other states in that every patient 
discharged from every hospital, public or private in Victoria has a diagnosis and procedure 
codes recorded, but in Victoria they also record whether the diagnosis was present on 
admission or whether the diagnosis arose during the course of admission. And so what 
we're able to do is say did any diagnosis arise during the course of admission? And by 
definition those are adverse events ... "(Duckett, 2006). 
Adverse event identification could become troublesome due to the operational interaction 
between public and private hospitals. If complications arise during surgery in a private 
hospital, sometimes patients are often transferred to a public facility. Adverse events in this 
case should on! y be recorded in the private hospital, but it might be also recorded in the 
public hospital. In other words, adverse events in this study might not be accurately 
identified and consequently, the outcomes might not reflect the true situation. 
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Conversely, the superior performance of public hospitals in WA in terms of adverse events 
eould be due to underreporting in Australian public hospitals. This practice happened and 
was exposed by the media in other states of Australia including NSW, QLD and ACT 
(Faunce, T. & Bolsin, S., 2004). Staff members who tried to report malpractice were 
allegedly isolated and intimidated. In the Public Hearing of the Inquiry into Health 
Funding in Brisbane, March 2006, Mr Anthony Morris QC described the behavior of public 
hospital managers: " ... first, you deny the fact: secondly, you bury the evidence; and thirdly, 
you shoot the messenger" and then described consequences that the whistleblowers face 
which included having: " ... their honesty, their motives, and their clinical competence 
challenged; and being victimized with inconvenient rosters and other workplace 
impediments; and otherwise bullied until they are eventually eased (or squeezed) out of the 
system altogether" (quoted from House Standing Committee on Health and Ageing, 2006, 
p.216). The problem of underreporting adverse events is also observed by journalist Mike 
Steketee: "Even if they involve a small proportion of cases, there are far too many mistakes 
in hospitals, ones that can ruin people's lives and occasionally kill them ... So potent is the 
politics of hospital care that governments throw everything at cases that make it into the 
media and are ruthless in covering up those that don't" (Steketee, 2007, p.l). 
Underreporting adverse events in Australian public hospitals has reached such a serious 
level that researchers and medical professionals have called for a cultural change. Kingston 
et al. (2004, p.41) stated that "our study has identified, in an Australian context, that 
innovations to improve patient safety, such as incident reporting, require cultural change. 
A climate that does not foster disclosure and investigation of errors has been found to be 
pervasive in healthcare systems ... and is clearly detrimental to patients' best interests". 
Paddy A. Dewan, the Head of Paediatric Surgery in Sunshine hospital in Victoria, has 
insisted that "cultural change is needed to allow staff to understand that a complaint from a 
patient or a staff member should be viewed as an opportunity for change ... " (Dewan, 2005, 
p.253). 
The above observations do not definitely indicate that the same practice has been or has not 
been carried out in Western Australian public hospitals. According to the Department of 
Health, WA, a "safety-aware" culture and clinical incident reporting are encouraged in 
Western Australian public and private hospitals. The Sentinel Reporting system was 
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implemented in October 2003. Through reporting, investigating and analyzing the adverse 
events, preventative strategies to improve patient safety are believed to be developed and 
implemented (Department of Health, WA, 2006). Two notes can be drawn from the above 
fact: firstly, only one year of this study dataset belongs to the period of Sentinel Event 
reporting in WA; and secondly, the effectiveness of the reporting program has not been 
evaluated. In other words, there is no guarantee that underreporting of adverse events did 
not occur in Western Australian public hospitals in the period 1995-2004. The possibility 
that data limitations influence the finding in this case can not be ruled out. 
Another issue concerning adverse event econometric results relates to patient length of stay. 
As mentioned, the exclusion aims to avoid the endogeneity problem caused by a two-way 
causation relationship between adverse events and patient length of stay. However, one can 
argue that excluding LOS might cause another problem in the estimation, namely omitting 
variable. Even if one can argue that patient length of stay can be considered as one of an 
unobserved factors that multi-level model can account for, acknowledgement of the 
potential variable omission is necessary. Given issues concerning adverse events 
identification, reporting, and regression estimation, the econometric results of this indicator 
needs to be treated with caution. 
In assessing hospital performance, using multiple mortality indicators seems to be 
beneficial. This study includes a wide range of indicators involving both in-hospital and 
post-discharge mortality. The purpose of using different medical conditions for in-hospital 
mortality is that this takes into account the varied degree of professional consensus 
regarding the need for hospitalisation. As a result, biasness is potentially minimised. For 
example, if only 30 day post-discharge mortality was used as a quality indicator, a 
conclusion of inferior performance of public hospitals would have been drawn. 
The regression results were significantly different from those that were obtained in the 
descriptive statistics. In the descriptive analysis for all ages, the Charlson Index, and length 
of stay groups, public hospitals generally performed worse than private hospitals. 
Apparently, the exclusion criteria and the control for all patient characteristics together with 
hospital characteristics have resulted in different outcomes. One can only confidently 
suggest that public hospitals performed worse than private hospitals in terms of post 
discharge mortality. For other mortality indicators, public hospitals appeared to perform 
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better than their private counterparts or there was no significant evidence to suggest a 
difference in perfonnance of the two sectors. 
The above outcomes were obtained when all patient characteristics and some hospital 
characteristics were taken into account. However, for an appropriate assessment of relative 
performance of the two sectors, other variables that were unavailable in this dataset would 
ideally be included. These include information about the relative staff composition of 
public and private hospitals and capital. The following section will discuss the situation of 
public and private hospitals in Australia which is also relevant to Western Australian 
hospitals. 
Public hospitals have been taking the major share of complex cases while their funding and 
other resources including number of available beds, new equipment and quality staff have 
shrunk. The heavy work load in public hospitals has been reflected in their majority share 
of emergency admissions. As Ruth Pollard and Mark Metherell (2007) indicate "In the past 
decade, a clear division of labor has evolved: public hospitals are now dominant in 
emergency and medicine, while private hospitals rule in elective surgery, accounting for 
55.7 per cent of all operations , .. Those who end up in public system are sicker, with more 
advanced cancer and other conditions that make it more difficult to treat, ... on the other 
hand, the private hospital makes its living out of relatively easy diseases to treat [such as] 
early cancer which is susceptive to surgery therapy"(Pollard & Metherell, 2007, p.l). For 
Western Australian hospitals, as the descriptive statistics show, in the period 1995-2004, 
public hospitals admitted 68 per cent of emergency patients and the average case mix 
index for public hospital is 0.85 while it is 0.78 for private hospitals (AIHW, 2006). 
The situation is challenging for public hospitals when it involves the total number of 
admissions and the number of available beds. From 2000 to 2005, total admission numbers 
in Australian public hospitals increased from 3,882 million to 4,276 million (10%) while 
their available beds increased by 5% from 52,410 in 2000 to 55,112 in 2005 (AIHW, 2006). 
When the increase in number of available beds does not keep pace with the increase in the 
number of admissions, the occupancy rate can reach the level that creates "access block" 
(where the capacity constraint is met) and this is the situation that major Australian public 
hospitals have evidently been facing. As indicated later in the cost efficiency chapter, the 
average occupancy rate of major hospitals in Australia was 87% in the period 2003-2005 
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(without data from the ACT, WA). Stephen Leeder describes the crisis in public hospitals: 
"studies have shown that "access block" occurs once hospital occupancy rates exceed 85 
per cent, but large city hospitals in Australia commonly operate with occupancy rates over 
95 per cent" (Leeder, 2007). 
The number of nurses and doctors play a major role in the quality of care provided by 
hospitals. Aiken et al. (2002) found that hospital staffing had significant impacts on patient 
outcomes. The authors suggested that adequate staffing and hospital managerial support 
for nursing are the crucial force in improving the hospital quality of care (Aiken et al., 
2002). Australian public hospitals in general are facing critical shortages of nurses and 
doctors which are attributable to the lack of funding from governments and the growth of 
the private sector. As mentioned in the Australian hospital industry chapter, the 
Commonwealth and State governments share the cost of running public hospitals. The 
Commonwealth contributes according to the AHCAs. However, during the period 1996-
2006, the Commonwealth share of public hospital funding decreased from 45 to 41 per 
cent, and state and territory government funding share increased from 46 to 51 per cent 
(AIHW, 2007). When there are more hospital admissions due to population growth and 
ageing, the funding in public hospitals appears to be insufficient. Francis Sullivan 
comments on the situation "What is remarkable is the fact that the public sector is doing 
much more than it was before, for no more funding" (quoted in Pollard & Metherell, 2007). 
In Western Australia, in 2000 the media reported that major public hospitals in Perth had 
occasionally closed their accident/emergency wards, and cancelled elective surgery due to a 
shortage of staff which was as a result of funding problems (Lopez, 2000). 
The lack of funding tightens public hospital budgets and consequently, payment and work 
conditions for hospital staff may suffer. At the same time, the growth of private hospitals 
puts additional pressure on the public hospital staff shortage problem. With an increasing 
number of private hospitals, the demand for public hospital services may reduce. However, 
as Prof. Ian McAuley argues: "but they will also have reduced capacity to meet their 
demand ... They will either loose staff or will have to pay staff more out of constrained 
budgets" (quoted in McAuley, 2004, p13). Pollard and Merethell describe the problem 
"more than half of all surgery is performed in private hospitals ... potentially sucking more 
doctors and nurses out of the public system" (Pollard & Merethell, 2007). Public hospitals' 
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tight budget constraints together with higher payment from private hospitals have resulted 
in the resignation of nurses who seek casual work with private agencies. In many hospitals, 
many nurses on duty are agency temporary staff rather than permanent hospital staff. As a 
result, the continuity and familiarity with patients' need from nurses are lacking which 
potentially leads to the decline in quality of care. 
The above information suggests that, compared with private hospitals, public hospitals 
generally operate in more restricted conditions in terms of finance and staff numbers. 
Issues involved the lack of information about WA hospitals' financial and staffing 
situation, and the use of the multi-level models in this study should be addressed. The 
study was not able to incorporate information about the financial and staffing situation of 
hospitals in WA due to the unavailability of the required data. The multi-level models with 
hospital random intercepts aim to account for unobserved factors at hospital level. One 
may argue that hospital financial and staffing situation can be considered as one of hospital 
unobserved factors. Consequently, the results obtained can be considered as valid. 
However, the missing information is quite vital in terms of hospital operation and 
performance and knowing the direction and the magnitude of the hospital financial and 
staffing situation on hospital performance would be beneficial. 
In terms of policy implications of the results, the difference in the results obtained from the 
descriptive statistics and the econometric analysis indicate some important changes in 
patient pools, range of services, and funding for hospitals. The descriptive statistics 
analysis in general suggests an inferior performance of WA public hospitals whereas the 
econometric analysis shows that only one out of six hospital quality indicators is possibly 
associated "ith inferior performance of WA public hospitals when given the same patient 
and hospital features as those of private hospitals. Considering the important roles of 
public hospitals in providing health care services to the Australian population and their 
relatively good performance, policies involving reducing the gap of the operating 
conditions between public and private hospitals need to be considered, 
As part of reducing the gap between public and private hospitals, policies to minimize the 
difference in patients treated in the two sectors are needed. Since public hospitals, as 
shown in the descriptive statistics, admit more patients with severe co-morbidity 
conditions, reflected by higher average Charlson scores, and treat more complicated cases, 
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reflected by higher hospital case-mix index, private hospitals should be encouraged to 
increase their share. This could be done via policies aiming at increasing private health 
insurance coverage, encouraging private hospitals to expand their range of services, and 
preventing their cream-skimming behaviour. 
At the same time, given the severe lack of funding and serious medical staff shortage in 
public hospitals, policies for improving their hospital financial and staffing conditions are 
also needed. With respect to financing public hospitals, the decrease of Commonwealth 
share, as pointed out by AIHW media report on the 5th October 2007, is worrisome. With 
sufficient funding, public hospitals would be able to provide better services to the 
population by having more available beds, better medical equipment and more nurses and 
doctors. Also with sufficient funding, medical staff in public hospitals would be paid as 
well as those in private hospitals, and their working conditions would be less stressful if the 
staff shortage problem is fixed. 
In this study, policy implications can also found in the results concerning patient methods 
of payments to hospital. Results in this study also show that, for most cases, being a public 
patient is associated with higher risk of dying compared with being a private patient or a 
patient with other source of payment regardless of the ownership nature of the hospital. 
From the patient point of view, being a public patient does not seem beneficial if their 
survival chance is lower than being a private patient. Together with other advantages 
gained from purchasing private health insurance including a tax benefit, no hospital waiting 
time, the choice of doctor and accommodation when admitted to hospital, better hospital 
quality of care reflected in better survival chance would be a good additional motivation for 
potential hospital patients to obtain private health insurance. In a country like Australia, 
where private health insurance coverage has not significantly increased, the results of this 
study provide useful information for policy makers who try to increase private health 
insurance in the population. 
However, the disadvantages endured by public patients in this case also raise a serious 
concern about equity in receiving hospital care. Public patients generally have lower 
income and social status compared with private patients. They receive low level of 
hospital services reflected in longer waiting time and no choice of doctor and 
accommodation. Results of this study indicate that they also have lower survival chance 
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regarding adverse events and mortality. Policies from governments to improve the public 
patients' situation are, therefore, needed. 
The final policy implication from this study relates to the survival rates of rural patients. 
Patients whose residency located in non-metropolitan area were found to face higher risk of 
suffering adverse events and death. This result is consistent with the finding about death 
rates from heart disease by AIHW which indicates rural and regional areas have death rates 
40% higher than cities (Cresswell, 2008). As mentioned in the result section, this might be 
an indication of lacking in timely access to hospital care for rural patients. Policies for 
refonning the provision of health services to rural residents are needed. Arrangements such 
as increase transport subsidies to rural patients to travel the long distances to get tertiary or 
other specialist care and adequate accommodation for permanent and visiting health 
workers in rural areas are worth considering. In addition, the proposal of replacing state 
run health services with a new network of rural health district by the National Rural Health 
Alliance (Cresswell, 2008) is also a possibility. 
5.5 Conclusion 
In summary, for quality of care of public and private hospitals in Western Australia, this 
study uses a multi-level model method due to the multilevel nature of the dataset and the 
advantages of the method. A range of indicators including hospital adverse events and in-
hospital and post discharge mortalities are examined. The results show that public 
hospitals perform better than private hospitals if adverse events and non-cardiac non-stroke 
mortality are used as quality of care indicators, perform worse if post-discharge mortality is 
used as quality of care indicator. No statistically significant evidence can be found for the 
difference in the two sectors' performance when Al.VII mortality, heart failure mortality and 
stroke mortality are used as quality of care indicators. The results also show that public 
patients and in general have a higher risk of suffering adverse events or death compared 
with private and other patients. The results have policy implications concerning private 
hospital operation, public hospital funding and private health insurance. In the next two 
chapters, another aspect of public hospital performance, cost technical efficiency, will be 
examined. 
132 
CHAPTER 6: COST TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF AUSTRALIAN 
PUBLIC HOSPITALS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND 
ESTIMATION METHODS 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have discussed the performance of Australian hospitals in terms 
of quality of care. Another important aspect of Australian hospital performance is hospital 
cost technical efficiency. The relationship between cost technical efficiency and hospital 
quality of care will be studied in this chapter and chapter 7. The cost performance of public 
hospitals in New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), Queensland (QLD), South Australia 
(SA), Tasmania (TAS) and Northern Territory (NT) will be investigated. Public hospitals 
in Western Australia and the Australian Capital Territory are not included in this study due 
to data unavailability. 
The chapter is organized as follows: section 6.2 provides information about data source 
and data preparation for the analysis; section 6.3 discusses the methods used in the analysis; 
section 6.4 provides details of variable construction; and section 6.5 provides results of the 
descriptive analysis. 
6.2 Data source and data preparation 
Hospital level data for this study are provided by the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare (AIHW). The data provide information about hospital non-staff and staff 
expenditures, staff number, total number of patient stay (LOS), and patient admission 
volumes for age groups, hospital general output categories, hospital number of deaths and 
adverse events, and hospital Charlson scores. According to the data source (AIHW), all 
cost values are real values. The hospital outputs are emergency visits, outpatient visits, and 
inpatient admissions including medical, surgical admissions and admissions of other DRGs. 
Information about hospital peer group and teaching status is also included. In the original 
dataset there are 691, 700 and 698 hospitals in 2002-2003, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005 
respectively. The following table shows the numbers of hospitals in each peer group for 
each year in the original dataset. 
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Table 6.1: Hospital numbers iu the original dataset 
Hospitals group 2002-03 2003- 2004-
04 05 
Teaching 54 68 69 
Non teaching 637 632 629 
Peer group Al (principle referral) 68 68 75 
Peer group A2 (specialist women's and children's) 11 10 9 
Peer group Bl (large major city) 24 25 22 
Peer group B2 (large regional and remote) 23 22 18 
Peer group Cl (medium major cities and regional 27 32 31 
group 1) 
f Peer group C2 (medium major cities and regional 74 75 72 
group 2) 
Peer group DI (small regional acute) 82 88 98 
Peer group D2 (remote acute) 117 115 106 
Peer group D3 (small non-acute) 29 29 35 
Peer group E2 (multi-purpose service) 43 46 46 
I Peer group E3 (hospice) 4 4 4 
' I Peer group E4 (rehahilitation) 8 7 6 
I I Peer group ES (mother-craft) 8 8 7 
I Peer group E9 (other non-acute) 22 21 14 
I Peer group F (psychiatric) 18 19 19 
Peer group G (un-peered and other acute) 127 128 132 
total 691 700 698 
The data preparation process involves re-grouping using hospital peers and some data 
exclusion. For re-grouping, hospitals are re-divided into four subgroups: peer group A 
(major hospitals) comprises of hospitals originally in groups A 1 and A2, peer group B 
(large hospitals) comprises of hospitals originally in groups BI and B2, peer group C 
(medium hospitals) comprises of hospitals originally in groups Cl and C2, and peer group 
D (small acute hospitals) comprises of hospitals originally in groups DI and D2. Hospitals 
in peer group D3 are not included in the new peer group D since they are non-acute 
hospitals. Peer groups D3, E2, E3, E4, ES and E9 become sub-groups of new peer group E 
(sub-acute and non-acute hospitals). Peer groups F and G remain unchanged. 
The above regrouping is consistent with the public hospital peer group classification by 
AIHW (Australian Hospital Statistics 05-06, Table A2.8 Appendix 2). Since this study 
attempts to investigate the cost technical efficiency of all hospitals as a whole as well as 
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that of each peer group, the re-grouping process is beneficial in two ways: it reduces the 
number of peer group dummy variables in a sensible way which increases the degrees of 
freedom for the regression analysis, and it results in a reasonable number of observations 
for peer group analyses. 
The data exclusion process involves the elimination of some peer groups and hospitals with 
missing values. Hospitals in new peer groups E and G are excluded due to significant 
differences in their services and sizes within themselves (e.g. peer group G had a mean total 
cost of AUD 3,605,400 with a standard deviation of AUD15,083,300 which is substantially 
higher than the mean). Peer group F is eliminated due to its small number of observations. 
The second exclusion involves missing values. All observations with missing values or 
with values of zero for total cost, the input prices and outputs were excluded. Originally, 
the dataset provided by the AIHW consisted of 2089 observations. At the final stage of 
data preparation, there were 494 observations in total with 176, 176 and 142 observations 
for 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05 respectively. Table 6.2 shows the number of hospitals 
in each peer group across time in the final dataset. 
Table 6.2: Number of hospitals in each new peer group for each year 
Hospital peer 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Total 
group 
Peer group A 45 45 54 144 
Peer group B 37 36 30 103 
Peer group C 61 66 45 172 
Peer group D 33 29 13 75 
Total 176 176 142 494 
6.3 Model specification and methods 
The general model of total costs (TC) for hospital i can be written as: 
TC, =TC(Q,,W,,X,)+e, (6.1) 
where TC is total cost, Q presents hospital outputs, W input prices and X environmental 
variables at the i th hospital. 
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In general there are three methods used to measure firm cost technical efficiency and each 
has its own advantages and limitations. The OLS method is often used for deterministic 
frontier models. The OLS method is well known and easy to implement. The drawbacks of 
the OLS method are reflected in the fact that it requires specification of a functional form 
for the cost function and that the coefficients provide information on average performance 
rather than frontier performance. At the same time, there is no clear distinction between 
cost inefficiency and statistical noise in this method. The DEA method, without requiring a 
specific cost functional form and estimating cost technical efficiency in comparison with 
the frontier, has overcome both problems of the OLS method. However, the DEA method 
has a major limitation in its assumption about the absolute absence of data statistical noise 
(Newhouse, 1994). The SFA method, on the other hand, provides information on the 
frontier and accommodates the effects of data statistical noise. However, the cost 
functional form needs to be specified in the SF A method. 
In this study, the SF A method is chosen for the cost technical efficiency analysis due to its 
relative superiority compared with the other two methods. Among the three methods, the 
inferiority of the OLS method is noticeable. The choice between SFA and DEA involves a 
trade-off concerning assumptions about cost function specification and statistical noise. 
The assumption about the absolute absence of statistical noise in the DEA method appears 
too unrealistic. It is unlikely that bias resulting from environmental heterogeneity, external 
shocks, measurement errors or omitted variables do not exist. At the same time, the 
disadvantages of functional form specification in SF A can be reduced by allowing both 
Cobb-Douglas and trans-log cost functions to be estimated in the analysis and the more 
appropriate estimations will be selected. With all the above selection considerations, the 
SFA method appears to be the most appropriate method for the cost technical efficiency 
analysis in this study. 
For multi-product firms such as hospitals, the most popular cost functional models are 
Cobb-Douglas and Translog. The Cobb-Douglas cost model takes the form 
J K N 
ln(TC) "'.Bo+ 'La1 1nQ1 + 2:.B, lnW, + LBnXn (6.2) 
)""-1 k"'Jl /'l=t 
The translog cost model takes the form 
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(6.3) 
where Q indexes hospital outputs, W indexes hospital input prices and Xis a vector of 
environmental variables. As seen, the main difference between the Cobb-Douglas model 
and the trans-log model is the cross product terms. 
In the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), the error term comprises two elements v; and u; 
where v; represents statistical noise and u; represents the cost inefficiency. 
(6.4) 
where v; is a normally distributed random error with zero mean and variance u; and u; is 
the inefficiency term, assumed to be positive, with variance u; . 
With the available data spread over three years, both panel data and pooled cross sectional 
methods can be used in this study and the results compared. For the panel data method, the 
inefficiency terms u11 are assumed to have a normal distribution truncated at the zero point. 
The log-likelihood function is 
J(N) JN lnL="2 ~I; {ln(2Jr)+ln(u;)}- 2 ~(7;-l)ln(l-r) 
--~)n I+ I11(,-l r -Nln{l-ct>(-z)}--N z ] N { ( r, ) } - I -2 
2 ;.t t=I 2 
N IN IN7/ 2 
+ IIn{l-ct>(z;)}+-Iz;' --II &u 
2 
;.1 2 ,., 2 ,., 1=1 (I - r )us (6.5) 
Where Us =(u: +u;)l/ 2 , A=uulu,, r=u: 1u;, &II =yu-XUfJ' 1711 =exp{-17(t-7;)}, 
-
z = µl(ru;)u', ct>(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution, and 
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T 
µ(1- y)- sy "'t.l/1rE11 
" t=I 
Z; = T 
[y(l-y)a-;{1 + <!11?i -J)y} J11 2 
(6.6) 
'"' 
The technical efficiency (or inefficiency) will be estimated by 
~[-~) 
E(u11 I e,,) = µ 1+a-1 [ µ, l 
1-<l> --1 l ;,) 
(6.7) 
Where 
(6.8) 
(6.9) 
For the cross-sectional approach, there are three assumptions about the distribution of the 
inefficiency term u, : half normal, exponential, and normal truncated at the zero point. 
The log-likelihood functions are 
Half normal model 
lnL = :t{~1n(1')-lnrrs + ln<I>( 81A.)- e,',~} 
1• 1 2 2 a-8 2rr8 
(6.10) 
Exponential model 
I L - ~{ I rr; I ,....(e, -(8,2 18°!, l n - £... - nrr +--+ n"" . 
i>:d u 2a~ av ) 
(6.11) 
Truncated normal 
N { 1 In L L --ln(2Jr) 
l•l 2 
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where as = (a; +a; )11 ', ;.., = O'" IO',, y = O'; IO'; and <D(.)is the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. 
The estimation for u, is 
The technical efficiency (or inefficiency) will be estimated by 
I { l-<D(-0',-µ.,IO',)} 1 ') E,=E{exp(u,) e,) ----- exp(µ,1 +-0', 1-<I>(-µ,J O',) 2 
\\lbere µ,1 and O'. are defined: 
For the half normal model as 
For the exponential model as 
- 2 I µ,.i - Bi -crv (J'u 
For the truncated normal as 
(6.13) 
(6.I4) 
(6. 15) 
(6.16) 
(6.17) 
(6.18) 
(6.19) 
(6.20) 
In hospital cost technical efficiency measurement applying the SFA approach, two main 
options involving the analysis procedure exist: two-stage or one-stage. In the two-stage 
procedure, the efficiency scores obtained from an econometric frontier (in the first stage) 
are treated as the dependent variables in the second step with a set of organizational factors 
as the independent variables. There are two issues for this approach: the difficulty in the 
choice of variables in each stage and the violation of the independent and identical 
distribution assumption of the efficiency terms. 
With all above issues, single-stage estimation as suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) 
and used in Rosko (2001) and Brown (2003) is considered as another possibility. The cost 
function specification is 
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(6.22) 
where u,, is a non-negative random variable, associated \vith technical inefficiency of cost 
and assumed to have normal distribution truncated at zero point. u11 has variance of er: and 
mean of z,,8 where z 11 is a vector of variables influencing firm efficiency and 8 is a vector 
of corresponding parameters. As seen, the estimated inefficiencies are still a function of 
firm factors, but they are incorporated directly into the maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE). In other words, all parameters are estimated simultaneously in one step to avoid 
inconsistency in inefficiencies' distribution assumptions. 
In this study, the single-stage panel data estimation of hospital cost effieiency suggested by 
Battese and Coelli (1995) will be performed. Panel data method is chosen since the 
interdependence of hospital performance across time is being taken into account. The 
single-stage cross-sectional estimations and the two-stage estimations will also be carried 
out and the results will be provided in the Appendices Bl, B2, Cl and C2 for the purpose 
of comparison. The follov,,ing table provides a summary of the estimations in this study. 
Table 6.3: Estimations in this study 
Efficiency One-step estimation (Frontier Two-step estimation (STA TA 9) 
distribution 4.l) 
Pooled Cross- Panel Pooled Cross-section Panel 
section 
-
Exponential No No Yes No 
-
Truncated 
i ! half normal No No Yes No 
Truncated I normal Yes Yes Yes Yes I i 
---
6.4 Variable Description and Construction 
As explained in the previous section, whether the one-stage method or the two-stage 
method is used, there are two main equations in this hospital cost efficiency analysis. The 
first equation is the basic cost equation with total hospital costs as the dependent variable 
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and input prices, outputs, state and time dummies as the explanatory variables. The second 
equation explores factors influencing hospital cost efficiency. Explanatory factors in the 
second equation include hospital quality of care, occupancy rates, input use (staff per bed), 
and hospital available bed numbers reflecting hospital size. The hospital costs, input prices 
and outputs are in natural log values. The use of total cost rather than average cost as the 
dependent variable is preferable. Since hospitals produce a wide range of outputs, it is 
troublesome to nominate a denominator in the average cost function. The use of 
conventional logarithmic functional form relaxes the assumption that the rate of change is 
constant. 
There are three measurable input prices and five outputs in this study. The three input 
prices include doctor salary, nurse salary and other staff salary. Other staff comprises 
administrative, allied health and domestic staff. The average staff salary for each hospital, 
each year is obtained by dividing the hospital staff payment by the hospital full time 
equivalent staff number. Capital-related input prices are not included due to the lack of 
available data. Although interest payments are included in the provided dataset, most of the 
values are zero. As Yong and Harris (1999) point out: "interest is not usually paid by 
public hospitals, as funds are generally provided by Governments as free equity". As a 
result, interest payments from hospitals are not a good indicator for hospital capital cost, 
and hence are excluded from the estimation. 
Doctor salaries, nurse salaries and other staff salaries are assumed to be exogenous. This 
assumption seems reasonable since Australia has both private and public hospital sectors 
competing with each other for medical and general staff. As a result, the salary is more 
likely to be decided by the market or it is the price equilibrium of demand and supply of 
doctors, nurses and other hospital staff. As an increase in input prices would likely lead to a 
rise in total costs, a positive association between hospital input prices and total costs is 
expected. 
Outputs are measured by volumes of accident and emergency visits, outpatient clinic visits 
and inpatient separations. The inpatient separations include surgical, medical and other 
DRG separations. All quantities are expected to have a positive link with the total costs 
since any increase in input prices or outputs would expectedly result in an increase in the 
total operating cost. All outputs are assumed to be exogenous. This assumption is 
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reasonable since hospital outputs are not storable and the volume of each output is more 
likely a result of demand from patients. In addition, public hospitals cannot selectively 
admit patients based on cream-skimming. 
In addition to the above input price and output variables, other industry environment 
variables and hospital characteristics are also allowed for. Industry environmental variables 
are peer group dummies, state dummies and time variable (year dummies in the case of 
pooled cross-sectional analysis). The state dummy variables intend to capture the 
differences in states' health financing policies that influence the cost of hospital services. 
The time variable is considered as a reflection of all possible change in the Australian 
hospital industry such as technology and government health policies. As mentioned, this 
study 'Will investigate cost technical efficiency for hospital peer groups as well as all public 
hospitals as a pooled group. Peer group dummy variables are included in the latter case. 
Hospital characteristics such as hospital quality of care, average occupancy rate, hospital 
staffing situation, and hospital available bed numbers are possible determinants of hospital 
costs and hence hospital cost technical efficiency. The occupancy rate is defined as the 
ratio of actual patient days to the maximum patient days (maximum patient days = 
beds*365 days). The occupancy rate is expected to have an inverse relationship with 
hospital cost inefficiency. The association between cost efficiency and quality of care can 
be either positive or negative. In order to deliver high standard health services to patients, 
hospitals might have to devote larger spending on staff, medicines, and medical equipment. 
At the same time, one might argue that if hospital resources are used efficiently, high 
quality of care will be delivered as a result. 
As a reflection of the intensity of input use, hospital full time equivalent staff number per 
available bed is included as one of the explanatory factors of hospital cost efficiency. This 
use of inputs in cost efficiency analysis can be found in Zuckerman et al. (1994), Vitaliano 
and Toren (1994), Harris and Yong (1999). Dor (1994) commented of the inclusion of 
inputs in Vitaliano and Toren ( 1994) as "the use of input combinations in the second stage 
seems fine, since only input prices legitimately belong to the cost function itself..." (Dor, 
1994, p.331 ). Hospital full time equivalent staff number per bed is expected to relate 
positively to hospital cost inefficiency since higher numbers of staff might result in higher 
costs. 
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As an explanatory factor of hospital cost efficiency, hospital quality of care is measured by 
hospital excess mortality and excess adverse event rates. The excess rates are defined as 
the difference between the observed rates and the predicted rates. Predicted hospital 
mortality and adverse event rates are obtained by standardizing the observed rates over risk 
factors such as patient age, gender, patient severity of illness, and length of stay. Since the 
dataset contains information only at hospital level, not at patient level, hospital average 
values are used instead. 
The explanatory variables for mortality and adverse event regressions include demographic 
information of patients at hospital level. They comprise of the proportion of aged patients 
(80 years and older), the proportion of male patients, the proportion of emergency 
admissions, the hospital average length of stay, and the hospital average Charlson scores. 
The hospital average Charlson score can be considered as a proxy for hospital complexity 
of cases treated. Apart from hospital gender composition, all above are expected to have 
positive link with mortality and adverse event rates. In addition, since there are variations 
of mortality and adverse event rates across peer group, states and time (as shown in the 
descriptive results in the next section), a set of those dummy variables will be included in 
the mortality and adverse event regressions. The following table provides description of all 
variables. 
Table 6.4: Variable description 
Variables 
Total cost 
Input price variables 
Doctor salary 
Nurse salary 
Other staff salary 
Output variables 
Emergency 
Outpatient 
Surgical 
Description 
Log total operating cost (Australian dollars) 
Log average doctor salary (Australian dollars 
Log average nurse salary (Australian 
dollars) 
Log average other staff salary (Australian 
dollars) 
Log emergency room visits 
Log outpatient visits 
Log surgical separations 
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I 
Medical 
OtherDRG 
Dummy variables 
Teaching 
Peer Group A 
Peer group B 
Peer group C 
NSW 
SA 
QLD 
TAS 
NT 
Year 2003-2004 
Year 2004-2005 
Quality of care variables 
Mortality rate 
Adverse event rate 
I Percentage 80 
I 
' Percentage male 
Average LOS 
Average Charlson score 
Efficiency variables 
Hosp. quality of care 
Log medical separations 
Log other DRG separations 
1 if teaching hospital 
1 if peer group A (peer group D as 
reference) 
1 if peer group B (peer group D as 
reference) 
1 if peer group C (peer group D as 
reference) 
I ifNSW (VIC as reference) 
I if SA (VIC as reference) 
1 ifQLD (VIC a5 reference) 
l ifTAS (VIC as reference) 
l if NT (VIC as reference) 
1 if year 2003-2004 (year 2002-2003 as 
reference) 
1 if year 2004-2005 (year 2002-2003 as 
reference) 
Hospital mortality rate=nurnber of 
deaths/total inpatient admissions 
Hospital adverse event rate=number of 
medical incidents/total inpatient admissions 
Hospital percentage of patients aged 80 and 
older 
Hospital percentage of male patients 
Hospital average length of stay 
Hospital average Charlson score 
Hospital excess mortality or adverse event 
rate 
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Occupancy 
FTE staff/bed 
Beds 
6.5 Descriptive statistics 
Hospital occupancy rate 
Hospital number of FTE staff per bed 
Number of hospital beds 
In this section, descriptive statistics of hospitals across peer groups, states and time will be 
provided. This aims to give a general picture about the link between hospital costs and 
other hospital characteristics including staff salary, output capacity, and quality of care 
among hospitals before performing the multivariate regression analysis. Hospital quality of 
care in descriptive statistics is represented by hospital crude mortality and adverse event 
rates. As mentioned, in the multivariate regression analysis, excess mortality and adverse 
event rates will be used as indicators for hospital quality of care. Therefore, in addition to 
the main part describing the relationship between costs and hospital cost related 
characteristics, this section also considers the association between mortality rates and 
adverse event rates with hospital patient composition such as proportion of aged patients, 
average patient illness severity, and patient average length of stay. 
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for peer groups aud the pooled group 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
total cost 18.860 17.834 16.525 15.180 17.274 
(0.551) (0.303) (0.603) (0.492) (l.390) 
doctor salary 11.607 11.699 11.789 11.561 11.683 
(0.178) (0.253) (0.594) (0.520) (0.440) 
nurse salary 11.013 11.027 10.985 10.935 10.994 
(0.127) (0.153) (0.251) (0.092) (0.183) 
other staff salary 10.729 10.699 10.660 10.561 10.673 
(0.126) (0.139) (0.145) (0.174) (0.153) 
emergency 10.494 10.126 9.246 8.120 9.622 
(0.303) (0.364) (0.578) (0.670) (0.951) 
outpatient 12.646 11.782 10.522 9.448 11.241 
(0.600) (0.541) (0.775) (0.755) (1.329) 
surgery 8.792 7.984 6.717 3.506 7.098 
(0.446) (0.384) (0.823) (1.678) (1.939) 
medical 10.048 9.084 8.041 6.792 8.654 
(0.455) (0.507) (0.465) (0.495) (1.221) 
otherDRG 7.593 6.664 5.692 2.424 5.953 
(0.639) (0.799) (1.006) (!. 735) (1.965) 
mortality rate 0.012 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.015 
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(0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) 
adverse event rate 0.057 0.051 0.037 0.031 0.045 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) 
percentage 80 0.087 0.130 0.127 0.153 0.120 
(0.050) (0.072) (0.043) (0.058) (0.059) 
percentage male 0.489 0.461 0.456 0.481 0.470 
(0.066) (0.049) (0.037) (0.042) (0.052) 
average LOS 3.528 3.543 3.234 4.894 3.636 
I average Charlson score (0.658) (0.917) (0.794) (2.146) (1.230) 0.766 0.598 0.519 0.469 0.600 
I (0.327) (0.243) (0.214) (0.170) (0.277) 
' l percentage emergency 0.103 0.157 0.206 0.206 0.166 
(0.041) (0.059) (0.076) (0.086) (0.079) 
percentage surgery 0.209 0.240 0.210 0.066 0.194 
(0.042) (0. 133) (0.102) (0.067) (0.108) 
occupancy rate 0.919 0.854 0.696 0.496 0.764 
(0.158) (0.122) (0. 170) (0.139) (0.211) 
Full time equivalent stafflbed 4.604 3.789 2.822 1.856 3.396 
(1.181) (1.292) (0.855) (0.451) (1.403) 
number of hospital beds 377.267 156.398 61.946 27.801 168.371 
(185.383) (50.142) (25.435) (11.149) (174.543) 
The above table shows an apparent variation among hospital peer groups. As hospital peer 
groups are classified according to the total number of patient admissions, hospital total 
costs are expected to be positively correlated \vith hospital volumes for each output type 
and number of beds. The values in the above table are consistent with this expectation. 
Peer group A appears to have highest total costs and largest volumes of emergency and 
outpatient visits as well as highest volumes of surgery, medical and other DRG admissions. 
At the same time, peer group D with lowest total hospital costs admitted the least of 
admissions for all output categories. 
The relationship between total costs and input prices is not as consistent. While high total 
costs in hospitals were associated with high salary for nurses and other non-medical staff, it 
was not the case for doctor salary. Medium size public hospitals (peer group C) appear to 
pay the highest wage to their doctors and small hospitals pay the lowest. Doctors working 
in major hospitals (peer group A), on average, received less payment than those working in 
large (peer group B) and medium hospitals. One might suggest that the higher total costs of 
major and large hospitals might be due to their higher salary payments to nurses and other 
staff rather than to the doctors. 
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The high occupancy rates of major and large hospitals are attributable to their location in 
accordance with population geographical distribution. The Australian population is heavily 
concentrated in a few metropolitan centers where all major and large hospitals are located. 
As a result, population growth is more noticeable in urban areas than rural areas. 
Increasing demand for health care in urban areas results in high hospital occupancy rates 
for major and large hospitals. With occupancy rates of 91.2% and 85.4% respectively, 
major and large hospitals were believed to operate at above the "access block" rate of 85% 
(Leeder, 2007). 
While the table shows a positive association between total costs and hospital adverse event 
rates, the link between total costs and mortality rates is less apparent. Patients in major and 
large hospitals appeared to suffer higher risk of adverse events than patients in medium and 
small hospitals. Patients in major and medium hospitals seemed to incur lower probability 
of dying in hospitals than those in large and small hospitals. In other words, higher hospital 
total costs seemed to associate with lower quality of care if adverse event rates were used as 
a quality indicator, and no obvious link between costs and quality of care was observed if 
mortality rates were used as a quality indicator. 
For hospital quality of care, the links between adverse event rates with the hospital average 
Charlson index and occupancy rates are most noticeable. A higher average Charlson index 
indicates a higher proportion of seriously ill patients admitted to hospitals. With highly 
trained medical staff and high tech medical equipment, teaching hospitals could be 
expected to treat patients with more severe conditions. Since major and large hospitals 
account for more than 98% of teaching hospitals, their average Charlson scores were 
consequently higher compared to medium and small hospitals. There seems to be an 
inverse association between the hospital proportion of aged patients (80 years or older) and 
adverse event rates. Peer group A had the highest average adverse event rates and lowest 
proportion of aged patients, whereas peer group D experienced the opposite. 
As shown, the association between mortality rates and risk factors did not seem as clear as 
the association between adverse event rates and the risk factors. Major and medium 
hospitals appeared to control deaths better than large and small hospitals. Hospital average 
Charlson scores did not seem to strongly relate to hospital mortality. However, different 
from the case of adverse events, a positive association between hospital proportion of aged 
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patients (80 years or older) and mortality rates was detected. The above statistics might be 
an indication of significant attribution of patient illness complexity in adverse events and 
significant attribution of average patient age in hospital mortality. 
Hospital costs are likely to be different across states due to variation in state policy, 
population composition and other conditions. However, the difference in hospital costs 
across states, on average, might also be due to the difference in hospital numbers for each 
peer group in each state. The table below shows the number of observations for each peer 
group in each state in the period 2003-2005. 
Table 6.6: Hospital peer group composition for states 
VIC NSW SA QLD TAS NT Total 
Peer group 
A 8 65 15 45 6 5 144 
Peer group 
B 15 58 5 21 3 1 103 
Peer group 
c 19 83 27 43 0 0 172 
Peer group 
D 0 24 2 49 0 0 75 
As noticed, the number of observations for each peer group in each state varied greatly. 
There were no observations in peer groups C and D for Tasmania and Northern Territory. 
With observations of major and large hospitals only, these two state hospital statistics 
would show that, on average, they incurred higher total costs and admit larger number of 
patients than other states. In order to obtain a more sensible picture about the differences 
between states in terms of hospital costs, staff salary, and admission numbers, the 
descriptive statistics should be presented for each peer group across states. The following 
tables provide the descriptive statistics for each peer group across states and years. The 
summary following each table will discuss the highest and lowest values of hospital costs 
and other statistics. 
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Table 6.7: Descriptive statistics across states for peer group A 
VIC NSW SA QLD TAS NT 
total cost 18.879 18.990 19.014 18.661 18.811 18.518 I 
(0.495) (0.554) (0.452) (0.571) (0.294) (0.369) ! 
doctor salary 11.817 11.602 11.547 11.580 11.552 11.825 l 
(0.304) (0.193) (0.141) (0.081) (0.129) (0.199) i 
nurse salary 10.978 11.061 11.004 10.949 10.951 11.120 I 
(0.170) (0.141) (0.121) (0.060) (0.043) (0.059) 
other staff salary 10.705 10.763 10.715 10.674 10.731 10.867 
(0.139) (0.153) (0.067) (0.071) (0.078) (0.065) 
emergency 10.342 10.482 10.691 10.489 10.386 10.479 i I 
(0.262) (0.232) (0.185) (0.416) (0.140) co.219) I 
outpatient 12.180 12.813 12.416 12.630 12.720 1 l.956 
(0.476) (0.682) (0.304) (0.504) (0.295) (0.367) 
surgery 8.936 8.785 9.107 8.737 8.680 8.332 
(0.317) (0.436) (0.397) (0.462) (0.154) (0.478) 
medical 10.031 10.008 10.334 9.986 I 0.154 10.167 ! 
(0.339) (0.495) (0.310) (0.474) (0.151) <~:~~~) I other DRG 7.421 7.618 7.993 7.524 7.644 
(1.509) (0.520) (0.671) (0.540) (0.190) (0.362) I 
mortality rate 0.007 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.005 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
adverse event rate 0.045 0.057 0.057 0.059 0.081 0.038 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.025) (0.016) (0.015) 
percentage 80 0.068 0.108 0.083 0.070 0.091 0.016 
(0.041) (0.053) (0.047) (0.038) (0.008) (0.004) 
percentage male 0.458 0.491 0.474 0.501 0.490 0.459 
(0.169) (0.057) (0.062) (0.054) (0.010) (0.018) 
average LOS 3.186 3.795 3.366 3.274 3.810 3.044 
(0.339) (0.473) (0.333) (0.874) (0.267) (0.465) I 
average Charlson score 0.795 0.687 0.824 0.782 1.002 1.145 
(0.360) (0.319) (0.380) (0.310) (0.121) (0.110) 
percentage emergency 0.123 0.091 0.134 0.102 0.081 0.160 
(0.035) (0.044) (0.030) (0.034) (0.011) (0.020) 
percentage surgery 0.239 0.214 0.213 0.209 0.174 0.137 
(0.081) (0.039) (0.044) (0.028) (0.006) (0.036) 
occupancy rate 1.005 0.886 1.167 0.848 0.927 1.109 
(0.057) (0.084) (0.284) (0.101) (0.087) (0.061) 
Full time equivalent 
I staff/bed 5.636 4.673 5.192 4.230 3.984 4.390 
I (1.872) 1.298 (0.299) (0.978) (0.219) (0.412) 
number of hospital heds 299.646 402.032 378.947 367.600 392.833 242.800 
(98.696) (178.632) (153.962) (224.216) (105.411) (71.479) 
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Table 6.7 shows that in peer group A, hospitals in South Australia and the Northern 
Territory appear to be at the two bounds regarding total costs and hospitals outputs. South 
Australian hospitals incurred the highest total costs while the NT experienced the lowest. In 
terms of staff salary, NT seemed to be the most expensive state. On average, doctors, 
nurses and other non medical staff in the N1 major hospitals enjoyed the highest salary 
compared with their colleagues in other states. The lowest wages for doctors were paid in 
SA. In terms of outputs, major hospitals in SA appeared to have the heaviest workload on 
average compared with other states. They obtained the highest number of emergency visits 
and all inpatient separations. Combining with less than the highest number of available 
beds, hospitals in SA experienced the highest occupancy rates. With the least number of 
available beds, major hospitals in the NT had less inpatient admissions and provided 
services to fuwer outpatients than their peers. 
With respect to hospital quality of care indicators, hospitals in the NT appeared to be the 
best performer. While having the highest proportion of emergency admissions and the 
highest average Charlson scores, they experienced lowest average adverse event and 
mortality rates. At the same time, the statistics suggest that major hospitals in NSW did not 
perform as well as their peers. With the lowest average Charlson index, they incurred the 
highest mortality rates and a middle value of the adverse event rates. The fact that NSW 
major hospitals admitted the highest proportion of elderly patients (aged 80 years and 
older) while NT major hospitals had the lowest proportion of this patient type suggests 
possible influential impacts of patient average age on mortality and adverse events. 
Table 6.8: Descriptive statistics across states for peer group B 
VIC NSW SA QLD TAS NT 
total cost 17.658 17.934 18.126 I 7.596 I 7.894 18.023 
(0.205) (0.281) (0.271) (0.235) (0.267) 
doctor salary 11.773 11.710 11.787 I 1.591 11.598 12.096 
(0.462) (0.195) (0.312) (0. I 02) (0.325) 
nurse salary 11.098 11.037 10.961 10.977 10.854 11.255 
(0.078) (0.181) (0.065) (0.068) (0.082) 
I other staff salary 10.658 10.729 10.730 10.621 10.734 10.965 
(0.196) (0.107) (0.182) (0.121) (0.199) 
emergency 10.075 10.111 9.402 10.378 10.086 10.286 
' 
(0.413) (0.217) (1.007) (0.099) (0.314) 
outpatient 11.373 11.836 11.654 11.994 11.620 11.509 I 
(0.573) (0.597) (0.289) (OJ 75) (0.201) I I 
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surgery 8.351 7.911 8.215 7.873 7.975 7.867 
(0.575) (0.265) (0.059) (0.415) (0.245) 
medical 8.693 9.172 9.268 9.115 8.551 9.881 
(0.956) (0.309) (0.213) (0.406) (0.198) 
otherDRG 6.053 6.825 7.478 6.515 6.363 6.504 
(1.710) (0.289) (0.602) (0.570) (0.425) 
mortality rate 0.009 0.020 0.021 0.012 0.020 0.004 
(0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
adverse event rate 0.051 0.054 0.087 0.034 0.059 0.025 
(0.013) (0.020) (0.007) (0.013) (0.004) 
percentage 80 0.109 0.142 0.294 0.083 0.112 0.016 
(0.032) (0.057) (0.157) (0.035) (0.014) 
percentage male 0.471 0.459 0.555 0.438 0.457 0.455 
(0.028) (0.041) (0.099) (0.048) (0.010) 
average LOS 2.600 3.842 4.926 2.966 4.509 2.632 
(0.769) (0.716) (1.258) (0.403) (0.044) 
average Charlson score 0.730 0.576 0.750 0.511 0.506 1.199 
(0.304) (0.216) (0.126) (0.231) (0.067) 
percentage emergency 0.192 0.151 0.107 0.157 0.167 0.193 
(0.040) (0.066) (0.084) (0.030) (0.021) 
percentage surgery 0.377 0.211 0.226 0.217 0.335 0.114 
(0.285) (0.056) (0.026) (0.075) (0.010) 
occupancy rate 0.974 0.831 1.008 0.817 0.670 1.004 
(0.114) (0.095) (0.047) (0.120) (0.083) 
Full time equivalent 
staff/bed 5.141 3.620 3.565 3.452 3.162 3.383 
(2.738) (0.697) (0.806) (0.307) (0.107) 
number of hospital beds 104.011 173.724 216.760 129.571 168.000 164.000 
(40.433) (44.08) (34.50) (29.548) (64.086) 
Table 6.8 shows that in peer group B, South Australia and Northern Territory continued to 
be at the two bounds. South Australian large hospitals incurred the highest total costs, and 
had the highest number of medical and other DRG admissions. Their worst mortality and 
adverse event rates might relate to the fact that they had the highest proportion of aged 
patients, the longest patient average length of stay and the second highest average Charlson 
scores. Despite having the highest number of available beds, high volumes of admissions 
resulted in the highest occupancy rates in SA. At the same time, the sole hospital in the 
NT in the sample was seen as having the highest level of hospital quality with lowest 
mortality and adverse event rates, despite its highest average Charlson score and its highest 
proportion of emergency admission. As in peer group A, the NT hospital appeared to be 
the most costly. With the second highest hospital total costs, the sole large hospital in the 
151 
NT paid the highest wages to doctors, nurses and other staff while Queensland was the 
lowest payer. 
Table 6.9: Descriptive statistics across states for peer group C 
VIC NSW SA QLD 
total cost 16.522 16.744 16.496 16.123 
(0.495) (0.564) (0.665) (0.467) 
doctor salary 11.965 11.799 11.880 11.635 
(1.121) (0.575) (0.550) (0.149) 
nurse salary 10.973 11.062 10.883 10.905 
(0.381) (0.284) (0.109) (0.063) 
other staff salary 10.693 10.713 10.542 10.615 
(0.244) (0.110) (0.115) (0.105) 
emergency 8.679 9.415 9.118 9.250 
(0.596) (0.451) (0.770) (0.482) 
outpatient 9.931 10.800 9.749 10.731 
(0.526) (0.752) (0.684) (0.439) 
surgery 7.088 6.860 7.227 5.958 
(0.584) (0.742) (0.577) (0.688) 
medical 8.060 8.103 8.075 7.892 
(0.477) (0.454) (0.590) (0.366) 
otherDRG 5.914 5.666 5.980 5.465 
(0.419) (1.130) (0.851) (0.986) 
mortality rate 0.014 0.017 0.012 0.016 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
adverse event rate 0.044 0.038 0.038 0.031 
(0.028) (0.018) (0.008) (0.011) 
percentage 80 0.131 0.139 0.117 0.106 
(0.059) (0.036) (0.045) (0.038) 
percentage male 0.456 0.455 0.442 0.466 
(0.044) (0.035) (0.044) (0.029) 
; average LOS 3.002 3.386 2.920 3.239 
' (0.913) (0.628) (0.722) (0.992) I 
I average Charlson score 0.855 0.483 0.487 0.461 
(0.249) (0.154) (0.214) (0.166) 
percentage emergency 0.195 0.196 0.293 0.177 
(0.054) (0.078) (0.067) (0.039) 
percentage surgery 0.254 0.221 0.280 0.125 
(0.051) (0.110) (0.076) (0.052) 
occupancy rate 0.752 0.730 0.740 0.580 
(0.138) (0.143) (0.160) (0.188) 
Full time equivalent staff/bed 3.359 2.980 2.860 2.253 
(0.736) (0.914) (0.789) (0.461) 
number of hospital beds 53.855 66.957 61.259 56.279 
(16.938) (28.337) (24.239) (21.614) 
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Table 6.9 shows that in peer group C, New South Wales and Queensland hospitals were at 
the two bounds. Hospitals in NSW incurred the highest total costs and paid the highest 
salary to nurses and other non-medical staff. The hospitals also had the largest number of 
emergency and outpatient visits as well as the highest number of medical admissions 
compared with their peers. The highest mortality rates for NSW hospitals might be due to 
their highest proportion of aged patients and highest patient average length of stay. 
Queensland hospitals, on the other hand, experienced the lowest total costs, paid the lowest 
wages to doctors and admitted the lowest number of surgery, medical and other DRG 
patients. For these hospitals, having the lowest adverse event rates might be the results of 
having the lowest proportion of aged patients, the lowest average Charlson scores, and the 
lowest proportion of emergency admissions. 
Table 6.10: Descriptive statistics across states for peer group D 
NSW SA QLD 
total cost 15.506 14.931 15.031 
(0.348) (0.008) (0.486) 
doctor salary 11.547 11.492 11.570 
(0.854) (1.428) (0.156) 
nurse salary 11.008 10.825 10.904 
(0.093) (0.091) (0.069) 
other staff salary 10.703 10.212 10.506 
(0.085) (0.389) (0.147) 
emergency 8.475 7.778 7.960 
(0.457) (0.060) (0.706) 
outpatient 9.473 7.973 9.496 
(0.572) (0.033) (0.793) 
surgery 3.503 5.309 3.433 
(1.930) (0.188) (1.553) 
medical 7.062 6.978 6.652 
(0.328) (0.070) (0.519) 
other DRG 2.397 2.788 2.422 
(2.058) (0.552) (1.611) 
mortality rate 0.022 0.019 0.021 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.010) 
adverse event rate 0.027 0.031 0.032 
(0.012) (0.001) (0.021) 
percentage 80 0.167 0.184 0.144 
(0.049) (0.005) (0.062) 
percentage male 0.467 0.485 0.488 
(0.039) (0.004) (0.043) 
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average LOS 4.435 3.399 5.179 
(1.451) (0.199) (2.411) 
average Charlson score 0.463 0.468 0.472 
(0.150) (0.084) (0.183) 
percentage emergency 0.257 0.363 0.175 
(0.092) (0.010) (0.064) 
percentage surgery 0.070 0.158 0.061 
(0.095) (0.033) (0.047) 
occupancy rate 0.530 0.464 0.480 
(0.118) (0.037) (0.149) 
Full time equivalent staf£'bed 1.929 1.544 1.833 
(0.479) (0.110) (0.444) 
number of hospital beds 30.338 26.000 26.633 
(6.932) (0.000) (12.801) 
Table 6.10 shows that among three states in peer group D, SA had the lowest total hospital 
costs. This was associated with the lowest wages for medical and non-medical staff. The 
combination of low input prices and low emergency and outpatient visits seemed more than 
to offset the highest number of surgery and other DRG admissions. South Australian 
hospitals performed best in controlling mortality rates despite having the highest proportion 
of aged patients and emergency cases. On the other hand, NSW appeared to be the highest 
total hospital cost state, paying the highest salary to nurses and other staff. With the lowest 
average Charlson scores, NSW hospitals appeared to be the best performers in preventing 
adverse events. 
Time is another environmental dimension needs to be considered when investigating 
hospital costs. Hospital costs and other characteristics variations across time reflect 
changes including medical practices, technology, government policies and health system 
general conditions. As in previous part, the descriptive statistics of hospitals across years 
are presented according to peer groups. 
Table 6.11: Descriptive statistics across years for peer group A 
2002-2003 2003-04 2004-05 
total cost 18.813 18.878 18.884 
(0.529) (0.556) (0.571) 
doctor salary 11.529 11.626 11.657 
(0.134) (0.136) (0.218) 
nurse salary 10.952 11.012 11.065 
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(0.079) (0.093) (0.158) 
other staff salary I 0.681 10.720 10.778 
(0.110) (0.078) (0.153) 
emergency 10.490 10.498 10.494 
(0.297) (0.304) (0.314) 
outpatient 12.687 12.662 12.597 
(0.582) (0.618) (0.609) 
surgery 8.809 8.806 8.765 
(0.414) (0.451) (0.472) 
medical 10.060 10.093 10.000 
(0.445) (0.433) (0.483) 
otherDRG 7.711 7.636 7.458 
(0.550) (0.562) (0.747) 
mortality rate 0.012 0.012 0.011 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
adverse event rate 0.056 0.058 0.059 
(0.016) (0.019) (0.021) 
percentage 80 0.087 0.084 0.090 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.053) 
percentage male 0.491 0.493 0.484 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.082) 
average LOS 3.543 3.522 3.521 
(0.637) (0.687) (0.664) 
average Charlson score 0.713 0.797 0.785 
(0.332) (0.330) (0.322) 
percentage emergency 0.099 0.102 0.107 
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042) 
percentage surgery 0.208 0.204 0.215 
(0.033) (0.037) (0.052) 
occupancy rate 0.921 0.935 0.905 
(0.140) (0.167) (0.165) 
Full time equivalent staff/bed 4.609 4.631 4.576 
(1.130) (1.156) (1.261) 
number of hospital beds 380.792 383.620 369.035 
(178.143) (187.270) (192.744) 
Table 6.12: Descriptive statistics across years for peer group B 
2002-2003 2003-04 2004-05 
total cost 17.731 17.883 17.903 
(0.286) (0.308) (0.292) 
doctor salary 11.613 11.715 11. 788 
(0.292) (0.211) (0.218) 
nurse salary 10.979 11.059 11.047 
(0.087) (0.067) (0.250) 
other staff salary 10.671 10.700 I 0.733 
(0.117) (0.126) ro. I 73) 
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emergency I 0.112 10.142 10.125 
(0.343) (0.371) (0.393) 
outpatient 11. 751 11.863 11.723 
(0.523) (0.533) (0.578) 
surgery 7.967 7.995 7.990 
(0.367) (0.376) (0.425) 
medical 9.060 9.119 9.071 
(0.506) (0.504) (0.527) 
otherDRG 6.703 6.679 6.600 
(0.744) (0.776) (0.910) 
mortality rate 0.016 0.017 0.017 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
adverse event rate 0.048 0.052 0.055 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.022) 
percentage 80 0.120 0.134 0.139 
(0.069) (0.073) (0.076) 
percentage male 0.461 0.461 0.461 
(0.051) (0.049) (0.049) 
average LOS 3.507 3.561 3.565 
(0.867) (0.934) (0.984) 
average Charlson score 0.590 0.567 0.644 
(0.245) (0.216) (0.272) 
percentage emergency 0.158 0.150 0.164 
(0.056) (0.058) (0.063) 
percentage surgery 0.241 0.236 0.243 
(0.130) (0.132) (0.143) 
occupancy rate 0.872 0.868 0.817 
(0.129) (0.107) (0.126) 
Full time equivalent staff/bed 3.787 3.875 3.689 
(1.422) (1.290) (1.153) 
number of hospital beds 147.714 158.484 164.604 
(43.252) (51.412) (56.208) 
Table 6.13: Descriptive statistics across years for peer group C 
2002-2003 2003-04 2004-05 
total cost 16.410 16.530 16.675 
(0.577) (0.586) (0.640) 
doctor salary 11.733 11.789 11.865 
(0.836) (0.472) (0.280) 
nurse salary 10.896 11.031 11.037 
(0.217) (0.322) (0.105) 
other staff salary 10.624 10.657 10.711 
(0.165) (0.127) (0.126) 
emergency 9.263 9.196 9.296 
(0.579) (0.570) (0.597) 
outpatient 10.525 10.484 10.572 
156 
(0.706) (0.782) (0.863) 
surgery 6.591 6.738 6.858 
(0.846) (0.782) (0.844) 
medical 7.970 8.030 8.153 
(0.418) (0.467) (0.510) 
otherDRG 5.501 5.732 5.893 
(1.144) (1.000) (0.758) 
mortality rate 0.016 0.015 0.013 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
1 adverse event rate 0.035 0.037 0.038 
i (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
I percentage 80 0.124 0.129 0.125 
I percentage male 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.045) 
0.456 0.456 0.455 
(0.035) (0.037) (0.039) 
average LOS 3.353 3.246 3.054 
(0.766) (0.784) (0.830) 
average Charlson score 0.482 0.512 0.581 
(0.180) (0.214) (0.246) 
i percentage emergency 0.211 0.204 0.203 
I percentage surgery (0.079) (0.075) (0.073) 0.203 0.212 0.217 
i (0.099) (0.098) (0.114) I occupancy rate 0.703 0.692 0.693 
(0.169) (0.173) (0.172) 
Full time equivalent staff/bed 2.847 2.735 2.915 
(0.886) (0.848) (0.827) 
number of hospital beds 57.858 62.342 66.904 
(22.381) (26.048) (27.934) 
Table 6.14: Descriptive statistics across years for peer group D 
2002-2003 2003-04 2004-05 
total cost 15.156 15. 178 15.246 
(0.496) (0.484) (0.532) 
doctor salary 11.375 11.722 1 I .673 
(0.615) (0.449) (0.122) 
nurse salary 10.890 10.973 I 0.968 
(0.088) (0.089) (0.056) 
other staff salary 10.539 10.595 10.543 
(0. 160) (0.182) (0.188) 
i emergency 8.135 8.065 8.204 
(0.667) (0.690) (0.677) 
outpatient 9.440 9.317 9.760 
(0.723) (0.761) (0.789) 
surgery 3.591 3.470 3.369 
(l.744) 1.496) 1.995 
157 
medical 6.751 6.806 6.863 
(0.492) (0.524) (0.465) 
otherDRG 2.607 2.250 2.345 
(l.570) (1.797) (2.067) I mortality rate 0.022 0.020 0.021 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.011) 
1 adverse event rate 0.032 0.027 0.034 
• I (0.021) (0.013) (0.022) i percentage 8 0 0.161 0.149 0.140 
(0.059) (0.056) (0.061) 
percentage male 0.476 0.485 0.486 
(0.045) (0.034) (0.052) 
average LOS 4.813 5.080 4.684 
(1.685) (2.455) (2.575) 
average Charlson score 0.473 0.458 0.483 
(0.190) (0.153) (0.161) 
percentage emergency 0.212 0.216 0.167 
(0.097) (0.088) (0.032) 
percentage surgery 0.077 0.057 0.059 
(0.086) (0.046) (0.054) 
occupancy rate 0.501 0.505 0.462 
(0.132) (0.147) (0.143) 
Full time equivalent stafflbed 1.933 1.792 1.806 
(0.474) (0.454) (0.384) 
number of hospital beds 26.730 27.966 30.154 
(I 0.539) (I 1.139) (13.101) 
Details in the four Tables 6.11, 6.12, 6.13, and 6.14 indicate a time trend for variables in all 
peer groups. Hospitals in all peer groups experienced increasing total costs in the period 
2002-2005. This was associated with a consistent increase in salary for doctors, nurses and 
other non medical staff in hospitals in peer groups A, B and C over three years. Although 
the staff salary in peer group D decreased then increased, the values were higher in 2004-
2005 than in 2002-2003. While hospitals in peer group C experienced a consistent increase 
in all inpatient admissions, a mixed movement can be seen for other peer groups. 
A mixed picture can be noticed for quality of care indicators. There was an increasing 
trend in adverse event rates for peer groups A, B and C. Peer group D experienced a 
decrease then an increase, but the rates for 2004-2005 were higher than that of 2002-2003. 
Hospital performance in preventing deaths seemed to improve more than preventing 
adverse events. Mortality rates consistently decreased over the three year period for peer 
group C, stabilised and then decreased for peer group A, decreased then increased slightly 
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for peer group D. Peer group B was the only group having higher mortality rates in 2004-
2005 than in 2002-2003. Although the change in the hospital's proportion of aged patients 
and average Charlson scores was not always consistent in the three year period for all peer 
groups, the values were always higher at the end of the period (except the proportion of 
aged patients for peer group D). Average hospital bed numbers improved over time for all 
groups except peer group A. Together with other hospital features, patient ageing and 
illness severity seemed to be important attributes in the deterioration of hospital adverse 
event prevention. 
6.6 Summary 
This section provides a general picture about the variations in costs and quality of care 
among hospitals in Australia with regard to peer groups, states and years. For most cases, 
higher total costs seem to be associated with higher output volumes as well as higher 
hospital staff salaries. Larger hospitals seem to control deaths better than adverse events. 
Among the states, South Australian major and large hospitals are the most costly while 
small hospitals appear to be the least costly. Northern Territory major and large hospitals 
are the best performers in controlling quality of care compared with their peers. An 
increasing trend in hospital costs and staff salary over time is also noticed. For quality of 
care, an improvement of hospital death prevention is observed while the reverse can be 
seen for adverse event prevention. The descriptive statistics are useful and important in 
presenting an overall picture of public hospital costs and quality of care in Australia. 
However, deeper understanding of the relationship between costs, quality and other factors 
will be acquired in the multivariate cost regression analysis in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7: COST TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF AUSTRALIAN 
PUBLIC HOSPITALS: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, estimation of hospital cost technical efficiency using 
the single stage approach suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) appears to be the most 
appropriate for this study. This chapter presents regression results of the single stage 
approach for panel data using the Frontier v4.l software program. Estimations for both 
Cobb-Douglas and trans-log cost functions will be carried out followed by selection tests 
for the most appropriate ones. The results discussion will be based on the selected 
estimations. For comparison purposes, results of the single stage cross-sectional method 
using the Frontier v4. l program and the two-stage estimations using STA TA 9 will be 
presented in Appendices B 1, B2, C 1 and C2. 
The chapter will have two main sections: the econometric results and the discussion of the 
obtained results. In the econometric results section, two subsections are presented. The 
first part presents the results of the quality of hospital care estimations. The second part 
provides results of the cost efficiency estimations in which quality of care measures 
obtained from the first part are used. 
7.2 Econometric results 
In this section, the estimation of hospital quality of care, cost frontier, accompanied by cost 
efficiency, will be obtained for each peer group. In addition, results of the pooled group, 
where all hospitals are included in a single group, will also be provided. 
7.2.1 Quality of care results 
This section provides results of two hospital quality of care indicators: mortality and 
adverse events. For each indicator, estimation results of quality of care regressions and a 
summary of obtained measures are presented. 
7.2.1.1 Hospital mortality 
Hospital mortality estimation aims to obtain hospital risk-adjusted mortality rates. 
Although the standardization in this study is not as ideal as in the cases where individual 
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patient information is used, the estimations have been achieved by using the best 
information available. Details in Table 7 .1 show that the results are generally consistent 
with expectation. For all peer groups, hospitals with a higher proportion of elderly patients 
experienced higher death rates. Apart from peer group A and the pooled group, patient 
gender did not appear to have significant impact on hospital mortality and this was reflected 
by the insignificant statistical association between the proportion of male patients and 
hospital average death rates. Higher average Charlson scores seemed to co-exist with 
higher average mortality rates for hospitals in peer groups B, D and the pooled group. The 
positive relation between hospital average length of stay and hospital average mortality 
rates implied a consistent association between patient length of stay and the risk of dying in 
hospital. 
While the above were consistent with the general expectation, results for emergency and 
teaching variables were not as expected. Hospitals admitting more emergency patients 
were expected to have higher average death rates. This is true only for hospitals in peer 
group A. For other peer groups, if controlling for other factors, a change in the proportion 
of emergency patients did not seem to have an important impact on their average mortality 
rates. Being a teaching hospital appeared to be associated with higher mortality rates for 
hospitals in peer group A, and lower mortality rates for hospitals in peer group C. No 
significant association between teaching status and hospital mortality was found for 
hospitals in peer group B and the pooled group. 
The results for state and time dummy variables show a consistent pattern for all peer 
groups. Hospitals in NSW and QLD appeared to perform worse than those in VIC 
(reference state). The negative and statistically significant coefficients for the time variable 
of peer groups A, C and the pooled group suggested an improvement in controlling 
mortality in those hospitals over time. 
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Table 7.1: Hospital mortality estimation 
Dependent variable: hospital mortality rate 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
Percentage 80 0.056** 0.027** 0.055** 0.084** 0.053** 
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.019) (0.007) 
Percentage male -0.013** 0.005 -0.002 -0.019 -0.009* 
(0.005) (0.020) (0.008) (0.020) (0.005) 
Average Charlson 0.001 0.022** 0.002 0.011** 0.007** 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Average LOS 0.003** 0.003** 0.002** 0.001** 0.002** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Percentage 
emergency 0.021 ** -0.020 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 
I Teaching (0.009) (0.013) (0.005) 
(0.015) (0.005) 
0.001 * 0.001 -0.013** -0.002** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Peer A -0.002* 
(0.001) 
PeerB -0.001 
(0.001) 
PeerC -0.001 
INSW 
(0.001) 
0.003** 0.01 o•• 0.002** 0.005** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) I 
iSA 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.002** 
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
QLD 0.003** 0.008** 0.003** -0.001 0.005** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
TAS 0.001 0.011 ** 0.005** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
NT 0.000 -0.013** 0.000 I 
(0.001) (0.006) co.001) I 
time -0.001 ** -0.001 -0.002** 0.002 -0.001• I 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) co.001) I 
Constant -0.005 -0.018 0.001 0.009 0.000 I 
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) 
Number of 
observations 144 102 172 75 493 
1 R- square-0 0.786 0.536 0.548 0.595 0.534 
I 
••ps;o.os;•ps;o.i; H0 :fl O;H1 :fJ-FO 
Hospital excess mortality rates are the difference between observed mortality rates and risk-
adjusted mortality rates. A summary of peer group average excess mortality rates is 
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displayed in Table 7.2. Average excess mortality rates were highest for peer group Band 
lowest for peer group D. Peer group A was found to have the second lowest average rates. 
At the two limits, peer group D had the lowest minimum and peer group B had the highest 
maximum. 
Table 7.2: Excess mortality rates 
I 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
3.38E-11 -4.35E-l l 1.900E-l l i Mean -7.28E-12 3.42E-l l I Stand. 
i Error 0.002 0.00& 0.004 0.006 0.006 
Minimum -0.006 -0.014 -0.010 -0.015 -0.024 
Maximum 0.006 0.035 0.013 0.01.9 0.045 
7.2.1.2 Hospital adverse events 
Excess adverse event rates were used as the second hospital quality indicator. As in the 
case of mortality rates, the estimation of hospital adverse event rates intends to produce 
hospital risk-adjusted adverse event rates using available hospital level information. 
Results of adverse event estimation are provided in Table 7.3. 
The results show some similarities to the mortality estimation. An increase in hospital 
average Charlson scores and patient average length of stay was associated with a 
statistically significant increase in hospital average adverse event rates. As in the case of 
hospital mortality estimation, gender of patient did not appear to be an important attribute 
to hospital adverse events for peer groups B, C and D. Apart from peer group B, an 
increase in the hospital proportion of emergency admissions did not link to higher hospital 
adverse event rates. Being a teaching hospital increased the probability of having higher 
adverse event rates for peer group C only. While time was associated with an improvement 
in hospital mortality, no significant difference in hospital adverse events was found over 
time. For peer group A, other thing being constant, hospitals in NSW, QLD and Tasmania 
incurred higher average adverse event rates compared with those in Victoria. Hospitals in 
the NT appeared to perform generally better than those in Victoria. 
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Table 7.3: Hospital adverse event estimation 
Dependent variable: hospital adverse event rate 
Peer A PeerB 
Percentage 80 0.018 0.022 
(0.031) (0.032) 
Percentage male 0.045** -0.017 
(0.017) (0.047) 
Average Charlson 0.015** 0.007 
(0.005) (0.012) 
Percentage 
emergency 0.033 0.064** 
(0.044) (0.029) 
Teaching 0.003 0.001 
(0.004) (0.006) 
Peer A 
PeerB 
PeerC 
NSW 0.005* -0.006 
(0.003) (0.006) 
SA 0.007 0.014 
(0.004) (0.013) 
QLD 0.011 ** -0.016** 
(0.004) (0.005) 
TAS 0.024** -0.009 
(0.006) (0.008) 
NT -0.012* -0.027** 
(0.007) (0.011) 
time 0.003 0.003 
(0.003) (0.004) 
Constant -0.033 0.010 
(0.013) (0.027) 
Number of 
observations 144 102 
R- squared 0.418 0.476 
**p:0:0.05; • p:0:0.1; H 0 : /3 = O;H1 : /3 * 0 
PeerC PeerD Pooled 
0.060** -0.026 0.061 ** 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.014) 
-0.028 0.022 0.036** 
(0.031) (0.036) (0.016) 
0.029** 0.079** 0.021 ** 
(0.007) (0.014) (0.004) 
0.023 0.024 0.009 
(0.016) (0.034) (0.014) 
0.068** 0.006* 
(0.004) (0.003) 
0.024** 
(0.004) 
0.022** 
(0.003) 
0.012** 
(0.002) 
0.001 0.002 
(0.005) (0.003) 
0.004 0.002 0.004 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) 
0.000 0.004 0.000 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) 
0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.022** 
(0.007) 
0.001 0.000 0.002 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
0.008 -0.023 -0.024 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.009) 
172 75 493 
0.432 0.558 0.46 
Hospital excess adverse event rates are the difference between observed (crude) adverse 
event rates and risk-adjusted rates. A summary of peer group average excess adverse event 
rates is displayed in Table 7.4. Average excess adverse event rates were highest for peer 
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group D and lowest for peer group A. Peer group C had second lowest average rates. At 
the two limits, peer group B had the lowest minimum and peer group C had the highest 
maximum. 
Table 7 .4: Excess adverse event rates 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
Mean 3.23E-11 l.09E-10 5.96E-11 l.68E-10 -2.07E-11 
Stand. Error 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.016 
Minimum -0.029 -0.039 -0.031 -0.030 -0.045 
Maximum 0.048 0.040 0.051 0.041 0.062 
7.2.2 Hospital cost efficiency estimations-one stage approach 
The single stage cost efficiency estimation is carried out using statistical software Frontier 
version 4.1. Recall that in this approach, the cost inefficiency terms u" are assumed to 
have a normal distribution truncated at zero points. u" has variance of a; and mean 
z"5 where z;, is a vector of attributes to hospital cost efficiency. These factors are 
incorporated directly into MLE. All parameters (costs and cost efficiencies) are estimated 
simultaneously in one step, hence overcoming the inconsistency in the assumptions of the 
efficiency terms. 
Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 show results of the cost efficiency estimations for Cobb-Douglas 
and translog cost functions for all peer groups and the pooled group when excess mortality 
rates were used as quality indicator. Similarly, Table 7.7 and Table 7.8 show results of the 
cost efficiency estimations for Cobb-Douglas and translog cost functions for all peer groups 
and the pooled group when excess adverse event rates were used as quality indicator. The 
choice of which estimation can be used for the results discussion will be based on the log 
likelihood ratio hypothesis tests. In the situation when the estimation selected by the log 
likelihood ratio test shows some abnormalities such as extreme values or unexpected sign 
with statistical significance, then the selection for an appropriate estimation will be based 
on overall economic sensibility. 
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Table 7.5: Cobb-Douglas cost efficiency estimation- panel data approach (excess 
mortality rates as quality indicator) 
Dependent variable: total costs 
Variable Peer A Peer B PeerC PeerD Pooled 
doctor salary 0.100 0.057 0.0214 0.063 0.025 
(0.061) (0.048) (0.017) (0.092) (0.022) 
nurse salary -0.058 0.469** 0.1534** -0.825 0.159** 
(0.058) (0.087) (0.046) (0.650) (0.056) 
other staff salary 0.307** 0.230** 0.2843** -0.140 0.190** 
(0.077) (0.092) (0.081) (0.678) (0.068) 
I emergency -0.280** -0.054 0.0749** 0.040 0.039 
' (0.043) (0.050) (0.025) (0.142) (0.026) I . I outpatient 0.154** 0.050 -0.0206 0.123 0.134** 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.027) (0.222) (0.024) 
I surgery 0.385** 0.100** 0.1587** 0.115** 0.158** 
(0.045) (0.041) (0.027) (0.053) (0.017) 
medical 0.421 ** 0.020 0.0514 0.275** 0.294** 
(0.044) (0.047) (0.034) (0.129) (0.033) 
otherDRG 0.110** 0.088** 0.0110 0.039** 0.068** 
' 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.011) (0.023) (0.012) 
j teaching -0.001 0.001 -0.2511 ** 0.031 
J peer group A 
(0.025) (0.048) (0.087) (0.039) 
0.177** 
i (0.089) I peer group B 0.159** 
' I (0.088) 
peer group C -0.111 ** 
(0.056) 
NSW 0.049 0.093** 0.1654** 0.136** 
(0.068) (0.045) (0.058) (0.039) 
!SA 0.024 -0.041 0.0214 -0.744 0.050 
I (0.051) (0.068) (0.053) (0.931) (0.043) I QLD -0.195** 0.082 0.0884 -0.507** -0.080** 
' (0.062) (0.064) (0.092) (0.133) (0.047) 
TAS -0.011 0.300** 0.159** 
(0.081) (0.087) (0.081) 
NT 0.081 0.114 0.049 
(0.059) (0.138) (0.087) 
Time 0.056** 0.037** 0.0271 •• 0.128** 0.050** 
(0.009) (0.016) (0.013) (0.042) (0.012) 
Constant 7.173** 7.278** 8.6122** 21.226** 6.639** 
(0.951) (1.007) (J.206) (0.997) (0.836) 
No.Obs 144 102 172 59 477 
Log likelihood 135.86 112.35 162.28 20.17 185.99 
Inefficienc mean 1.437 1.678 2.38 1.00 1.617 
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excess mortality -1.036 3.443** 4.3310 -0.004 -0.938 
(0.973) (1.300) (4.422) (0.998) (2.548) 
occupancy rate -0.839** 0.185 -0.0179 0.075 -0.114 
(0.093) (0.137) (0.072) (0.274) (0.070) 
full time staff/bed 0.112** 0.107** 0.2857** 0.009 0.136** 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.076) (0.012) 
beds 0.001 ** 0.005** 0.0122** 0.002 0.001 ** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
constant 0.320** -0.807** -0.7730** -0. l 03 -0.185** 
(0.106) (0.210) (0.186) (0.062) (0.040) 
**p$0.05;*p$0.l; H0 :f3=0;H1 :jJotO 
Table 7.6: Translog cost efficiency estimation- panel data approach (excess mortality 
rates as quality indicator) 
Dependent variable: total costs 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
doctor salary (a) 19.605** 11.494** 0.023 0.592** -6.261 ** 
(1.000) (0.919) (0.021) (0.158) (2.152) 
nurse salary (b) -41.082** -13.032** 0.156** -2.042** -4.595 
(1.000) (0.929) (0.060) (0.429) (2.794) 
other staff salary ( c) 13.367** -3.517** 0.205** 0.412 0.732 
(1.000) (0.934) (0.099) (0.515) (4.355) 
emergency ( d) -5.154** 11.851** 0.083** -0.347** -0.846 
(1.000) (0.940) (0.038) (0.145) (1.810) 
outpatient ( e) 9.867** -1.254 -0.010 0.196 2.384 
(1.000) (0.923) (0.040) (0.112) (1.503) 
surgery (t) -6.504** 8.777** 0.182** 0.025 -1.864 
(1.000) (0.963) (0.028) (0.058) (1.258) 
medical (g) 3.948** 1.113 0.063 0.425** 2.641 
(1.000) (0.952) (0.047) (0.088) (1.802) 
other DRG (h) -1.768 8.881 ** 0.015 -0.047 -0.806 
a2 
(l.000) (0.974) (0.014) (0.035) (0.942) 
-0.653 -0.549 0.000 0.012 -0.038** 
b2 
(1.000) (0.515) (0.017) (0.199) (0.016) 
1.396 0.422 -0.005 -2.106** -0.237** 
c2 
(1.000) (0.564) (0.128) (0.539) (0.096) 
-0.268 0.823 -0.144 -1.123** -0.292 
(1.000) (0.697) (0.239) (0.516) (0.188) 
ab 0.682 0.715 0.198 1.253 0.521** 
(1.000) (0.820) (0.217) (0.697) (0.186) 
ac 
-0.447 -0.663 -0.297 -1.009 0.161 
(1.000) (0.743) (0.248) (0.646) (0.219) 
be 0.157 0.640 0.321 3.128** 0.349 
d2 
(1.000) (0.865) (0.228) (0.816) (0.297) 
0.233 -0.232 0.073 0.210 0.041 
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(1.000) (0.484) (0.057) (0.296) (0.035) 
e1 0.070 0.148 0.015 -0.473** 0.049 
(1.000) (0.205) (0.044) (0.155) (0.026) 
f -0.094 0.465 0.018 -0.018 0.005 
(1.000) (0.555) (0.020) (0.075) (0.010) 
g2 
-0.124 0.213 0.069 0.321 -0.009 
(1.000) (0.373) (0.107) (0.310) (0.045) 
h2 
-0.041 -0.040 0.001 0.073** 0.013** 
(1.000) (0.216) (0.011) (0.033) (0.007) 
de -0.386 0.226 0.035 0.852** -0.101** 
(1.000) (0.715) (0.085) (0.314) (0.043) 
df 0.451 -0.064 -0.003 -0.494** 0.096** 
(1.000) (0.763) (0.070) (O.J 85) (0.038) 
dg 0.493 0.320 -0.142 0.067 -0.110 
(1.000) (0.673) (0.139) (0.399) (0.066) 
dh -0.257 -0.427 0.052 0.023 0.003 I 
(1.000) (0.528) (0.054) (0.183) co.o33) I 
ef -0.013 -0.168 -0.051 o.s1 o•• -0.059** 
(1.000) (0.463) (0.046) (0.123) (0.026) 
eg -0.084 -0.525 -0.017 -0.698** -0.014 
(1.000) (0.613) (0.094) (0.326) (0.048) 
eh -0.075 0.261 0.042 -0.186** 0.025** 
(1.000) (0.314) (0.030) (0.067) (0.021) 
fg 0.017 0.516 0.074 0.023 0.049 
(1.000) (0.547) (0.093) (0.133) (0.031) 
th 0.217 -0.406 0.003 -0.126 0.008 
(1.000) (0.458) (0.023) (0.081) (0.011) 
gh 0.170 -0.259 -0.028 0.502 -0.068 
(1.000) (0.413) (0.063) (0.264) (0.030) 
ad 0.173 0.428 0.043 -0.577 -0.052 
(1.000) (0.648) (0.109) (0.410) (0.079) 
ae -0.137 0.146 0.056 0.578 0.032 
(1.000) (0.556) (0.089) (0.275) (0.050) 
af 0.341 -0.105 -0.031 0.136 0.021 
(1.000) (0.640) (0.070) (0.082) (0.027) 
ag -0.756 -1.007 0.014 -0.567 -0.038 
(1.000) (0.651) (0.120) (0.545) (0.064) 
ah -0.325 0.671 0.021 -0.098 0.012 
(1.000) (0.431) (0.046) (0.115) (0.024) 
bd -0.292 -1.238 0.071 0.419 0.277 
(1.000) (0.775) (0.278) (0.549) (0.192) 
be -0.463 -0.101 -0.443 -0.409 -0.137 
(1.000) (0.644) (0.269) (0.582) (0.156) 
bf 0.331 -2.310** 0.055 -1.380** 0.133 
(1.000) (0.862) (0.234) (0.475) (0.158) 
bg 0.449 2.512** -0.201 0.169 -0.167 
(1.000) (0.760) (0.401) (0.614) (0.226) 
bh 0.197 -0.387 -0.053 1.416** -0.093 
1.000) (0.673) 0.225) (0.392) (0.132) 
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cd -0.083 -0.085 -0.192 -0.731 -0.096 
(1.000) (0.844) (0.304) (0.584) (0.191) 
ce 0.094 -0.044 0.357 0.292 -0.082 
I cf (1.000) (0.665) (0.305) (0.522) (0.125) -0.483 1.068 -0.048 1.225** -0.037 (1.000) (0.855) (0.241) (0.479) (0.148) 
cg -0.275 -1.881** 0.186 0.465 0.119 
(1.000) (0.831) (0.442) (0.715) (0.207) 
ch 0.364 -0.469 -0.037 -1.506** 0.172 
(1.000) (0.707) (0.250) (0.466) (0.117) 
I teaching 0.092 0.005 -0.334** 0.036 
I (1.000) (0.178) (0.107) (0.033) 
peer group A 0.181** I 
(0.076) . 
peer group B 0.139** 
(0.066) 
peer group C -0.107** 
(0.050) 
NSW -0.035 0.030 0.221 ** 0.163** 
(1.000) (0.153) (0.058) (0.035) 
SA -0.191 -0.173 0.041 1.127** 0.055 
(1.000) (0.202) (0.058) (0.520) (0.038) 
QLD -0.387 -0.239 0.122 -0.788** -0.034 
(l .000) (0.271) (0.077) (0.161) (0.041) 
TAS -0.210 -0.056 0.194** 
(l.000) (0.430) (0.063) 
NT -0.010 0.280 0.160 
! (1.000) (0.778) (0.084) I time 0.081 0.109** 0.035** 0.058 0.047** 
' 
I Constant 
(1.000) (0.057) (0.015) (0.045) (0.012) 
36.629** -83.863** 8.620** 20.107** 57.778**' 
(l.000) 
; 
I (0.998) (1.131) (1.053) (26.306) 
' ' 
'No. Obs 144 102 172 59 477 
Log likelihood 155.96 110.75 188.61 82.97 262.748 ' 
i Inefficiency mean l.072 1.150 1.000 1.098 3.912 
I 
I I ar 0.000 -0.026 3.668 0.762 I excess mort 1ty 0.913 
I occupancy rate (1.000) (I .000) (2.091) (1.022) (1.244) 0.000 0.615 -0.040 -0.901 ** -0.065 
(1.000) (0.612) (0.092) (0.369) (0.061) 
full time staff/bed 0.000 -0.003 0.285 0.174 0.139** I 
(1.000) (0.055) (0.025) (0.105) co.011) I 
beds 0.000 0.003 0.011 0.013** 0.002** 
I constant 
(1.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) 
0.000 -0.876 -0.757 -0.275 0.584 
{l.0002 (0.523) {0.129} {0.250) (0.787) ' 
**p:S0.05; • p:SO.!; H0 : /3 = O;H, : /3 ~ 0 
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Table 7.7: Cobb-Douglas cost efficiency estimation- panel data approach (excess 
adverse event rates as quality indicator) 
Dependent variable: total costs 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
doctor salary 0.167 0.047 0.031 0.061 0.036* 
(0.981) (0.060) (0.023) (0.637) (0.020) 
nurse salary -0.208 0.450** 0.151** -0.859 0.156** 
(0.125) (0.079) (0.072) (0.781) (0.046) 
other staff salary 0.366** 0.247** 0.327** -0.131 0.188** 
(0.095) (0.090) (0.115) (0.842) (0.061) 
emergency -0.287** -0.023 0.074 0.054 0.029 
(0.043) (0.048) (0.047) (0.664) (0.026) 
outpatient 0.182** 0.066 -0.012 0.115 0.137** 
(0.042) (0.043) (0.028) (0.542) (0.022) 
surgery 0.369** 0.052 0.149** 0.118 0.146** 
(0.045) (0.043) (0.023) (0.203) (0.015) 
medical 0.395** 0.010 0.037 0.277 0.303** 
(0.052) (0.056) (0.034) (0.842) (0.029) 
other DRG 0.113** 0.109** 0.014 0.041 0.074** 
(0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.067) (0.011) 
teaching -0.008 0.018 -0.246** 0.049 
(0.021) (0.050) (0.092) (0.037) 
peer group A 0.193** 
(0.073) 
peer group B 0.167** 
(0.060) 
peer group C -0.111** 
(0.042) 
NSW 0.073 0.069 0.162** 0.135** 
(0.068) (0.045) (0.037) (0.033) 
SA 0.084 -0.042 0.032 -0.752 0.044 
(0.066) (0.079) (0.046) (0.970) (0.039) 
QLD -0.156** 0.040 0.075 -0.505 -0.087** 
(0.064) (0.058) (0.052) (0.300) (0.040) 
TAS -0.027 0.280** 0.151** 
(0.074) (0.087) (0.072) 
NT 0.137 0.100 0.029 
(0.072) (0.165) (0.080) 
Time 0.055** 0.042* 0.026 0.129 0.049** 
(0.010) (0.024) (0.019) (0.138) (0.011) 
Constant 7.466 7.289 8.172 21.456 6.423 
(1.022) (1.497) (1.402) (0.998) (0.179) 
No. Obs 144 102 172 59 477 
Log likelihood 139.56 112.53 161.59 20.38 205.12 
Inefficiencv mean 1.458 1.659 2.32 1.06 1.920 
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excess adv.event rate 1.346 1.423 1.414** 0.007 3.160** 
(0.845) (0.894) (0.716) (0.996) (0.561) 
occupancy rate -0.676** 0.201 -0.027 0.007 -0.097 
(0.125) (0.196) (0.119) (0.530) (0.061) 
full time staff/bed 0.107** 0.112** 0.287** 0.017 0.132** 
(0.011) (0.022) (0.034) (0.031) (0.011) 
beds 0.001 ** 0.005** 0.012** 0.002 0.001** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
constant 0.223 -0.820 -0.783 -0.094 -0.002 
(0.133) (0.243) (0.310) (0.067) (0.587) 
**p:"':0.05; * p:"':0.1; H0 : /3 = O;H1 : /3 * 0 
Table 7.8: Translog cost efficiency estimation- panel data approach (excess adverse 
event rates as quality indicator) 
Dependent variable: total costs 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
doctor salary (a) 19.605** 11.533** 0.024 8.442** -5.484** 
(1.000) (0.922) (0.021) (1.000) (2.219) 
nurse salary (b) -41.082** -13.048** 0.144 -119.344** -4.376 
(1.000) (0.933) (0.063) (1.000) (3.151) 
other staff salary ( c) 13.367** -3.507** 0.201 ** -156.151 ** 1.467 
(1.000) (0.938) (0.098) (1.000) (4.907) 
emergency ( d) -5. 154** 11.877** 0.090** 52.312** -0.234 
(1.000) (0.944) (0.038) (1.000) (2.006) 
outpatient ( e) 9.867** -1.325 0.003 -36.936** 2.631 
(1.000) (0.926) (0.039) (1.000) (1.469) 
surgery (f) 
-6.504** 8.764** 0.169** -2.917** -2.013 
(1.000) (0.965) (0.028) (1.000) (1.289) 
medical (g) 3.948** 1.143 0.056 -16.960** 1.866 
(l.000) (0.955) (0.048) (1.000) (1.966) 
other DRG (h) -1.768 8.873** 0.020 3.088** -0.559 
a2 
(1.000) (0.976) (0.014) (1.000) (0.950) 
-0.653 -0.551 0.003 0.078 -0.035** 
b2 
(1.000) (0.515) (0.017) (1.000) (0.015) 
1.396 0.320 0.007 1.931 -0.173 
c2 
(1.000) (0.581) (0.123) (1.000) (0.099) 
-0.268 0.642 -0.172 0.601 -0.312 
(1.000) (0.721) (0.299) (1.000) (0.223) 
ab 0.682 0.827 0.178 -1.894** 0.420** 
(1.000) (0.829) (0.213) (1.000) (0.195) 
ac 
-0.447 -0.621 -0.282 2.376** 0.183 
(1.000) (0.774) (0.244) (1.000) (0.231) 
be 0.157 0.739 0.347 9.495** 0.325 
d2 
(1.000) (0.878) (0.282) (1.000) (0.313) 
0.233 -0.068 0.079 0.590 0.054 
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(1.000) (0.534) (0.059) (1.000) (0.035) 
e2 0.070 0.151 0.006 0.547 0.051 ** 
(l.000) (0.336) (0.050) (1.000) (0.026) 
f -0.094 0.498 0.017 0.062 0.003 
(l.000) (0.637) (0.021) (l.000) (0.010) 
g2 -0.124 0.201 0.049 0.946 -0.004 l 
(1.000) (0.625) (0.101) (1.000) (0.047) 
h2 
-0.041 -0.074 0.005 -0.079 0.015** 
(l.000) (0.273) (0.011) (l.000) (0.007) 
de -0.386 0.154 0.031 -0.760 -0.096** 
(l.000) (0.762) (0.087) (l.000) (0.041) 
df 0.451 -0.313 0.000 -0.035 0.099** 
(1.000) (0.830) (0.069) (1.000) (0.037) 
dg 0.493 0.227 -0.156 -0.227 -0.130** 
! dh 
(l.000) (0.703) (0.150) (1.000) (0.065) 
-0.257 -0.290 0.053 0.106 0.003 
I (1.000) (0.530) (0.054) (1.000) (0.032) 
ef -0.013 -0.151 -0.054 -0.178 -0.069** 
(1.000) (0.584) (0.046) (1.000) (0.026) 
eg -0.084 -0.329 0.020 0.241 -0.003 
{I .000) (0.755) (0.092) (1.000) (0.047) 
eh -0.075 0.193 0.038 0.039 0.028 
(1.000) (0.419) (0.032) (1.000) (0.020) 
fg 0.017 0.373 0.101 -0.541 0.053 
(1.000) (0.729) (0.079) (l.000) (0.031) 
th 0.217 -0.392 -0.004 0.064 0.003 
(1.000) (0.551) (0.022) (1.000) (0.011) 
gh 0.170 -0.227 -0.031 -0.055 -0.062** 
(1.000) (0.611) (0.062) (1.000) (0.030) 
ad 0.173 0.331 0.031 0.615 -0.066 
(1.000) (0.731) (0.106) (1.000) (0.077) 
ae -0.137 0.088 0.067 -0.559 0.031 
(l.000) (0.611) (0.088) (1.000) (0.051) 
af 0.341 -0.092 -0.022 0.134 0.022 
(1.000) (0.671) (0.069) (1.000) (0.027) 
ag -0.756 -0.936 0.013 -2.050** -0.019 
I ah 
(1.000) (0.761) (0.120) (1.000) (0.064) 
-0.325 0.550 0.013 -0.098 0.009 
(1.000) (0.500) (0.043) (1.000) (0.022) 
i bd -0.292 -0.878 0.095 -1.855 0.286 
! (1.000) (0.833) (0.346) (l.000) (0.194) 
be -0.463 -0.111 -0.473 2.531 ** -0.222 
(1.000) (0.636) (0.293) (1.000) (0.158) 
bf 0.331 -2.289** 0.043 0.462 0.069 
(1.000) (0.857) (0.231) (1.000) (0.157) 
bg 0.449 2.042 -0.253 -1.911* -0.051 
(1.000) (0.796) (0.503) (J .000) (0.222) 
I bh 0.197 -0.305 -0.009 -0.296 -0.073 (1.000) (0.724) (0.240} __ (1.000) (0.134) 
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! cd -0.083 -0.405 -0.205 -3.790** -0.160 
(1.000) (0.851) (0.361) (1.000) (0.190) 
ce 0.094 ..Q.038 0.373 0.993 -0.028 
' 
(1.000) (0.744) (0.320) (1.000) (0.128) 
I cf 
-0.483 1.315 -0.060 0.143 0.050 
(1.000) (0.852) (0.237) (1.000) (0.145) 
cg -0.275 -1.494 0.232 4.825** 0.046 
(1.000) (0.892) (0.526) (1.000) (0.210) 
ch 0.364 -0.473 -0.067 0.060 0.125 
! teaching (1.000) (0.736) 
(0.258) (1.000) (0.121) 
0.092 0.005 -0.322** 0.048 
I peer group A 
(1.000) (0.273) (0.108) (0.033) 
0.204** 
I (0.075) 
J peer group B 0.164** 
I (0.065) 
peer group C -0.094 
(0.049) 
NSW -0.035 -0.018 0.193** 0.159** 
I (1.000) (0.248) (0.062) (0.036) 
' !SA -0.191 -0.232 0.037 -1.110 0.052 
(1.000) (0.379) (0.061) (1.000) (0.039) 
QLD -0.387 -0.315 0.078 -0.028 -0.052 
(1.000) (0.365) (0.080) (1.000) (0.043) 
TAS -0.210 -0.039 0.176** 
(1.000) (0.677) (0.062) 
:NT -0.010 0.273 0.140** 
(1.000) (0.872) (0.087) 
time 0.081 0.106 0.038 0.136 0.050** 
(l.000) (0.070) (0.016) (1.000) (0.012) 
constant 36.629 -83.865 8.895 1468.384 47.092 
(1.000) (0.998) (1.060) (1.000) (27.064) 
No. Obs 144 102 172 59 477 
Log likelihood 155.961 I 09.691 188.677 94.69 270.253 
Inefficiency mean 1.072 1.150 2.202 1.009 3.37 
excess adv.ev.rate 0.000 1.227 1.081 ** 0.000 1.932** 
(1.000) (1.198) (0.951) (1.000) (0.515) 
occupancy rate 0.000 0.432 -0.011 0.000 -0.064 
(1.000) (0.727) (0.099) (1.000) (0.061) 
full time staff/bed 0.000 -0.003 0.279** 0.000 0.137** 
(1.000) (0.072) (0.026) (1.000) (0.011) 
beds 0.000 0.002 0.011 •• 0.000 0.001 
(1.000) (0.001) (0.001) (1.000) (0.000) 
constant 0.000 -0.634 -0.746 0.000 0.464 
1.000 (0.653) 0.103 (1.000 (0.759 
**p $0.05; • p s 0.1; H 0 : fJ = O; H, : fJ ¢ 0 
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For the above estimations, the Maximum Likelihood estimator is used to estimate the cost 
functions. In the next step, the log likelihood ratio tests are used as a criterion to decide 
which function is more appropriate. Table7.9 and Table 7.10 report the log likelihood test 
for all peer groups and the pooled data. 
Table 7 .9: Hypothesis null tests for cost efficiency model (excess mortality rates as 
quality indicator) 
Log likelihood 
Cobb-Douglas 
Log likelihood 
Translog 
Peer A 
I 
! 135.86 
155.96 
PeerB PeerC 
112.35 162.28 
110.75 188.61 
.•. 
PeerD Pooled ! 
! 
20.17 185.99 
82.97 262.748 
Log likelihood 
Ratio 
40.2 3.2 I s2.66 125.6 153.s2 I I t-------··t-------+-----;,-----+------1--------<1 
;r 2 critical value 55.76 55.76 55.76 
( 5% significance, 
degree of I 
freedom=36) I 
Decision 
I I 
! Accept Ho. J Accept Ho. i Accept Ho. 
I Cobb- ! Cobb- Cobb-
1 
Douglas I Douglas Douglas 
more more more 
appropriate appropriate appropriate 
55.76 I ss.16 
i 
Reject Ho. J Reject Ho. 
Translog ! Translog ! 
more I more 1 
appropriate 
1 
appropriate I 
Table 7 .10: Hypothesis Null tests for Cost efficiency model (excess adverse event rates 
as quality indicator) 
··-· Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
-~-- ·-
Log likelihood 
Cobb-Douglas 139.56 112.53 161.59 20.38 205.12 
Log likelihood 
Trans log 155.961 109.691 188.677 94.69 270.253 
Log likelihood 32.8 5.68 54.16 148.62 130.26 
Ratio i 
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I I 55.76 I x 2 critical value 55.76 ' 55.76 55.76 55.76 
(5% significance, I degree of 
I freedom=36) 
I 
Decision Accept Ho. I Accept Ho. Accept Ho. Reject Ho. Reject Ho. 
' Translog I Cobb- I Cobb- Cobb- Translog Douglas Douglas Douglas more more 
' 
more more more appropriate appropriate 
appropriate appropriate I appropriate 
From Table 7.9 and Table 7.10, the results show that the Cobb-Douglas cost function is 
more appropriate for peer groups A, B and C. The log likelihood ratios are lower than the 
x' value and this suggests the acceptance of the null hypothesis of Cobb-Douglas cost 
function at 5% significance. For economic sensibility, the sign of the Cobb-Douglas 
estimated coefficients are generally consistent with expectation. The negative and 
statistically significant coefficient of emergency admissions variable in peer group A raises 
some concern about the appropriateness of the Cobb-Douglas estimation. However, the 
estimated coefficient for the same variable in translog estimation suffers similar 
inconsistency. Hence, it is reasonable to decide that Cobb-Douglas cost estimations are 
more appropriate than translog estimations for peer groups A, B and C. 
The choice of cost estimations for peer group D and the pooled group is less straight 
forward. The log likelihood ratios are higher than the x 2 critical value and this suggests the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of the Cobb-Douglas cost function at 5% significance. 
However, some abnormalities of the translog estimations can be found in the sign of input 
and output coefficients. The negative and statistically significant coefficients for the nurse 
salary variable in peer group D, the doctor salary variable in pooled group, and the joint 
product variables :in peer group D and pooled group, do not provide much economic sense. 
Compared with translog estimations, the results from Cobb-Douglas estimations show that 
\\Tongly signed coefficients are accompanied with statistical insignificance. Hence, Cobb-
Douglas estimations for peer group D and the pooled group seem to make more economic 
sense compared with the translog estimations. In addition, with the translog cost 
estimations where excess adverse event rates were used as quality indicator, all coefficients 
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in peer group A and peer group D had standard error values equal I. This might be an 
indication of some distortion in the estimations. As a result, estimations from Cobb-
Douglas estimations for peer group D and the pooled group will be selected for discussion. 
Table 7.5 and Table 7.7 show that the results are not significantly different from each other 
when excess mortality rates or excess adverse event rates were used as quality of care 
indicator. Jn addition, the results are mostly consistent with expectation. In most cases, an 
increase in hospital staff salary was associated with an increase in total costs. For example, 
in table 7.5, the cost elasticity of nurse salary implied that an increase of one per cent in 
nurse salary would raise hospital costs by 0.47 per cent for hospitals in peer group B and 
0.15 per cent for hospitals in peer group C. The cost elasticity of other staff salary stated 
that a rise of one per cent in other staff salary would push the total costs up by 0.3 per cent, 
0.23 per cent and 0.28 per cent for hospitals in peer groups A, B, and C respectively. 
Keeping all other factors unchanged, for most cases, a change in doctor salary did not 
appear to have significant impacts on hospital total costs. This might be due to the small 
difference in the log values of doctor salary in the same peer group. For example, for peer 
group A, the log values of doctor salary at 25 percentile, 50 percentile, and 74 percentile 
were 11.51, 11.58, and 11.6 respectively. For peer group B, the log values were 11.5, 11.6 
and 11.8 at 25 percentile, 50 percentile and 75 percentile respectively. 
For hospital outputs, an increase in volumes was significantly associated with an increase 
in total costs for most cases. An increase in the number of surgical admissions raised the 
total costs most heavily for major hospitals and this might due to the fact that surgical cases 
in major hospitals were much more complex that those in large, medium and small 
hospitals. There is no clear explanation for negative cost elasticity for emergency 
admissions in peer group A. 
There is evidence of economies of scale in the overall activities of hospitals. A value of 
less than one for the output coefficient sum suggests that one per cent increase in the 
overall output activities required less than one per cent increase in hospital costs. For 
example, as shown in Table 7.5, the respective values of output coefficient sum were 0.79 
for peer group A, 0.204 for peer group B, 0.275 for peer group C, 0.592 for peer group D 
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and 0.693 for the pooled group. These values suggest that in terms of economies of scale, 
peer group A was the worst performer and peer group B was the best. 
Teaching hospitals typically perform more complex, innovative or rare medical procedures. 
As a result, a positive link between teaching status and total costs is expected. However, 
the results show that teaching status did not have a significant impact in hospital costs for 
hospitals in peer group A and had a negative and significant link with hospital costs for 
peer group C. The inconsistency in the results might be due to extremely large number of 
teaching hospitals in peer A and extremely small number in peer group C. There were 32, 
40, 43 teaching hospitals out of the totals 45, 45 and 54 hospitals in peer group A in 2002-
2003, 2003-2004, and 2004-2005 respectively. At the other extreme, there was only one 
teaching hospital out of a total 66 peer C hospitals in 2002-2003, of 65 in 2003-2004 and of 
45 in 2004-2005. 
For the state dummy variables, NSW and QLD appeared to have more consistent results 
compared with other states. While hospitals in NSW appeared to incur higher costs than 
those in VIC, the opposite can be noticed for hospitals in QLD. Among states, Queensland 
appeared to incur the lowest costs for peer groups A and D. This might be a reflection of 
the assertiveness of the Queensland goverrnnent's policy in controlling hospital costs. The 
coefficient of the time variable shows that hospital costs have consistently increased over 
time. Substantial improvement in technology in treating hospital patients and the 
accessibility of technology for all hospitals can be a possible explanation for the rise in 
hospital costs. 
The mean values of the inefficiency terms show a significant variation between peer 
groups. On average, Australian public hospitals operated at 61.7% (when excess mortality 
rates were used as quality indicator) and at 92% (when excess adverse event rates were 
used as quality indicator) above the cost frontier (or at 61.7% and 92% cost inefficiency). 
When hospitals were divided into peer groups, the results indicate that hospital efficiency 
increased with size. Peer group A appeared to be the most efficient group with an average 
inefficiency score of 43.7% (Table 7.5) and 45.8% (Table 7.7) whereas peer group B 
appeared to operate at 67.8% and 65.9% (Table 7.5 and Table 7.7). Peer group C operated 
at 138% and 132% cost inefficiency respectively. The perfect cost efficient outcome for 
peer group D is questionable on its reliability. The small number of hospitals in this peer 
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group in the dataset might not be sufficient enough for cost efficiency estimation. Table 
7.11 and Table 7.12 below will show summaries of cost efficiency measurements for all 
groups. 
Table 7.11: Summary of cost inefficiencies for hospital peer groups (excess 
mortality rates as quality indicator) 
Std. 
Mean Dev Minimum Maximum 
Peer group A 1.437 (0.299) 1.000 2.357 
Peer group B 1.678 (0.423) 1.002 3.186 
Peer group C 2.381 (1.062) 1.023 6.111 
Peer group D 1.015 (0.020) 1.000 1.084 
Pooled 1.620 (0.671) 1.000 4.781 
Table 7.12: Summary of cost inefficiencies for hospital peer groups (excess 
adv.event rates as quality indicator) 
Std. 
Mean Dev Minimum Maximum 
Peer group A 1.458 (0.300) 1.000 2.384 
Peer group B 1.659 (0.411) 1.002 3.188 
Peer group C 2.324 (1.038) 1.008 5.902 
Peer group D 1.015 (0.019) 1.000 1.070 
Pooled 1.921 (0.769) 1.0096 5.301 
Details in Table 7.11 and Table 7.12 confirm the great variation between peer groups in 
terms of cost efficiency. At the same time, the tables show extreme conditions for peer 
group C. In peer group A, the least efficient hospital was about twice as inefficient 
compared with the most efficient hospital. The ratio is more than 3 times for peer group B 
and less than 2 peer group D. In peer group C, however, the least efficient hospital was 6 
times more inefficient than the most efficient hospital. The results suggest that cost 
management at some medium size hospitals may need serious attention. 
As mentioned, another aspect of this study is to investigate the possible trade-off between 
hospital cost efficiency and hospital quality of care. Together with quality of care, other 
factors, that possibly influence hospital cost efficiency (inefficiency) are included in the 
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estimation. They are occupancy rate, intensity of input use (measured by number of full 
time equivalent staff per bed) and hospital size (measured by number of available beds). 
For convenience, the lower section of Table 7.5 and Table 7.7 is duplicated in the Table 
7.13 and Table 7.14 below. 
Table 7.13: Factors influencing hospital cost inefficiency (excess mortality rates as 
quality indicator) 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
excess mortality 
rate -1.036 3.443** 4.3310 -0.004 -0.938 
(0.973) ( 1.300) ( 4.422) (0.998) (2.548) 
occupancy rate -0.839** 0.185 -0.0179 0.075 -0.114 
(0.093) (0.137) (0.072) (0.274) (0.070) 
full time staff/bed 0.112** 0.107** 0.2857** 0.009 0.136** 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.076) (0.012) 
beds 0.001** 0.005** 0.0122** 0.002 0.001 ** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
-
constant 0.320** -0.807** -0.7730** -0.103 0.185** 
(0.106) (0.210) (0.186) (0.062) (0.040) 
**p::S:0.05;*p::S:O.l; H 0 :f3=0;H1 :f3*0 
Table 7.14: Factors influencing hospital cost inefficiency (excess adv. event rates as 
quality indicator) 
excess adv. events 
rate 1.346 1.423 1.414** 0.007 3.160** 
(0.845) (0.894) (0.716) (0.996) (0.561) 
occupancy rate -0.676** 0.201 -0.027 0.007 -0.097 
(0.125) (0.196) (0.119) (0.530) (0.061) 
full time staff/bed 0.107** 0.112** 0.287** 0.017 0.132** 
(0.011) (0.022) (0.034) (0.031) (0.011) 
beds 0.001 ** 0.005** 0.012** 0.002 0.001 ** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
constant 0.223 -0.820 -0.783 -0.094 -0.002 
(0.133) (0.243) (0.310) (0.067) (0.587) 
**p::S:0.05;*p::S:O.l; H 0 :f3=0;H1 :f3*0 
Results from Table 7.13 and Table 7.14 show some consistency with expectation. The 
change in intensity of input use and hospital size appeared to have significant impact on 
hospital cost efficiency. Increase in the intensity of input use, reflected by the number of 
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full time equivalent staff per available bed, appeared to increase hospital cost inefficiency. 
Once again, peer group C stood out as the most affected group. Tultlle one extra staff per 
available bed increased the cost technical inefficiency of hospitals in peer groups A and B 
approximately by 0.11 %, it increased the cost technical inefficiency of hospitals in peer 
group C nearly three times as much. Similarly, one extra available hospital bed raised 
hospital cost inefficiency by 0.001 % for hospitals in peer group A, 0.005% for hospitals in 
peer group B, it would raise 0.012% for hospitals in peer group C. This suggests some 
careful consideration in expanding the intensity of input use and the size of medium size 
hospitals in Australia. 
Hospital quality of care appeared to have a significant impact on cost efficiency only for 
some groups of hospitals. An increase in hospital excess mortality rate by I% would 
increase the cost inefficiency by 3.4% for hospitals in peer group B. At the same time, an 
increase in hospital excess adverse event rate by 1 % would increase the cost inefficiency by 
1.4% for peer group C and 3.16% for the pooled group. This implies an improvement in 
quality of care in those hospitals would be associated with an improvement in cost 
efficiency. Hence, the existence of quality and efficiency trade-off for large Australian 
hospitals cannot be found. For other peer groups, insignificance in the impact of quality of 
care on cost efficiency confirms the fact that improvement in quality did not make hospitals 
less cost efficient. This provides important policy implication for managing hospital 
quality of care. 
Similarly, hospital occupancy appeared to have impacts on hospital cost efficiency only for 
hospitals in peer groups A. Occupancy rate is supposed to have a positive impact on cost 
efficiency. A higher occupancy rate is expected to reduce hospital cost inefficiency since it 
indicates a high intensity of resources used. Table 7.13 and table 7.14 show that was only 
the case for hospitals in peer group A. An increase in I% in hospital occupancy rate 
reduced cost inefficiency by 0.84% (with excess mortality rates as quality indicator) and 
0.67% (with excess adverse event rates as quality indicator) respectively. Increasing 
hospital cost efficiency generally is a good economic consideration. However, hospitals in 
peer group A, as shov.n in the descriptive statistics, had already experienced extreme 
"access block" occupancy rates. The less than unity elasticity of inefficiency with respect 
to occupancy rate for those hospitals questions the validity of increasing cost efficiency as a 
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rational economic choice. Increasing occupancy rates for hospitals in other peer groups for 
cost efficiency can not be seen as optimal since the results do not suggest any significant 
association between the two. 
To summarise, there are two main approaches in examining hospital cost efficiency: the 
one-stage approach and the two-stage approach. For each approach, panel data method and 
pooled cross-sectional method can be carried out. In this chapter, only results of the one-
stage approach with panel data method are presented. Results of the one-stage cross-
sectional method and the two-stage approach with both panel data and cross-sectional 
methods are provided in Appendices Bl, B2, Cl, and C2, respectively. 
Table 7.15 and Table 7.16 provide the summaries of results of all methods. For each 
method, only results of the most appropriate estimation are presented. More specifically, 
results of Cobb-Douglas cost functions are presented for the one-stage approach. For the 
two-stage approach, since only limited numbers of convergence are achieved, results 
presented in Table 7.15 are from those convergences. In the case of more than two 
convergences can be achieved for the same dataset with the same method but with different 
assumptions for efficiency term distribution, results with the smallest overall variance will 
be chosen for the presentation. In the tables, the bold values represent the results when 
hospital excess mortality rates were used as hospital quality of care indicator. The plain 
values, on the other hand, represent results when excess adverse event rates were used as 
hospital quality of care indicator. In Table 7 .15 only one set of values was obtained in the 
two-stage approach. The change of quality indicators had influence only in the second 
stage. Therefore, the first stage results were the same with either indicator. 
Table 7.15: Summary of inefficiency scores across estimations 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
One stage- Panel data 43% 68% 138% 0% 62% 
! approach (Cobb-Douglas was 46% 66% 132% 6% 92% 
chosen) 
One stage- Pooled cross 84% 65% 131% 2% 75% 
sectional approach (Cobb-
Douglas was chosen) 87% 67% 140% 2% 141% 
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Two stage- Panel data 
approach (Cobb Douglas) 26% 69% 50% 55% 54% 
Two stage- Panel data 
approach (translog) 372% 
Two stage- Pooled cross 
sectional approach (Cobb 8% 0% 16% 0.1% 4.7% 
Douglas) 
Two stage- Pooled cross 
I sectional approach (translog) 0.2% 
The above results suggest that the selection of an estimation approach strongly influences 
the final outcomes of hospital cost efficiency values. However, the selection does not 
appear to significantly vary conclusions about the trade-off between hospital cost efficiency 
and quality of care. As indicated in table 7.16, for a majority of cases, no trade-off has 
been found. As highlighted earlier, the one-stage cross-sectional method and the two-stage 
methods data have estimation limitations which will be discussed closely in the next 
section. Since the one-stage panel data method is considered as the most appropriate, the 
discussion will be based on the results obtained from one-stage panel data estimations. 
In addition, the discussion will only focus on the results of peer groups A, B, and C due to 
some concerns over the estimations for peer group D and the pooled group. Results 
concerning peer group D are not considered in the discussion part due to small number of 
observations. With only 59 observations, the degrees of freedom were only 48 and 12 for 
the Cobb-Douglas and translog estimations, respectively. The validity of the statistical 
inference is questionable when the degrees of freedom were low. When all hospitals are 
pooled together, with the peer dummy variables, it is assumed that the main difference 
among peer groups was reflected only in the intercepts. In other words, any difference 
between peer groups was limited to the parallel shifts of cost functions. However, a 
comparison of coefficients in peer group individual regressions revealed some difference in 
marginal responses. The validity of the pooled group estimated results, therefore, is 
questionable. 
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Table 7.16: Trade-off between hospital cost efficiency and quality of care 
I One stage- Panel data 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
No No No No No 
approach (Cobb-Douglas 
chosen) No No No No No 
One stage- Pooled cross No No No No No 
1 sectional approach (Cobb-
I 
I Douglas chosen) No No No No No 
Two stage- Panel data No No Yes No No 
approach (Cobb Douglas) No No Yes No No 
Two stage- Panel data No 
approach (translog) Yes 
Two stage- Pooled cross 
sectional approach (Cobb No No No No No 
Douglas) No No No No Yes 
Two stage- Pooled cross 
sectional approach (translog) No 
Yes 
7.3 Results Discussion 
This section provides a discussion of the results obtained from single stage panel data 
procedures. In particular, the discussion focuses on the following aspects of the results: the 
methods used in measuring hospital cost technical efficiency, the relative cost efficiency of 
hospital peer groups, the relationship between hospital quality of care and cost efficiency, 
and the considerations needed for cost efficiency analysis. 
Discussion about the methods is concerned with the use of output variables and the choice 
of the panel data method instead of the pooled cross-sectional method v.'.ith time dummies. 
The choice of output variables in this study reflects the main issues of defining hospital 
outputs: the ultimate aim of hospital services is to improve patient health or quality of life. 
As a result, hospital outputs should reflect the improvement in patient health. Given the 
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impossibility of measuring this conceptual (or latent) hospital output, patient discharges or 
cases are used as hospital outputs instead. 
Using patient discharges or cases as hospital outputs is not without problems. A single type 
of hospital output such as the total number of cases does not reflect the multi-product 
nature of hospital services. As Street states: "Currently, there is no accurate way to 
amalgamate these activities into a single output measure without loss of information, 
making it preferable to specify diverse outputs as separate explanatory variables" (Street, 
2003, p.898). On the other hand, diagnosis-related group outputs would involve several 
hundred separate categories and including all of these would severely affect the regression 
degrees of freedom. In addition, patients in the same DRG group may also require a 
variation of hospital level of care. To overcome the problems concerning a single or a large 
number of hospital outputs, some general output aggregations have been used. The 
aggregation can be based on the patient's characteristics including age, gender, and 
payment method; or on types of treatment This study uses a typical popular hospital output 
aggregation which is based on types of treatments. The hospital outputs therefore include 
emergency patients, outpatients, and inpatients (inpatients comprise of surgical, medical 
and other DRG patients). 
In terms of estimation method, the two-stage approach is widely used by researchers. 
However, it has drawn questions concerning the choice of variables in the first and second 
steps and the inconsistency involving the assumptions about the distribution of the 
inefficiencies. Vitaliano and Toren (1994) acknowledge "One of the most difficult 
decisions to be made in the estimation of frontiers is what variables to include in the first 
step where the frontier and inefficiency is estimated, and what to reserve for use in 
'explaining' the inefficiency in a second step" (Vitaliano & Toren ,1994, p.287). 
Worthington (2004) raised a question and suggested a possible explanation concerning the 
same issue in using two-stage e&1imation: "if the variables employed in the second stage are 
thought to affect performance, why were they not included in the original model?"; "the 
reason for this can often be ascribed either to limitations in the underlying model, such as 
the inability to incorporate categorical or exogenous variables, or more prosaically, to 
empirical convenience". In addition, in the first stage, the estimated inefficiencies are 
assumed to be independently and identically distributed. Since in the second stage the 
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inefficiencies are assumed to be a function of a number of firm factors, they can not be 
regarded as identically distributed. Worthington (2004, p.l 64) pointed out: "if the variables 
used in specifying the original efficient model are correlated with the explanatory variables 
used in the second stage, then the second stage estimates will be inconsistent and biased". 
Hence, the single stage approach used in this study appears to be the most appropriate 
method. 
In this study, data for the same set of hospitals were obtained for three consecutive years. 
As a result, both the pooled cross-sectional approach and the panel data approach can be 
considered for the analysis. However, the panel data approach is considered as more 
appropriate for two main reasons. First, the panel data method takes into account the 
interdependence of a frrm' s performance across time while this is ignored by the cross-
sectional method. Second, the panel data method is superior in the fact that there is no need 
for an error distribution assumption to be specified whether a one step or two-step approach 
is used. Similar to the panel data method, the cross-sectional one-step estimation using 
Frontier v4. l assumes the inefficiency terms are normally distributed and truncated at zero. 
If estimated by the cross-sectional and two-step approach, all three assumptions of the cost 
inefficiency terms would have been considered. 
The division into peer groups is useful for comparing the cost efficiency between hospitals. 
The results show that major hospitals are more cost efficient than large and medium 
hospitals. This might suggest that they are operating at their full capacity with a limited 
budget Their smaller cost inefficiency scores indeed suggest that they may have reached 
their capacity constraints. Recall the link between occupancy rates and cost inefficiencies 
for major hospitals (peer A), an increase of I% in occupancy rate leads to less than I% 
increase in cost efficiency. Given that major hospitals are already the most cost efficient 
peer groups compared with others and they have already reached unacceptable high 
occupancy rates, improving cost efficiency via increasing their occupancy rates does not 
sound ideal. More attention may need to be paid to improving their quality of care. 
Low cost efficiency of peer group C (medium hospitals) may indicate that some factors 
others than cost efficiency concerns may be the cause of inefficiency. Maintaining hospital 
capacity for emergency admissions is an example. In order to cope with unpredictable 
emergency admissions, hospitals need to keep some capacity in reserve which results in 
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higher operating costs. The ability of meeting this objective varies across hospitals due to 
their systematic differences in capacity. Smaller hospitals need to retain a larger capacity 
compared with large hospitals to meet the objective. As a result, their cost efficiency is 
lower compared with large hospitals. Another example is the impact on cost efficiency 
from the environment where the hospitals operate. Smaller hospitals seem to operate in 
areas where c-0mmunity and primary care is underdeveloped. Consequently, their costs of 
treating patients may be higher which leads to lower cost efficiency. In other words, there 
may be other dimensions including access to services, hospital amenities or care that 
patients highly value but contribute significantly to hospital high c-0sts. 
With regard to cost efficiency results for each peer group, some policy implications 
concerning hospital operating capacity can be found. Developing procedures to increase 
capacity of hospitals in peer group C (medium hospitals) might be useful. More 
specifically, raising medium hospital occupancy rates did not appear to have a significant 
impact on their cost technical efficiency. With the average occupancy rate of 69% (Table 
6.5), there is room for medium hospitals to share heavy workload with major and large 
hospitals. Raising occupancy rates for hospitals in peer groups A and B would not be 
considered as ideal since they are already operating above their capacity. As a result, 
improving conditions in medium hospitals to attract more patients is a possible way to 
lessen the current "crisis" in major and large public hospitals. At the same time, more GP 
clinics and aged care facilities can potentially reduce the overcrowding problem in major 
and large hospitals. Policies encouraging patients to use private hospital services should 
also be considered as another alternative. 
Measuring hospital quality of care by excess mortality rates and excess adverse event rates 
has some limitations involving their representation of quality of care and the reliability of 
risk adjustment. First, mortality and adverse events capture only one aspect of the quality 
of care experienced by a hospital's patients. Other aspects reflecting public hospital quality 
of care include waiting time for emergency admission, waiting time for elective surgery, 
receipt of appropriate treatment during admission, post discharge services, and so on. 
Unfortunately, only administrative data at hospital level were available for this study. 
More specifically, only the overall mortality and adverse event rates were obtained in this 
study to be used as hospital quality of care indicators. 
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The second limitation concerns the risk adjustment process at the hospital level for 
mortality and adverse events. The risk adjusted mortality rates or adverse event rates were 
obtained by standardising the hospital's percentage of elderly patients, gender composition, 
average illness severity, and other hospital characteristics. As mentioned in the count data 
model section in chapter four, aggregating patient level information into hospital level will 
certainly be accompanied by some loss of information. However, with limited available 
data, quality of care measures in this study would provide the best possible picture of 
relative performance of the public hospitals in terms of quality of care. 
The association between hospital cost efficiency and quality of care gives interesting policy 
implications. It is commonplace to assume that hospitals provide poor care in order to 
reduce costs. In other words, there would be a trade off between quality of care and cost 
efficiency. However, the finding from this study shows no evidence of that trade-off. 
More interestingly, it shows a positive link between cost efficiency and quality of care for 
hospitals in peer group B. The results suggest that poor care is perhaps a result of 
mismanagement, poor staffing levels or low staff quality rather than low costs. This has 
important policy implications for policy makers. If the focus is to improve hospital quality 
of care, this can be undertaken without jeopardizing cost efficiency. If the focus is to 
improve cost efficiency, this can be done without jeopardizing hospital quality of care. In 
some cases, programs that lead to reduction in inefficiency would also lead to reductions in 
mortality rates and adverse event rates. 
7.4 Conclusion 
In summary, this chapter has presented an analysis of cost technical efficiency for 
Australian public hospitals in the period 2002-2005. The hospital costs are examined both 
by pooled data and peer groups. The analysis was carried out using the single stage, panel 
data method. The results show that major and large hospitals, despite much higher 
operating costs, were more cost efficient than medium hospitals. The results provide no 
evidence of hospital's trading off between cost technical efficiency and quality of care, as 
measured by hospital excess mortality and adverse event rates. The following chapter 
provides a conclusion of the results of this and the preceding chapters. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1 A brief recapitulation 
This thesis has been concerned with the performance of public and private hospitals in 
Australia. Performance was measured by hospital quality of care and hospital cost 
technical efficiency. For hospital quality of care, the thesis compared adverse event and 
mortality rates between public and private hospitals in Western Australia in the period 
1995-2004. For hospital cost technical efficiency, the thesis examined the relative costs of 
Australian public hospital peer groups in the years 2002-2003, 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. 
The thesis commenced with an introduction to the Australian hospital industry 
followed by the two main analyses. A brief description of public and private hospital 
financing arrangements, the funding situation and operating issues was given. Two 
chapters (chapters 4 and 5) provided the descriptive statistics, methods and regression 
analyses for hospital quality of care. Chapter 4 focused on the difference in adverse event 
and mortality rates between public and private hospitals when attributed factors were not 
controlled. The chapter also provided details of the methods used in the analysis. The 
formulation of multilevel logistic models was presented. In chapter 5, the results indicated 
that, in general, public hospitals performed better than their private counterparts if adverse 
events and non-cardiac non-stroke mortality were hospital quality indicators, and 
performed worse when 30 day post-discharge mortality was used as the hospital quality 
indicator. No significant difference between the two sectors can be found when quality 
indicators were heart attack (AMI) mortality, heart failure mortality and stroke mortality. 
Important absent factors that might potentially influence the outcomes were 
discussed. For adverse events, issues such as event identification for all hospitals and 
under-reporting in public hospitals were mentioned and discussed. For mortality, the most 
important missing information was the number and quality of medical staff (doctors and 
nurses) in both public and private hospitals. Although the multi-level models used in this 
study have advantages in controlling for unobserved factors including omitted variables at 
all levels, it would be useful to learn the exact effect of hospital financing and staffing 
conditions on quality of care. 
In the supplementary analysis concerning the impact of patient method of payment, it 
appeared that public patients faced a higher risk of dying than private patients regardless of 
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the ownership status of the hospital to which they were admitted. Since method of payment 
relates to patient social and economic status, the above finding raises some concerns about 
equity and access to treatment. In the discussion section, policy implications concerning 
gap reduction between patients treated and operating environment of public and private 
hospitals were also mentioned. Policy implications can also he found in the supplementary 
analysis about the gap of quality of care between rural and urhan patients. 
Chapters 6 and 7 presented the descriptive statistics, methods and regression results 
for Australian public hospital cost technical efficiency. Chapter 6 provided a detailed 
discussion about the chosen method for cost efficiency measurement. The stochastic 
frontier approach appeared to be more appropriate compared with the data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) approach due to the relief of the assumption about the statistical noise non-
existence in the DEA method. The descriptive statistics showed that major and large 
hospitals incurred substantially higher operating costs compared with medium and small 
hospitals. However, the results in chapter 7 suggested that major and large hospitals were 
more cost efficient than medium hospitals. The study found no evidence of the trade-off 
between hospital cost technical efficiency and quality of care. 
8.2 Thesis contribution 
The contribution of this thesis is to the empirical literature of relative performance between 
the public and private hospital sectors, and the policy implications of this. As mentioned, 
there are numerous studies ahout the financial performance of public and private sectors. 
For hospital quality of care, a few studies have been undertaken examining the relative 
performance of for-profit and non-profit hospitals, mainly in the US. In Austntlia, the 
comparative studies of hospital quality of care using a wide range of indicators are rare. 
For hospital cost efficiency, studies in Australia mainly concentrate on hospitals within one 
state rather than Australia-wide. As a result, this study, with the use of several indicators 
for quality of care and with the inclusion of public hospitals from several states and 
territories in the cost technical efficiency analysis, has contributed to the empirical 
knowledge of literature. 
Another important aspect of this study is reflected in the fact that it is one of the first 
studies in Australia to apply multi-level models in examining the relative performance of 
hospitals. Given the richness of available information and the multi-level nature of the 
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dataset, this study has applied the best possible methods for investigating hospital quality of 
care. 
The study has important implications for policies coneeming Australian hospital 
funding, staffing and managing. Among all quality indicators, only post discharge 
mortality results suggested an inferior performance of WA public hospitals in the period 
1995-2004. The apparent poorer performance of public hospitals, as shown in the 
descriptive statistics section, was mainly due to the relatively heavier workload (sicker 
patients and more complicated cases), and possibly the lack of resources rather than 
mismanagement or incompetence. Policy makers, as a result, should provide policy to give 
necessary resource support to public hospitals. At the same time, policies that encourage 
private hospitals to expand their range of services including those providing treatments to 
complicated cases are also needed. The hospital quality of care analysis also has important 
policy implications regarding the higher risk of suffering adverse events and mortality of 
public patients and rural patients. Programs to give support to those groups of patients 
seem needed. 
The cost technical efficiency analysis of Australian public hospitals has a related 
policy implication. Although incurring high operating costs, major and large hospitals 
appeared to be more cost efficient than medium hospitals. However, major hospitals' 
occupancy rates are exceptionally high and being described as "access blocked". At the 
same time, major hospitals appeared to have lower scale economies compared with large 
and medium hospitals. The first policy implication is that high cost hospitals are not 
necessarily highly inefficient hospitals, so they should not necessarily be penalized for 
having high operating costs. Secondly, policy makers should consider substitutive policies 
that are aimed at reducing the workload for major and large public hospitals. This would 
involve, for example, more GP clinics taking a bigger share of patients waiting in public 
hospital emergency rooms, more aged care facilities to accommodate aged patients, and 
more improved conditions for medium hospitals to attract patients away from major and 
large hospitals. At the same time, policies encouraging patients to use private hospital 
services should also be considered. 
8.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
This thesis has limitations involving data availability, computer software, time and budget 
constraints. As mentioned, the major data disadvantages are the lack of hospital staffing 
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information for Western Australian hospitals, and the absence of cost data for Australian 
private hospitals. If the above was obtained, more conclusive results could be obtained. 
Another data limitation involves the obtained excess mortality rates in the cost efficiency 
analysis. These values would have been more appropriately derived if patient level data 
were used in the risk adjusting process. However, obtaining patient data for all public 
hospitals in Australia would be costly. At the same time, a proper risk-adjusting process 
would be extremely time-consuming with such a dataset. 
All regression analyses in the quality of care sections of this study have been done 
using STAT A versions 9 and I 0. The software is sufficient but there are some drawbacks. 
As mentioned in chapter 5, the "gllamm" command for multilevel logistic regression took a 
long time to converge and had constraints in including dummy variables when the dataset 
was large. 
With the increasing importance of the health services due to population growth and an 
ageing population, studies about the performance of health service providers are essential 
for the public in general, hospital staff, health insurance companies and policy makers. 
Given the above limitations, there is space for further research in this area. A deeper 
understanding of the relative performance of Australian public and private hospitals studied 
here might be reproduced by studies with more adequate information about patients, 
hospital staff and other aspects of hospitals. 
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APPENDIX A: Quality of care- Results from Count data models and two-
stage two-level models 
Count Data Models 
Table A.1: Variable description 
Variable name Description 
Public hospital Hospital ownership status dummy : public= I; private=O 
Case mix index Hospital case-mix index 
Total admissions Hospital annual total admissions(in hundreds) 
Percentage 80 Percentage of patients aged 80 and older 
Percentage male Percentage of male patients 
Average LOS Hospital average length of stay 
Percentage charlson6 Percentage of patients with Charlson score of 6 and higher 
Percentage emergency Percentage of emergency patients 
Year 1996 Year 1996 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 1997 Year 1997 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 1998 Year 1998 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 1999 Year 1999 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2000 Year 2000 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2001 Year 2001 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2002 Year 200 I dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2003 Year 2003 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
Year 2004 Year 2004 dummy variable with 1995 as reference 
The following tables show the results of Poisson regression, one-level random intercept 
Poisson regression and two-level random intercept Poisson regression for adverse event 
counts, in-hospital non-cardiac non-stroke mortality counts, AMI mortality counts, heart 
failure mortality count, stroke mortality count and 30 day post-discharge mortality counts. 
Adverse events 
Table A.2: Estimated coefficients for adverse event count models 
Dependent variable: hospital adverse event counts 
Poisson One level 
Variables 
exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err 
205 
Two level 
exp(b) std. err 
public hospital 0.966** (0.008) 1.035** (0.014) 1.324** 
case-mix index 3.374** (0.034) 2.530** (0.075) 1.300** 
total admissions (OOOs) 1.005** (0.000) 1.003** (0.000) 1.002** 
percentage 80 0.088** (0.006) 0.993 (0.209) 4.965** 
percentage male 70.634** (3. !05) 12.27** (0.991) 3.230** 
percentage ch6 51.069** (17.807) 881.7** (355.824) 0.148** 
percentage emergency 0.429** (0.018) 0.815** (0.054) 0.681 ** 
percentage city 1.126** (0.024) 2.298** (0.124) 5.762** 
year 1996 1.042** (0.012) 1.058** (0.013) 
year 1997 0.973** (0.011) 1.012 (0.013) 
year 1998 1.028** (0.012) 1.020** (0.013) 
year 1999 1.244** (0.014) 1.237** (0.015) 
year 2000 1.215** (0.013) 1.226** (0.014) 
year 2001 1.092 •• (0.012) 1.095** (0.013) 
year 2002 1.009 (0.011) 1.006 (0.012) 
year 2003 0.983 (0.011) 0.981 (0.013) 
year 2004 0.929** (0.011) 0.946** (0.013) 
No. obs at level 1 654 654 654 
No. obs at level 2 81 
log likelihood -31691 -6189 -6348 
variance level one 
( \f/1(!)) 1.383 0.435 
variance level two 
( \f/1(;)) 2.276 
**p~0.05; *p~O.l H 0 : /3 = l;H1 : /3 #I 
In-hospital non-cardiac non-stroke mortality 
Table A.3: Estimated coefficients for non-cardiac non-stroke mortality count models 
Dependent variable: in-hospital non-cardiac non stroke death counts 
(0.027) 
(0.036) 
(0.000) 
(0.919) 
(0.249) 
(0.057) 
(0.048) 
(0.297) 
Poisson One level Two level 
Variables 
exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err 
public hospital 1.132** (0.025) 1.950** (0.145) 1.102** (0.025) 
case-mix index 1.095** (0.045) 0.966 (0.112) 0.851 ** (0.066) 
total admissions (OOOs) 1.005** (0.000) 1.002** (0.000) 1.003** (0.000) 
percentage 80 3.807** (0.712) 19.75** (7.217) 5.917** (1.864) 
percentage male 7.485** (0.863) 1.564 (0.518) 2.294** (0.422) 
Average LOS 1.755** (0.040) 1.41 ** (0.079) 1.847** (0.052) 
percentage ch6 67.809** (59.650) 1 !06.1 ** (1274.831) 74.309** (61.819) 
percentage emergency 0.980 (0.097) 0.538** (0.115) 0.768** (0.085) 
percentage city 0.565** (0.026) 2.784** (0.577) 0.752** (0.042) 
year 1996 1.040 (0.029) 1.021 (0.030) 
year 1997 1.099** (0.030) 1.085** (0.034) 
year 1998 1.096** (0.031) 1.019 (0.033) 
year 1999 1.079** (0.030) 1.065* (0.036) 
year 2000 1.006 (0.029) 1.005 (0.035) 
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! year 2001 1.070** (0.031) 1.025 (0.037) I year2002 1.076** (0.030) 1.045 (0.038) 
year 2003 0.%8 (0.029) 0.931 * (0.036) 
year2004 0.870** (0.027) 0.851 ** (0.036} 
no. obs 654 654 654 
log likelihood -5821 -2045 -2084 
variance level one 
( \V?)) 5.353 2.43 
variance level two 
( V't7)l 0.86 
**p:S:0.05; *p:S:OJ H 0 : fJ = l;H1 : fJ ot 1 
AMI Mortalitt 
Table A.4: Estimated coefficients for AMI mortality count models 
Dependent variable: in-hospital AMI death counts 
Two 
Variable Poisson One level level 
exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err 
public hospital 1.085 (0.097) 1.290** (0.332) 2.249** (0.231) 
case-mix index 11.341** (2.982) 5.012 (2.223) 2.103** (0.713) 
total admissions (OOOs) 1.006** (0.000) 1.001•• (0.001) 1.006** (0.000) 
percentage 80 0.800 (0.882) 64.8* (143.6) 0.450 {0.536) 
percentage male 330.2** (186.889) 3.95 (4.819) 0.134** (0.117) 
average length of stay 0.501 ** (0.068) 1.216 (0.270) 2.659** (0.425) 
percentage ch6 0.000** (0.000) 0.019 (0.100) 0.022 (0.082) 
percentage emergency 37.23** {15.580) 2.368 (1.836} 0.498 (0.317) 
percentage city 0.699 (0.149) 0.39* (0.211) 1.148 (0.319) 
year 1996 1.376** (0.169) 1.188 (0.153) 
year 1997 1.274* (0.160) 1.198 (0.166) 
year 1998 1.063 (0.132) 1.136 (0.154) 
year 1999 0.827 (0.100) 0.901 (0.129) 
year2000 0.640** (0.086) 0.688* (0.104) 
year 2001 0.748** (0.096) 0.795 (0.120} 
year2002 0.733** (0.100) 0.698** (0.111) 
'year2003 0.746** (0.103) 0.651 ** (0.105) 
year 2004 0.695** (0.101) 0.597** (0.105) 
no. obs at level l 435 435 435 
no. obs at level 2 58 
log likelihood -945.6 
-737.5 
-757.3 
variance level one 
( \V1(l)) 0.398 0.535 
variance level two 
( V'};)) 0.534 
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**p:50.05; *p:50.1 H, :fl=I;H1 :jJ~l 
Heart Failure Mortali!l: 
Table A.5: Estimated coefficients for heart failure mortality count models 
Dependent variable: in-hospital heart failure death counts 
Variable Poisson One level Two level 
exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err 
public hospital 1.538** (0.117) 2.475** (0.719) 3.039** (0.247) 
case-mix index 1.570** (0.327) 1.139 (0.470) 0.709 (0.172) 
total admissions ( OOOs) 1.004** (0.000) 1.004** (0.001) 1.003** (0.000) 
percentage 80 217.4** (187.185) 1221.3** (2248.264) 13.437** (11.862) 
percentage male 7.45** (3.191) 5.133* (4.958) 0.127** (0.066) 
average length of stay 1.034 (0.106) 1.561. (0.275) 2.698** (0.280) 
percentage ch6 0.046 (0.158) 0.773 (3.651) 0.179 (0.588) 
percentage emergency 1.028 (0.355) 0.323 (0.224) 0.133** (0.052) 
percentage city 0.935 (0.159) 1.063 (0.623) 2.901 ** (0.511) 
year 1996 1.093 (0.114) 1.049 (0.118) 
year 1997 1.003 (0.106) 1.021 (0.118) 
I year 1998 1.066 (0.112) 1.110 (0.126) 
1 year 1999 0.868 (0.094) 0.898 (O. l 07) 
year2000 0.751 ** (0.080) 0.775** (0.094) 
year2001 0.771 ** (0.088) 0.772** (0.101) 
year2002 0.805** (0.087) 0.817 (0.103) 
year2003 0.715** (0.082) 0.700** (0.094) 
year 2004 0.551 ** (0.069) 0.542** (0.081) 
no. obs at level 1 500 500 500 
no. obs at level 2 60 
log likelihood -1110.4 -883.72 -890.6 
variance level one 
( lfi11 ) 0.628 0.586 
variance level two 
( wi~)l 0.61 
**p:50.05;*p:50.l H0 :fJ=l;H1 :f3*1 
Stroke Mortali!l'. 
Table A.6: Estimated coefficients for stroke mortality count models 
Dependent variable: in-hospital Stroke death counts 
Two 
Variable Poisson One level level 
exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err 
public hospital 1.402** (0.100) 3.401 ** (1.000) 3.497** (0.259) 
case-mix index 5.021 ** (1.077) 0.745 (0.330) 0.833 (0.193) 
total admissions ( 1.005** (0.000} 1.002•• (0.001) 1.003** £Q.000 
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OOOs) 
percentage 80 337** (284.7) 80.5** (166.220) 1.359 (J.162) 
percentage male 30.49** (12.983) 4.66 (5.570) 0.226** (0.116) 
average length of stay 0.448** (0.047) 1.397* (0.268) 2.884** (0.318) 
percentage ch6 0.000** (0.000) 1069 (4543) 5.455 (15.813) 
percentage emergency 30.399** (9.969) 1.925 (1.346) 1.346 (0.501) 
percentage cily 1.762** (0.291) 3.671 ** (2.396) 4.990** (0.810) 
year 1996 1.216** (0.117) 1.018 (0.109) 
year 1997 0.931 (0.086) 0.860 (0.089) 
year 1998 0.934 (0.082) 0.960 (0.095) 
year 1999 0.742** (0.067) 0.870 (0.090) 
year 2000 0.625** (0.053) 0.807** (0.087) 
year 2001 0.585** (0.052) 0.784** (0.089) 
year 2002 0.625** (0.055) 0.764** (0.088) I year 2003 0.576** (0.058) 0.649** (0.087) 
'year2004 0.471 ** (0.049) 0.536** (0.077) 
no. obs at level 1 491 491 491 
no. obs at level 2 60 
log likelihood -1306.24 -920.59 -942.34 
variance level one 
(If'?)) 1.459 0.69 
variance !eve! two 
( lf'lf)l 0.693 
**p:>0.05; •p:::;O.J H 0 : /3 = l;H1 : /31' I 
30 da:i: nost-discharge mortalitv 
Table A. 7: Estimated coefficients for post-discharge mortality count models 
Dependent variable: hospital post-discharge death counts 
I Variable Poisson One level Two level 
exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err exp(b) std. err 
I public hospital 1.452** (0.028) 1.886** (0.058) 2.380** (0.054) 
case-mix index 0.966 (0.036) 1.390** (0.104) 1.092 (0.070) 
total admissions (in 
OOOs) l.005** (0.000) 1.002** (0.000) l.002** (0.000) 
percentage 80 0.232** (0.039) 15.487** (4.629) 33.513** (9.731) 
percentage male 19.450** (2.008) 7.014** (1.485) 7.948** (l.208) 
average length of stay 1.575** (0.032) 1.132** (0.047) 1.080** (0.036) 
percentage ch6 399.2** (300) 379.01 ** (321) 1.475 (l.213) 
percentage 
emergency 0.756** (0.066) 0.352** (0.050) 0.456** (0.046) 
percentage city 0.679** (0.027) 1.491 ** (0.127) 2.133** (0.153) 
year 1996 0.993 (0.025) 1.021 (0.027) 
year 1997 1.073** (0.027) 1.124** (0.029) 
year 1998 1.079** (0.027) 1.060** (0.029) 
year 1999 1.134** (0.028) 1.157** (0.032) 
year 2000 1.191 ** (0.029) 1.206** (0.033) 
·ear 2001 l.266** (0.031 1.227** (0.036) 
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year 2002 1.127•• (0.028} 1.114** (0.033} 
year 2003 1.146 .. (0.029) 1.104** (0.034) 
year 2004 1.007 (0.027) 0.990 (0.034) 
no. obs at level I 654 654 654 
no. obs atlevel 2 81 
log likelihood -7104 -2615 -2656 
variance level one 
(lfi11 l 2.931 0.581 
variance level two 
( lf1(~)) 1.739 
**ps0.05; *psO.I Ho: /3 l;Hl : /3¢1 
The above tables show that for all indicators, public hospital performance is inferior 
compared to private hospital performance. The Poisson regression does not take into 
account the issue of over-dispersion. In other words, with the Poisson regression, the 
variance is assumed to be equal to the mean. The Poisson regression results show that the 
number of adverse events in a public hospital is lower than in a private hospital, holding 
other things constant. Results for other indicators generally show that the number of deaths 
in a public hospital is higher than in a private hospital, holding other things constant. 
The one-level random intercept Poisson regression handles the over-dispersion 
problem. For all indicators, the existence of over-dispersion is confirmed with the values of 
if(l! are greater than zero. The results show that the number of adverse events and deaths 
are higher in public hospitals than in a private hospital, holding other things constant 
As was mentioned in chapter 4, the two-level random intercept Poisson regression 
handles the time-wise correlations for hospitals as well as over-dispersion. For all 
indicators, the values of lf(ll and rpl'l are greater than zero and that can be considered as a 
confirmation of the above problems. The results also show that the number of deaths and 
adverse events in public hospitals are higher than private hospitals, holding other factors 
unchanged. 
The association of hospital counts and other explanatory factors appears to be 
consistent with expectations. For all indicators, proportion of older patients, average length 
of stay, and total number of admissions are positively a~sociated with hospital number of 
adverse events or deaths. In most cases, an increase in hospital case-mix index or an 
increase in proportion of patients with high Charlson score results in higher number of 
adverse events and deaths. For the "environment" impact, in the one-level model, later 
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years are significantly associated with a fewer number of deaths in the case of specific 
illnesses such as AMI, heart failure and stroke. For all disease indicators, the negative 
impact of the environment on number of adverse events and deaths is only clear for the 
years of2002, 2003 and 2004. 
Table A.8 presents an overall comparison between public and private hospitals using 
count data models. Public hospitals appear to have inferior performance compared with 
their private counterparts. 
Table A.8: Result summary of the count data models for public hospitals (private hospitals as 
reference) 
Adverse event rate 
In-hospital 
mortality 
all 
Poisson model 
disease +•• 
AMI in-hospital mortality + 
Heart failure in-hospital +•• 
mortality 
One level model Two level model ' 
+** +•• 
+•• +** 
+** +** 
+•• +*"' 
, Stroke in-hospital mortality +•• +** +•• 
I 
130 day post discharge +** +•• +** 
mortality 
**p::::0.05; *p::::O.I H0 :f3=1;H, :/Jot.I 
(the sign '_' indicates a lower adverse event or mortality rate for public hospitals and the sign '+' 
indicates a higher adverse event or mortality rate for public hospitals ) 
Two-level Two Step Model 
This section presents results from the two steps that involve patient level data and hospital 
level data, respectively. In the first step (patient level), the risk adjusted mortality rate or 
adverse event rates are constructed for each hospital, each year using logistic regression 
estimation. Hospital 9030 is chosen to be the benchmark for all regressions at patient level 
because of its average size and its consistent existence in the sample after the inclusion 
restrictions. As a result, the obtained hospital risk adjusted mortality or adverse event rates 
are interpreted as relative to hospital 9030 rates. Results for all years are included in the 
appendix D. In the second step (hospital level), hospital risk-adjusted mortality or adverse 
event rates (including hospital 9030's rate with the value of 0) are regressed against 
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hospital characteristics including ownership status using panel data random effects 
estimated via the maximum likelihood method. 
Adverse Events 
Table A.9: Panel data, random effect estimates (adverse events, non-cardiac non-stroke and post-
discharge mortality) 
Dependent variable: hospital risk-adjusted adverse event rates or mortality rates 
non-cardiac non- 30 post-discharge 
Adverse events stroke mortality mortality 
public hospital 0.061 -0.204 0.628** 
(0.190) (0.134) (0.100) 
hosp. case mix index 1.104** -0.642•• -0.162 
(0.185) (0.185) (0.151) 
hosp. admissions o.ooo•• 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant -2.076 0.911 0.156 
(0.206) (0.199) (0.138) 
log likelihood -509 -433 -499 
intra-hosp. correlation 0.75 0.48 0.31 
**pS0.05; *pS0.1 H0 : /) = O;H1 : j) ~ 0 
Table A.10: Panel data, random effect estimates (AJl,fl, heart failure and stroke murtality) 
Dependent variable: hospital risk-adjusted mortality rates 
Heart failure 
AMI mortality mortality Stroke mortality 
public hospital -0.204 0,109 -0.482** 
(0.134) (0.157) (0.199) 
hosp. case mix index -0.642 -0.565 -0.241 
(0.185) (0.365) (0.511) 
hosp. admissions 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 0.9ll 1.004 1.292 
(0.199) (0.339) (0.467) 
log likelihood -390 -401 -426 
intra-hosp. correlation 0.37 0.27 0.25 
**ps0.05; *pSO.l H0 :j)=O;H, :f3*0 
Results from the logistic regressions in the first step (Appendix D) are consistent with 
expectations. The output shows that there was a positive association between age and 
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adverse event and mortality rates. In the same way, sicker patients or patients admitted to 
emergency room had higher probability of suffering from adverse events or in-hospital and 
post-discharge death. In general, patients who lived in metropolitan areas seemed to be less 
vulnerable to adverse events and in-hospital and post discharge death. 
The regression results in the second step give a mixed picture. While higher case mix 
index which represents higher proportion of complicated cases treated by hospitals 
associate with higher adverse event rates the reserve can be seen for the case of non-cardiac 
and non-stroke mortality. The case mix index did not appear to have a significant impact 
on other quality indicators. Hospital size, as reflected by total number of admissions, did 
not seem to have a significant impact on quality of care. The outcomes suggest that 
ownership status impact was not conclusive for all quality indicators. Compared with 
private hospitals, public hospitals appeared to perform worse if 30 day post-discharge was 
used as quality indicator, better if stroke mortality was used as quality indicator. Hospital 
ownership type did not influence hospital adverse event, non-cardiac non-stroke, heart 
attack and heart failure mortality rates. 
The table below summarizes the outcomes of the two- level two-stage method 
Table A.21: Result summary of the two-level two-stage models 
-
Public hospitals ( private hospitals as 
benchmark) 
Adverse event rate + 
In-hospital all disease mortality 
-** 
AMI in-hospital mortality +** 
i Heart failure in-hospital mortality _,.. 
i Stroke in-hospital mortality + 
30 day post discharge mortality +•• 
**ps0.05; *ps0.1 
(the sign '_' indicates a lower adverse event or mortality rate for public hospitals and the sign '+' 
indicates a higher adverse event or mortality rate for public hospitals ) 
One thing needs to be noted that the logistic regression estimation in step one assumes that 
the probability of patients at risk of adverse events or death in a hospital are mutually 
independent. The assumption seems to be unreasonable and it is relaxed in the multi-level 
one-step model. 
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APPENDIX Bl: Cobb-Douglas and translog cost efficiency estimations-
pooled cross-sectional approach (excess mortality rates as quality 
indicator) 
The software program frontier v4. l was developed specially for panel data application. 
However, if the dataset is arranged as pooled cross-sectional, estimations can still be 
carried out. Compared with the panel data approach, the assumption in the cross-sectional 
approach makes less economic sense. In pooled cross-sectional method, each hospital in 
each year is considered as an individual entity. This implies the performance of hospital X 
in 2003 is not related with its performance in 2004 and 2005. In contrast, the panel data 
approach assumes the time-wise relationship of individual hospital performance. Although 
the panel data approach is already considered as the selected approach for this study, 
estimations obtained by using the pooled cross-sectional approach are presented below for 
comparison purposes. 
Table Bl.1: Cobb-Douglas cost efficiency estimation- pooled cross-sectional approach 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
doctor salary 0.085 0.052 0.024 0.057 0.025 
(0.065) (0.048) (0.020) (0.864) (0.020) 
nurse salary -0.102 0.454** 0.152** -0.913 0.165 
(0. 104) (0.076) (0.040) (0.848) (0.042) 
other staff salary 0.300** 0.228** 0.304** -0.135 0.183 
(0.092) (0.084) (0.072) (0.863) (0.065) 
emergency -0.215** -0.055 0.076** 0.031 0.040 
! outpatient 
(0.045) (0.049) (0.028) (0.905) (0.027) 
0.138** 0.057 -0.023 0.116 0.136 
(0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.883) (0.023) 
surgery 0.259** 0.103** 0.162*• 0.132 0.159 
(0.033) (0.039) (0.022) (0.490) (0.015) 
medical 0.231 ** 0.007 0.054 0.286 0.293 
(0.052) (0.041) (0.040) (0.944) (0.030) 
otherDRG 0.080** 0.093** 0.011 0.033 0.067 
' 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.010) (0.268) (0.012) ! teaching 0.033 -0.001 -0.253** 0.031 
(0.028) (0.045) (0.081) (0.038} 
peer group A 0.165 
(0.071) 
peer groupB 0.147 
(0.056) 
1 
peer group C -0.119 
I (0.040) 
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NSW 0.053 0.087** 0.173** 0.133 
(0.041) (0.042) (0.038) (0.040) 
SA 0.020 -0.046 0.030 -0.806 0.048 
(0.049) (0.071) (0.044) (1.000) (0.042) 
QLD -0.129** 0.069 0.100* -0.530 -0.084 
(0.045) (0.055) (0.053) (0.995) (0.045) 
TAS -0.051 0.289** 0.161 
(0.065) (0.088) (0.074) 
NT 0.050 0.143 0.051 
(0.067) (0.139) (0.086) 
year 2004 0.049 0.054** 0.040 0.154 0.050 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.996) (0.022) 
year2005 0.112* 0.079** 0.051 0.224 0.096 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.994) (0.023) 
Constant 10.447** 7.580** 8.414** 22.346 6.619 
(1.078) (1.037) (0.884) (0.999) (0.589) 
excess mortality -4.847 3.135** 5.421 ** 0.000 -0.603 
(3.535) (1.100) (1.639) (1.000) (1.269) 
occupancy rate -0.194** 0.178 -0.019 0.002 -0.123 
(0.089) (0.142) (0.074) (0.986) (0.065) 
full time 
staff/bed 0.111 •• 0.104** 0.287** 0.016 0.136 
(0.007) (0.017) (0.018) (0.745) (0.012) 
beds 0.001 •• 0.005** 0.012** 0.002 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.019) (0.000) 
constant -0.241 -0.796** -0.804** -0.089 -0.104 
(0.192) (0.123) (0.044) (0.707) (0.298) 
No. Obs 144 102 172 59 477 
Log likelihood 146.59 112.66 162.87 20.75 185.56 
Inefficiency 
mean 1.84 1.647 2.31 1.017 1.749 
Table B.1.2: Translog cost efficiency estimation- pooled cross-sectional approach 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
doctor salary (a) 19.632 7.850** 0.007 0.491 -6.445** 
(1.000) (0.927) (0.027) (0.731) (2.239) 
nurse salary (b) -41.107** -16.180** 0.038 -1.527 -4.481 
(1.000) (0.936) (0.045) (0.971) (3.214) 
other staff salary 
(c) 13.320** -6.261 ** -0.014 0.054 0.183 
(1.000) (0.939) (0.126) (0.977) (4.970) 
emergency ( d) -5.148** 10.490** 0.091 -0.233 -0.693 
(1.000) (0.947) (0.055) (0.872) (2.041) 
outpatient ( e) 9.929** -0.700 0.162** 0.216 2.378 
(1.000) (0.930) (0.053) (0.889) (1.519) 
. surgery -6.558** 4.981 ** 0.293** 0.002 -1.953 
215 
(1.000) (0.967) (0.035) (0.341) (1.336) 
medical (g) 3.935** 2.902** 0.404** 0.399 2.563 
(1.000) (0.956) (0.056) (0.866) (2.022) 
other DRG (h) -1.744** 10.386** 0.046** 0.007 -0.777 
(1.000) (0.977) (0.019) (0.256) (0.946) 
a2 -0.652 -0.597 0.000 0.161 -0.038** 
(1.000) (0.582) (0.028) (0.554) (0.016) 
-
b2 1.386 0.343 0.018 2.391 ** -0.236** 
(1.000) (0.591) (0.311) (0.676) (0.100) 
c2 -0.266 0.820 0.080 -0.620 -0.267 
(1.000) (0.691) (0.394) (0.711) (0.225) 
ab 0.684 1.080 0.151 1.334 0.523** 
(1.000) (0.849) (0.434) (0.853) (0.192) 
-
ac -0.453 -0.463 -0.123 1.844** 0.174 
(1.000) (0.755) (0.494) (0.842) (0.234) 
be 0.172 0.589 0.019 3.458** 0.337 
(1.000) (0.865) (0.363) (0.871) (0.323) 
d2 0.232 -0.146 0.202 0.145 0.040 
(1.000) (0.515) (0.108) (0.757) (0.037) 
e2 0.070 0.138 0.075 -0.375 0.050 
(1.000) (0.261) (0.087) (0.646) (0.026) 
f2 -0.095 0.457 0.070 -0.047 0.005 
(1.000) (0.601) (0.029) (0.228) (0.010) 
g2 -0.122 0.263 0.102 -0.183 -0.008 
(1.000) (0.479) (0.221) (0.844) (0.046) 
h2 -0.041 -0.089 -0.014 0.072 0.014 
(l.000) (0.254) (0.015) (0.196) (0.007) 
de -0.385 0.162 -0.047 0.512 -0.101 ** 
(1.000) (0.760) (0.138) (0.868) (0.043) 
df 0.452 -0.015 -0.039 -0.353 0.093** 
(1.000) (0.835) (0.204) (0.818) (0.037) 
dg 0.494 0.170 0.160 0.343 -0.108 
(1.000) (0.759) (0.361) (0.917) (0.068) 
dh -0.257 -0.406 -0.095 0.018 0.006 
(1.000) (0.556) (0.095) (0.801) (0.033) 
ef -0.013 -0.161 -0.133 0.483 -0.058** 
(1.000) (0.562) (0.101) (0.746) (0.026) 
eg -0.085 -0.404 -0.135 -0.525 -0.014 
(1.000) (0.721) (0.207) (0.872) (0.049) 
eh -0.074 0.232 0.096 -0.160 0.023 
(1.000) (0.345) (0.042) (0.557) (0.021) 
fg 0.016 0.411 -0.041 0.182 0.047 
(1.000) (0.680) (0.179) (0.879) (0.032) 
th 0.218 -0.342 0.053 -0.097 0.008 
(1.000) (0.522) (0.036) (0.251) (0.011) 
gh 0.169 -0.222 -0.037 0.436 -0.069** 
(1.000) (0.489) (0.092) (0.854) (0.031) 
ad 0.174 0.413 -0.146 -0.496 -0.050 
(1.000) (0.733) (0.168) (0.816) (0.079) 
ae -0.136 0.126 0.091 0.472 0.033 
!1.000) (0.605) (0.173) (0.723) (0.051) 
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af 0.342 -0.109 0.000 0.135 0.022 
(1.000) (0.626) (0.149) (0.538) (0.027) 
ag -0.760 -1.119 -0.032 0.114 -0.041 
(1.000) (0.714) (0.346) (0.852) (0.063) 
. ah 
-0.326 0.666 0.046 -0.086 0.011 
(1.000) (0.509) (0.080) (0.588) (0.023) 
bd -0.288 -0.939 -0.222 -0.223 0.258 
(1.000) (0.828) (0.505) (0.854) (0.199) 
be -0.468 -0.139 0.280 0.346 -0.132 
(1.000) (0.665) (0.570) (0.871) (0.158) 
I bf 0.330 -2.275 0.450 1.659** 0.137 
(1.000) (0.866) (0.440) (0.807) (0.160) 
bg 0.460 2.353 -0.564 0.275 -0.157 
(1.000) (0.779) (0.664) (0.879) (0.233) 
bh 0.195 -0.424 -0.297 1.348 -0.093 
(1.000) (0.648) (0.507) (0.843) (0.134) 
I cd -0.089 -0.265 0.051 0.008 -0.092 
I (1.000) (0.813) (0.513) (0.875) (0.196) 
ce 0.092 -0.044 -0.360 -0.392 -0.087 
(1.000) (0.659) (0.588) (0.843) (0.128) 
cf -0.477 1.398 -0.378 1.344 -0.032 
I cg (1.000) (0.854) (0.464) (0.827) (0.148) -0.282 -1.776 0.491 -0.156 0.118 
(1.000) (0.887) (0.664) (0.890) (0.223) 
ch 0.365 -0.574 0.248 -1.444 0.170 
(1.000) (0.657) (0.556) (0.873) (0.119) 
teaching 0.092 -0.011 -0.291 0.034 
I peer group A (1.000) (0.157) (0.203) (0.033) o.1s1 •• 
(0.077) 
peer group B 0.136** 
(0.067) 
peer group C -0.109** 
(0.050) 
NSW -0.036 0.014 0.169 0.161 ** 
(l .000) (0.171) (0.102) (0.036) 
SA -0.191 -0.197 -0.012 1.090 0.056 
(1.000) (0.310) (0.096) (0.991) (0.040) 
QLD -0.387 -0.259 -0.086 -0.680 -0.032 
(1.000) (0.252) (0.109) (0.824) (0.043) 
TAS -0.210 -0.018 0.196** 
(1.000) (0.431) (0.066) 
NT -0.011 0.295 0.158 
(l.000) (0.671) (0.086) 
Year2004 0.084 0.127 0.101 0.099 0.055** 
(1.000) (0.088) (0.043) (0.799) (0.020) 
Year 2005 0.163 0.227 0.235 0.117 0.090** 
(1.000) (0.124) (0.061) (0.865) (0.024) 
Constant 36.741 -24.494 7.394 19.430 61.574 
(1.000) (0.998) (1.009) (1.000) (27.553) 
excess mortalit ' 0.000 -0.009 -0.110 0.004 0.830 
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(l.000) (0.999) (0.065) (1.000) (1.283) 
occupancy rate 0.000 0.441 -0.275 -0.123 -0.067 
(1.000) (0.722) (1.000) (0.984) (0.063) 
full time staff/bed 0.000 0.008 -0.346** -0.045 0.140** 
(1.000) (0.067) (0.210) (0.662) (0.011) 
beds 0.000 0.003** 0.149 0.011 0.002** 
(1.000) (0.001) (0.045) (0.029) (0.000) 
No. Obs 
Log likelihood 155.981 109.861 107.567 74.159 263.178 
Inefficiency mean 1.072 I.I SO 1.304 1.109 2.318 
Table B.1.3: Hypothesis null tests for cost efficiency models 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
Log likelihood 146.59 112.66 162.87 20.75 185.56 
Cobb-Douglas 
Log likelihood 155.98 109.86 107.57 74.16 263.18 
Translog 
Log likelihood 
Ratio 18.78 5.6 110.06 106.82 155.24 
Chi-Square critical 
value (5% 55.76 55.76 55.76 55.76 55.76 
significance, 
degree of 
freedom=36) 
Decision Accept Ho. Accept Ho. Reject Ho. Reject Ho. Reject Ho. 
Cobb- Cobb- Translog Translog Translog 
Douglas Douglas more more more 
more more appropriate appropriate appropriate 
aopropriate annrooriate 
Results from cross-sectional estimations show some similarities and differences from 
the panel data estimations. As in the case of the panel data estimations, Cobb-Douglas cost 
function would be more appropriate for peer groups A and B if using log likelihood ratio 
tests and judgment on economic sensibility. For peer groups D and the pooled group, the 
Cobb-Douglas cost function estimations failed the log likelihood ratio test but would be 
considered as more appropriate than the translog estimations if the selection was based on 
economic sense. Different from the panel data estimations, the translog cost function for 
peer group B meets both selection criteria, hence would be considered as appropriate for 
that peer group. 
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APPENDIX B2: Cobb-Douglas and translog cost efficiency estimations-
pooled cross-sectional approach (excess adverse event rates as quality 
indicator) 
Table B2.1: Cobb-Douglas cost efficiency estimation- pooled cross-sectional approach 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
doctor salary 0.099 0.049 0.029 0.058 0.036 
(0.071) (0.049) (0.020) (0.864) (0.020) 
nurse salary -0.102 0.451 ** 0.147** -0.914 0.158** ' 
(O.l 10) (0.084) (0.055) (0.848) (0.046) 
other staff salary 0.332** 0.257** 0.318** -0.135 0.190 
(0.094} (0.095) (0.086} (0.863) (0.064) 
emergency 0.200** -0.018 0.082** 0.031 0.029 
(0.043) (0.049) (0.029) (0.905) (0.027) 
outpatient 0.156** 0.056 -0.013 0.116 0.137 
(0.032) (0.035) (0.030) (0.883) (0.023) 
surgery 0.242** 0.045 0.148** 0.131 0.145 
(0.054) (0.042) (0.023) (0.490) (0.015) 
medical 0.199** 0.006 0.038 0.286 0.304 
(0.066) (0.043) (0.045) (0.944) (0.030) 
other DRG 0.085** 0.110** 0.016 0.033 0.075 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.013) (0.267) (0.011) 
teaching 0.038 0.017 0.241 ** 0.050 
(0.031) (0.047) (0.084) (0.038) 
peer group A 0.193 
(0.075) 
peer group B 0.166 
(0.063) 
peer group C -0.111 
(0.044) 
NSW 0.037 0.065 0.162** 0.135 
(0.050) (0.043) (0.038) (0.035} 
SA 0.009 -0.048 0.033 -0.806 0.044 
(0.046} (0.075) (0.041) (1.000) (0.040) 
1 QLD 0.138** 0.044 0.076 -0.530 -0.086 
(0.050) (0.056) (0.053) (0.995) (0.042) 
TAS -0.065 0.273** 0.153 
(0.067} (0.090) (0.074} 
NT 0.035 0.097 0.026 I (0.076) (0.146) (0.084) 
year2004 0.050* 0.051 ** 0.041 0.154 0.047 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.996) (0.022) 
I year2005 0.107** 0.079** 0.054 0.224 0.095 
[Constant 
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.994} (0.023) 
9.978 7.329 8.254 22.352 6.205 
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(1.064) (l.049) (1.055) (0.999) (1.057) 
Log likelihood 149.62 112.68 161.98 20.785 205.35 
Inefficiency 
mean 1.875 1.673 2.396 1.017 2.411 
excess adv.event 
rate 1.620 1.501 1.404 0.004 3.154 
(0.617) (0.890) (0.742) (1.000) (0.560) 
occupancy rate -0.137 0.194 -0.013 0.001 -0.096 
(0.097) (0.152) (0.085) (0.986) (0.061) 
full time 
staff/bed 0.107 0.115 0.283 0.016 0.133 
(0.010) {0.017) (0.020) {0.744) (0.011) 
beds 0.001 0.005 0.012 0.002 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) {0.019) (0.000) 
constant -0.262 -0.843 -0.746 -0.088 0.221 
(0.110) {0.164) {0.100) (0.707) (0.700) 
Table B2.2: Translog cost efficiency estimation- pooled cross-sectional approach 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
doctor salary (a) 19.632** 7.856** 0.024 9.528** -5.640** 
(1.000) (0.931) (0.021) (0.909) (2.187) 
nurse salary (b) -41.107** 16.186** 0.146 122.58** -4.275 
( 1.000) (0.938) {0.064) (0.920) (3.147) 
other staff salary 
(c) 13.320** -6.262** 0.204 155.16** 0.936 
(1.000) (0.941) {0.097) (Ll64) (4.882) 
emergency ( d) -5.148** 10.487** 0.089 51.449** -0.077 
i (1.000) (0.948) (0.040) (0.954) (1.930) 
I outpatient (e) 9.929** -0.721 0.002 35.492** 2.587** 
(1.000) (0.931) (0.040) (1.160) (1.459) 
surgery (t) -6.558** 4.973** 0.168 -0.843 -2.068 
(1.000) (0.968) (0.028) (1.152) (1.280) 
medical (g) 3.935** 2.910** 0.058 18.508** 1.811 
(1.000) (0.958) (0.049) (1.088) (1.927) 
other DRG (h) -1.744** 10.388** 0.020 2.789** -0.542 
(1.000) (0.978) (0.013) {1.057) (0.939) 
a2 -0.652 -0.580 0.003 0.068 -0.034** 
(1.000) (0.608) (0.017) (0.047) (0.016) 
b2 1.386 0.301 0.006 2.980** -0.174 
(1.000} (0.636) (0.125) (0.467) (0.100) 
c2 -0.266 0.794 -0.183 1.425** -0.287 
(1.000) (0.714) (0.298) (0.355) (0.221) 
ab 0.684 1.134 0.184 -2.350** 0.422** 
1.000} ~0.824) (0.223} (0.422) 0.193 
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ac -0.453 -0.494 -0.292 2.625** 0.194 
(1.000) (0.806) (0.252) (0.479) (0.227) 
be 0.172 0.603 0.361 7.867** 0.315 
(l.000) (0.829) (0.286) (0.744) (0.314) 
d2 0.232 -0.105 0.080 0.682** 0.052 
(1.000) (0.567) (0.058) (0.118) (0.036) 
e2 0.070 0.173 0.010 0.503** 0.052** 
(1.000) (0.284) (0.049) (0.059) (0.025) 
f2 -0.095 0.451 0.017 0.043* 0.003 
(1.000) (0.651) (0.021) (0.022) (0.009) 
g2 -0.122 0.282 0.052 0.894** -0.002 
(1.000) (0.424) (0.097) (0.130) (0.045) 
h2 -0.041 -0.093 0.005 -0.072** 0.016** 
(1.000) (0.278) (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) 
de -0.385 0.126 0.027 -0.759** -0.097** 
(l.000) (0.709) (0.082) (0.093) (0.043) 
df 0.452 -0.093 0.000 0.036 0.097** 
( 1.000) (0.817) (0.068) (0.069) (0.036) 
dg 0.494 0.207 -0. 159 -0.553** -0.128** 
(1.000) (0.730) (0.130) (0.202) (0.067) 
dh -0.257 -0.396 0.058 0.113** 0.006 
(1.000) (0.557) (0.052) (0.060) (0.033} 
ef -0.013 -0. 144 -0.054 -0.212** -0.068** 
(1.000) (0.592) (0.046} (0.051) (0.025) 
eg -0.085 -0.458 0.018 0.380** -0.004 
(1.000) (0.731) (0.091) (0.114) (0.046} 
eh -0.074 0.236 0.036 0.045* 0.027 
(1.000) (0.408) (0.033) (0.026) (0.021) 
fg 0.016 0.430 0.101 -0.565** 0.051 
(l.000) (0.770) (0.087) (0.069) (0.031) 
fh 0.218 -0.366 -0.003 0.070** 0.002 
(1.000) (0.544) (0.025) (0.014) (0.012) 
gh 0.169 -0.230 -0.032 -0.124** -0.063** 
(1.000) (0.477) (0.065) (0.063) (0.031) 
ad 0.174 0.405 0.033 0.495** -0.063 
(l.000) (0.751) (0. 108) (0.218) (0.075) 
ae -0. 136 0.104 0.069 -0.657** 0.031 
( 1.000) (0.551) (0.088) (0.137) (0.051) 
af 0.342 -0.114 -0.021 0.074** 0.024 
(1.000) (0.657) (0.068) (0.037) (0.026) 
ag -0.760 -1.146 0.010 -1.520** -0.021 
(1.000) (0.735) (0.122) (0.318) (0.066) 
ah -0.326 0.661 0.010 -0.146** 0.009 
(1.000) (0.522) (0.045) (0.031) (0.021) 
bd -0.288 -0.876 0.098 -1.591** 0.267 
{l.000) (0.834) (0.345) (0.351) (0.186) 
be -0.468 -0.056 -0.464 2.542** -0.214 
(1.000) (0.673) (0.275) (0.280) (0.157) 
bf 0.330 -2.299 0.060 -0.022 0.071 
(1.000) (0.869) (0.236} (0.318) (0.155) 
bg 0.460 2.259 -0.303 -1.535** -0.045 
(1.000) (0.789) (0.461) (0.469) (0.224) 
bh 0.195 -0.481 -0.013 -0.174 -0.072 
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(1.000) (0.723) (0.223) (0.185) (0.131) 
cd -0.089 -0.337 -0.207 -3.806** -0.156 
(1.000) (0.820) (0.365) (0.374) (0.188) 
ce 0.092 -0.115 0.360 0.953** -0.033 
(1.000) (0.575) (0.311) (0.249) (0.126) 
cf -0.477 1.492** -0.079 0.509 0.054 
(1.000) (0.874) (0.249) (0.295) (0.145) 
cg -0.282 -1.664** 0.288 4.207** 0.046 
(1.000) (0.889) (0.493) (0.509) (0.212) 
ch 0.365 -0.496 -0.063 0.042 0.122 
(1.000) (0.641) (0.244) (0.179) (0.120) 
teaching 0.092 -0.022 -0.319 0.046 
(1.000) (0.320) (0.108) (0.034) 
peer group A 0.204** 
(0.077) 
peer group B 0.162** 
(0.065) 
peer group C -0.095 
(0.049) 
NSW -0.036 0.002 0.191 0.157** 
(1.000) (0.169) (0.065) (0.036) 
SA -0.191 -0.212 0.036 -0.806** 0.052 
(1.000) (0.268) (0.062) (0.268) (0.039) 
QLD -0.387 -0.272 0.075 -0.070 -0.049 
(1.000) (0.267) (0.082) (0.068) (0.042) 
TAS -0.210 0.013 0.179** 
(1.000) (0.530) (0.063) 
NT -0.011 0.268 0.138** 
(1.000) (0.794) (0.087) 
Year 2004 0.084 0.124 0.041 0.096** 0.056** 
(1.000) (0.114) (0.026) (0.029) (0.020) 
Year 2005 0.163 0.222 0.074 0.228** 0.097** 
(1.000) (0.166) (0.031) (0.040) (0.024) 
Constant 36.741 -24.495 8.893 1470.939 50.175 
(1.000) (0.998) (1.060) (0.998) (27.041) 
Log likelihood 155.98 111.13 188.63 111.67 270.43 
Inefficiency mean 1.072 1.148 2.249 1.317 3.373 
Excess adv. event 
rate 0.000 1.366 1.119 3.724** 1.908** 
(1.000) (1.070) (0.837) (0.894) (0.515) 
occupancy rate 0.000 0.396 -0.010 -0.047 -0.066 
(1.000) (0.736) (0.096) (0.070) (0.061) 
full time staff/bed 0.000 0.004 0.279** 0.207** 0.138** 
(1.000) (0.079) (0.027) (0.041) (0.011) 
beds 0.000 0.002 0.011 ** 0.011 ** 0.001 •• 
(1.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
constant 0.000 -0.653 -0.724 -0.427 0.458 
(1.000) (0.690) (0.085) (0.124) (0.765) 
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Table B.2.3: Hypothesis null tests for cost efficiency Model 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
Log likelihood 149.62 112.68 161.98 20.785 205.35 
Cobb-Douglas 
Log likelihood 155.98 111.13 188.63 111.67 270.43 
Trans log 
Log likelihood 
Ratio 12.72 3.1 53.3 181.77 130.16 
Chi-Square critical 
value (5% 55.76 55.76 55.76 55.76 55.76 
significance, 
degree of 
freedom=361 
Decision Accept Ho. Accept Ho. Accept Ho. Reject Ho. Reject Ho. 
Cobb- Cobb- Cobb- Translog Translog 
Douglas Douglas Douglas more more 
more more more appropriate appropriate 
appropriate annronriate annronriate 
Cobb-Douglas cost function would be more appropriate for peer groups A, B and C 
if using log likelihood ratio tests and judgment on economic sensibility. For peer groups D 
and the pooled group, the Cobb-Douglas cost function estimations failed the log likelihood 
ratio test but would be considered as more appropriate than the translog estimations if the 
selection was based on economic sense. 
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APPENDIX Cl: Cost efficiency estimation-Two step approach (mortality 
as quality indicator) 
Table Cl.1: Cobb- Douglas cost efficiency estimation- panel data approach 
Peer Peer Peer Peer group 
group A group B group C D Pooled 
doctor salary 0.102 0.039 0.019 -0.020 -0.002 
(0.067) (0.040) (0.016) (0.041) (0.015) 
nurse salary 0.216** 0.199** -0.030 -0.492** 0.088** 
(0.089) (0.051) (0.029) (0.226) (0.036) 
other staff salary 0.185** 0.072 0.000 -0.031 0.055 
(0.073) (0.071) (0.054) (0.091) (0.040) 
emergency -0.144* 0.054 0.106** 0.010 0.064** 
(0.085) (0.113) (0.033) (0.079) (0.030) 
outpatient 0.281 ** 0.239** 0.176** 0.082 0.247** 
(0.062) (0.053) (0.044) (0.061) (0.027) 
surgery 0.426** 0.202** 0.236** 0.077** 0.150** 
(0.071) (0.078) (0.035) (0.039) (0.023) 
medical 0.383** 0.176** 0.280** 0.405** 0.459** 
(0.064) (0.062) (0.056) (0.106) (0.032) 
otherDRG 0.064* 0.068** 0.021 0.022 0.039** 
(0.036) (0.033) (0.016) (0.020) (0.012) 
teaching 0.001 0.032 0.177 0.065 
(0.026) (0.033) (0.273) (0.026) 
peer group A 0.073 
(0.070) 
peer group B 0.012 
(0.061) 
-
peer group C 0.148** 
(0.045) 
NSW 0.144 0.093 0.098 -0.024 
(0.167) (0.091) (0.078) (0.060) 
SA 0.044 0.159 0.028 -0.703** -0.046 
(0.179) (0.149) (0.082) (0.239) (0.079) 
-
QLD -0.170 -0.228** -0.222** -0.438** 0.250** 
(0.167) (0.115) (0.086) (0.093) (0.064) 
TAS 0.034 0.238 0.061 
(0.183) (0.178) (0.151) 
NT 0.122 0.368** -0.161 
(0.199) (0.163) (0.165) 
Time 0.054** 0.029 0.081 ** 0.113** 0.040** 
(0.012) (0.030) (0.013) (0.039) (0.010) 
Constant 2.844 6.787 9.307 16.878 6.697 
(1.881) (1.450) (0.685) (2.493) (0.624) 
No. Obs 144 102 172 59 477 
Log likelihood 134.87 94.12 127.57 34.10 289.27 
Inefficiency mean 26.35% 69.2% 49.67% 55.16% 53.53 
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Table Cl.2: Factors influencing hospital cost inefficiency 
Peer group Peer group Peer group Peer 
A B c groupD Pooled 
excess mortality 0.149 -3.458 -3.088** -0.392 0.041 
(0.185) (3.279) (1.310) (0.302) (l. ll2) 
occupancy rate -0.006 -0.241 0.021 -0.013 -0.075* 
(0.005) (0. 148) (0.055) (0.010) (0.044) 
full time staff/bed 0.000 0.049* 0.078** 0.004 0.010 
(0.001) (0.026) (0.021) (0.007) (0.011) 
beds 0.000** 0.002** 0.003** 0.000 0.001 ** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 0.282 0.427 0.104 0.570 0.430 
(0.036) (0.183) (0.098) (0.047) (0.050) 
R-squared 0.042 0.264 0.371 0.027 0.168 
Table Cl.3: Translog cost efficiency estimation- Panel data approach 
Peers A,B, D and pooled group estimations do not converge after 300 iterations 
PecrC 
Std. 
Coefficient Error 
i doctor salary (a) 0.023 (0.015) 
i nurse salary (b) 0.042 (0.040) 
other staff salary 
(c) -0.056 (0.072) 
emergency ( d) 0.118** (0.031) 
outpatient ( e) 0.164** (0.050) 
surgery (f) 0.182** (0.040) 
medical (g) 0.252** (0.063) 
other DRG (h) 0.017 (0.021) 
a2 0.007 (0.010) 
b2 0.071 (0.081) 
c2 0.026 (0.148) 
ab 0.101 (0.135) 
ac 
-0.059 (0.154) 
be -0.134 (0.133) 
d2 0.009 (0.033) 
e2 -0.033 (0.034) 
f2 0.047** (0.019) 
g2 0.082 (0.090) 
h2 -0.008 (0.007) 
de 0.007 (0.039) 
df 
-0.110** (0.039) 
dg 0.142 (0.086) 
dh 
-0.043 (0.031) 
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ef 0.059 (0.037) 
eg -0.039 (0.086) 
eh -0.008 (0.021) 
fg -0.135** (0.066) 
fh 0.011 (0.015) 
gh 0.078 (0.052) 
ad -0.108 (0.059) 
ae 0.050 (0.050) 
af 0.061 (0.043) 
ag -0.085 (0.071) 
ah 0.021 (0.024) 
bd -0.204 (0.166) 
be 0.086 (0.148) 
bf 0.196 (0.127) 
bg -0.280 (0.250) 
bh 0.053 (0.113) 
cd 0.291 (0.184) 
ce -0.088 (0. 169) 
cf -0.197 (0.137) 
cg 0.219 (0.258) 
ch -0.090 (0.116) 
teaching 0.241 (0.276) 
NSW 0.093 (0.101) 
SA -0.045 (0.129) 
QLD -0.310 (0.128) 
time 0.115 (0.057) 
constant 9.589 (2.549) 
No. Obs 
Log likelihood 150.83 
I Inefficiency mean 372% 
Table Cl.4: Factors influencing hospital cost inefficiency 
PeerC 
Coefficient Std.Error 
excess mortality 7.496 (16.045) 
occupancy rate -0.799 (0.482) 
full time staff/bed 0.454** (0.126) 
beds 0.027** (0.003) 
constant 1.330 (0.275) 
R-squared 0.482 
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Table Cl.5: Cobb-Douglas cost efficiency estimation- pooled cross-sectional approach 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
d(e)vhet d(t) d(e) vhet d(t) d(h) vhet 
doctor salary 0.118 O.Ql5 -0.027 0.065 0.010 
(0.085) (0.058) (0.027) (0.056) (0.026) 
nurse salary -0.327 0.172 -0.016 -0.935** 0.029 
(0.165) (0.102) (0.043) (0.438) (0.057) 
other staff salary 0.425** 0.115 -0.094 -0.146 0.092 
(0.122) (0.116) (0.082) (0.181) (0.078) 
emergency -0.J 07 -0.176** 0.168** 0.039 -0.010 
(0.057) (0.054) (0.033) (0.076) (0.031) 
!outpatient 0.282** 0.334** 0.243** 0.116 0.284** 
!surgery 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.039) (0.056) (0.022) 
0.780** 0.212•• 0.315** 0.123** 0.250** 
(0.047) (0.044) (0.038) (0.028) (0.022) 
medical 0.256** 0.108 0.327** 0.309** 0.306** 
ttherDRG 
(0.045) (0.053) (0.059) (0.096) (0.025) 
0.001 0.091 ** 0.034 0.037 0.065** 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) 
caching 0.037 0.110 -0.086 0.205** 
' (0.034) (0.057) ! (0.111) (0.033) ~=-A 0.043 (0.091) 
er group B -0.081 
beer groupC (0.077) -0.286** 
l 
I (0.056) 
!NSW -0.077 0.129** -0.026 0.032 
(0.065) (0.048) (0.057) (0.037) 
SA -0.195** 0.050 -0.113 -0.811 •• -0.049 
(0.063) (0.087) (0.056) (0.200) (0.044) 
QLD -0.333** -0.181** -0.299** -0.504** -0.282** 
I (0.060) (0.060) (0.070) (0.092) (0.043) ! 
ITAS -0.155** 0.208** -0.050 
~ (0.074) (0.096) (0.071) -0.059 0.214 -0.160 (0.080) (0.177) (0.092) ear2004 0.064** 0.082** 0.039 0.172** 0.047** 
lyear2005 
(0.024) (0.034) (0.030) (0.071) (0.022) 
0.114** 0.153** 0.126** 0.237** 0.105** 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.041) (0.105) (0.023) 
Constant 4.625 8.957 8.872 22.380 8.055 
(1.988) (1.762) (1.194) (5.023) (0.893) 
INo. Obs 
Log likelihood 100.770 63.820 53.810 18.640 99.710 
Inefficiency rnean0.075 0.00001 0.164 0.001 \ 0.047 
7.5% 0.0% 16.4% 0.1% 4.7% 
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Table Cl.6: Factors influencing hospital cost efficiency 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
~xcess mortality -2.033 0.0002 0.964 0.000 0.076 
(2.339) (0.000) (2.984) (0.000) (0.056) 
occupnacy rate -0.031 0.0000 -0.125 0.000 -0.012 
(0.018) {0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.002) 
full time staff/bed0.009 0.0000 0.014 0.000 0.002 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) 
beds 0.000 0.0000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 0.056 0.0012 0.135 0.001 -0.044 
(0.023) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.001) 
R-squared 0.042 0.150 0.062 0.192 0.136 
Table Cl.7: Translog cost efficiency estimation- pooled cross-sectional approach 
Peers A, B, D and C estimations do not converge after 300 iterations 
Pooled 
d{h) 
doctor salary (a) -4.182 
(2.710) 
nurse salary (b) -0.081 
(3.941) 
other staff salary 
(c) -3.323 
(6.111) 
emergency ( d) -4.329 
(2.414) 
outpatient ( e) 4.968** 
(1.844) 
surgery (f) -0.660 
(l.649) 
medical (g) 1.406 
(2.550) 
other DRG (h) -1.466 
(l.162) 
a2 0.002 
(0.019) 
b2 -0.075 
(0.119) 
c2 -0.022 
(0.276) 
ab 0.202 
(0.232) 
ac 0.180 
(0.284) 
be 0.059 
228 
(0.398) l 
d2 0.100** 
(0.040) 
e2 0.086** 
(0.029) 
t2 0.008 
(0.011} 
g2 0.063 
(0.052) 
h2 0.010 
(0.007) 
de 0.105** 
(0.049) 
df 0.113** 
(0.046) 
. dg 0.276** 
(0.074) 
dh -0.001 
' (0.038) 
ef 0.072** 
(0.029) 
I 
eg 0.032 
(0.053) 
eh 0.002 
(0.024) 
fg 0.084** 
(0.035) 
fh 0.016 
(0.012) 
gh -0.062 
(0.034) 
ad -0.052 
(0.087) 
ae 0.121•• ' 
(0.060} 
af 0.015 
(0.031) 
ag -0.118 
(0.072} 
ah 0.002 
(0.027) 
bd 0.368 
I (0.229) 
be o.s11•• I 
(0.188) I 
bf 0.117 
(0.182) 
bg 0.080 
{0.271) 
229 
bh -0.004 
(0.156) 
cd 0.161 
(0.221) 
ce -0.049 
(0.143) 
cf -0.158 
(0.165) 
cg 0.032 
(0.242) 
ch 0.173 
(0.136) 
teaching 0.112** 
(0.036) 
peer group A 0.153 
(0.086) 
peer group B 0.091 
(0.075) 
peer group C -0.093 
(0.056) 
NSW 0.107** 
(0.040) 
SA -0.023 
(0.045) 
QLD 0.196** 
(0.045) 
TAS -0.013 
(0.070) 
NT 0.082 
(0.097) 
Year 2004 0.074** 
(0.021) 
Year 2005 0.131 ** 
(0.026) 
Constant 49.114 
(32.047) 
No. Obs 
Log likelihood 171.60 
Inefficiency 
mean 0.20% 
Table Cl.8: Factors influence hospital cost efficiency 
Pooled 
d(h) 
excess mortality 2.344 
(1.561) 
occupancy rate 0.188** 
(0.035) 
230 
full time 
staff/bed 0.035** 
(0.006) 
beds 0.000 
(0.000) 
constant 0.232 
(0.023) 
R-squared 0.089 
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APPENDIX C2: Cost efficiency estimation- Two step approach (adverse events as quality 
indicator) 
Table C2.1: Factors influencing hospital cost inefficiency (Cobb-Douglas, panel data approach) 
Peer group Peer group Peer group Peer group 
A B c D Pooled 
excess adv. event 
rate -0.014 1.386 1.221 ** -0.188 0.312 
(0.035) (1.315) (0.592) (0.271) (0.445) 
occupancy rate -0.007 -0.220 0.068 -0.004 -0.071 
(0.005) (0.146) (0.057) (0.013) (0.046) 
full time stafl7bed 0.000 0.052 0.083** 0.000 0.011 
(0.001) (0.028) (0.020) (0.006) (0.011) 
beds 0.000 0.002•• 0.003** 0.000 0.001 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 0.283 0.381 0.042 0.571 0.427 
(0.036) (0.185) (0.095) (0.055) (0.051) 
R-squared 0.034 0.323 0.386 0.007 0.174 
Table C2.2: Factors influencing hospital cost inefficiency (translog, panel data approach) 
PeerC 
Coefticient Std.Error 
excess adv. event rate 8.665** (4.018) 
occupancy rate 0.364 (0.364) 
full time staff/bed 0.437** (0.089) 
beds 0.017** (0.004) 
constant 1.252 (0.334) 
R-squared 0.441 
Table C2.3: Factors influencing hospital cost inefficiency (Cobb-Douglas, pooled cross-section 
approach) 
Peer A PeerB PeerC PeerD Pooled 
excess adv. event rate 0.458 0.000 1.283 0.000 1.968 .. 
(0.277) (0.000) (1.009) (0.000) (0.492) 
occupancy rate -0.026 0.000 -0.131 0.000 0.239** 
(0.020) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.033) 
full time staff/bed 0.009** 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.035** 
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(0.004) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.005) 
beds 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
constant 0.053 0.001 0.154 0.001 0.266 
(0.022) (0.000) (0.051) (0.000) (0.019) 
R-squared 0.047 0.145 0.073 0.223 0.164 
Table C2.4: Factors influencing hospital cost inefficiency (translog, pooled cross-section approach) 
Pooled 
d(h) 
excess adv. event rate 1.371 ** 
(0.435) 
occupancy rate 0.180** 
(0.035) 
full time staff/bed 0.034** 
(0.007) 
beds o.ooo•• 
(0.000) 
constant 0.230 
(0.023) 
R-squared 0.105 
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Appendix D: Ordinary logit, hospital fixed effect estimations for adverse 
events, non-cardiac non-stroke mortality, AMI mortality, heart failure 
mortality, stroke mortality and post-discharge mortality, 1995-2004 
Adverse event 
1995 1996 
age 0.052 (0.006) age 0.061 (0.006) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.156 (0.018) male 0.116 (0.017) 
Charlson index 0.010 (0.005) Charlson index 0.008 (0.005) 
City(patient) -0.444 (0.025) City(patient) -0.552 (0.024) 
Emergency 0.236 (0.019) Emergency 0.222 (0.020) 
9020 -0.889 (0.144) 9020 -1.252 (0.138) 
9022 -0.447 (0.113) 9022 -1.070 (0.114) 
9027 -0.479 (0.108) 9027 -0.816 (0.099) 
9047 0.877 (0.057) 9047 0.581 (0.044) 
9060 -1.994 (0.451) 9060 -3.339 (0.709) 
9061 0.292 (0.143) 9061 -0.307 (0.154) 
9063 0.304 (0.069) 9063 -0.237 (0.061) 
9072 -1.633 (0.361) 9067 -1.850 (0.414) 
9128 -1.184 (0.233) 9072 -1.865 (0.308) 
9148 0.426 (0.060) 9092 -0.732 (0.149) 
9152 -3.376 (1.002) 9128 -1.876 (0.242) 
9163 -1.145 (0.298) 9148 -0.087 (0.050) 
9164 -1.028 (0.276) 9152 -2.626 (0.503) 
9165 -0.265 (0.455) 9163 -1.445 (0.258) 
9195 2.244 (1.120) 9164 -1.264 (0.237) 
9196 -1.099 (0.322) 9165 -0.508 (0.454) 
9206 -0.043 (0.151) 9196 -1.445 (0.338) 
9257 -1.859 (0.506) 9206 -0.306 (0.133) 
9301 -1.342 (0.275) 9257 -1.545 (0.309) 
9353 -0.570 (0.162) 9301 -2.351 (0.321) 
9359 0.166 (0.080) 9353 -1.377 (0.173) 
9360 0.864 (0.062) 9359 -0.589 (0.076) 
9381 -1.900 (0.453) 9360 0.322 (0.051) 
9389 -1.429 (0.202) 9381 -2.131 (0.413) 
9398 -0.648 (0.298) 9389 -1.852 (0.179) 
9414 -0.178 (0.153) 9398 -1.929 (0.413) 
9444 -0.642 (0.177) 9414 -0.856 (0.159) 
9459 0.056 (0.111) 9444 -1.262 (0.177) 
9461 -0.425 (0.102) 9459 -0.498 (0.170) 
9478 -0.672 (0.215) 9461 -0.651 (0.086) 
9510 -0.615 (0.364) 9478 -0.844 (0.176) 
9516 -0.364 (0.121) 9510 -1.808 (0.506) 
9523 -0.406 (0.236) 9516 -0.877 (0.118) 
9528 -2.705 (0.383) 9523 -1.435 (0.309) 
9537 -0.765 10.183\ 9528 -1.446 (0.162) 
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9539 -0,865 (0.340) 9537 -1.429 (0. 173) 
9542 -0.419 (0, 119) 9539 -1.792 (0.451) 
9544 -0.906 (0.120) 9542 -1.213 (0.139) 
9562 0.219 (0.111) 9544 -0.927 (0.090) 
9570 0.016 (0.092) 9562 -0.228 (0.105) 
9592 0.549 (0.063) 9570 -0.573 (0.087) 
9637 -0.412 (0.108) 9592 0.211 (0.051) 
9851 0.136 (0.203) 9637 -0.913 (0.099) 
9658 -0.933 (0.232) 9651 -0,780 (0.242) 
9686 -1.346 (0.265) 9658 -1.945 (0.282) 
9700 -0.305 (0.102) 9686 -2.909 (0.411) 
I 9734 0.268 (0.200) 9700 -1.148 (0, 102) 
9735 1.553 (0,079) 9734 -0.262 (0.206) 
9737 -1.239 (0,216) 9735 1.010 (0.074) 
9747 0.825 (0.054) 9737 -2.580 (0.319) 
9748 -0.920 (0.239) 9747 0.337 (0.042) 
9752 -0.462 (0.165) 9746 -1.814 (0.274) 
9760 -0.358 (0.198) 9752 -0.866 (0.157) 
9776 -0.244 (0.118) 9760 -1.124 (0.255) 
9799 -1.460 (0.162) 9776 -0.598 (0.109) 
I 9808 0.915 (0.054) 9799 -1.468 (0.122) 
19818 0.495 (0.261) 9808 0.207 (0.043) 
9823 -0.715 (0.229) 9818 0.108 (0.227) 
9827 0.402 (0.111) 9823 -1.080 (0.198) 
1-cons -5.010 (0.200) 9827 -0.252 (0.117) I cons -4.819 f0.197l 
1997 1998 
l age 0.069 (0.006) age 0.063 (0.006) I age squared 0.000 (0.000) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
' male 0.153 (0.017) male 0.069 (0.017) 
Charlson lndex -0.003 (0.005) Charlson index -0.013 (0.005) 
City(patient) -0.539 (0.025) City(patient) -0552 (0.024) 
i Emergency 0.423 (0.020) Emergency 0.404 (0.019) 
I 901s -4.175 (1.001) 9016 -4.112 (1.001) 
' 9020 -0.361 (0.109) 9020 0.152 (0.103) 
9022 -0.712 (0.115) 9022 -0.311 (0.106) 
9027 0.104 (0.082) 9027 0.224 (0.088) 
9047 0.482 (0.049) 9047 0.919 (0.051) 
9060 -2.272 (0.450) 9060 -2.939 (0.709) 
9061 0.146 (0.146) 9061 0.229 (0.157) 
9063 0.411 (0.059) 9063 0.534 (0.062) 
9067 -0.802 (0.260) 9067 -0.963 (0.310) 
9072 -1.587 (0.296) 9072 -1.546 (0.296) 
9092 -0.335 (0.102) 9092 0.152 (0.070) 
9128 -1.642 (0.236) 9128 -1.551 (0.257) 
9148 0.403 (0.052) 9148 0.379 (0.056) 
9152 -1.830 (0.451) 9152 -1.506 (0.412) 
9163 -1.243 (0.258) 9163 -0.936 (0.245) 
9164 -0.910 (0.227) 9164 -0.552 (0.210) 
9165 -0.716 (0.583) 9196 -0.362 (0.298) 
9196 -2.560 (0.710 9206 0.363 0.129 
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9206 
9257 
9301 
9353 
9359 
9360 
9381 
9389 
9398 
9414 
9444 
9461 
9478 
9510 
9516 
9523 
9528 
9537 
9539 
9542 
9544 
9562 
9570 
9577 
9592 
9637 
9651 
9658 
9686 
9700 
9734 
9735 
9737 
9747 
9748 
9752 
9760 
9776 
9799 
9808 
9818 
9823 
9827 
_cons 
1999 
age 
age squared 
male 
Charlson index 
0.219 
-1.355 
-2.599 
-0.994 
-0.477 
0.585 
-1.377 
-1.599 
-0.951 
-0.434 
-1.008 
-0.438 
-0.966 
-1.356 
-0.167 
-1.640 
-1.689 
-1.058 
-2.688 
-0.494 
-0.251 
0.138 
-0.354 
-2.444 
0.403 
-0.629 
-0.093 
-1.462 
-3.180 
-0.741 
0.552 
1.407 
-2.215 
0.619 
-1.083 
-0.782 
-0.635 
-0.554 
-0.599 
0.452 
0.245 
-1.414 
-0.090 
-5.462 
0.050 
0.000 
O.D75 
-0.003 
(0.127) 
(0.341) 
(0.382) 
(0.168) 
(0.083) 
(0.056) 
(0.308) 
(0.175) 
(0.266) 
(0.141) 
(0.183) 
(0.095) 
(0.213) 
(0.416) 
(0.104) 
(0.360) 
(0.211) 
(0.159) 
(1.002) 
(0.117) 
(0.080) 
(0.107) 
(0.093) 
(0.712) 
(0.055) 
(0.101) 
(0.177) 
(0.248) 
(0.580) 
(0.095) 
(0.171) 
(0.077) 
(0.411) 
(0.046) 
(0.238) 
(0.163) 
(0.257) 
(0.116) 
(0.097) 
(0.047) 
(0.222) 
(0.257) 
(0.124) 
(0.198) 
(0.005) 
(0.000) 
(0.015) 
I0.005) 
9257 
9301 
9353 
9359 
9360 
9366 
9381 
9389 
9398 
9414 
9444 
9461 
9478 
9510 
9516 
9523 
9528 
9537 
9542 
9544 
9562 
9570 
9592 
9637 
9651 
9686 
9700 
9724 
9734 
9735 
9743 
9747 
9748 
9752 
9760 
9776 
9799 
9808 
9818 
9823 
9827 
_cons 
age 
2000 
age squared 
male 
Charlson index 
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-0.815 (0.267) 
-1.426 (0.257) 
-0.887 (0.179) 
-0.305 (0.085) 
0.850 (0.058) 
-0.943 (0.383) 
-1.740 (0.414) 
-0.971 (0.152) 
-1.029 (0.309) 
-0.166 (0.137) 
-0.654 (0.182) 
-0.029 (0.088) 
-1.014 (0.232) 
-1.396 (0.506) 
0.568 (0.090) 
-0.906 (0.286) 
-0.419 (0.129) 
-1.167 (0.201) 
0.453 (0.090) 
-0.102 (0.085) 
0.420 (0.108) 
-0.205 (0.101) 
0.524 (0.056) 
-0.536 (0.104) 
-0.245 (0.194) 
-2.821 (0.503) 
-0.685 (0.102) 
-3.051 (1.003) 
0.432 (0.179) 
1.666 (0.079) 
-1.106 (0.179) 
0.844 (0.049) 
-0.773 (0.228) 
-0.609 (0.201) 
-0.806 (0.339) 
-0.425 (0.108) 
-0.516 (0.096) 
0.661 (0.050) 
-0.363 (0.308) 
-1.311 (0.257) 
0.539 (0.094) 
-5.386 (0.193) 
0.056 (0.005) 
0.000 (0.000) 
-0.022 (0.015) 
0.002 I0.004\ 
City(patient) -0.497 (0.022) Emergency ·0.420 (0.022) 
Emergency 0.618 (0.016) Clty(patient) 0.850 (0.016) 
9020 -0.252 (0.097) 9016 -3.328 (0.449) 
9022 -0.602 (0.105) 9020 ·0.597 (0.093) 
9027 0.352 (0.067) 9022 -0.627 (0.091) 
9047 0.821 (0.043) 9027 -0.148 (0.069) 
9060 -1.699 (0.305) 9047 0.275 (0.038) 
9061 -0.300 (0.172) 9060 -3.784 (0.708) 
9063 0.234 (0.055) 9061 -1.065 (0.209) 
9067 -1.195 (0.275) 9063 -0.379 (0.057) 
9072 -1.351 (0.237) 9067 -1.200 (0.231) 
9092 0.273 (0.052) 9072 -1.928 (0.249) 
9128 -0.840 (0.160) 9092 -0.007 (0.045) 
9148 0.178 (0.048) 9128 -1.391 (0.167) 
9152 -2.115 (0.503) 9148 -0.076 (0.043) 
9163 -0.964 (0.209) 9152 -2.631 (0.579) 
9164 -1.308 (0.265) 9163 -1.728 (0.250) 
9165 -1.187 (0.712) 9164 -1.482 (0.225) 
9196 -0.312 (0.243) 9165 -1.480 (0.712) 
9206 -0.380 (0.159) 9196 -0.145 (0.239) 
9257 -1.314 (0.274) 9206 -0.213 (0.140) 
9296 -1.257 (0.507) 9257 -2.645 (0.452) 
9301 -1.204 (0.194) 9296 -2.007 (0.358) 
9353 -1.082 (0.163) 9301 -1.682 (0.225) 
9359 -0.483 (0.077) 9353 -1.129 (0.143) 
9360 0.630 (0.051) 9359 -0.627 (0.070) 
9366 -1.583 (0.381) 9360 0.212 (0.047) 
9381 -1.177 (0.250) 9366 -2.272 (0.411) 
9389 -1.352 (0.147) 9369 -0.822 (0.205) 
9398 -0.479 (0.184) 9381 -1.574 (0.230) 
i 9414 -0.322 (0.117) 9389 -1.203 (0.113) 
1:~ -0.833 (0.162) 9398 -1.166 {0.221) -0.305 (0.084) 9414 -0885 (0.119) 
19478 -0.868 (0.186) 9444 -1.432 (0.176) 
9510 -0.664 (0.277) 9452 -1.376 (0.305) 
19516 0.301 (0.083) I 94e1 -0.366 (0.074) 
9528 -0.577 (0.119) 9478 -1.340 (0.190) 
'9537 -0.996 (0.148) 9510 -1.202 (0.297) 
9539 -1.113 (0.505) 9516 O.o39 (0.082) 
9542 -0.070 (0.087) 9528 -0.836 (0.115) 
9544 -0.188 (0.072) i 9537 -0.955 (0.130) 
9562 0.370 (0.091) 9542 -0.595 (0.097) 
9570 -0.407 (0.082) 9544 -0.453 (0.066) 
9577 -1.187 (0.324) 9562 -0.174 (0.094) 
9592 0.378 (0.047) 19570 -0.427 (0.072) 
9626 -1.858 (0.411) 9577 -2.416 (0.505) 
9637 -0.741 (0.090) 9592 0.345 (0.042) 
9651 -0.745 (0.202) 9626 -1.976 (0.292) 
9669 -1.611 (0.504) 9637 -1.121 (0.088) 
9686 ·3.473 (0.579) 9651 -1.675 (0.271) 
9700 -0.635 (0.086) 9686 -4.742 (1.001) 
9724 -2.782 (0.581) 9700 -1.129 (0.091) 
l 9734 0.147 L9724 -1.353 (0.256 
237 
9735 1,390 (0,073) 19734 0,456 (0,147) 
9743 -0.762 (0,088) ' 9735 1,335 (0.067) 
9747 0.529 (0,042) 19743 -0,771 (0,070) 
9748 -1.040 (0,201) 9744 -3.116 (0,709) 
9760 -0.820 (0,500) 9747 0.087 (0,037) 
9776 -0.751 (0.089) 9748 -1.178 (0.175) 
9799 -0.664 (0,083) 9750 -2.199 (1,008) 
9808 0.384 (0,042) 9776 -0.825 (0,075) 
9818 -0,861 (0.338) 9799 -0,865 (0.074) 
9823 -1.876 (0,283) 9808 0,031 (0,037) 
9827 -1.015 (0, 158) I 9818 -0,766 (0.241) 
_cons -4,738 (0, 170) 9823 -2.146 (0,255) 
l 9827 -0.758 (0.127) 
j-cons -4,719 (0.167) 
2001 2002 
age 0.063 (0.005) age 0.042 (0.005) 
age squared 0,000 (MOO) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0,018 (0.015) male 0.057 (0,015) 
Charlson index -0,011 (0.004) Charlson index -0.014 (0.004) 
Ci!y(pa1ien1) -0.415 (0,023) Ci!y(patient) -0.402 (0,023) 
Emergency 0,880 (0.017) Emergency 0.910 (0,017) 
9016 -3,576 (0,579) I 9016 -3,531 (0.579) 
9020 -0.431 (0,089) I 9020 -0.301 (0.087) 
9022 -0,362 (0,084) 9022 -0.372 (0.085) 
9027 -0, 188 (0,072) 9027 0.018 (0.067) 
9047 0.424 (0.039) I 9047 0.474 (0.039) 
9060 -3,344 (0,579) 1 9060 I -4.395 (1.001) 
9061 -0,319 (0.156) I 9063 -0,307 (0.066) 
9063 -0.844 (0,074) I 9067 -1,076 (0.226) 
9067 -1.134 (0,237) 9072 -1.751 (0,242) 
9072 -1.374 (0.208) 9092 0.030 (0.047) 
9092 0.055 (0.045) 9128 -1,544 (0,189) 
9128 -1.361 (0.176) 9148 0,100 (0.045) 
9148 0.120 (0.043) 9152 -3.674 (1.001) 
• 9164 -1.521 (0,249) 9164 -1,081 (0.208) 
19165 -2.008 (1.003) 9165 -0,639 (0,583) 
. 9206 
-0, 127 (0.132) 9206 -0,085 (0.133) 
9257 -2.017 (0,384) 9257 -1,090 (0.266) 
9296 -2.458 (0,581) 9296 -3,386 (1,002) 
9301 -1.567 (0,220) 9301 -1.291 (0, 193) 
I 9353 -1.512 (0,184) 9353 -1.375 (0, 179) 
I 9359 --0.485 (0,070) I 9358 -1,073 (0.174) 
' 19359 I 9360 0.383 (0.047) -0,431 (0.070) 
i 9366 -2.698 (0,502) I 9360 0.379 (0.049) 
9369 --0.691 (0.198) I 9366 -2.109 (0.356) 
9381 --0.930 (0,205) I 9369 -0,246 (0.165) 
9389 -1.262 (0,125) 9381 -0.887 (0.201) 
9398 -0.957 (0.204) 9389 -1.044 (0, 117) I 
I 9414 -0,855 (0,117) 9398 -1.234 (0.236) I i 
10,156\ (0.127) ' i 9444 -0.989 9414 -0.948 I 
238 
9452 -3.161 (0.709) fM44 -0.766 (0.146) ' 
9461 0.017 (0.066) 19452 -1.199 (0.261) 
9476 -0.902 (0.160) 94ll1 0.165 (0.064) 
9510 -1.240 (0.309) 19478 -1.069 (0.173) 
' 9516 -0.022 (0.085) 9484 -2.858 (0.711) 
9528 -0.742 (0.116) i 9510 -2.258 (0.505) 
9537 -1.087 (0.145) I 9516 0,019 (0.087) 
9542 -0.567 (0.102) 9528 -0.641 (0.110) 
9544 -0.353 (0.066) 9537 -0.544 (0.123) 
9562 -0.110 (0.099) 9542 -0.511 (0.102) 
9570 -0.018 (0.068) 9544 ·0.177 (0.065) 
9592 0.404 (0.042) 9562 -0.014 (0.099) 
9626 -2.933 (0.502) 9570 -0.194 (0.073) 
9637 -0.742 (0.081) 9592 0.204 (0.044) 
9651 -1.420 (0.239) ' 9637 -0.874 (0.064) 
9686 -4.660 (1.001) 9651 -2.004 (0.319) 
9700 -1.145 (0.096) 9686 -2.349 (0.336) 
9734 0.152 (0.162) 9700 -0.887 (0.091) 
' 9735 1.344 (0.069) : 9734 -0.100 (0.180) 
19743 -0.769 (0.067) 9735 1.482 (0.071) 
9744 -3.140 (0.579) 9743 -0.873 (0.071) 
9747 0.129 (0.039) 9744 -2.976 (0.579) 
' 
19748 -1.181 (0.194) 9747 0.282 (0.039) 
9762 -0.208 (0.295) 9748 -0.940 (0.189) 
J 9776 -0.673 (0.072) 9762 -0.167 (0.274) 
9799 -0.374 (0.065) 9776 -1.174 (0.085) 
9808 -0.127 (0.039) 19799 -0.677 (0.069) 
9818 ·0.896 (0.272) 9608 -0.055 (0.039) 
19623 -1.385 (0.203) 9818 -0.530 (0.241) 
19827 -0.489 (0.114) 9823 -0.945 (0.153) 
_cons -5.118 (0.169) 9827 -0.652 (0.118) 
' 
_ccns -4.621 (0.169) 
' 
2003 2004 
age 0.043 (0.005) I age 0.070 (0.005) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) I :;.squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male -0.001 (0.015) -0.008 (0.014) 
Charlson index -0.008 {0.004) Charlson Index ·0.024 (0.004) 
City(patient) -0.404 (0.023) ' City(patlent) -0.334 (0.022) 
Emergency 0.978 (0.017) Emergency 0.988 (0.016) 
9016 -3,693 (0.579) 9016 -2.840 (0.380) 
9020 -0.491 (0.080) l 9020 -0.429 (0.079) 
9022 -0.284 (0.078) 9022 -0.431 (0.082) 
9027 -0.205 (0.068) 9027 -0.141 (0.074) 
9047 0.242 (0.038) 9047 0.406 (0.038) 
9063 ·0.541 (0.066) 9063 0.002 (0.054) 
9067 -1.153 (0.216) 9067 -0.687 (0.189) 
9072 -1.311 (0.182) 9072 -1.381 (0.208) 
9092 -0, 172 10.045\ 9092 -0.304 (0.048) 
' 
239 
9128 -1.174 (0.142) 9128 -1.080 (0.157) 
9148 -0.112 (0.043) 9148 0.022 (0.043) 
9164 -1.106 (0.186) 9164 -1.106 (0.201) 
9206 -0.692 (0.159) 9165 0.042 (0.386) 
9257 -1.201 (0.238) 9206 -0.752 (0.172) 
9296 -1.374 (0.340) 9257 -1.677 (0.308) 
9301 -1.290 (0.179) 9296 -1.387 (0.384) 
9353 -1.287 (0.158) 9301 -1.002 (0.169) 
9358 -1.355 (0.174) 9353 -1.248 (0.169) 
9359 -0.488 (0.065) 9358 -0.941 (0.135) 
9360 0.108 (0.048) 9359 -0.400 (0.064) 
9366 -1.640 (0.270) 9360 0.033 (0.049) 
9369 -0.511 (0.164) 9366 -1.947 (0.319) 
9381 -1.039 (0.194) 9369 -0.442 (0.155) 
9389 -1.048 (0.104) 9381 -1.048 (0.194) 
9398 -1.022 (0.197) 9389 -0.916 (0.106) 
9414 -1.016 (0.125) 9398 -1.196 (0.215) 
9444 -0.845 (0.143) 9414 -1.409 (0.142) 
9452 -1.864 (0.356) 9444 -0.620 (0.139) 
9461 -0.335 (0.072) 9452 -1.823 (0.319) 
9478 -0.852 (0.147) 9461 -0.232 (0.071) 
9484 -3.236 (0.710) 9478 -1.316 (0.193) 
9510 -2.607 (0.582) 9484 -1.606 (0.323) 
9516 -0.273 (0.091) 9516 0.122 (0.079) 
9528 -0.624 (0.097) 9523 -2.656 (0.504) 
9537 -0.934 (0.136) 9528 -0.580 (0.100) 
9542 -0.651 (0.099) 9537 -1.235 (0.155) 
9544 -0.165 (0.060) 9542 -0.669 (0.104) 
9562 -0.390 (0.110) 9544 -0.316 (0.064) 
9570 -0.395 (0.069) 9562 -0.377 (0.111) 
9592 0.058 (0.041) 9570 -0.520 (0.070) 
9637 -0.873 (0.077) 9592 0.129 (0.041) 
9651 -2.641 (0.410) 9637 -0.645 (0.075) 
9686 -1.170 (0.179) 9651 -2.200 (0.356) 
9700 -1.440 (0.101) 9686 -1.703 (0.227) 
9734 0.237 (0.153) 9700 -1.398 (0.103) 
9735 1.145 (0.072) 9734 0.094 (0.171) 
9743 -1.088 (0.069) 9735 0.961 (0.081) 
9747 0.060 (0.037) 9743 -0.939 (0.062) 
9748 -0.901 (0.170) 9744 -3.689 (0.708) 
9762 -0.902 (0.383) 9747 0.162 (0.037) 
9776 -1.518 (0.084) 9748 -0.823 (0.169) 
9799 -0.234 (0.060) 9762 -0.114 (0.265) 
9808 -0.163 (0.037) 9776 -0.584 (0.058) 
9818 -0.334 (0.192) 9798 -2.881 (1.002) 
9823 -1.482 (0.165) 9799 -0.164 (0.059) 
9827 -1.067 (0.124) 9808 0.073 (0.037) 
_cons -4.477 (0.167) 9818 -0.263 (0.198) 
9823 -1.135 (0.148) 
9827 -0.434 (0.092) 
-
cons -5.402 (0.166) 
240 
ln~hospital non-cardiac non-stroke mortality 
1995 
I age 0.032 (0.016) 
1 
age squared 0.000 (0,000) 
male 0.219 (0.043) 
I LOS 0.038 (0.010) I LOS squared 0.000 (0.000) 
Charlson index 0.407 (0.007) I City(palient) 0.022 (0.082) 
Emergency 1.506 (0,052) 
i 9020 0.252 (0,207) 
19022 -1.319 (0.591) 
9027 -0,360 (0, 185) 
' 9047 0.046 (0.130) 
9061 -1.419 (1.013) 
9063 ·2.036 (0.312) 
9072 Q, 151 (0.329) 
9128 0.359 (0.272) 
9148 ·0.504 (0.156) 
9163 -0.193 (0.379) 
9164 0.409 (0.335) 
9196 0.452 (0.405) 
9206 0.582 (0,360) 
19257 -1,730 (1.013) 
9301 0.246 (0,307) 
I 9353 0.123 (0.261) 
9359 ·0,136 (0.200) 
9360 0,374 (0. 179) 
9381 -0,278 (0.597) 
9389 0.082 (0,235) 
9414 ·0.141 (0.388) 
9444 0.207 (0.267) 
9459 ·0.822 (0.340) 
9461 ·1.228 (0.514) 
9478 0.833 (0.272) 
9510 ·0,632 (1.016) 
9516 0.359 (0.261) 
9523 -0,155 (0.413) 
9528 0.753 (0.260) 
9537 0.185 (0.269) 
' 9539 1.183 (0.469) 
19542 -0.400 (0.280) 
i 9544 0. 101 (0.203) 
19562 0.648 (0.249) 
9570 ·0.459 (0.213) 
9592 0.415 (0.131) 
9637 0.379 (0.200) 
9651 1.105 (0.440) 
19658 0.691 (0.189) 
9700 0.292 (0.201) 
9734 2.418 (0.254) 
I e13s ·1.352 10.4421 
1996 
age 0.040 (0.016) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.273 (0.041) 
LOS 0.040 (0.009) I LOS squared 0.000 (0.000) 
Charlson index 0.401 (0,007) 
j City(patienl) -0.151 (0.074) 
I Emergency 1.535 (0.050) 
9020 0.777 (0.182) 
! 9022 ·1.081 (0.590) 
9027 1.001 (0.173) 
9047 0.300 (0, 123) 
1:! -0.233 (0,718) ·1.593 (0.371) 
9067 -0.755 (0.727) 
19072 ·0.060 (0.350) 
9092 -0.095 (0.283) 
I 9128 0.290 (0.282) 
I 
19148 ·0,121 (0,144) 
9163 ·1,226 (0.597) 
19164 -0.230 (0.436) 
9196 -0.386 (0,721) 
' 9206 -0.262 (0.592) 
9257 -0.464 (0.473) 
9301 -0.849 (0.470) 
19353 0.123 (0.266) 
9359 -0.056 (0, 188) 
9360 -0.138 (0,183) 
I 9381 -1.571 (1.013) 9389 0.109 (0.233) 
9398 -0.370 (0.743) 
9414 -0.042 (0.385) 
9444 0.219 (0.269) 
9459 -0.370 (0.431) 
9461 -0.627 (0.424) 
19478 0.179 (0.344) 
9510 0.542 (0.603) 
I 9516 0.268 (0.293) 
19523 0.591 (0.341) 
9528 1.139 (0,258) 
19537 -0.162 (0.287) 
' 9539 -0.493 (1.021) 
9542 ·0,080 (0.278) 
9544 0.048 (0.192) 
I 9562 1.056 (0.223) 
19570 0.042 (0, 184) 
'9577 0.195 (0.601) 
I 9592 0.505 (0.127) 
19637 0.455 (0.193) 
' 9651 ·0.641 11,014\ 
241 
9737 0.172 (0.398) 9658 0603 (0.186) 
9747 -0.245 (0.122) 9700 -0.514 (0.235) 
9748 -0.387 (0.387) 9734 2.713 (0.241) 
9752 0.620 (0.238) 9735 -0.579 (0.360) 
9760 0.143 (0.411) 9737 -0.031 (0.464) 
9776 0.178 (0.217) 9747 0.065 (0.117) 
9799 -0.017 (0.253) 9748 0.963 (0.238) 
9808 -0.188 (0.124) 9752 0.785 (0.234) 
9823 0.282 (0.329) 9760 -0.388 (0.593) 
9827 -0.675 (0.594) 9776 0.675 (0.185) 
-
cons -9.161 (0.570) I 9799 -0.335 (0.264) 
___ __J 9808 0.223 (0 11 B) 
9823 -0.331 (0.406) 
9827 -0.111 (0.515) 
cons 
-
-9.515 (0.551) 
1997 1998 
age O.D16 (0.014) age 0.057 (0 015) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.227 (0.040) male 0.235 (0.040) 
LOS 0.073 (0.009) I LOS 0.082 (0.009) I 
LOS squared -0.001 (0.000) ! LOS squared ·0.002 (0.000) 
Charlson index 0.400 (0.007) ! Charlson index 0.377 (0.007) 
City(patient) -0.003 (0.075) 1 City(patient) -O.D75 (0.078} 
Emergency 1.526 (O.Q48) Emergency 1.477 (0.049) 
9020 0.125 (0.202) 9020 0.209 (0.195) 
9022 0.228 (0.320) 9022 -0.558 (0.462) 
9027 0.637 (0.167) 9027 -0.202 (0.206) 
9047 0.247 (0.112) 9047 0.294 (0.122) 
9061 0.917 (0.329) 9061 0.811 (0.322) 
9063 -2.279 (0.459) 9063 -1.645 (0.310) 
9067 0.453 (0.389) 9067 0.501 (0.374} 
9072 -0.260 (0.381) 9072 -0.293 (0.349} 
9092 -0.797 (0.244) I 9092 0.162 (0.148) 
19128 0.245 (0.285) 19128 0.159 (0.314) 
19148 -0.206 (0.137) 9148 -0.244 (0.142) 
9163 -0.454 (0.405) 9163 -0.139 (0.369) 
I 9164 ·0.476 (0.471) 9164 0.338 (0.354) 
! 9196 -1.055 (1.011) 9196 0.705 (0.482) l 9206 0.747 (0.338) 9206 1.185 (0.289) 
9257 -1.472 (1.010) 9257 -0.361 (0.598) I 9301 0.060 (0.291) 9301 -0.559 (0.383) 
I 9353 0.156 (0.259) 9353 --0.544 (0.382) I 9359 0.089 (0.182) 9359 -0.072 (0.195) 
' 9360 ·0.076 (0.159) 9360 -0.251 (0.191) 
9381 -0.255 (0.595) 9381 0.194 (0.477) 
9389 0.444 (0.203) 9389 -0.226 (0.255) 
9414 -0.413 (0.402) 9398 1.069 (0.429) 
9444 0.192 (0.271) 9414 OJJ39 (0.335) 
9461 -0456 (0.369) 9444 0.543 (0.261) 
9478 0.726 0.269 9461 -0.486 (0.353) 
242 
9510 -0.002 (0.723) 9478 0.898 (0.264) 
9516 0.745 (0.225) 9516 0.206 (0.312) 
9523 -1.175 (0.722) 9523 0.242 (0.369) 
9528 0.753 (0.252) 9528 1.200 (0.223) 
9537 -0.187 (0.263) 9537 --0.387 (0.304) 
9539 0.888 (0.719) 9542 --0.291 (0.228) 
9542 0.423 (0.202) 9544 0.172 (0.198) 
9544 -0.025 (0.194) 9562 0.977 (0.205) 
9562 0.921 (0.216) 9570 0.122 (0. 174) 
9570 -0.293 (0.187) 9592 0.314 (0.127) 
9577 -0.988 (1.013) 9637 -0.232 (0.234) 
9592 1.009 (0.115) 9651 -0.068 (0.593) 
9637 -0.274 (0.228) 9700 --0.190 (0.213) 
9651 0.371 (0.419) 9724 0.441 (0.475) 
9658 0.148 (0. 193) 9734 0.985 (0.592) 
9700 --0.053 (0.189) '9735 --0.862 (0.425) 
9734 2.613 (0.245) 9743 0.183 (0.200) 
9735 -2.032 (0.540) 9747 -0.020 (0.119) 
9737 0.664 (0.395) 9748 --0.111 (0.408) 
9747 0.041 (0.106) 9752 1.059 (0.262) 
9748 0.821 (0.276) 9760 -0.997 (1.022) 
9752 0.574 (0.248) 9776 --0.106 (0.211) 
9760 --0.405 (0.591) 9799 -0.440 (0.259) 
9776 0.288 (0.188) 9808 0.155 (0.119) 
9799 -0.172 (0.243) 9823 -0.017 (0.350) 
9808 --0.001 (0.108) 
9823 0.525 (0.280) 
9827 0.895 (0.289) 
19827 -0.065 (0.374) 
_cons -10.200 (0.549) 
-
cons -8.682 (0.508) 
1999 2000 
age 0.020 (0.015) age 0.014 (0.015) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.275 (0.039) male 0.279 (0.040) 
LOS 0.073 (0.009) LOS 0.116 (0.009) 
LOS squared -0.001 (0.000) LOS squared -0.002 (0.000) 
Charlson index 0.364 (0.006) Charlson ~ndex 0.344 (0.006) 
Cily(patient) 0.089 (0.077) 
Emergency 1.782 (0.051) 
9020 0.349 (0.212) 
9022 -0.202 (0.468) 
City(patient) 0.028 (0.078) 
' I Emergency 1.554 (0.051) 
9020 0.656 (0.213) 
'9022 -0.021 (0.407) 
9027 -0.283 (0.217) i 9027 0.017 (0.204) 
9047 0.598 (0.137) 9047 0.673 (0.140) 
9061 0.108 (0.524) 9061 0.226 (0.598) 
9063 -1.272 (0.297) ' 9063 -1.435 (0.332) 
9067 0.566 (0.480) 9067 0.903 (0.479) 
9072 0.813 (0.300) 9072 0.782 (0.333) 
9092 0.472 (0.155) 
9128 0.631 (0.329) 
9148 0.009 (0.155) 
9163 
.. 
0.313 10.338\ 
19092 0.455 (0.157) 
9128 1.137 (0.296) 
' 9148 0,441 (0.157) I 9163 0.593 (0.328) 
243 
9164 OJ98 (0,528) 9164 -0,141 (0.601) 
9206 1.558 (0.323) 9196 -0.000 (1,023) 
9257 0.454 (0.526) 9206 1.617 (0,323) 
9301 0.390 (0,319) 9257 0.434 (0,541) 
9353 0.734 (0,268) 9296 -{),346 (0,723) 
9359 0.410 (0,211) 9301 -0.389 (0.599) 
9360 0.706 (0, 181) 9353 0.564 (0,312) 
9381 0.946 (0.413) 9359 0.861 (0.195) 
9389 1,071 (0.210) 9360 0.681 (0.182) 
9398 -0.782 (1.015) 9381 0,821 (0.440) 
9414 0.381 (0,350) 9389 0.831 (0.227) 
9444 0.762 (0.295) 9398 -0,037 (0,732) 
9461 Q,929 (0,247) 9414 0.299 (0,358) 
9478 0.778 (0,356) 9444 1.164 (0.262) 
9510 1150 (0,602) 9461 0.303 (0.300) 
9516 1.242 (0,253) 9478 0.901 (0.347) 
9528 1.906 (0,219) 9510 1.182 (0.604) 
9537 0.334 (0,281) 9516 0.454 (0,347) 
9539 0.981 (1.017) 9528 1,815 (0.220) 
9542 -{),347 (0,248) 9537 0.955 (0,254) 
9544 0.468 (0.211) 9542 -0,378 (0,303) 
9562 1.107 (0.220) 9544 0.238 (0.225) 
9570 0.152 (0,183) 9562 0,531 (0,227) 
9592 0.376 (0.139) 19570 0.083 (0.195) 
9637 0.255 (0,240) 9592 0.762 (0.141) 
9651 o.992 (0.416) 9637 0,549 (0.221) 
9700 0.802 (0.202) 9651 1.932 (0.316) 
9734 1,694 (0.525) 9700 0.629 (0,226) 
9735 -0,854 (0.429) 9724 0,131 (1.014) 
9743 0.680 (0.171) 9734 1.495 (0.543) 
9747 0.339 (0, 133) 9735 -1.104 (0.498) 
9748 0.792 (0,342) 9743 0.712 (0.177) 
9750 0,217 (0,749) 9747 0.372 (0, 136) 
9776 -{),096 (0.223) 9748 0,834 (0.322) 
9799 0.566 (0,217) 9750 -0.770 (1.020) 
9808 0.276 (0, 135) 9776 -0.073 (0.224) 
9823 0.883 (0.331) 9799 0.627 (0.200) 
9827 1.073 (0,330) 9808 0.423 (0.136) 
_cons -9,768 (0 533) 9823 0.807 (0,344) 
9827 0,913 (0360J 
-
cons -9.651 (0.536) 
2001 2002 
age 0.046 (0.015) age -0.009 (0.013) 
age squared 0,000 (0.000) age squared 0,000 (0.000) 
male 0.286 (0,039) male 0.259 (0.037) 
LOS 0.133 (0.009) LOS 0.153 (0.008) 
LOS squared -0,003 (0.000) LOS squared -0,004 (0,000) 
Charlson index 0.346 (0.006) i Charlson index 0.317 (0.006) 
City(patienl) -0.020 (0.073) I Clty(patienl) -0.074 (Q,069) 
Erner en 1.579 0.050 ! Erner en 1,600 0.048 
244 
9020 0.552 (0.216) 9020 0.439 (0.208) 
' 9022 -0.082 (0.430) 9022 -1.353 (0. 719) 
9027 -0.301 (0.202) 9027 -0.197 (0.190) 
9047 0.592 (0.137) 9047 0.549 (0.130) 
• 9061 0.369 (0.523) 9063 -0.853 (0.339) 
19063 -2.740 (0.593) 9067 0.764 (0.438) 
9067 0.703 (0.480) 9072 0.634 (0.283) l 
; 9072 0.730 (0.307) I 9092 0.397 (0.147) 
9092 0.357 (0.153) 9128 0.903 (0.290) 
9128 0.790 (0.325) 9148 0.688 (0.152) 
9148 0.480 (0.160) 9164 0.466 (0.412) 
19164 0.798 (0.374) 9206 0.946 (0.380) 
9206 1.222 (0.349) 9257 1.076 (0.397) 
i 9257 0.465 (0.602) 9301 0.487 (0.320) 
I 9296 -0.560 (1.012) 19353 0.439 (0.293) 
19301 0.536 (0.371) 9358 0.191 (0.379) 
' 9353 0.445 (0.292) 9359 0.562 (0.190) 
! 9359 0.554 (0.201) I 9360 0.680 (0.171) 
19360 0.329 (0.192) 19381 0.206 (0.525) 
19381 0.983 (0.414) 9389 1.045 (0.197) I 9389 0.586 (0.231) 19398 -1.214 (1.020) 
• 9398 --0.078 (0.728) 9414 0.362 (0.328) 
I 9414 0.596 (0.311) 9444 1.086 (0.248) 
9444 0.803 (0.281) ' 9461 0.580 (0.244) 
9461 0.056 (0.310) 19478 0.674 (0.327) 
9478 0.356 (0.376) I 9484 1.093 (0.601) 
9510 -0.070 (1.015) ' 9510 0.205 (0.734) 
9516 0.807 (0.285) 9516 1.220 (0.244) 
19528 1.802 (0.229) 9528 1.661 (0.209) 
9537 0.869 (0.247) 19537 0.822 (0.245) 
I 9542 -0.304 (0.266) 9542 --0.345 (0.252) 
' 9544 0.184 (0.210) ' 9544 0.237 (0.196) 
19562 0.991 (0.220) '9562 1.171 (0.198) 
I 9510 0.209 (0.192) 9570 0.040 (0.189) 
19592 0.407 (0.142) 9592 0.516 (0.133) 
9637 0.223 (0.230) 9637 0.148 (0.215) 
! 9651 1.417 (0.405) 9651 1.053 (0.435) 
9700 1.241 (0.197) 9700 0.976 (0.192) 
9734 0.013 (1.016) 9734 1.757 (0.438) 
9735 -1.116 (0.464) 9735 -2.899 (1.036) 
9743 0.859 (0.160) 9743 0.912 (0.149) 
9747 0.346 (0.136) 9747 0.452 (0.128) 
9748 0.305 (0.391) 9748 0.370 (0.388) 
9750 0.266 (1.034) i 9776 0.308 (0.179) 
9776 0.370 (0.185) 19799 0.063 (0.197) 
9799 0.196 (0.209) 19808 0.413 (0.128) 
9808 0.327 (0.136) 9818 0.010 (0.723) 
9818 0.906 (0.473) 9823 0.934 (0.299) 
9823 1.057 (0.353) 9827 0.298 (0.379) 
9827 -0.072 (0.518) -8.786 (0.487) 
_cons -10.843 (0.547) 
245 
2003 2004 
age -0.003 (0.014) I age 0.021 (0.015) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) l age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.367 (0.037) male 0.291 (0.038) 
LOS 0.157 (0.008) LOS 0 154 (0.009) 
LOS squared -0.004 (0.000) LOS squared -0.004 (0.000) 
Charlson index 0.299 (0.005) Charlson index 0.295 (0.005) 
City(patient) -0.047 (0.071) i City(patient) -0.033 (0.071) 
Emergency 1.623 (0.049) j Emergency 1.665 (0.049) 
9020 0.308 (0.210) l 9020 0.247 (0.194) 
9022 0.891 (0.284) 19022 0.176 (0.355) i 
9027 -0.358 (0.199) 9027 -0.237 (0.201) 
9047 0.478 (0.134) l 9047 0.402 (0.126) 
' 9063 -1.312 (0.428) ! 9063 -0.988 (0.305) 
9067 0.746 (0.441) 1 9067 0.585 (0.476) 
9072 0.579 (0.285) J eon 0 188 (0.319) 
9092 0.513 (0.146) I 9092 0.295 (0.141) 
9128 1.144 (0.253) 9128 0.881 (0.284) 
9148 0.942 (0.152) 9148 0.659 (0.149) 
9184 0.582 (0.372) 9164 0.755 (0.338) 
9206 0.673 (0.440) 9206 0.617 (0.517) 
9257 -0.183 (0.731) 9257 0.483 (0.525) 
9301 0.477 (0.329) 9301 0.418 (0.337) 
9353 1.280 (0.249) 9353 0.982 (0.275) 
9358 0.227 (0.340) 9358 -0.049 (0.328) 
9359 0.355 (0.200) 9359 -0.191 (0.216) 
9360 0.661 (0.175) 9360 0.455 (0.171) 
9381 0.734 (0.446) 9381 0.074 (0.482) 
9389 0.889 (0.205) 9389 0.727 (0.210) 
9398 -1.531 (1.038) 9398 0.256 (0.538) 
9414 0.882 (0.307) 9414 0460 (0.306) 
9444 1.369 (0.244) 9444 1.390 (0.242) 
9461 0.156 (0.307) 9461 0 371 (0.279) 
9478 0.525 (0.387) 9478 0.404 (0.357) 
9484 0.719 (0.601) 9484 0.600 (0.536) 
9510 0.454 (0.738) 9516 1.186 (0.249) 
9516 1.214 (0.260) 9523 0.972 (0.387) 
9528 1.820 (0.207) i 9528 1.779 (0.195) 
9537 0.483 (0.295) I 9531 0.755 (0.240) 
9542 -0.174 (0.235) I es42 -0.487 (0.267) 
9544 0.327 (0.202) I 9544 0.233 (0.193) 
9562 0.985 (0.213) 19562 0.978 (0.203) 
9570 0.191 (0164) I 9570 -0.141 (0.188) 
9592 0.551 (0.134) I 9592 0.367 (0.128) 
' 9637 -0.009 (0.250) l 9637 -0.643 (0.287) 
9651 1.081 (0.437) ! 9651 1.018 (0.431) 
9700 0.760 (0.206) i 9700 0.482 (0.221) 
9734 1.412 (0.543) I 9734 0.753 (0.737) 
9735 -1.558 (0.571) 9735 -2.192 (0.652) 
9743 0.685 (0.162) 9743 0.467 (0.150) 
9747 0.339 (0.131) 9747 0.199 (0.124) 
9748 -0.197 (0.487) 9748 0.254 (0.369) 
9776 0.474 10.169\ 9776 0.224 0.161 
246 
9799 0.892 (0.193) 9799 0.557 (~:n 
9<l08 0.463 (0.130) 9808 0.208 (0.124) 
9818 0.258 (0.597) 9818 0.601 (0.522) 
9823 0.788 (0.315) 9823 0.764 (0.282) 
9827 0.731 (0.329) 9827 -0.465 (0.515) 
_cons -9.414 (0.517) _cons -10.011 (0.528) 
AM I morlal!!:l 
1995 1996 
age 0.152 (0.078) age 0.048 (0.077) 
age squared -0.001 (0.001) age squared 0.000 {0.001) 
male -0.410 (0.158) l male -0.308 (0.167) 
LOS -0.687 (0.045) LOS -0.574 (0.046) 
LOS squared 0.022 (0.002) LOS squared 0.018 (0.002) 
Charlson Index 0.478 (0.055) 1 Charlson index 0.462 (0.053) 
City(palieot) -0.586 (0.303) City(patieot) -0.279 (0.314) 
Emergency 0.720 (0.378) Emergency 0.575 (0.311) 
9020 -0.600 (1.459) 9020 2.332 (1.929) 
9027 3.795 (1.952) 9027 4.451 (1209) 
9047 0.991 (0.649) 9047 0.650 (0.535) 
9072 0.845 (1.101) . 9072 0.334 (1.075) 
9128 1.043 (1.093) I 912a 0.118 (1.292) 
9148 0.745 (1.260) 19148 1.487 (0.825) 
9163 0.503 (1.371) 9163 1.054 (0.933) 
9301 0.447 (1.460) ! 9164 0.484 (1.111) 
9353 1.664 (1.056) 9301 2.176 (0.912) 
9359 1.707 (0.836) 9353 0.673 (1.109) 
9360 0.078 (1.231) 9359 1.209 (0.700) 
9381 0.933 {1.445) 9360 0.479 (0.801) 
9389 0.947 (0.876) 9389 0.065 (0.806) 
9414 0.999 (0.998) ' 9398 1.685 (1.275) 
9444 2.614 (1.025) 19414 0676 (1.238) 
9459 -0.426 (1.051) 9444 1.392 (1.229) 
9528 0.617 (1.415) ! 9459 1.819 (1.354) 
9537 0.553 (1.274) 19478 2.316 (0.946) 
9542 1.179 (1.045) 9516 0.626 (1.556) 
9544 1.288 (0.888) 9528 1.080 (1.345) 
9562 1.698 (1.240) 9537 --0.416 (1.197) 
9570 1.390 (1.105) 9542 1.879 (1.356) 
9592 1.764 (0.790) 19544 0.632 (0.817) 
9637 1.112 (0.914) 9562 2.305 (1.310) 
9658 3.027 (0.973) I 9510 0.500 (0.931) 
9700 1.458 (0.870) '9592 0.533 (0.682) 
9747 1.057 (0.639) 9637 1.893 (0.790) 
9748 1.578 (1.059) 9658 -0.914 (1.335) 
9752 0.320 (1.391) ' 9700 -0.412 (1.181) 
9776 1.004 (1.047) 9747 0.730 (0.523) 
9799 1.078 (1.141) 9748 0.368 (1.343) 
9808 1.884 (0.639) 9776 1.676 (1.355) 
9823 0.763 (1.378) 9799 0.289 (1.255) 
9827 3.819 12.146\ 0.533 
247 
I -cons ·9.138 (2.854) 
1997 1998 
age 0.098 (0.080) ! age 0.046 (0.075) 
age squared 0.000 (0.001) age squared 0.000 (0.001) 
male ·0.757 (0.168) male ·0.295 (0.156) 
LOS ·0.648 (0.050) LOS ·0.506 (0.046) 
LOS squared 0.020 (0.002) LOS squared 0.016 (0.002) 
Charlson Index 0.379 (0.055) Charlson index 0.375 (0.048) 
City(patient) ·0.475 (0.310) City(patient) ·0.575 (0.274) 
Emergency 1.238 (0.339) Emergency 0.854 (0.291) 
9027 3.567 (1.615) 9020 D.408 (0.940) 
9047 0201 (0.491) 9047 0.522 (0.433) 
9092 0.257 (0.794) 9072 0.804 (0.961) 
9128 ·0.780 (1.317) 9092 0.517 (0.513) 
9148 1.000 (0.779) 9128 0.795 (1.210) 
9163 0.005 (0.941) 9148 1.978 (0.761) 
9301 0.609 (1.016) 9163 ·0.017 (0.949) 
9353 0.870 (1.358) 9164 1.239 (1.172) 
9359 0.888 (0.722) 9301 0.039 (1.192) 
9360 0.227 (0.878) 9353 1.504 (0.907) 
9381 1.799 (1.253) 9359 0.947 (0.657) 
9389 ·0.542 (0.762) 9360 ·0.328 (0.843) 
9414 0.263 (1.194) 9414 0.754 (1.161) 
9444 0.341 (0.891) 9444 ·0.120 (1.173) 
9478 0.366 (1.110) 9478 1.235 (1.493) 
9516 1.771 (1.215) 9516 0.855 (1.507) 
9523 1.757 (1.127) 9528 0.689 (1.214) 
9528 0.957 (1.050) 9537 0.247 (0.836) 
9537 ·0.737 (1.276) 9542 1.859 (1.206) 
9544 0.677 (0.757) 9544 0.322 (0.729) 
9562 2.340 (1.009) 9562 2447 (1.130) 
9570 1.969 (1.096) 9592 0.440 (0.606) 
9592 1.295 (0.739) 9637 0.443 (0.713) 
9637 1.419 (0.754) 9700 1.008 (0.900) 
9658 1.126 (1.087) I 9724 3.932 (1.728) 
9700 0.760 (0.749) 9743 1.116 (0.922) 
9747 0.326 (0.479) 9747 0.547 (0.421) 
9748 0.539 (1.483) 9748 1.300 (1.206) 
9776 ·0.376 (1.305) 9776 1.453 (1.278) 
9799 0.823 (0.893) 9799 1.655 (0.842) 
9808 0.940 (0.486) 9606 1.062 (0.430) 
9823 0.466 (1.283) 9823 1.193 (1.202) 
9827 2.842 (2.018) 
-
cons ·7.027 (2.727) 
_cons ·7.511 (2.896) 
1999 2000 
age ..Q.001 (0.075) age 0.135 (0081~1 
age squared 0.001 (0.001) age squared 0.000 (0.001) 
male ·0.262 I0.1611 male -0.337 0.164 I 
248 
LOS 
LOS squared 
Charlson Index 
City(patient) 
Emergency 
9020 
9047 
9092 
9128 
9148 
1
9301 
9353 
9359 
11' 9360 
9389 
9414 
j 9444 
1
9478 
I 951s 
·19528 
9537 
9544 
9592 
9637 
• 9700 
9743 
9747 
9748 
I 9776 
9799 
9808 
! _cons 
2001 
age 
age squared 
male 
LOS 
LOS squared 
Charlson index 
City(patient) 
Emergency 
9020 
9027 
9047 
9067 
9092 
9128 
9148 
9353 
9359 
-0.484 (0.047) 
0.016 (0.002) 
0.399 (0.049) 
-0.387 (0.274) 
0.866 (0.350) 
-0.151 (1.027) 
0.425 (0.459) 
0.269 (0.510) 
1.513 (0.903) 
-0.007 (0.648) 
0.105 (1.164) 
1.051 (1.217) 
0.529 (0.666) 
-0.501 (0.681) 
0.000 (0.718) 
-0.937 (1.229) 
-1.080 (1287) 
1.221 (1.188) 
1.437 (2.016) 
0.954 (1.096) 
-0.310 (0.952) 
0.364 (0.640) 
0.026 (0.542) 
-0.350 (1.166) 
-0.676 (1.170) 
-1.573 (1.140) 
-0.331 (0.462) 
1.121 (1.016) 
-0.277 (1.334) 
0.083 (0.927) 
0.009 (0.469) 
-5.302 (2.775) 
0.120 (0.075) 
0.000 (0.001) 
-0.146 (0.157) 
-0.506 (0.048) 
0.017 (0.002) 
0.343 (0.042) 
-0.078 (0.283) 
0.377 (0.305) 
0.699 (0.859) 
-0.369 (1.167) 
0.735 (0.390) 
1.201 (1.047) 
0.460 (0.456) 
0.350 (1.157) 
1.063 (0.668) 
2.134 (0.877) 
1.146 10.611\ 
LOS -0.481 (0.048) 
LOS squared O.o15 (0.002) 
Charlson index 0.436 (0.051) 
City(patient) -0.699 (0.279) 
Emergency 0.870 (0.391) 
9047 -0.214 (0.386) 
9061 1.692 (1.497) 
9092 -0.250 (0.450) 
9128 0.518 (0.954) 
9148 -0.882 (1.120) 
9301 0.796 {1.504) 
9359 -0.470 (0.820) 
9360 -0.876 (1.081) 
9389 -0.788 (0.901) 
9414 -1.219 (1.130) 
l 9461 2.343 (1.791) 
19537 0.964 (0.869) 
9544 -0.568 (0.699) 
I 9562 -0.722 (1.529) 
19592 -0.132 (0.506) 
9637 -0.280 (0.665) 
I 9700 -0.420 (0.824) 
9743 0.401 (0.791) 
9747 0.183 (0.369) 
9776 0.801 (1.034) 
9799 0.260 (0.930) 
9808 -0.214 (0.390) 
9823 1.183 (1.055) 
cons -9.446 (2.9751 
2002 
age 0.021 (0.070) 
I age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
I male -0.078 (0.154) 
. LOS -0.393 (0.044) 
' LOS squared 0.012 (0.002) 
Charlson index 0.537 (0.046) 
City(patient) -0.410 (0.254) I Emergency 0.545 (0.326) 
9027 0.851 (0.984) 
9047 0.064 (0.420) 
9092 -0.046 (0.495) 
9128 -0.287 (1.158) 
9148 -0.212 (0.842) 
9164 0.726 (0.976) 
9257 3.034 (1.416) 
; 9301 0.605 (1.238) 
I 9353 1.060 1.253 
249 
9360 0.530 (0.644) 9358 3.176 (1.885) 
19444 2.281 (0.880) 9359 -0.782 (0.810) 
9478 1.479 (0.968) 9360 0.272 (0.713) 
9510 2.909 (1.294) 9389 0.148 (0.743) 
9516 3.309 (1.393) 9478 1.()61 (1.261) 
9537 °"534 (1.237) 9518 1.304 (1.405) 
9544 0.678 (0.593) 9528 1.470 (0.999) 
9562 2.252 (1.229) 9537 -0.321 (1.196) 
9570 1.538 (0.614) 9544 0.234 (0.594) 
9592 0.480 (0.511) 9562 2.127 (1.001) 
9637 -0.305 (1.168) 9570 -0.856 (0.800) 
9700 0.327 (0.878) 9592 0.375 (0.504) 
9747 0.266 (0.397) 9637 0.383 (0.685) 
9748 2.104 (0.878) ' 9700 -1.311 (1.181) 
9808 0.551 (0.394) l 9743 -0.371 (0.859) 
9823 1.221 (1.141) l 9747 0.066 (0.406) 
_cons -9.237 (2.753) 19748 0.459 (1.243) 
9776 1.381 (0.697) 
9808 0.459 (0.413) 
9823 0.688 (1.184) 
_cons -6.466 (2.565) 
2003 2004 
age 0.209 (0.083) age 0 013 (0.068) 
age squared -0.001 (0.001) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male,, 
-0.024 (0.160) male -0.215 (0. 158) 
LOS -0.415 (0.044) LOS -0.435 (0.049) 
LOS squared 0.014 (0.002) LOS squared 0.014 (0.002) 
Charlson index 0.380 (0.044) Charlson index 0.372 (0.040) 
City(palient) -0.061 (0.274) City(patient) -0.466 (0.242) 
Emergency 1.094 (0.383) Emergency 0.621 (0.317) 
9020 0.606 (0.863) 9020 0.547 (0.957) 
9027 2.071 (1.012) 9047 0.567 (0.556) 
9047 0.247 (0.480) 9067 1.197 (1.023) 
9067 1.155 (1.363) 9072 1.701 (1.074) 
9092 0.151 (0.539) 9092 0.421 (0.599) 
9128 0.691 (0.949) 9128 0.412 (0.987) 
9146 1.189 {0.742) 9148 0.755 (0.838) 
9301 0.665 (0.934) 9301 -0.174 (1.286) 
9356 1.444 (1.427) 9353 0.972 (1.278) 
9359 -0.964 (0.902) 9359 -0.563 (0.797) 
9360 0.144 (0.651) 9360 -1.288 (1.140) 
9389 -0.433 (0.802) 9381 0.463 (1.209) 
9414 1.041 (1.321) 9389 0.136 (0.774) 
9537 0.420 (0.947) 9444 0.174 (1.008) 
9544 0.269 (0.633) 9484 3.079 (1.275) 
9570 0.587 (0.843) 9528 1.682 (1.237) 
9592 0.089 (0.583) 9537 0.225 (1.012) 
9637 0.966 (0.695) 9544 -0.063 (0.696) 
9700 -0.725 (1.011) 9562 0.768 (1.300) 
9743 0.663 10.662\ 9570 -0.213 (1.176) 
250 
19747 -0.312 (0.477) 9592 -0.279 (0,688) 
9748 3.574 (1.315) 9637 -1.317 (U89) 
9776 -0.808 (1.135) i 9743 -0. 110 (0.825) 
9808 0.149 (0-480) I 9747 0.192 (0.547) 
9823 0.962 (1.239~ 9748 -(1733 (1.211) 
_cons -13.733 (3.131) 9776 0.032 (0.773) 
L 9799 O.o20 (1.328) 
9808 0.290 (0.555) 
I _cons -5.872 (2.576) 
Heart F allu~ mortality: 
1995 1996 
~--
(0.077) I age -0.018 (0.076) l age -0.003 
age squared 0.000 (0.001) I age squared 0.000 (o.001i I 
male 0.282 (0.142) 1 male 0.013 (0.144) 
LOS -0.177 (0.033) I LOS -0.229 (0.034) 
LOS squared 0.007 (0.001) I LOS squared 0.008 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.240 (0.038) J Charlson Index 0270 (0.041) 
Clty(patient) -0.529 (0.326) I City(patient) -0.602 (0.338) 
Emergency 0.103 (0.235) Emergency -0.124 (0.250) 
9020 -0.575 (0.608) 19020 0.234 (0,702) 
9027 0.098 (0.586) 19022 1.437 (1.252) 
9047 -0.216 (0.439) 9027 0.453 (0.718) 
9063 2.086 (1.523) ' 9047 0.476 (0.501) 
9072 0.163 (1.177) 9067 0.693 (1.298) I 
9148 -0.341 (0.587) 9072 0.182 (1.185) 
9163 -0.817 (1.158) 9092 -0.015 (0.872) I 
9164 -0.319 (1.173) 9128 0.446 (0,970) 
9196 0.931 (1,226) 9148 0.096 (o.?oo) I 
9206 ·0,070 (1.171) 9163 0.068 (1.197) ! 
9257 0.541 (1.206) 9206 0.943 (1,174) 
9301 -0.172 (1.158) 9353 0.680 (0.773) I 
9353 ·1.190 (1.138) 9359 -0.291 (0.699) ' 
9359 -0.347 (0.611) 9360 -0.140 I (1.140) I 
9389 -0.848 (0.685) 9389 0.157 (0.725) I 
9414 -0.770 (1.145) 9414 0,933 (o.833) I 
9459 -0.678 (0.712) 9444 0.993 (0.848) 1 
9516 0.468 (0.673) 9461 2.163 (0.865) l 
9523 -1.181 (1.142) 9478 0.747 (0.828) I 
9537 -1.096 (0.727) 9528 0.306 (0.945) 
9542 -0.042 (0.676) 9537 -0,362 (0.823) I 
9544 -0.547 (0.662) 9542 0.218 (0 745) 
9562 -0.008 (0.648) 9544 -0.788 (0.813) I 
9570 0.029 (0.528) 9562 1.047 (0.671) 
9592 0.342 (0.473) 9570 0.019 (0.674) ' 
9637 -0.655 (0.726) 9577 1.967 (1.012) I 
9658 0.637 (0.564) 9592 1.277 (0.529) 
' 9700 -0.408 (0,661) 9637 0.100 (0.727) I 
9735 1.753 (1.621) 9658 0,412 (0.668) 
9737 1.630 (1.364) 9700 -0,224 (0.762) ' 
9747 -0.443 10.4201 9747 0,237 co.493) I 
251 
9752 1.449 (0.843) 9748 -0.528 (1.169) I 
9776 -0.279 (0.590) 9752 0.288 (0.932) i 
9799 -0.430 (0.917) 9776 0.379 (0.6ssi I 
9808 0.384 (0.413) 9799 0.031 (0.831) 
9823 1.346 (0.980) 9808 0.676 (0.499) 
9827 0.074 (1.130) 9823 1.152 (0.962) 
_cons -3.515 (2.873) -3.937 (2.910) 
1997 1998 
age -0.026 (0.068) age 0.115 (0.080) 
age squared 0.001 (0.000) I age squared 0.000 (0.001) 
male 0.148 (0.134) I male 0.036 (0.133) 
LOS -0.172 (0.032) I LOS -0.183 (0.032) 
LOS squared 0.007 (0.001) ' LOS squared 0.007 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.311 (0.037) Charlson index 0.263 (0.037) 
City(patient) 0.363 (0.436) City(patient) -0.271 (0.356) 
Emergency 0.046 (0.237) Emergency ·D.153 (0.193) 
9020 -0.344 (0.619) 9020 -0.186 (0.762) 
9027 0.767 (0.542) 9027 1.344 (0.650) 
9047 -0.275 (0.392) 19047 0.486 (0.501) 
9067 1.057 (1.270) I 9o63 1.557 (1.316) 
9092 -1.390 (1.073) 9067 1.219 (1.276) 
9128 1.366 (0.734) 9072 0.409 (0.954) 
9148 0.567 (0.481) 9092 ·0.184 (0.598) 
9164 0.505 (0.926) 9128 -0.240 (0.945) 
9206 0.388 (1.110) 9148 0.418 (0.582) 
9353 1.186 (0.729) 9163 -0.705 (1.186) 
9359 1.097 (0.603) 9301 -0.361 (0.938) 
9360 -0.459 (0.809) 9353 0.512 (0.801) 
9381 1.101 (1.279) 9359 0.622 (0.642) 
9389 0.172 (0.921) 9360 -0.057 (0.771) 
9414 -0.207 (1.171) 9389 -0.101 (0.949) 
9444 -0.107 (1.167) 9414 -0.375 (1.187) 
9516 -0.440 (1.121) 9444 0.114 (0.973) 
9528 0.274 (1.186) 9478 1.466 (0.929) 
9537 1.381 (0.712) 9516 0.040 (0.895) 
9542 0.163 (0.679) 9523 -0.013 (1.204) 
9544 -0.041 (0.700) 9528 -0.237 (0.952) 
9562 0.289 (0.601) 9537 -0.940 (1.191) 
9570 -0.557 (0.592) 9542 0.358 (0.681) 
9592 -0.039 (0.444) 9544 0.109 (0.727) 
9637 0.839 (0.656) 9562 1.100 (0.619) 
9658 0.035 (0.536) 9570 0.398 (0.613) 
9700 0.291 (0.806) 9592 0.299 (0.537) 
9747 0.089 (0.361) 9637 -0.427 (0.841) 
9748 0.845 (0.926) 9700 0.159 (0.756) 
9752 0.745 (0.916) 9743 0.151 (0.634) 
9776 -0.860 (0.694) 9747 0.218 (0.489) 
9799 0.943 {0.775) 9748 0.704 (0.959) 
9808 -0.146 (0.386) 9752 0.528 (0.957) 
9823 0.967 !0.9491 9760 1.149 1.221 
252 
I -cons -4.145 (2.567) 9776 -0.731 (0871) 
9799 0.778 (0.806) 
9808 -0.190 (0.502) 
9823 0.847 (1.204) 
_cons -8.970 (3.101) 
1999 2000 
age 0.012 (0.078) age -0.088 (0.070) 
age squared 0.000 (0.001) age squared 0.001 (0.000) 
male -0.154 (0.144) male -0.017 (0.154) 
LOS -0.153 (0.035) LOS -0.215 (0.038) 
LOS squared 0.005 (0.001) j LOS squared 0.008 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.300 (0.039) Charlson index 0.347 (0.044) 
City(patient) 0.640 (0.416) City(patient) 0.027 (0.353) 
Emergency -0.425 (0.237) Emergency -1.092 (0.231) 
9020 -0.071 (0.666) 9020 0.791 (0.714) 
9027 0.356 (0.776) I 9022 0.420 (1.211) 
9047 -0.276 (0.470) I 9021 -0.823 (1.154) 
9092 -0.249 (0.529) 9047 -0.015 (0.590) 
9148 0.366 (0.563) 9007 1.605 (1.326) 
9164 1.221 (0.957) 9072 1.001 (0.890) 
9301 1.021 (0.939) I so92 0.716 (0.567) 
9353 1.028 (0.779) 19128 1.611 (0.846) 
9359 1.007 (0.679) , 9148 0.443 (0.653) 
9360 -0.147 (0.670) 9164 0.600 (1.237) 
9381 1.912 (1.337) 9301 0.904 (1.217) 
9389 0.864 (0.721) 9353 1.015 (0.985) 
9444 1.562 (0.882) 9359 1130 (0.708) 
9478 0657 (1.180) 9360 -1.181 (0.905) 
9516 -0.054 (0.772) 9389 1.028 (0.798) 
9528 0.775 (0.966) 9444 1.114 (1.009) 
9537 0.531 (0.939) 9461 3.013 (1.530) 
9542 -0.194 (0.852) 9478 0.730 (1.369) 
9544 0.011 (0.827) 9516 -0.572 (1.183) 
9562 -0.006 (0.652) ' 9528 ..{}.112 (0.995) 
9570 -0.854 (0.841) 9537 -0.094 (1.221) 
9577 2.601 (1.421) 9544 -0.167 (0.875) 
9592 0.382 (0.466) ! 9562 -0.963 (1.157) 
9637 0.627 (0.785) I 9570 0.803 (0.699) 
9700 1.722 (0.693) 9592 1.018 (0.582) 
9743 0.953 (0.544) 9637 1.039 (0.774) 
9747 0.034 (0.434) 9700 0.600 (0.773) 
9748 0.156 (1.189) ' 9743 1.073 (0.632) 
I 
9776 0.180 (0.576) ' 9747 0.271 (0.561) 
9799 -0.058 (1.177) 9748 0.373 (1.214) 
9808 -0.245 (0.448) 9776 0.530 (0.718) 
_cons -5.256 (2.971) 9799 0.869 (1.019) 
9808 0.498 (0.566) 
-
cons -0.463 (2.682) 
253 
2000 2002 
age 0.178 (0.103) age 0.019 (0.079) 
age squared -0.001 (0.001) age squared 0.000 (0.001) 
male 0.119 (0.149) male 0.053 (0.140) 
LOS -0.047 (0.035) LOS -0.165 (0.035) 
LOS squared 0.003 (0.001) LOS squared 0.006 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.235 (0.041) Charlson index 0.306 (0.038) 
City(patient) 0.019 (0.388) City(patient) -0.169 (0.368) 
Emergency -0.885 (0.249) Emergency -0.196 (0.248) 
9022 0.972 (0.885) 9020 0.240 (0.608) 
9027 -0.674 (0.712) 9022 0.100 (1.171) 
9047 0.293 (0.518) 9027 -0.364 (0.613) 
9072 1.054 (0.889) 9047 0.081 (0.467) 
9092 -0.177 (0.557) 9067 0.079 (1.210) 
9148 -0.780 (0.726) 9072 0.110 (0.931) 
9164 1.384 (1.312) 9092 0.129 (0.495) 
9206 0.029 (0.846) 9128 0.148 (0.926) 
9353 0.373 (0.971) 9148 -0.464 (0.707) 
9359 0.233 (0.706) 9164 0.075 (1.211) 
9360 -0.984 (0.723) 9206 0.786 (1.174) 
9389 0.661 (0. 788) 9257 1.524 (1.270) 
9414 0.574 (1.208) 9301 -0.532 (1.155) 
9444 -0.890 (1.224) 9353 -0.774 (1.167) 
9478 1.120 (1.238) 9359 0.110 (0.666) 
9516 0.051 (0.747) 9360 -0.113 (0. 755) 
9528 -1.516 (1.242) 9389 -0.940 (1.167) 
9537 0.728 (0.876) 9414 -0.324 (1.181) 
9544 -0.333 (0.864) 9444 0.575 (0.778) 
9562 0.280 (0.808) 9510 2.025 (1.253) 
9570 0.916 (0.614) 9516 0.619 (0.737) 
9592 0.650 (0.536) 9528 -0.549 (0.958) 
9637 0.321 (0.779) 9537 1.369 (0.887) 
9700 1.010 (0.749) 9542 0.342 (0.894) 
9734 -0.265 (1.170) 9544 -0.875 (0.815) 
9743 -0.074 (0.640) 9562 1.384 (0.814) 
9747 0.315 (0.504) 9570 -1.285 (1.100) 
9748 0.394 (0.978) 9592 0.422 (0.487) 
9776 -0.301 (0.667) 9637 0.373 (0.712) 
9808 0.232 (0.515) 9700 0.654 (0.781) 
9823 1.175 (1.261) 9743 0.238 (0.525) 
_cons -11.893 (4.088) 9747 0.166 (0.452) 
9748 -0.605 (1.180) 
9776 0.025 (0.646) 
9799 -0.878 (1.187) 
9808 0.163 (0.455) 
9818 1.703 (1.046) 
9827 1.469 (0.881) 
_cons -5.630 (3.085) 
2003 2004 
I age -0.088 (0.077) I age 0.030 (0.091) 
254 
age squared 0.001 (0.001) I age squared 0.000 (0.001) 
male -0.034 (0.148) I male -0.222 (0.158) 
LOS -0.108 (0.034) LOS -0.089 (0036) 
LOS squared 0.004 (0.001) ' LOS squared 0.004 (0.001) 
Chartson index 0.343 (0.037) Charlson index 0.286 (0.037) 
City(patient) -0.512 (0.338) Clty(patient) 0.538 (0.490) 
Emergency -0.306 (0.231) Emergency -0.208 (0.247) 
9020 0.167 (0.704) 9020 -0.385 (0.791) 
9022 0.039 (1.203) '9022 1.849 (0.854) 
9027 0.072 (0.718) 9027 1.971 (0.780) 
9047 0.599 (0.512) 9047 1.069 (0.567) 
9067 2.042 (1.133) I 9063 1.516 (0.980) 
9092 0.485 (0.527) 19067 2.962 (1.338) 
9128 -OA06 (1.182) I 9092 0.438 (0.597) 
9148 0.573 (0.618) ! 9128 1.522 (1.275) 
9257 1.006 (1.215) 19148 -0.208 (0.819) 
9353 0.193 (0.850) 9164 3.111 (1.125) 
9359 0.468 (0.662) 19301 1.786 (1.009) 
9389 0.461 (0.704) 9353 2.204 (0.860) 
9414 0.592 (1.197) 19359 1.380 (0.830) 
9444 0.895 (0.869) 9360 -0.277 (0.910) 
9484 2.492 (1.410) 9381 2.639 (1.360) 
9510 2.407 (1.301) 9389 1.626 (0,820) 
9516 0.468 (0.740) 9414 1.779 (1.261) 
9528 -1.018 (0.949) 9444 1.196 (1.255) 
9537 0.272 (0.873) 9461 0.843 (1,195) 
9544 0.246 (0.677) 9516 -0.457 (1.194) 
9562 1.660 (0,769) 19528 1,679 (0.901) 
9570 0.416 (0.712) 9537 1.869 (1.055) 
9592 0.258 (0.551) 9542 0,680 (1.177) 
9637 -0.287 (0,924) 9544 1.122 (0.878) 
I 97QQ 
-0.306 (0,931) i 9562 1.454 (0.697) 
9743 0.928 (0.561) 19570 1.173 (0.639) 
9747 -0.169 (0.507) 9592 0.632 (0.591) 
9748 0.495 (0.944) i 9837 0.446 (1,239) 
9776 0.460 (0,619) 19700 1.548 (0.920) 
9799 0.150 (0.801) I 9743 0.468 (0.697) 
9808 0.273 (0.504) 19747 0.446 (0.547) 
_cons -1.713 (2.939) 19748 1.753 (1.307) 
9776 -0.236 (0.786) 
19799 1.460 (0.906) 
9808 0.440 (0.561) 
_cons -7.408 (3.562) 
StrQke mg£.ill!fty 
1995 1996 
age -0.060 (0.053) age 0.008 (0.053) 
age squared 0.001 (0.000) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male -0.097 10.1251 male -0.224 10.1151 
255 
LOS -0.229 (0.029) LOS -0.210 (0.026) 
LOS squared 0.006 (0.001) LOS squared 0.006 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.190 (0.041) Charlson index 0.215 (0.036) 
Cily(pallent) -0.068 (0.237) City( patient) -0.149 (0.225) 
Emergency 2.272 (0.288) Emergency 1.717 (0.216) 
9020 0.719 (0.530) 9020 0.300 (0.457) 
9027 0.753 (0.675) 9027 2.037 (0.688) 
9047 0.958 (0.359) 9047 -0.148 (0.345) 
9128 -0.547 (0.893) 9072 0.115 (0.750) 
9148 -0.843 (0.614) 9092 -0.888 (0.806) 
9163 -0.674 (1.139) 9128 0.172 (0.788) 
9164 -0.323 (1.149) 9148 -0.734 (0.557) 
9206 2.433 (1.197) 9163 -1.565 (1.112) 
9359 -0.453 (0.627) 9164 0.330 (0.692) 
9389 -0.787 (0.719) 9196 0.508 (1.208) 
9444 -0.139 (0.859) 9206 2.351 (0.914) 
9459 0.121 (0.536) 9301 -1.161 (1.099) 
9478 1.399 (1.208) 9359 -0.250 (0.498) 
9523 -0.740 (1.142) 9389 -2.123 (1.084) 
9528 1.607 (0.970) 9444 -0.801 (0.861) 
9537 1.158 (0.821) 9459 -0.148 (0.820) 
9542 1.748 (0.898) 9461 2.633 (1.231) 
9544 -0.351 (0.595) 9478 1.045 (0.840) 
9562 1.274 (0.852) 9516 1.585 (0.659) 
9570 -0.324 (0.587) 9523 -0.816 (0.858) 
9592 -0.205 (0.501) 9537 -0.265 (0.636) 
9637 0.011 (0.669) 9544 0.978 (0.487) 
9658 0.215 (0.742) 9562 2.175 (0.532) 
9700 0.745 (0.616) 9570 -1.035 (0.613) 
9747 0.516 (0.351) 9592 0.145 (0.407) 
9748 0.538 (0.765) 9637 -0.678 (0.841) 
9752 1.343 (0.678) 9658 -0.195 (0.497) 
9776 0.717 (0.579) 9700 -0.168 (0.656) 
9808 0.672 (0.353) 9747 0.354 (0.320) 
9827 2.810 (1.164) 9748 -0.238 (0.859) 
_cons -3.209 (1.888) 9752 0.191 (0.671) 
9776 ·0.304 (0.584) 
9799 -0.621 (0.723) 
9808 0.496 (0.322) 
9823 -0.645 (0.879) 
_cons -5.045 (1.946) 
1997 1998 
age -0.168 (0.050) age -0.092 (0.053) 
age squared 0.002 (0.000) age squared 0.001 {0000) 
male -0.019 (0.124) male -0.189 (0.119) 
LOS -0.155 (0.029) LOS -0.240 (0.029) 
LOS squared 0.003 (0.001) LOS squared 0.007 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.301 (0.036) Chartsonindex 0.202 (0.035) 
City(patienQ -0.237 (0.209) City(patient) -0.063 (0.237) 
Erne 0.200 Emernenr.v 1.048 I0.1841 
256 
9020 1.184 (0.575) I 9020 0.221 (0.626) 
9027 2.009 (0.922) 9027 1.425 (0.948) 
9047 1.257 (0.495) 9047 1.038 (0.459) 
9081 3.189 (1.433) 9061 2.279 (1.000) 
9072 0.238 (1.176) 19067 0.723 (1.165) 
9092 0.122 (0.715) I 9012 0.129 (0.898) 
9128 0.778 (0.812) ; 9092 0.889 (0.503) 
9148 0.536 (0.637) 19128 0.864 (0.811) 
9163 -0.565 (1.184) 9148 -0.441 (0.733) 
9164 0.239 (1.203) l 9163 .-0.262 (1.161) 
9353 -0.563 (1.194) 9164 0.098 (1.174) 
9359 0.346 (0.655) 9301 0.910 (0.854) 
9360 1.338 (0.883) 9353 0.568 (0.913) 
9389 1.210 (0.630) I 9359 0.940 (0.595) 
9444 -0.298 (1.160) 19360 0.371 (1.111) 
9516 1.976 (0.912) 9381 1.687 (1.228) 
9537 0.094 (1.156) I 9389 1.423 (0.595) 
9544 1.403 (0.626) 19444 -0.226 (1.161) 
9562 0.928 (1.146) I 9516 1.611 (0.779) 
9570 -0.220 (0.775) I 9537 0.345 (0.897) 
9592 0.543 (0.668) 19542 0.669 (1.232) 
9637 0.668 (0.751) '9544 0.776 (0.661) 
9658 .-0,541 (0.888) 9562 0.961 (0.784) 
9700 0.877 (0.703) 9570 0.691 (0.584) 
9747 1.554 (0.481) 9592 0.628 (0.526) 
9748 0.077 (1.191) 9637 0.041 (0.772) 
9752 0.855 (0.820) 19700 0.427 (0.664) 
9776 1.355 (0.601) 9743 0.603 (0.601) 
9799 0.099 (0.921) I 9141 1.240 (0.446) 
9808 1.338 (0.486) 19748 2.408 (0.852) 
9827 3.132 (1.230) I 9752 2.172 (0.884) 
-
cons -0.135 (1.838) 19760 2.008 (1.310) 
9776 0.107 (0.694) 
; 9799 0.561 (0.792) 
9808 1.022 (0.450) 
9827 0.916 (1.152) 
_cons -1.958 (1.939) 
1999 2000 
age -0.093 (0.048) age -0.158 (0.049) 
age squared 0.001 (0.000) , age squared 0.001 (0.000) 
male -0.271 (0.121) male .-0.188 (0.125) 
LOS -0.198 (0.029) LOS -0.192 (0.030) 
LOS squared 0.005 (0.001) LOS squared 0.005 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.210 (0.037) Charlson index 0.342 (0.035) 
C~y(patient) -0.249 (0.225) City(patient) -0.319 (0.221) 
Emergency 1.733 (0.271) Emergency 1.043 (0.242) 
19020 -0.501 (0.680) 9020 -0.111 (1.349) 
9027 1.239 (0.820) 9022 3.581 {1.479) 
I 
9047 1.011 (0.462) 9027 1.399 (1.376) 
9067 1.153 (0.935) 9047 2.433 (0.904) 
9072 -0.133 (Q,899) 9072 2.376 1.080 
257 
9092 0.466 (0.501) 9092 1.926 (0.922) 
9128 1.424 (0.840) 9128 0.789 (1.399) 
9148 0.220 (0.818) I 9148 1.981 (1.013) 
9163 ·0.819 (1.142) 9163 1.107 (1.406) 
9164 0.451 (1.175) 9164 1.756 (1.395) 
9301 ..Q.288 (1.148) 9206 3.210 (1.429) 
9353 ..Q.951 (1.145) 9257 2.140 (1.247) 
9359 0.616 (0.594) 9301 2.784 (1.128) 
9380 0.438 (0.755) 9353 2.630 (1.135) 
9389 ..Q.022 (0.640) 9359 1.849 (0.970) 
9478 0.994 (1.212) 9380 2.074 (1.045) 
9516 1.111 (1.158) 9389 1.884 (0.976) 
9544 0.188 (0.662) ' 9414 1.639 (1.384) 
9562 0.312 (0.889) l 9444 1.471 (1.188) 
9570 -0.297 (0.666) l 9461 3.703 (1.409) 
' 9592 0.208 (0.510) l 9476 2.464 (1.239) 
' 9637 0.248 (0.691) 9516 2.677 (1.408) 
9700 0.301 (0.717) 9528 3.162 (1.122) 
9743 ·0.145 (0.591) 9542 2.320 (1.614) 
9747 1.029 (0.451) 9544 2.044 (1.009) 
9776 ·0.107 (0.648) 9562 2.402 (1.100) 
9799 ..Q.205 (0.891) 9570 1.971 (0.954) 
9808 0.901 (0.451) '9577 3.002 (1.454) 
9823 0.886 (0.925) I 9592 1.402 (0.936) 
' 
_cons -2.045 (1.785) i 9637 1.938 (1.028) 
! 9700 1.149 (1.103) 
9743 1.781 (0.948) 
9747 2.401 (0.897) 
9748 1.313 (1.396) 
9776 1.381 (0.996) 
9799 0.890 (1.103) 
9808 2.250 (0.899) 
9823 1.697 (1.398) 
-
cons -1.357 (1.968) 
2001 I age -0.119 (0.047) I age ·0.121 (0.047) 
I age squared 0.001 (0.000) ! age squared 0.001 (0000) 
! male ·0.181 (0.119) ! male -0.174 (0.117) 
LOS ..Q.092 (0.027) 1 LOS ·0.114 (0.028) 
LOS squared 0.003 (0.001) l LOS squared 0.003 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.239 (0.035) l Charlson index 0.338 (0.034) 
City(patient) 0.355 (0.237) I City(patient) -0.323 (0.219) ! I Emergency 0.290 (0.203) Emergency 0.846 (0.217) 
l 9020 0.285 (0.425) 9020 0.387 (0.625) 
9022 1.653 (1.284) 9022 1.632 (1.216) 
9027 ..Q.420 (0.637) 9027 -1.053 (0.884) 
9030 -1.574 (0.744) 9047 0.383 (0.508) 
9067 0829 (0.820) 9072 ..Q.147 (0.923) 
9072 1.403 (0.589) 9092 0.352 (0.528) 
9092 0.183 0.268 9128 2.153 1.029 
258 
r--
9148 -0.608 (0.574) 9148 0.754 (0.656) 
9164 2.260 (0.968) 9164 0.832 (0.886) 
9206 0.303 (1.140) 9206 2.313 (1.320) 
9257 1.525 (0.855) 9257 0.987 (1.279) 
9353 1.007 (0.625) 9353 0.917 (0.752) 
9359 0.262 (0.456) 9359 -0.234 (0.622) 
9360 -1.236 (0.754) 9360 0059 (0.777) 
9389 0.878 (0.522) 9381 1.730 (1.029) 
9414 0.444 (0.789) 9389 -0.501 (0.707) 
9444 -0.577 (1.064) 9414 -0.825 (1.175) 
9478 0.001 (1.134) 9444 -1.060 (1.158) 
9516 0.340 (0.814) 9516 -0.223 (1.162) 
9528 0.005 (0.824) 9528 1.166 (0.787) 
9537 0.581 (0.608) 9537 0.301 (0.774) 
9544 0.521 (0.444) 9544 -1.787 (0.888) 
9562 0.016 (0.585) 9562 0.723 (0.833) 
9570 -0.668 (0.629) 9570 -1.181 (0.882) 
9592 -0.920 (0.388) 9592 -0.090 (0.552) 
9637 -1.209 (1.064) 9637 -0.118 (0.724) 
9700 -0.546 (0.783) 9700 -0.216 (0.737) 
9743 0.464 (0.306) I 9743 -0.011 (0.590) 
9747 0.335 (0.210) 9747 0.508 (0.498) 
9748 -0.646 (1.067) 9748 -0.706 (1.198) 
9776 -0.817 (0.547) 9776 -0.136 (0.622) 
9799 0.590 (0.821) 9799 -0.051 (0.829) 
9808 0.508 (0.206) 9808 0.389 (0.500) 
9823 0.482 (0.809) 9818 1.734 (1.365) 
_cons -0.347 (1.672) 9823 0.909 (0.772) 
9827 0.227 (1.188) 
i 
_cons -0.960 (1.750) 
2003 2004 
age -0.111 (0.043) 
1 
age -0056 (0.052) 
age squared 0.001 (0.000) age squared 0.001 (0.000) 
male -0.048 (0.116) male -0.186 (0.126) 
LOS -0.135 (0.028) LOS -0.191 (0.030) 
LOS squared 0.003 (0.001) LOS squared 0.005 (0.001) 
Charlson index 0.267 (0.032) Charlson index 0.287 (0.036) 
City(palient) -0.399 (0.200) i City(patient) O.D78 (0.241) 
Emergency 0.890 (0.195) Emergency 0.661 (0.205) 
9020 1.688 (0.589) 9020 16.455 (1.951) 
9027 0.281 (0.917) . 9022 18.092 (2.201) 
9047 0.705 (0.552) 19027 17.035 (1.977) 
i 9067 0.482 (1.214) I 9041 17.099 (1.912) 
19072 0.506 (0.847) ' 9072 16.876 (2.056) 
9092 0.602 (0.569) 9092 16.774 (1.920) 
19148 0.904 (0.754) 9148 16.936 (1.975) 
' 9164 0.744 {1.223) 9164 17.285 (2.066) 
l 9206 2.214 (1.277) 9301 17.255 (2.206) 
9301 1.035 (0.953) 9353 17.073 (2.052) 
9353 1.105 (0.783) 9358 17.256 (2.069) 
9358 1.499 (0.943) 9359 16.207 1.943 
259 
9359 0.242 (0.657) 9389 15.757 (2.037) 
9389 0.308 (0.771) 9398 16.842 (2.106) 
9444 0.655 (0.842) 9414 16.180 (2.146) 
9478 0.477 (1.194) 9444 16.092 (2.178) 
9484 0.583 (1.209) 9461 17.693 (2.228) 
9516 1.144 (1.183) 9516 16.685 (1.992) 
9528 1.195 (0.845) 9537 17.712 (1.994) 
9537 0.827 (0.855) 9544 16.899 (1.943) 
9544 0.768 (0.648) 9570 16.585 (1.953) 
9562 1.522 (0.847) 9592 16.154 (1.931) 
9570 1.174 (0.658) 9637 16.619 (1.975) 
9592 1.148 (0.579) 9700 15.843 (2.138) 
9637 0.154 (0.765) 9743 16.786 (1.932) 
9700 0.350 (0.765) 9747 17.155 (1.893) 
9743 0.951 (0.596) 9748 15.837 (2.214) 
9747 1.375 (0.530) 9776 17.069 (1.911) 
9776 0.367 (0.630) 9799 17.294 (2.035) 
9799 1.027 (0.947) 9808 16.865 (1.898) 
9808 1.282 (0.535) cons -19.405 
-
9823 -0.291 (1.184) 
_cons -1.215 (1.620) 
30 da}'. (;!Ost-discharge mortalitl'. 
1995 1996 
age 0.036 (0.014) age -0.001 (0.013) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.264 (0.038) male 0.315 (0.037) 
LOS 0.083 (0.009) LOS 0.104 (0.008) 
LOS squared -0.002 (0.000) LOS squared -0.003 (0.000) 
Charlson index 0.364 (0.007) Charlson index 0.342 (0.006) 
City(patient) 0.034 (0.070) City(patient) 0.120 (0.069) 
Emergency 0.537 (0.044) Emergency 0.384 (0.042) 
9020 0.920 (0.179) 9020 0.751 (0.179) 
9022 -0.003 (0.303) 9022 -0.012 (0.290) 
9027 -0.083 (0.201) 9027 0.664 (0.162) 
9047 0.557 (0.131) 9047 0.575 (0.119) 
9060 -0.941 (1.008) 9060 0.154 (0.589) 
9061 -1.562 (1.009) 9061 0.505 (0.396) 
9063 -0.224 (0.183) 9063 -0.284 (0.184) 
9072 0.757 (0.325) 9067 -0.165 (0.724) 
9128 1.068 (0.255) 9072 0.136 (0.433) 
9148 0.104 (0.147) 9092 0.763 (0.226) 
9152 0.341 (0.591) 9128 0.929 (0.272) 
9163 -0.159 (0.478) 9148 0.069 (0.138) 
9164 0.605 (0.368) 9152 -0.945 (1.007) 
9196 0.464 (0.430) 9163 0.283 (0.405) 
9206 0.719 (0.306) 9164 0.519 (0.404) 
9257 1.417 (0.327) 9196 0.375 (0.515) 
9301 0.956 (0.282) 9206 0.485 (0.324) 
9353 0.422 (0.282) 9257 1.719 (0.277) 
9359 0.583 (0.184) 9301 1.073 (0.272) 
9360 0.692 10.160\ 9353 0.895 10.241 \ 
260 
9381 0.418 (0.521) 9359 0.765 (0.170) 
9389 0.475 (0.240) i 9360 0.212 (0.150) 
9398 -0.509 (1.012) 9381 0.219 (0.596) 
9414 1.318 (0.254) 9389 1.123 (0.197) 
9444 0.296 (0.304) 9398 0.641 (0.601) 
9459 0.645 (0.214) 9414 1.574 (0.246) 
9461 0.066 (0.254) 9444 0.768 (0.259) 
9478 0.853 (0.314) 9459 1.192 (0.242) 
i 9510 1.288 (0.526) 9461 -0.046 (0.255) I 9516 0.453 (0.232) 9478 1.331 (0.265) 
I 9523 -0.240 (0.524) 9510 0.033 (1.012) 
' 9528 0.394 (0.307) 9516 -0.036 (0.262) 
9537 0.931 (0.240) 9523 -0.002 (0.524) 
9539 0.842 (0.468) i 9528 1.060 (0.242) 
19542 0.677 (0.194) 9537 0.936 (0.232) 
I 9544 0.225 (0.217) 9539 1.020 (0.404) 
19562 1.104 
(0.196) 9542 0.455 (0.194) 
9570 0.275 (0.185) 19544 0.090 (0.214) 
' 9592 -0.084 (0.147) I 9562 0.396 (0.225) 
' 9637 0.630 (0.205) 9570 0.343 (0.166) 
9651 -0.288 (0.723) 9577 1.543 (0.438) 
9658 1.419 (0. 182) 9592 0.061 (0. 133) 
9686 -0.541 (0.591) 9637 0.729 (0.198) 
j 9700 0.631 (0.200) 9651 0.489 (0.469) 
19734 0.452 (0.453) 9658 0.767 (0.197) 
9735 -0.087 (0.296) 9700 0.165 (0.215) 
9737 0.015 (0.375) 9734 0.526 (0.411) 
9747 0.476 (0.124) 9735 -1.664 (0.525) 
9748 -0.315 (0.472) 9737 ·0.558 (0.462) 
i 9752 0.266 (0.306) 9747 0.447 (0.113) 
i 9760 0.699 (0.333) 9748 1.410 (0.244) 
19776 0.622 (0.196) '9752 0.686 (0.261) 
9799 0.075 (0.268) 9776 0.602 (0.182) 
9808 0.548 (0.125) 9799 0.098 (0.254) 
9818 0.447 (1.010) 9808 0.730 (0.113) 
9823 -0.044 (0.471) 9823 0.148 (0.431) 
9827 -0.471 (0.465) 19827 -0.448 (0.462) 
_corns -8.525 (0.480) -7.645 (0.457) _cons 
1997 1998 
I age -0.011 (0012)1 age 0.069 (0.013) 
, age squared 0.000 (0.000) I age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.198 (0.034) male 0.333 (0.035) 
LOS 0.086 (0.008) LOS 0.102 (0.006) 
LOS squared -0.002 (0.000) LOS squared -0.003 (0.000) 
Charlson index 0.346 (0.006) Charlson index 0.337 (0.006) 
City(patient} 0.119 (0.065) City(patient) 0.041 (0.068) j Emergency 0.423 (0.040) Emergency 0.575 (0.040) 
9016 -1.644 (1.005) 9016 -1.477 (1.006) 
9020 0.691 (0.162) 9020 0.820 (0.162) 
9022 -0.484 0.316 9022 -0.859 0.421 
261 
9027 
9047 
9060 
9061 
9063 
9067 
9072 
9092 
9128 
9148 
9163 
9164 
9196 
9206 
9257 
9301 
9353 
9359 
9360 
9366 
9381 
9389 
9398 
9414 
9444 
9461 
9478 
9510 
9516 
9523 
9528 
9537 
9539 
9542 
9544 
9562 
9570 
9577 
9592 
9637 
9651 
9658 
9686 
9700 
9734 
9735 
9737 
9747 
9748 
9752 
9760 
9776 
9799 
0.468 
0.515 
0.388 
-0.013 
-0.034 
0.548 
0.835 
0.400 
0.520 
0.011 
0.434 
0.432 
-1.044 
0.267 
-0.278 
0.745 
0.698 
0.619 
-0.120 
-0.678 
0.845 
0.689 
-0.930 
0.739 
0.401 
-0.545 
1.240 
1.020 
-0.181 
-0.034 
0.780 
0.679 
0.428 
0.487 
0.481 
0.672 
0.496 
1.084 
0.067 
0.715 
0.004 
0.953 
-1.289 
0.342 
0.375 
-0.035 
0.187 
0.579 
0.585 
0.772 
-0.423 
0.321 
-0.220 
(0.150) 
(0.104) 
(0.420) 
(0.422) 
(0.146) 
(0.433) 
(0.296) 
(0.172) 
(0.285) 
(0.125) 
(0.342) 
(0.376) 
(1.006) 
(0.319) 
(0.719) 
(0.259) 
(0.237) 
(0.162) 
(0.139) 
(1.005) 
(0.398) 
(0.201) 
(1.010) 
(0.271) 
(0.275) 
(0.284) 
(0.246) 
(0.518) 
(0.256) 
(0.517) 
(0.229) 
(0.218) 
(0.589) 
(0.175) 
(0.174) 
(0.187) 
(0.146) 
(0.469) 
(0.121) 
(0.179) 
(0.429) 
(0.169) 
(0.714) 
(0.169) 
(0.432) 
(0.258) 
(0.368) 
(0.098) 
(0.340) 
(0.231) 
(0.587) 
(0.173) 
10.253\ 
9027 
9047 
9060 
9061 
9063 
9067 
9072 
9092 
9128 
9148 
9152 
9163 
9164 
9196 
9206 
9257 
9301 
9353 
9359 
9360 
9381 
9389 
9398 
9414 
9444 
9461 
9478 
9510 
9516 
9523 
9528 
9537 
9542 
9544 
9562 
9570 
9592 
9637 
9651 
9686 
9700 
9734 
9735 
9743 
9747 
9748 
9752 
9760 
9776 
9799 
9808 
9818 
9823 
262 
-0.198 (0.200) 
0.188 (0.115) 
0.156 (0.511) 
0.863 (0.293) 
-0.454 (0.175) 
0.397 (0.435) 
0.258 (0.317) 
0.634 (0.129) 
0.757 (0.259) 
-0.145 (0.131) 
-0.743 (1.006) 
1.065 (0.259) 
1.029 (0.293) 
0.183 (0.597) 
0.777 (0.275) 
0.257 (0.519) 
0.074 (0.328) 
0.463 (0.274) 
0.305 (0.177) 
0.131 (0.147) 
-0.088 (0.594) 
0.866 (0.192) 
0.192 (0.616) 
0.862 (0.255) 
0.409 (0.285) 
0.323 (0.203) 
1.127 (0.255) 
1.067 (0.595) 
0.071 (0.265) 
0.807 (0.333) 
0.783 (0.224) 
0.135 (0.273) 
0.252 (0.186) 
0.580 (0.177) 
0.680 (0.199) 
0.451 (0.159) 
-0.062 (0.123) 
0.437 (0.189) 
-0.119 (0.513) 
-1.344 (0.715) 
0.484 (0.170) 
-0.679 (1.007) 
0.074 (0.296) 
0.909 (0.163) 
0.430 (0.107) 
0.850 (0.308) 
0.408 (0.315) 
-0.484 (0.726) 
0.104 (0.184) 
0.079 (0.215) 
0.520 (0.108) 
-0.433 (1.007) 
0.171 (0.359) 
0.484 (0.099) 9827 -0.362 (0334)] 
9823 0.870 (0.286) _cons -9.806 (0.460~ 
9827 -0.998 (0.510) 
-
cons -6.758 (0.405) 
1999 2000 
age 0.042 (0.012) age 0.000 (0.011) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.245 (0.033) 
, age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
j (0.032) I male 0.378 
LOS 0.076 (0.008) LOS 0.065 (0.008) 
LOS squared -0.002 (0.000) LOS squared -0.001 (0.000} 
Charfson index 0.336 (0.005) 
City(pafient) -0.004 (0.062) 
Charlson index 0.325 (0.005) j City(patlent) 0.127 (0.063) 
Emergency 0.735 (0.039) Emergency 0.645 (0.038) 
9016 -0.831 (0.714) 9020 0.878 (0.184) 
9020 0.372 (0.167) 9022 0.118 (0.277) 
9022 -0.770 (0.347) 9027 -0.175 (0.213) 
9027 -0.538 (0.197) 9047 0.687 (0.119) 
9047 0.293 (0.103) 
9060 -0.437 (0.585) 
9060 -1.178 (1.006) 
I 0061 -0.447 (0.717) 
9061 -0.033 (0.422) 9063 0.293 (0.158) 
9063 -0.012 (0.137) 9067 0.528 (0.520) 
9067 0.860 (0.329) 9072 1.231 (0.279) 
9072 0.327 (0304) 9092 0.701 (0.130) 
9092 0.287 (0.119) 9128 1.552 (0.236) 
9128 0.276 (0.284) 9148 0.457 (0. 129) 
9148 ·0.337 (0.121) • 9163 1.037 (0.295) 
9152 -0.084 (0.714) 9164 0.627 (0.431) 
9163 0.108 (0.318) 9206 1.191 (0.284) 
9164 0.260 (0.399) 
9196 0.233 (0.516) 
9257 2.416 (0.255) 
i 9296 -0.230 (0.719) 
9206 0.560 (0.296) 9301 1.418 (0.276) 
9257 -0.299 (0.591) 9353 0.555 (0.307) 
9296 -0.384 (1.008) I 9359 0.876 (0.170) 
9301 0.417 (0.258) 9360 0.591 {0.146) 
9353 0.396 (0.238) 9381 0.785 (0.431) 
9359 0.442 (0.158) 9389 1.211 (0.189) 
9360 0.135 (0.137) l 9398 0.396 (0.596) 
9381 0.130 (0.465) 9414 0.863 (0.271) 
9389 0.773 (0.175) 9444 1.320 (0.238) 
9398 0.641 (0.399) 9461 -0.284 (0.282) 
9414 0.196 (0.289) 9478 2.061 (0.226) 
9444 0.607 (0.243) 9516 0.684 (0.238) 
9461 -0.233 (0.233) 9528 1.505 (0.196) 
9478 -0.064 (0.398) 9537 1.228 (0.221) 
9510 1.440 (D.400) 9542 0.157 (0.242) 
9516 -0.020 (0.249) 9544 0.827 (0.178) 
9528 0.401 (0.226) 9562 0.477 (0.218) 
9537 0.039 (0250) 9570 0.084 (0.188) 
9539 0.917 (0.594) 9592 0.419 (0.125) 
9542 
-
-0.077 (0.194) 9608 -0.775 (0.512 
263 
9544 
9562 
9570 
9577 
9592 
9626 
9637 
9651 
9686 
9700 
9724 
9735 
9743 
9747 
9748 
9776 
9799 
9808 
9818 
9823 
9827 
_cons 
2001 
age 
age squared 
male 
LOS 
LOS squared 
Charlson index 
City(patient) 
Emergency 
9016 
9020 
9022 
9027 
9047 
9060 
9061 
9063 
9067 
9072 
9092 
9128 
9148 
9164 
9206 
9257 
9296 
9301 
9353 
0.407 
0.061 
0.091 
-0.258 
-0.199 
-0.405 
0.534 
0.189 
-1.614 
0.445 
-0.794 
-0.319 
0.349 
0.260 
0.657 
0.478 
0.413 
0.229 
0.597 
0.345 
-0.894 
-8.652 
0.030 
0.000 
0.351 
0.080 
-0.002 
0.312 
0.139 
0.652 
1.365 
0.784 
-0.354 
0.202 
0.671 
-1.456 
-0.304 
0.317 
1.702 
0.579 
0.003 
0.306 
0.221 
0.927 
0.460 
0.880 
0.568 
0.223 
0.913 
(0.164) 
(0.227) 
(0.153) 
(0.720) 
(0.111) 
(0.714) 
(0.162) 
(0.393) 
(0.714) 
(0.161) 
(1.008) 
(0.293) 
(0.142) 
(0.098) 
(0.285) 
(0.138) 
(0.163) 
(0.099) 
(0.513) 
(0.326) 
(0.457) 
(0.426) 
(0.011) 
(0.000) 
(0.031) 
(0.008) 
(0.000) 
(0.005) 
(0.060) 
(0.037) 
(0.266) 
(0.176) 
(0.320) 
(0.164) 
(0.112) 
(1.006) 
(0.588) 
(0.151) 
(0.284) 
(0.329) 
(0.133) 
(0.357) 
(0.126) 
(0.359) 
(0.337) 
(0.469) 
(0.591) 
(0.400) 
10.241\ 
9626 
9637 
9651 
9686 
9700 
9724 
9734 
9735 
9743 
9747 
9748 
9750 
9776 
9799 
9808 
9818 
9823 
9827 
_cons 
age 
2002 
age squared 
male 
LOS 
LOS squared 
Charlson index 
Ctty(patient) 
Emergency 
9016 
9020 
9022 
9027 
9047 
9060 
9063 
9067 
9072 
9092 
9128 
9148 
9164 
9206 
9257 
9296 
9301 
9353 
9358 
264 
1.346 (0.292) 
1.216 (0.166) 
1.167 (0.313) 
-0.704 (0.588) 
1.255 (0.167) 
3.197 (0.224) 
0.623 (0.594) 
0.716 (0.257) 
1.158 (0.142) 
0.852 (0.113) 
1.124 (0.292) 
-0.219 (1.017) 
0.990 (0.144) 
0.576 (0.175) 
0.916 (0.114) 
-0.485 (0.719) 
1.046 (0.309) 
-0.092 (0.394) 
-7.920 (0.396) 
0.023 (0.011) 
0.000 (0.000) 
0.215 (0.031) 
0.114 (0.008) 
-0.003 (0.000) 
0.288 (0.005) 
0.219 (0.062) 
0.705 (0.037) 
1.577 (0.272) 
1.075 (0.184) 
0.504 (0.254) 
0.573 (0.170) 
1.024 (0.125) 
0.303 (0.515) 
0.646 (0.170) 
1.516 (0.348) 
1.141 (0.296) 
0.655 (0.140) 
0.887 (0.331) 
0.655 (0.139) 
1.448 (0.335) 
1.211 (0.296) 
2.126 (0.317) 
0.420 (0.721) 
1.260 (0.289) 
0.600 (0.333) 
-0.115 (Q.464) 
9359 0.731 (0.164lj 9359 1.367 (0.169) 
9360 0.514 (0.137) ' 9360 1.131 (0.144) 
9381 0.100 (0.592) 
I 
9366 -0.915 (1.007) 
9389 0.958 (0.191) 9381 0.963 (0.470) 
9398 -0.913 (1.009) 9389 1.298 (0.206) 
9414 1.367 (0.209) 9398 0.049 (0.725) 
9444 1.226 (0.229) 9414 2.181 (0.198) 
9461 0.260 (0.206) 9444 1.460 (0.252) 
9478 0.369 (0.378) 9461 0.287 (0.235) 
9510 0.824 (0.594) 9478 1.436 (0.294) 
9516 0.059 (0.272) 9484 2.173 (0.436) 
9528 1.349 (0.197) 9510 2.031 (0.409) 
9537 1.094 (0.213) 9516 0.600 (0.262) 
9542 0.261 (0.213) 9528 1.478 (0.207) 
9544 0.945 (0.158) 9537 1.369 (0.234) 
9562 0.524 (0.220) 9542 0.824 (0.198) 
9570 0.535 (0.161) 9544 1.401 (0.167) 
9592 0.232 (0.120) 9562 1.296 (0.200) 
9608 0.838 (0.174) 9570 0.529 (0.184) 
9626 1.415 (0.266) 9592 0.645 (0.132) 
9637 1.268 (0.155) 9608 0.828 (0.201) 
9651 -0.087 (0.512) 9637 1.316 (0.175) 
9686 -0.941 (0.587) 9651 -0.099 (0.591) 
'9700 1.462 (0.158) 9686 -1.575 (1.007) 
9735 0.567 (0.249) 9700 1.752 (0.168) 
9743 0.746 (0.132) 9735 0.052 (0 351) 
i 9747 0.640 (0.109) 9743 1.137 (0.141) 
9748 0.665 (0.329) 9747 0.999 (0.123) 
9750 0.731 (1.026) 9748 1.805 (0.272) 
9776 1.026 (0.132) 9776 1.198 (0 150) 
9799 0.638 (0.157) 9799 0.915 (0.167) 
9808 0.716 (0.106) 9808 0.899 (0.123) 
9818 1.032 (0.339) 9818 1.215 (0.378) 
9823 0.489 (0.398) i 9823 1.654 (0.263) 
9827 0.070 (0.320) 9827 0.634 (0.272) 
! _cons -8.889 (0.398) _cons -8.957 (0.400) 
2003 2004 
age -0.002 (0.011) I age -0.013 (0.011) 
age squared 0.000 (0.000) age squared 0.000 (0.000) 
male 0.396 (0.030) I male 0.242 (0.030) 
LOS 0.103 (0.007) LOS 0.112 (0.008) 
LOS squared -0.002 (0.000) LOS squared ··0.003 (0.000) 
Charlson index 0.273 (0.004) Charlson index 0.277 (0.004) 
City(palient) 0.202 (0.062) City(patient) -0.055 (0.055) 
Emergency 0.674 (0.036) Emergency 0.861 (0.037) 
9020 1.103 (0.169) 9016 -0.704 (0.586) 
9022 0.197 (0.277) 9020 0.365 (0.165) 
9027 0.643 (0.160) 9022 -0.050 (0.255) 
9047 0.976 (0.122) 9027 0.122 (0.166) 
9063 0.031 10.190\ 9047 0.427 (0.105 
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9067 1.996 (0.275) ' 9060 -1,435 (1,005) 
9072 1.018 (0,288) i 9063 0.092 (0.146) 
9092 0.742 (0.132) 19067 -1.472 (1.009) 
9128 1588 (0.227) 9072 0.480 (0.274) 
9148 0.490 (0,138) 9092 0.248 (0, 116) 
9164 1.469 (0,303) 9128 1.295 (0.206) 
9206 0.327 (0.401) 9148 0,075 (0 123) 
9257 1.742 (0.366) I 9164 1.079 (0.266) 
9301 0.780 (0,332) ! 9206 -0,596 (0.587) 
' 9353 1.456 (0.238) ! 9257 0.593 (0.428) 
9358 1.078 (0.248) I 9296 -0,736 (1,007) 
9359 1.376 (0.160) 19301 0.326 (0.313) 
9360 0.717 (0.147) 9353 0.391 (0.278) 
9369 -0.642 (0,717) 9358 0.368 (0,246) 
9381 0.607 (0.522) 9359 0.597 (0, 145) 
9389 1,351 (0.188) 9360 0258 (0.133) 
9398 1.320 (0,375) 9369 -1.682 (1.005) 
9414 1.454 (0.251) 9381 -0.180 (0 468) 
9444 1.033 (0.286) 9389 0.625 (0.184) 
9461 0.127 (0,244) 9398 0.406 (0.405) 
9478 l.105 (0.332) 9414 0.725 (0.208) 
9484 2124 (0.366) 9444 0.606 (0.264) 
9510 0.772 (0.725) 9461 0.097 (0,213) 
9516 0.229 (0.292) 9478 0.897 (0.257) 
9528 1.099 (0.216) 9484 0.331 (0.522) 
9537 1.118 (0.245) 9516 -0,355 (0,318) 
9542 0.621 (0. 198) 9523 0.187 (0.465) 
9544 1.567 (0.159) 9528 1.088 (0, 172) 
9562 0.577 (0.243) 9537 0.712 (0,213) 
9570 0.558 (0.173) 9542 0.066 (0.204) 
9592 0526 (0. 126) 9544 0.693 (0.147) 
9808 -1,616 (0.513) 9562 0.606 (0.199) 
9637 1.587 (0.163) 9570 -(),048 (0.164) 
9651 -().581 (0.718) 9592 0.033 (0.110) 
9686 -1.092 (0.717) 9808 ·0,048 (0,202) 
9700 1.138 (0. 181) 9637 0.884 (0, 149) 
9734 0.059 (0.730) 9651 -0.459 (0.587) 
9735 0.151 (0.332) 9700 0.592 (0, 167) 
9743 0.932 (0.141) 9734 0.542 (0.520) 
9744 -1.074 (1,007) 9735 0.051 (0.274) 
9747 0.875 (0, 120) 9743 0.669 (0, 117) 
9748 0.877 (0.366) 9744 -1.404 (1.005) 
9776 0980 (0, 143) 9747 0.400 (0,101) 
9799 1.206 (0.158) 9748 1.029 (0.246) 
9808 0.959 (0.119) 9776 0,348 (0,129) 
9818 -0.128 (0.593) 9799 0.161 (0.152) 
9823 1.685 (0.245) 9808 0.314 (0.101) 
9827 0.120 (0.312) 9818 0.684 (0.372) 
9836 1.424 (0.243) 9823 0.348 (0.283) 
_cons -8.267 (0.394) 9827 -0.555 (0.348) 
i 9836 -0.804 0.370 
! cons -7.150 0.384 
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Appendix E 
Table El: Re-estimation of AMI (three-level one stage) without LOS 
I 
Std. 
Coefficient Error Pvalue 
Age 0.077 0.022 0.000 
Age squated 0.000 0.000 0.716 
Male -0.202 0.046 0.000 
Chatlson score 0.271 0.013 0.000 
City (patient) -0.128 0.069 0.063 
Emergency 0.353 0.087 0.000 
Total hosp. seps(OOs) -0.001 0.000 0.003 
Hosp. case mix index -0.208 0.231 0.369 
Public hospital 0.462 0.089 0.000 
Constant -8.304 0.822 0.000 
level l units 27819 
level 2 units 442 
level 3 units 58 
log likelihood -7276 
hosp. level variance 0.05 0.01 
group level variance 2.70E-15 6.SOE-09 
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